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Many events and discussions about Africa’s evolving peace and security architecture focus on its institutional challenges and efforts to manage and resolve conflicts across the continent, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan.

The conference ‘Climate Change, Resources, Migration: Old and New Sources of Conflict in Africa?’ hosted by the Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF) in Cape Town placed its emphasis differently. The conference, while analysing the current state of Africa’s peace and security architecture, focused rather on the structural root causes of conflict in Africa and on the question of whether the security framework in place offers appropriate answers to deal with these challenges.

Climate change, natural resources and migration have been of central interest to HBF, as a green political foundation, for many years, and they undoubtedly contribute, in conjunction to aggravating political, economic and social circumstances, to instability and insecurity on the continent.

This publication presents the critical themes that informed the debates during the conference. While the first article, written by Leonie Joubert, provides an overview of the conference proceedings, the ensuing contributions explore the range of issues on which the various discussion panels focused.

Setting the scene, Monica Juma introduces the topic of security and regional cooperation in Africa. She further discusses the factors that have put enormous pressure on the African peace and security architecture in its attempt to respond effectively and guarantee security for the continent. Building on this, Siphamandla Zondi sheds light on South Africa’s diplomacy efforts to create conditions of peace, stability and democracy across the continent.

In the third article, Oli Brown underlines the gravity of climate change to Africa, however warning not to oversimplify the relationship between climate change and conflict on the continent. Sarah Wykes outlines the governance and economic impediments to sustainable development and security associated with mineral-dependent states in Africa, while highlighting the role multinational companies can play, either positively or negatively, in influencing this outcome. In the last article, Loren Landau argues that as long as the central state remains at the core of how we understand security in the context of migration, we will fail to effectively protect women and other vulnerable migrant groups.

The conference clearly underscored that we need to understand and deal more comprehensively with structural root causes of conflict in Africa if sustainable peace and security is to be achieved. We therefore hope that this publication will provide a platform for further discussions focused on the obstacles to peace and security in Africa and the political solutions to overcome them.

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Profiles

Leonie Joubert is a freelance science journalist, columnist and author. She received an Honorary 2007 Sunday Times Alan Paton Non-Fiction Award, was the 2007 Ruth First Fellow, and was listed in the Mail & Guardian’s 200 Young South Africans You Must Take To Lunch (2008). Leonie has been published widely, including in the Sunday Independent, Sunday Argus, Sunday Tribune, African Decisions, Africa Geographic, Getaway, Progress, EarthYear, Farmers Weekly, Engineering News, Cape Times, SA4×4, Xplore and the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung, among others. She was a regular columnist for the Mail & Guardian.

Dr Monica Juma is the Executive Director for Research at the Africa Institute of South Africa. Monica has extensive experience in her field, having served in a number of international think tank and research institutions such as the Africa Policy Institute or the International Peace Academy (now Institute) where she focused on crisis and conflicts in Africa. Monica has been published extensively in numerous journals and publications on matters, among others, relating to peace and security and gender and security. She holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Politics from the University of Oxford, where she was a Commonwealth Fellow and Wingate Scholar.

Dr Siphamandla Zondi is an analyst of governance, international relations, and social policy in Africa. He was trained in African studies at the former University of Durban-Westville (UDW) and the University of Cambridge in the UK. Siphamandla lectured for short stints at UDW and the former Rands Afrikaans University. He later coordinated the SADC integration programme at the Africa Institute of South Africa. Currently, he is the Executive Director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand. He has published extensively on social policy, rural reform, regional integration, food security, public health, and participatory governance. He also conducts seminars on policy-making and leadership development.
Dr Loren Landau has been with the Forced Migration Studies Project at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) since 2002. His research explores sovereignty, migration and urban transformation, and state–society relations, and he has published extensively on these issues. Loren holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Washington, Seattle, an MSc in Development Studies from London School of Economics and Political Science, and an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He has received a number of research awards and fellowships including the Vice Chancellor’s Award for Academic Citizenship (WITS) and the Lisa Gilad Prize for his most innovative and thoughtful contribution to the advancement of refugee studies (International Association for the Study of Forced Migration).

Oli Brown is a senior researcher and programme manager for both the Trade and Investment and Security Programmes at the International Institute for Sustainable Development, which he joined in late 2004. He also coordinates the Trade Knowledge Network – a network of research organisations working on the ways in which trade and investment policies can promote and enable sustainable development in developing countries. After completing a BA in Social Anthropology and an MA in International Relations, Oli spent two years in Nepal managing education and conservation projects and a year and a half as a trade policy researcher for Oxfam GB. He has completed consultancies for the United Nations Development Programme, the International Organisation for Migration and International Alert, and has written on a wide range of trade, environment and sustainable development issues.

Dr Sarah Wykes is a researcher and campaigner working on issues of corporate accountability, corruption and the human rights and environmental impacts of the extractive sector, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She has worked for Oxfam, Amnesty International and for the UK watchdog NGO Global Witness. She has also been involved extensively in advocacy and policy development for the international Publish What You Pay campaign. Most recently, Sarah has done research on the political environment for oil development in Uganda, and she is currently managing a project looking at the social and environmental impacts of a planned multi-billion investment in tar sands and agro-fuel in Congo Brazzaville. Sarah holds a BA from Cambridge and an MA and PhD from the University of London.
Securing Africa in an uncertain climate

Leonie Joubert
Introduction

Africa is one of the most conflict-ridden continents in the world, where many clashes may start within the one country’s borders, but spill over into neighbouring states. Discussions around security in Africa are often viewed in military terms and focused on political conflict. But what is really understood about underlying root causes such as resource use, migration and climate change, and how do these overlap on the continent? What are the governance and economic impediments to sustainable development and security – two sides of the same coin – associated with these issues? The Heinrich Böll Foundation set about answering these and other questions in August 2009 when it brought together key thinkers from Africa and beyond for a two day conference. The following article gives an overview of conference proceedings.

Opening with a keynote address, Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, with the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, said that since the birth of the African Union (AU), several peacekeeping mechanisms have been created with the objective of making Africa a more united and cooperative continent. These include the five peacekeeping “pillars”, as follows:

- The Peace and Security Council (PSC);
- The Panel of the Wise;
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS);
- The African Standby Force (ASF); and
- The Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

While the establishment of this African peace and security architecture demonstrates a new proactive and interventionist approach to the continent’s security challenges, the AU has predominantly responded to the consequences and symptoms of violent conflict instead of addressing structural root causes.

