Southern African economies, with the exception of South Africa, are largely based on rain-fed agriculture. Climate variability already has a big impact on the food security, human health and safety, and economic performance of the different countries in the region. Climate variability is destined to increase, driven by climate change. In response, policy-led actions are required to enable the necessary adaptation. This leads us to questions of how climate change-related policy has evolved and what kind of policy development is required to cope with the threat of climate change in Southern Africa.
The Heinrich Boell Foundation Southern Africa (HBF) put these questions to Arthur Chapman, hydrologist and climate change specialist with OneWorld Sustainable Investments, Cape Town, and leader of components of the Regional Climate Change Programme. Excerpts from his response follow:
HBF: What is your overall assessment of the policy response to climate change in southern African countries?
Arthur Chapman: A glaring feature of climate change-related policies in Southern Africa is the lack of them. Climate change has not entered the policy statements of most countries, probably because governments and regional bodies, for example, the Southern African Development Community, are not sure how to address the issue in policy. Part of the problem is, firstly, the uncertainty of climate projections. Global circulation model projections are not particularly coherent in agreeing on the direction of change. These indicate both drying and wetting, depending on which scale is used to model the climates. Further, El Niño Southern Oscillation is a dominant influence of intra-annual climate and El Niño is the source of the large divergence in simulation results. This creates uncertainty and causes a lack of confidence in the validity of focussing on specific policy statements.
Additionally, the time scale at which climate changes may play out seems excessive to many. A 50-year horizon is in conflict with the pressing needs of day-to-day survival for most of the region’s population. Half of the SADC countries are classified as Least Developed Countries and most are unlikely to take actions in the near future, especially if such activities were to divert resources away from other problems of more immediate import.
HBF: In the few instances that country policies address climate change, what are the defining features of climate change policies in the region?
AC: Where countries have statements in policy, these are usually vague and address the issue only in general terms, particularly with reference to agriculture and water resources. Existing policy statements tend to focus on the impact of climate change on the availability of water. We know however that water is an enabling factor of production and developing this resource is what concerns governments the most. There is hardly a mention of the impacts of climate change on hydropower, sea level rise, groundwater, health or food security.
HBF: In view of these challenges has how has the region positioned itself by way of policy to participate at COP15?
AC: Regional responses to climate change have been fairly mechanistic to date. A draft regional statement to the COP15 has been prepared by SADC representatives and this is being piloted through various avenues of approval. National Communications to the UNFCCC have been prepared; some countries are preparing their second, one or two have not completed their first. Potential adaptations identified thus far have not emerged in any policy statements. Terrestrial sequestration of carbon in trees and the soil is likely to have the greatest potential for the region to participate in the carbon market. Policy statements supporting this approach have yet to be devised. Given the regional shortages of electricity, hydropower is likely to drop out as an option because it would be difficult to prove additionality.
HBF: Going to COP15 what specific concrete demands are southern African countries making and where do you see the opportunities for favourable outcomes from Copenhagen?
AC: Individual countries are looking for opportunities for adaptation, but based on foreign financial assistance. Financial incentives for avoiding deforestation through Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) possibly has the greatest attraction as a mitigation strategy in the northern SADC states because of its apparent conceptual simplicity and income-generating potential. But, there are pitfalls. Firstly, the technical capability for developing and driving the project proposals is scarce. Secondly, the management capacity and local laws enforcing compliance, which ensures continuous project performance, are often not available.
HBF: The Kyoto Protocol is based on flexible mechanisms but Southern Africa has not benefited immensely from these. Why is this so and how can this situation be turned around?
AC: As of September 2008 there were more than 30 CDM projects in Southern Africa. These were mostly in South Africa, and also in Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. This represents a small fraction of the number of CDM projects existing worldwide, as well as the associated Certificated Emission Reductions. The largest contributors to credits are fossil fuel switches in South Africa and reforestation projects in the DRC.
The economic under-development of the region works against increasing the number and scope of CDM projects. Low levels of industrialisation, outside of South Africa, mean that emissions reduction or carbon trade into the region have little collateral. Only the DRC is making a significant play for reforestation or avoided deforestation as means of participating in the market mechanisms. From both income-generating and restoration of environmental conditions viewpoints, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia could all benefit substantially. The general aridity of Namibia, Botswana and South Africa means that these countries cannot make good use of bio-sequestration at large enough scales.
HBF: How would market-based mechanisms look after COP15?
AC: A common perception is that a new or revised Kyoto Protocol will not easily be achieved at Copenhagen. However, the potential for implementing externally-funded adaptation and mitigation projects post-Kyoto are favourable providing some of the constraints on project implementation can be reduced. The initially obvious carbon projects suitable for Southern Africa concern Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry as well as soil-based carbon sequestration. The question of additionality should be easy to prove – it is unlikely that afforestation-reforestation (AR) would happen anyway as most of the region is so short of finance that it is unlikely that AR would happen in most business-as-usual scenarios. There are many unknowns regarding soil-based carbon sequestration, despite its conceptual attractiveness.
HBF: What has been the impact of the global economic recession on market-based mechanisms?
AC: The recent global economic recession has caused the carbon market price to plunge, almost by two thirds at one stage, indicating that economic incentives for Kyoto-style projects are not stable and are uncertain. But, the long-term price trend of carbon is likely to be up. Given the carbon market volatility, an advantage still lies with African countries which could supply the carbon market at cheaper rates than countries in Europe or North America.
HBF: Besides risks associated with the volatility of the global carbon market what other risks are there for market-based mechanisms such as REDD and LULUCF?
AC: Afforestation-reforestation projects face several other risks, including those of fire and disease, which effectively lower the CER prices. This point also highlights the hazard of CER expiry, either through the unplanned release of certified carbon stocks or at the end of the 30 year contract period. The expiring CER cannot be converted into subsequent contracts or commitments. These problems all lower AR CER values, more so than permanent emissions reduction or sequestration schemes. There is also an increasing public unease regarding the displacement activities of relocated deforestation, also known as “leakage”.
Other risks include questions of land rights and recipients of project dividends. Firstly, carbon offsets through afforestation schemes require land. Questions on who owns the land, who are the recipients of the investment dividends and whether outside political elites dispossess local people are key concerns that project developers must solve before investment can be made. Opposition to AR schemes may develop if perceptions of permanent expropriations of these “Kyoto lands” arise. The issue of “land-use sovereignty” is possibly one of the biggest risks to AR schemes in Southern Africa.
HBF: Lastly, what in your view are the priorities for the region to realise an effective policy response to the climate crisis?
AC: To develop improved policy responses to climate change, progress is required on a number of issues. Firstly an improved knowledge of how climates will evolve in Southern Africa, including the Small Island States is needed as these will give direction to policy and adaptation. Secondly, there is need for the development of enabling policies in other aspects of government to encourage sustainable private sector investment, which means for example, sorting out the process of identifying beneficiaries of investment and dividend flows, and directing this to benefit people where CDM projects are located. Lastly, we need to improve the management and technical capacities within each country, in order to encourage suitable projects.