Speaking during the opening session of the conference, Dr Monica Juma emphasised that these security structures have historically employed the “hard options” approach to dealing with conflicts – namely, militaristic interventions – rather than proactive, pre-emptive responses to prevent conflicts before they erupt.
Deputy Minister Ebrahim reiterated the need to focus on the root causes of conflicts in Africa, rather than concentrating just on managing their manifestations at flashpoints around the continent.

The use of the continent’s ample natural resources, migration and, now, the impacts of climate change could work in concert to increase the nature of security threats across the continent.

In the context of such challenges, climate change – and its anticipated adverse impacts on water availability, food security and the continent’s coastlines – may intensify forced migration and scarce resource-related contestation. As the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) observes, Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to the global phenomenon, which has serious implications for the continent’s security.

All these factors demand a fresh analytical approach to understating how to prevent and manage conflict on the continent. It requires a conscious and informed response from the AU to the question whether or not the institutional mechanisms currently in place are appropriate to respond to these existing and emerging threats.

But, as Prof Ulf Engel stressed, the implementation of the African peace and security architecture is an ongoing, non-linear process that is continuously negotiated and changed, the exact outcomes of which are not to be foreseen at the current stage.
Climate change: redrawing the map of Africa

The link between conflict and climate change (particularly, the way in which this phenomenon amplifies ecological deterioration) is not always a linear cause-and-effect relationship. However, climate change will impact on the continent severely, possibly magnifying the kinds of environmental and related stressors that already push communities into conflict. In some cases, the impacts of these conflict situations are already very real.

Oli Brown, with the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), said Africa is the canary in the mine of global security, and that climate change will redraw the map of the continent as the continent’s coastlines will be reshaped by rising sea levels. Climate change will alter where and when rain falls, where flooding occurs and where diseases are found. This has the potential to push communities and nations into conflict as they struggle to access resources or are forced into “distressed” migration. “Africa is the first continent to fully feel the effect of climate change on political and economic stability (because of) its history of ethnic, resource and political conflict, and its reliance on climate sensitive sectors like rain-fed agriculture”, said Brown during a panel discussion.

Climate change will amplify existing social and environmental pressures that drive human conflict, including desertification, water scarcity, land degradation and fishery depletion. These converging crises may reverse development gains that have been made across Africa in recent decades. However many thinkers, including Brown, warn that this doesn’t mean that African communities will automatically fight under conditions of stress.

The IPCC says Africa is one of the continents most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. But what happens at the local level, as a result of this change, depends largely on an individual community’s capacity to adapt. Given the nature of African conflicts, which often traverse borders, climate change will aggravate territory and border disputes, migration, food insecurity and water stress. Conflict seen in Darfur, northern Kenya, and along the Nile River, and distressed migration from the West Africa Sahel, are all regions where weather-related disasters might amplify tensions and cause humanitarian crises.

For instance, changes in the amount and pattern of rainfall, along with increased evaporation due to temperature increases, will bring a decline in available water in parts of the continent. This, along with increasing demand from a growing population, is a likely flashpoint for conflict.

Meanwhile, parts of the Sahel and equato-
East Africa might actually experience a rise in rainfall, although this could be accompanied by an increased likelihood of flooding in the east. Decreases in rainfall and extensive drought periods will reduce crop yields in parts of the continent, undermining food security. Some climate models anticipate a 50% decrease in agricultural yields by 2020.

“East Africa is highly dependent on natural resources, and the capacity to adapt is very low,” said Elvin Nyukuri from the African Centre for Technology Studies. She argued that climate change will increase the number of poor in the region by undermining their access to natural capital, for instance through deforestation and land degradation. “But are these new conflicts, or old ones?”

Illustrating her point, Nyukuri listed the droughts which had sparked conflict between Uganda and Mali in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s. The climatic conditions had been linked to civil unrest and an increase in the number of people left destitute.

“East African food production is dependent on rain-fed agriculture. El Nino events can be disastrous,” said Nyukuri, recalling the 1998 event. The United Nations Environmental Programme warned, in its report *Sudan: post-conflict environmental assessment*, of the potential for “a succession of new wars across Africa” unless greater interventions are made to contain the dangers of climate change. But one of the challenges of responding appropriately is that climate change will not play out uniformly across the continent. Some areas will be hit harder than others, requiring good modelling, early warning systems and careful planning.

The idea of impending “climate wars” suggests the potential for military response, whether to secure a country’s resources or to put up barriers to large-scale migration. But Brown said that focusing on military response “raises the stakes and draws attention away from the very real, and current, development problems that already pose immediate threats to vulnerable societies; extreme poverty, access to education, HIV/AIDS and so on”.

“Extreme weather events ... heighten personal insecurity (for people), where sometimes their last resort is death,” concluded Nyukuri. “We need a tailored response to dealing with climate-related disasters.”

Africa’s natural capital: a resource curse?

Africa has an abundant wealth of natural resources. Focussing on extractable mineral wealth, this panel considered the notion that they signified a “resource curse”, where the exploitation of these resources has often led to conflict rather than to development on the continent.
Sustainable development and security are two sides of the same coin, without security there can be no development.

Sustainable development and security are two sides of the same coin, the panel concluded – without development there can be no security, and without security, there can be no development. Regarding how it manages resources, African leadership needs an overhaul, but companies are also responsible for acting ethically.

“The Democratic Republic of Congo is a resource-rich country, but it’s also very underdeveloped,” Claude Kabemba from Southern Africa Resource Watch said, illustrating these points. But because of the social instability here, the conflict in the region has been called “Africa’s world war”. “This conflict is largely resource driven and funded.”

Similar scenarios have played out in Angola and Sierra Leone. This is particularly true as the new “scramble for Africa” brings in strong interest from emerging economies such as India and China. These examples demonstrate the relationship between natural resource wealth and the likelihood of conflict. As Dr Sarah Wykes pointed out, “oil-rich states have a propensity to be ‘highly militarised and volatile’ and, while ‘conflict will often have its roots in pre-existing tensions in society’, a sudden influx in oil wealth ‘will tend to raise the stakes, whether at the community or national level’.”

As long as African leaders regard natural capital as a way of making “easy” money, and as efforts towards good governance, transparency and accountability lapse, unfair use of resources is more likely to bring about conflict. This results in a greater likelihood of “resource-rich countries (slipping) into poverty and income inequality,” argues Wykes, as well as “high levels of corruption and authoritarianism, higher spending on military and security forces, high child mortality, low life expectancy and low spending on health and education”.

Tim Hughes, from the South African Institute of International Affairs, reiterated the need for natural resource governance. “Tanzania is the third-largest gold producer in Africa, and yet it is emblematic of so many challenges in Africa,” he said. If one wishes to explain why Africa is prone to violence, one needs to look at the issues of greed (where some gain the lion’s share of the resources) and grievance (where tensions emerge over which communities get access to the resources and which don’t).

Hughes presented the case of the North Mara gold mine, in Tanzania, where he showed how greater transparency, engagement from all levels of government, and participation by community stakeholders are needed to alleviate these potential flashpoints within communities. This was a case where a progressive mining company (Barrick Gold Corporation) was able to secure a social licence to operate and make a significant
and positive developmental impact in the medium- to long-term.

Tackling the resource curse requires “strengthening resource governance, in particular through enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms along the ‘value chain’,” argued Wykes.

People on the move

Migration is something that African communities have used for centuries as a way of adapting to changing circumstances. Therefore the movement of people around the continent should not be seen as a tide that must be held back at national borders, but rather a natural ebb and flow of people that must be managed locally in such a way as to avoid potential conflict situations.

This movement of people will continue in future – and while climate change may not necessarily be a primary driver of it, it may amplify environmental stresses that push people into migration. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) predicts that there may be as many as 200 million additional refugees around the world by the middle of this century. Large-scale distressed migration threatens to put previously separate groups into conflict over the same resources on the African continent.

The cumulative effect of climate change, natural disasters, disease and food insecurity will also increase the likelihood of fragile states toppling over and becoming failed states. However, in Africa, more and more people on the move are women, and they are often vulnerable to abuse as they travel along migration routes.

As Dr Loren Landau of the University of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Programme pointed out, it’s time to move away from a state-centred approach to managing migration as well as the possible security implications surrounding migration, since current methods do not reflect realities on the ground. People move for reasons of economics, physical circumstance, politics or health. “We must begin to realise that what national and regional governments are doing practically does little to Africa to regulate movement. True, South Africa deported more than 300 000 in 2008. [But these] efforts did little to disrupt the movements of people across the border. We need to move beyond the idea that we can redirect the flow of migrants”, Landau told the conference.

Migration management must happen at the level of the local community, Landau argued. This must happen not through political reform (for instance, passing laws to tighten border controls) but rather through promoting tolerance within receiving communities. This may be achieved through service provision by local administrations and by adapting municipal budgets to accommodate migrants. Migrants should also be seen as becom-
ing contributing members to the economy, rather than economic drains on the system.

The increasing number of women migrants in Southern Africa in the past 50 years is partly explained by high levels of poverty, unemployment and lack of access to basic resources, said Kate Lefko-Everett from the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. “But migration is often seen as a positive step for many women,” she said, where in some cases they were able to escape patriarchies. Some enjoyed the independence which migration offered them. Many, particularly those who were breadwinners, were able to make autonomous decisions about migration.

But many migrants – particularly women – are often already vulnerable, which is why they became migrants in the first place. “We must find ways of protecting women and other potentially vulnerable migrant groups. More laws and more policing are likely to result in greater insecurity, not more,” said Landau. “An approach to economic and human security in the future will require that we rethink these modalities and the institutions that support them.”

**Leadership and the new-look security architecture**

A failure in African leadership lies at the heart of conflict related to resources, and therefore calls for a significant overhaul, Vasu Gounden from The
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes said, arguing for a transformation in the continent’s leadership. “We need a new breed of leaders who see natural resources as national resources and not personal resources. And who see democracy for what it is: an assembly that represents the interests of the nation, elected by the nation, and not an assembly supposedly elected by the nation to represent the personal interests of people [in government]. And here on the continent we need to hold our governments accountable. Corruption is rife. That’s what depletes our resources”, argued Gounden.

The democratic change witnessed on the continent in the past two decades, coinciding with rapid globalisation, has seen power taken away from dictatorships that flourished in the post-colonial Cold War era. But, said Gounden, now all the negative aspects of dictatorships have been “democratised” where resources have been taken from the hands of a few and put it in hands of many (in government), producing a legitimised corruption through democracy.

The AU’s Panel of the Wise (PoW) is positioned to deal with political conflict, and should consider broadening its scope to deal with resource management within this context. This could push for good governance, as a measure against what Gounden described as “democratised corruption” where “a few at the centre collude in pillaging of resources” with the consent of governments. Increasingly, too, pan-African initiatives such as the PoW, as well as individual country leadership, need to view environmental issues as core to the healthy functioning of communities on the continent. “The South African National Defence Force has been trained to have more of a humanitarian role, and not just deal with peacekeeping and defence issues”, said Gounden.

This might be an example of how the AU security apparatus needs to be repositioned so that it is equipped to deal with climate change related natural disasters as well as conflict emerging from climate impacts. Gounden continued: “The African Standby Force is focused on conflict and, in some cases, where enforcement is required. But it’s not adapted to rescue people in floods or [for] dealing with natural disasters and man-made calamities that come out of environmental disasters and man-made calamities that might come out of wars. It’s only geared towards dealing with wars.”

But it may be time for the AU security structures to get the material, equipment and personnel training needed so that it can intervene appropriately. Since climate change related impacts will see an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, heatwaves and coastal storm surges, there will be a greater frequency of communities needing to be evacuated from disaster-struck areas, and who need assistance with temporary shelter, food and water.

Similarly the AU’s conflict early warning system is oriented towards detecting fault lines related mostly to social unrest, particularly as it manifests in political conflict. Its mandate and operational capacity are not designed for managing crises related to flooding, droughts, desertification, and other climate-related crises. “I think there’s room for improvement in the public early warning system. And there needs to be more resources put into allowing the AU to adapt to these new challenges”, said Gounden. The fact that this hasn’t happened already is not due to incompetence, he continued, but rather as a result of the fact that AU structures are already overextended with responding to so many conflicts on the continent.

But while all aspects of the AU security structure need to be overhauled to reconsider future disaster events and the possible humanitarian and conflict crises that might emerge from that,
it is a change in African leadership that probably requires the greatest reworking.

To conclude, it’s worth reflecting on the fact that while enormous efforts have been made to build a strong security architecture on the African continent, it has had questionable outcomes. Dr Monica Juma pointed out that African institutions with weak capacity tend to get drawn into peace missions, while there is resistance from actors off the continent with better capacity to engage themselves in African conflicts.

To correct the failings of the AU’s security apparatus, and create a comprehensive peace and security framework, more resources need to be allocated to them. This must be accompanied with a shift in focus towards pre-emptive intervention rather than militaristic involvement.

But academics and policy-makers also need to rethink how they view the links between climate change, resources, migration and conflict, seeing the many ways in which these factors interact to amplify conflict. These issues can no longer be treated as intellectual silos.
Security and regional cooperation in Africa: how can we make Africa’s security architecture fit for the new challenges?

Monica Juma
Across Africa, growing caution and waning excitement is replacing the optimism that characterised the opening years of the 21st century, an era marked by transformation processes that many analysts viewed as the precursor for Africa claiming its rightful place in the global arena. For many, the 21st century was Africa’s to claim. Epitomising the mood and aspirations of Africa then was the launch of the Africa Union (AU) which, compared to its predecessor the Organisation of the African Unity, was forged on higher standards and expectations.

These standards were embodied in the Constitutive Act and an array of other AU instruments, such as the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) framework document (both of 2002). Noting the need to stabilise the continent, the AU prioritised security as a prerequisite for Africa’s regeneration, and underscored regional cooperation as the building block for the pursuit of Africa’s sustainable peace and development.

Thus, the continent spent an inordinate amount of time and resources on developing a comprehensive framework for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction, variously referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Impressive progress has been registered in developing the normative framework and requisite institutions. However, the changing nature of threats and the dynamics of anticipated challenges in the future threaten to render the APSA ineffective.

I argue that four factors have put enormous pressure on the APSA, as it has evolved, in its attempt to respond effectively and guarantee security for the continent. These are:

- The weakening normative framework which has led the continent in the path of reactive rather than proactive engagement;
- The effects of globalisation which are engendering fragmentation rather than integration of Africa;
- The ever growing challenge of climate change and environmental stress, which is pushing Africa to levels of vulnerability never conceived and imagined before; and
- The approaches in the pursuit of peace and security that fall short of the scale of challenges on the ground.
**Weakening normative framework**

By 2000, Africa had embarked on developing a comprehensive normative framework to underpin its engagement on the global stage: an African agenda, driven by the notion of regeneration and renaissance that had emerged. Its core ideology, associated with Pan Africanism, galvanised action that led to the elaboration of common standards and benchmarks to transform Africa's policy environment at regional and national levels. Significantly, good governance; peace and security; regional cooperation; and the provision of basic needs in line with the notion of human security were identified as focus areas for action.

In addition, Africa defined engagement frameworks beyond the continent through new “partnerships” that would respond to the needs and aspirations embodied in its development agenda. It is within this mound that the Africa-G8 and later the Africa-China (Africa-India etc) partnerships were created. Similarly, this principle led to the revitalisation of South–South cooperation, leading to the launch of the India, Brazil, South Africa axis (IBSA). Underpinning these partnerships was the notion that Africa stood to impact the international arena better as a bloc than as individual countries.

Unfortunately, there has been a steady weakening of the normative framework that formed the foundation of collective action. By 2007, indications of weakening prospects of Africa’s collective action internationally were beginning to appear. Significant to this change was the failure of political leadership to continue forging a common approach in international engagement. The critical mass of African leaders that shared in the passion of Pan-Africanism and how to realise it was dissipating following initial disagreements on some of programmes and issues of common concern.

With the departure of the pioneers of the African renaissance, in particular Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo, the consensus on how to champion the Africa agenda collapsed. An example of this is the debate on the Union Government which has seen the hardening of two opposing sides since it was discussed by the AU Summit in 2006. On one side are those that favour fast-tracking political integration, and on the other are those countries that prefer strengthening regional integration as a step towards continental political integration.

Weakening collective framework has had significant unintended consequences as countries are increasingly electing to go it alone and pursue their national interests, irrespective of implications for regional or/and continental commitments. A significant example of this is the recent threat posed to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) following the signing of the European Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreements by Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland.
In 2009, Africa’s visibility and influence was limited at a number of critical international meetings. Its representations remained timid during the G20 Summits that deliberated measures for dealing with the current global crisis. Nor was there any effective advocacy of the African positions and aspirations when the Non-Aligned Movement met in Sharm El Sheikh in mid 2009. Africa’s muted voice in these forums is in contrast to its bold position in relation to, say, the United Nations (UN) reform debate of 2005.

At a time when the global financial architecture is under reconstruction and as the rest of the world is fashioning response in a cooperative manner, African countries are going it alone. Yet, a majority of them depend on bilateral and multilateral financial support from outside. Seemingly, Africa is losing the opportunity to engage and impact current negotiations on the world order of the future. If this is so, it is unlikely that Africa’s interests will be represented fully nor it is probable that it will claim the 21st century as early as anticipated.

Politically, a number of challenges confront efforts at implementing the AU’s standards. Most glaring in this regard is the acclaimed African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process. Commendably, more than half of African countries have embraced the APRM and more than a dozen of these have gone through the review process. However, national plans of actions developed to induce good governance and improved conditions to attract domestic and foreign investment have largely remained unimplemented.

Furthermore, there is limited evidence to indicate that this process has improved governance and induced investments. Election processes constitute another area where Africa’s high standards remain largely unrealised. Electioneering periods are characterised by uncertainty and in many cases become triggers of violence and conflicts. Other than offer a stage for competitive politics, elections have become threat multipliers leading to debates about their value, particularly in fragile environments like Africa.

Overall, there is a steady growth of attempts at unconstitutional takeover of power. For instance, Mauritania, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, and Togo have seen blatant coups attempts (some successful). In addition have been numerous efforts at manipulation of constitutions. Collectively, these experiences have spurred theorisation on the phenomena of democracy in recession.

A centrepiece to realising good governance is reengaging the African people in their own governance. This would entail ensuring that legitimate governments replace ruling elites that the mass-
es have lost confidence in, ensuring a leadership capable of reinvigorating the people, restoring hope and confidence, and providing them with a sense of dignity to deal with the challenges of the future.

Globalisation and the disintegration of Africa

The second broad set of factors that pressure Africa’s peace and security architecture relate to the negative impacts of globalisation. A critical feature of globalisation that has not received much attention is the contradictory tendency to integrate and centralise certain regions of the world while disintegrating and marginalising others.

On the one hand, forces of integration, driven centripetally, have produced large and powerful economic, political and military blocs, particularly among the stronger and developed countries. Thus, increasingly Europe (including the former Soviet), the United States, and stronger Asian countries such as China are acting in concert in engaging the forces of globalisation. On the other hand, processes of disintegration, driven by centrifugal forces, are producing what Mwesiga Barregu (2009) sees as regions of perpetual suffering and deprivation. The zones of wealth and peace stand in stark contrast against those characterised by steady marginalisation, impoverishment, disintegration and fragmentation, as witnessed in most of the African continent.

A recent illustration of how globalisation could accelerate Africa’s disintegration was epitomised in July 2009. A consortium of 13 European companies were to create DESERTEC, a project that will develop solar panels on the Sahara aimed at providing 25% of Europe’s energy needs by 2025. Its exclusive focus on Northern Africa is likely to deepen the already existing divide between north and sub-Saharan Africa, and further reduce the chances for forging a continental Africa identity.

More fundamentally, it has the potential to foreclose the evolving of a common position as far as the development of Africa’s energy needs is concerned (Simelane & Juma, 2009).

That African countries have failed to realise meaningful economic and political integration is, at least in part, attributed to these global processes. Economic data indicates the continent registered economic growth before the global economic crisis, reaching a global record in some countries. However, this wealth has not trickled down and has hardly had any positive impact on the lives of millions of people that are divided from the ruling elite. Yet, a majority of these countries, though marginal to the global economic system, still remain vertically integrated with the European countries.
This fact, by itself, continues to block horizontal integration between African countries and reinforces the old structures of engagement that do not support manufacturing or provide employment. Lack of growth has exacerbated the process of disintegration of societies and communities and ensures a general lack of opportunity to engage productively. The impact of this reality is conflict and instability.

Another feature of globalisation with a negative impact is the current scramble for Africa’s natural resources. While the scope of this “new” scramble is huge and complex, with scrambler networks that involve international, regional, national and local actors, a distinctive character of the forces at play is the alienation of resources from the African peoples, with grave security consequences. Significantly, in today’s productive processes, African labour is losing its value.

This is new because, throughout history, African labour has been integral to the world’s development. In the slave trade era it was a critical productive factor for the opening up of new worlds. The colonial economy was predicated on the integration of African labour to production processes. In the “new” globalisation, African effort is being rendered relatively redundant in the global division of labour.

Inversely, the demand for Africa’s natural resources is growing exponentially, leading to exploitative deals that marginalise, displace and steadily exclude people. The current land appropriation deals across the continent, for extraction,
farming and other forms of “investment,” (Lee, 2009) are characteristic of this trend and carry potential risks for conflicts, as evidenced in Madagascar in March 2009.

On the production front, traditional agricultural export markets continue to fail while the continent suffers endemic and pervasive food shortages as a result of producing non-food commodities. Industrial production is encumbered by de-industrialisation, high production costs, narrow domestic demands due to low incomes, and stringent export markets due to supply and quality conditions. Raw material production, including mining and logging, is deepening under predatory conditions creating little employment, generating low returns and precipitating violent conflicts. Combined, these processes create numerous traps for African people and their countries.

These realities demand focus on some first order questions about what Africa should produce, for whom to produce and how to produce what is needed. It also points to the need to determine windows of opportunity to loosen the continent as it gets mortgaged by a network of national and international elite compacts. Some analysts have reinforced the AU position in relation to strengthening regional integration and continental unity, as necessary for creating “new economic spaces”.

Others have argued for the forging of new relationships, particularly with the rapidly growing economies of Asia (especially Indian and Chinese), the intention being the negotiation of resources for technology, owing to these countries high demand for African raw materials (Juma, 2009). A critical component to the efforts that Africa pursues should involve evolving a consensus on how to leverage resources of strategic value for the continent and how to ensure benefit for its people.

Climate change and environmental stress

A third set of factors relate to climate change and environmental stress. Growing evidence suggests that climate change stands as the security threat for the 21st century. In the 1980s, issues on climate change hinged on concerns about environmental degradation. This evolved into concerns about energy and economics, as countries began to grapple with how to slow the atmospheric pollution that was driving the problem. More recently, the debate has centred on broader concerns around national and regional security as climate change threatens to undermine international peace and stability. Climate change can act as a threat multiplier, especially in fragile situations.2

Although there is concern about climate change, no consensus has emerged on the specifics of what needs tackling and how this should be achieved. While developed countries focus mainly
on the carbon emissions and increase in green house effects, in Africa the challenge embodies a range of natural vulgarities. A shift in global climate will reshape coastlines, alter disease prevalence, change where rain falls, and modify where people can find water, grow food and live (Brown, 2009).

Besides threatening livelihoods, this is likely to force communities and nations into conflict as they struggle to access resources. The Darfur crisis, as most others in environmentally fragile regions, is explained in part by such natural factors. Changes in rainfall patterns, along with increased evaporation driven by rising temperatures, will mean some places on the continent will face considerable decline in available water and consequently suffer food insecurity.

As demonstrated by the CNA report, a rise in sea level for Africa could threaten more than 25% of Africa’s population that live within 100 kilometres of the coast, as well as 6 of Africa’s 10 largest cities that are on the coast. A country like Mozambique is particularly vulnerable as evidenced in 2000 when two cyclones displaced 500,000 people and caused nearly a million to depend on humanitarian assistance. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta accounts for 7.5% of the country’s landmass and is domicile to more than 20 million people that could be under eminent threat of a rise in sea levels.

Even though many communities use migration as a way to adapt successfully to climatic variability, increased pressure could see a tenfold increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people in the coming decades. The estimates for the numbers of environmental refugees are growing rapidly. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) predicts some 200 million people around the world may be forced to migrate as climate change amplifies the existing causes of migration, like environmental stress and conflict over resources.

Migration of such magnitude will inevitably lead to conflicts over stressed resources. The cumulative effect of climate change, natural disasters, diseases and food insecurity will also increase the likelihood of fragile states toppling over becoming failed states.

As noted by Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, South Africa’s Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, in Cape Town in August 2009, given the nature of African conflicts, which permeate across borders, climate change would aggravate territory and border disputes, migration, food insecurity and water stress. Thus as climate change fast becomes one of the greatest global threats to stability, there is need to develop, in Africa, strong early warning systems to help prevent future conflicts.

Peace and security
The fourth set of factors relate to the manner in which efforts that seek peace and security are be-
ing deployed. Overall, there has been enormous investment to develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, peace remains evasive. A quick balance sheet on the performance is illustrative of the gap between aspirations and reality. Globally, there have been concerted efforts to engage in the pursuit of peace, manifesting in deployment of hard power in scales unknown before in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

By 2008, the UN Peacekeeping operations budget had grown in excess of US$7 billion annually, yet this enormous investment has not delivered the desired end state, namely a safer and more secure world. In Africa, efforts since the launch of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2004 have seen peace processes in no less than 10 countries, all ending up in signed peace agreements. However, even with political settlements achieved, societies hardly enjoy public safety and security, and peace processes, therefore, remain largely fragile.

The gap between how peace is being sought and the reality of insecurity on the ground illuminates a number of features that require reflection, and perhaps reorientation.

First is the dwindling principle and practice of international burden sharing. Since the end of the Cold War, and as the practice of regionally-led initiatives for peace and security grow, there seems to be an inversion of responsibility. This emanates from an anomalous and undesirable trend in which organisations lacking the necessary capabilities have been left, or drawn into complex and volatile missions, to bear the brunt of conflicts, while the more capable organisations remain aloof.

This translates into the premier multilateral institutions, and by extension the most powerful countries, failing to take the lead in difficult situations. For instance, when the AU intervened in Darfur in 2004, it had neither the logistical, planning or operational capabilities to deal with what has come to be defined as the world’s most tragic humanitarian disaster. This is replicated in Somalia where, to date, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains largely ambivalent if not entirely negligent.

Second, the failure of burden sharing has led to a trend of benign neglect of crisis in some parts of the world, as the UNSC fudges its responsibility for international peace and security. Thus, while there is growing consensus of the value of regional leadership in line with chapter 8 of the UN charter, there is no corresponding delegation of authority nor resources to enable regional organisations, such as the resource strapped AU, to mount successful operations.

The result has been piecemeal, uncoordinated and inadequate engagement, often exacerbating insecurity. The debate has become one where the AU is accused of being reckless and of engaging in situations where there is no peace to keep. The fundamental question then becomes what the course of action is in situations of serious threat to lives and potent potential or real risk to inter-
national peace and security. Furthermore how can the UNSC remain aloof in spite of the principle of responsibility to protect?

Third, operationally there is also a trend towards framing peace and security challenges in technical terms, thus evading the political responsibility that should go with the processes that determine international engagement. Thus, when the threat to peace and security in Africa is discussed, it is framed in terms of the institutional incapacity of the AU to organise and run successful operations.

Finally, there is a growing resistance to link peacekeeping with other longer term measures. Seemingly, resources for early warning and prevention activities are comparatively less easy to come by and this has led to difficulties in terms of growing the softer options to support sustainable peace. Within the African context, this poses risk because a comprehensive APSA is predicated upon developing a range of capabilities, from prevention to negotiations and reconstruction and development skills. To the extent that to date there are no adequate resources to build and enhance the range of capabilities envisaged, then the pursuit for peace will remain a fire-fighting operation.

The AU peace fund is supposed to have 10% of the organisation’s budget of less than US$70 million, which is hardly sufficient to develop the necessary capabilities for the African Standby Force and the rest of the APSA structures. Indeed the preoccupation with the African Standby Force is skewed towards defence capabilities. There is therefore need to invest in developing softer options in support of conflict prevention and sustainable peace. Failure to do this will run the risk of creating what could be a robust force, which may be unable to respond to the range of challenges that would require soft power rather than hard capabilities in the future.

The above scenarios demand a reorientation of Africa’s security architecture to inject a dynamism that will enable it to respond adequately to current and future threats to the continent.

**Notes**
1. This led to a breakdown in negotiations with South Africa, which has been insisting on a Common External Tariff (CET) for the Southern African region. While the EU has agreed to relax some of the conditions, in particular to apply a common tariff to whole region, there are still outstanding issues that may require changes in areas such as the Rules of Origin for the goods in question.
2. See for example The CAN Corporation, National security and the threat of climate change, 2007.

**References**
From spoiler to peace champion
South Africa’s role in Africa’s security affairs

Siphamandla Zondi1
The pillars upon which our foreign policy will rest are the following beliefs: ... that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed; that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy choices.

Mandela, 1993
Introduction
As the quote above shows, even before the new constitutional principles were set out and a democratic government was established, the party that was to govern South Africa had made plain its intention to pursue diplomacy in Africa and the world at large. Indeed, since 1994 South Africa has transformed itself from an isolated and hostile state into an active driver of an African agenda globally and peace diplomacy within Africa.

This paper argues that South Africa’s championing of peace diplomacy is a result of a combination of its new role definition and the burden of history in the sense that, under apartheid, the country adopted a hostile policy towards the region. In redefining its role in international relations, the democratic government sought a neat balance between projecting its national interests while pursuing the values of human rights, peace and democracy building.

As a norm entrepreneur, it understood its moral obligation to promote exemplary conduct to states in international relations, especially in Africa, believing that states need to be “responsible global citizen[s]” (Mandela, 1993). Among other things, this obligation meant helping to create conditions of peace, stability and democracy.

South Africa’s Africa agenda: contours and context
As mentioned above, the new role of South Africa in international relations, following the end of apartheid, was an outcome of both the norms it set for itself and a response to apartheid South Africa’s hostile relations with Africa. The role of apartheid South Africa in the destabilisation of the region, through military incursions in several regional states and other acts of sabotage, weighed heavily on the minds of new authorities in Pretoria in 1994. In 1992, the African National Congress
South Africa would work to promote the universal values of peace, democracy, good governance, and equality throughout the world

(ANC) President, Nelson Mandela, announced in a foreign policy speech in the US that, in order to re-integrate the isolated country back into the global village and transform it into a good neighbour in Africa, the new authorities would develop policies “necessary to take South Africa into the new world order as a responsible global citizen” (own emphasis) (Mandela, 1993).

This did not only mean that South Africa would conduct itself in an exemplary manner as a norm entrepreneur, but that it would also work to promote the universal values of peace, democracy, good governance, and equality throughout the world. This thrust two principal roles in global affairs upon South Africa, namely peace-building in Africa, and bridge-building between the developed and developing world. This was all part of efforts to create an international environment conducive to the realisation of the country’s domestic imperatives for creating a better life for all.

In this sense, the global posture was an extension of the domestic values, policies and conduct in a democratic post-apartheid society. The parameters of this paper do not allow a detailed examination of South Africa’s bridge-building efforts. We are limited by the terms of reference to detailing South Africa’s peace-making efforts in Africa.

Peace diplomacy

In this context, the new South Africa strove for a rebirth of Africa, envisaging a peaceful, stable, democratic and developing continent. Believing, as Aziz Pahad (the then deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) put it, that “there can be no peace without development and no development without peace,” South Africa pursued the achievement of “sustained and sustainable peace in the continent” (Pahad, 2003). The country would support all efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and later the African Union (AU) aimed at ending conflict and instability, especially where the plan was to establish conditions for durable peace and transition to democracy.

For this reason, South Africa supported the OAU’s Central Organ charged with coordinating the organisation’s peace efforts on the continent. It also provided reasons and political backing for other peace-making activities by the OAU and AU.

But the dominant form of peace diplomacy that South Africa has pursued, since joining the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the 1990s, consists of mediation/facilitation of negotiated peace settlements founded on principles of consensus, inclusivity, participation, and democratic transition. Inspired by the country’s own experience of democratic transi-
tion, South Africa’s peace diplomacy exports a formula that is comprised of inclusive talks, consensus outcomes, a transitional inclusive government (or government of national unity), simultaneously punitive and restorative transitional justice, security sector reform, and constitutional reform.

As we shall see below, this has been generally successful in various parts of Africa. This is because the approach enabled both peace champions and spoilers to play a significant role in a country’s transition. It helped transform peace blockers into positive influences on peace processes or democratic transitions. The model also benefited from the fact that a strong African state is promoting it. Not only is the approach a piece of common sense, but it is also predisposed towards constructive engagement and preventive diplomacy (Landsberg & Kabemba, 1998).

South Africa has applied this model in countries like Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Zimbabwe. It has also been replicated by others in countries like the Comoros, Madagascar, and Sudan. Below, we shall turn to a few select cases in order to demonstrate the nuances of South Africa’s peace diplomacy.

South Africa’s role in Burundi

South Africa’s peace diplomacy in the Great Lakes area started with its election in 1994 as the vice-president of the OAU Central Organ, tasked with a major role in conflict resolution. This coincided with the Rwandan genocide, which the AU and the inter-
Drawing from its domestic experience, gradually South Africa built mutual trust amongst armed groups

national community had not been able to prevent nor contain. There were also fears that there could easily be genocide in Burundi because the conditions leading to the Rwandan tragedy prevailed in Burundi too, namely heightened ethnic conflict, arming of society, increased rebel activity, and a lack of popular legitimacy for the government (Ajulu, 2005).

In 1996, Tanzanian former president, Julius Nyerere, was appointed by the OAU as the official facilitator of the Burundi peace process. Nyerere immediately began the process of facilitation, but soon realised that South Africa had both the capacity and will to help him drive the Burundi process. He reasoned that the Arusha peace process required the backing of South Africa as an emerging power in the region. So, he formally requested the South African government to appoint a special envoy to act as an observer in the Arusha peace process.

Nyerere’s invitation was not welcomed by other regional players, especially Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, however his stature within the region helped him persuade these key external actors in the Burundi conflict of its validity. His championing of South Africa’s role gave it some legitimacy in the eyes of regional actors, people and other international institutions. Welile Nhlapo, then South African Ambassador to Ethiopia, was appointed as South Africa’s special envoy to the Great Lakes area with a mandate to assist Nyerere and Tanzania bring about peace in Burundi.

However, mutual distrust between Nyerere and the parties in conflict as well as the multiplicity of mediating actors undermined his facilitation. Tutsi elements saw Nyerere as being biased in favour of the Hutus. Also, his facilitation was further weakened by the internally driven mediation process, encouraged by the Tutsi main interlocutor, Pierre Buyoya, as well as by secret talks between the government and the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) rebel movement, facilitated and hosted by the Rome-based Community of Sant'Egidio. Notwithstanding these challenges, President Nyerere’s mediation team was able to get the Burundians to sign an agreement on some of the protocols that were to eventually form part of the final Arusha Accord, a year after his death.

South Africa, which had provided support to the Nyerere facilitation, took over the driving of the peace process with President Nelson Mandela and later President Mbeki’s deputy, Jacob Zuma, in the facilitator seat. South Africa began by building a coalition of concerned parties and stakeholders by engaging civil society and regional states to explore prospects for a mediated settlement. Drawing from its domestic experience, gradually South Africa built mutual trust amongst armed groups (Ajulu, 2005).

Mediators worked creatively to build upon Nyer-
ere’s hard work, and in the end they got 19 Burundian groups to sign the historic Arusha Accord in August 2000. The accord laid the basis for a lasting peace through a constitution-making process that lasted until October 2000, a power-sharing transitional government comprising both ethnic Hutus and Tutsis, reform of key institutions like parliament and the public service, and a process of reconciliation and justice.

However, one of the accord’s chief flaws was the exclusion of two main protagonists, CNDD/Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu’s (Palipehutu’s) Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL). Another was the fact that by its nature conflict negotiation is unable to focus on conflict transformation by dealing with the root causes of conflict and ending it through power sharing; instead it focuses on getting a deal among leaders and elite groups on the basis of brinkmanship.

Thirdly, the accord adopted the view that because the conflict involved mainly Hutu and Tutsi groups, the resolution thereof should be focused on finding ways of helping the two groups work together. Thus the other ethnic groups that were important for the peace-building process in Burundi were neglected (Zondi & Ikome, 2010).

Yet, notwithstanding these flaws and reservations from a number of signatories, the implementation of the accord progressed relatively well. The transitional government headed first by a Tutsi (Pierre Buyoya) and then by a Hutu (Domitien Ndayizeze), for 18 months each, acquitted itself well. Subsequently, South African facilitators succeeded in persuading the CNDD to sign a ceasefire with the transitional government in December 2002 and to join the accord in November 2003, leaving only the FNL outside the treaty.

The adoption of the new constitution via a referendum in February 2005 was followed in June and July by general elections, resulting in the formation of a permanent government based on the will of Burundian voters. The late arrivals to the peace process, the CNDD, won the elections and its leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, became the country’s first democratically elected president after war. With the assistance of the South African facilitation team, Nkurunziza’s government held negotiations with the FNL to end rebel incursions, culminating in an agreement in 2006 and bringing the final party into the fold.

The new government experienced many problems, partly from the governing party’s conduct but also due to structural problems of ubiquitous poverty, marginalisation of the rural areas, and a lack of alternatives for armed youth. This presents serious challenges for Burundi, given the very high expectations by the population. South African envoys continue to be involved in helping the new government manage its dialogue with alternative parties, as well as assisting with security sector reform, governance reform, and reconstruction of the economy.

**South Africa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

Aware of the intricate linkages between peace and economic rejuvenation of the Great Lakes area and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)), in 1997 South Africa attempted to broker a ceasefire agreement between the ailing President Mobutu Sese Seko and Congolese rebels led by Laurent Kabila. The initiative was supported by the United States (US) and France, former allies of Mobutu. Regional players opposed the initiative, seeing it as a US-driven scheme and being blinded by their own support for the Kabila rebellion.

In particular, Uganda and Rwanda were directly involved in the rebellion and conflict in Zaire, but felt that the South African initiative did not provide security to their interests and thus they actively opposed it. Angola also opposed it because the fall of Mobutu was more important to the government’s...
fight against União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) than peace in the then Zaire. Countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia supported the rebellion, seeing Mandela’s diplomacy as unnecessary.

Mandela failed to secure an agreement between the two parties. Kabila marched victoriously to Kinshasa with minimal resistance, backed by regional armies. This was deemed a failure of South Africa’s search for a soft landing instead of an outright overthrow of the Mobutu government (Alden & Le Pere, 2003). It was a failure that had a lot to do with a lack of full appreciation of the regional geopolitical dynamics on the part of Pretoria.

But the fallout between Kabila and his allies (Uganda and Rwanda) provided South Africa with another opportunity to revisit its peace diplomacy in the Great Lakes area. However, this too was undermined by further complication of regional dynamics with the regional split over the support for the Kabila regime. Whereas Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC to overthrow Kabila in August 1998, Mugabe used his position as chair of the SADC Organ to mobilise Angola and Namibia to militarily intervention in support of Kabila. This resulted in a complex conflict involving five regional armies. South Africa was isolated and ignored due to dynamics that were partly to do with Mugabe’s unhappiness at being overshadowed by the rise of Mandela and partly to do with the involved countries’ national interests.

With regard to Angola’s role, it was as much about cutting off UNITA’s diamonds as it was an indication of the frosty relations with Angola, which was miffed by South Africa’s position that Luanda needed to negotiate with UNITA to end the Angolan
civil war. The picture was further complicated by internal dynamics within the DRC with Kabila having become an autocrat, a symptom of Mobutism without Mobutu (Baregu, 2005).

South Africa used the mandate given by the SADC Summit of August 1998, which asked it to lead the process. South Africa became involved in behind-the-scenes moves to broker a peace agreement between Kabila and his nemesis. This was in parallel to SADC mediation efforts led by President Chissano of Mozambique, a Libyan initiative in December 1998, and the French efforts through the Franco-Africa Summit of November 1998.

Given its own difficulties with regional players on the DRC conflict and the dithering by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the OAU, South Africa threw its weight behind Zambia’s mediation efforts. South Africa did this by rallying international donors in support of the initiative as well as engaging Rwanda and Uganda bilaterally to negotiate an exit from the DRC. President Mbeki built on Mandela’s efforts using a hands-on, behind-the-scenes strategy.

These efforts led to the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999, calling for an UN observer mission to witness the implementation of ceasefire and the withdrawal of external armies, the formation of a joint military mechanism, and the resolution of internal DRC problems by negotiation. South Africa’s diplomatic and logistical support helped Zambia make this breakthrough.

After much wavering, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1279 establishing its peacekeeping mission in the DRC, namely the UN Organisation Mission in DR Congo (MONUC), by December 1999. The former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, was then appointed facilitator of inter-Congolese dialogue. However, the stalemate internally and among external actors remained until the assassination of Kabila in January 2001.

Joseph Kabila succeeded his father, promising to pursue peace in earnest. Within a short while, he had met his father’s enemies (Rwanda and Uganda)
and sent signals to South Africa that he was ready for mediated peace (Kabemba & Kibasomba, 2003). In May 2001, Masire, with the assistance of South Africa, helped the Congolese parties to sign the Declaration of Principles, a framework for inter-Congolese dialogue. This was followed in August of the same year by a Declaration of Commitment, which contained a draft agenda, rules of dialogue, and rules of procedure.

These interactions culminated in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue held at Sun City in South Africa over a 53-day period, from 25 February to 2 April 2002. The dialogue produced an agreement signed by 70% of the delegates under the title: The Political Agreement on the Consensual Management of the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The agreement represented a broad consensus on a transitional government, but fell short of spelling out the terms of power sharing. It was principally an agreement between the government and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC), rejected by armed forces like the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) -Goma.

Key provisions of the agreement included the following:

◆ Kabila should continue as president and supreme commander of the army until elections were held;
◆ MLC’s Bemba should become prime minister and head of government;
◆ An assembly, a senate and a senior army council should be established;
◆ The president should make ministerial appointments from names submitted by delegations with the counter-signature of the prime minister;
◆ A mechanism should be established to oversee the formation of a new national army to be comprised of government, MLC and RCD forces with RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), RCD-National (RCD-N) and Mai-Maï elements; and
◆ A working group to develop a transitional constitution to be established.

However, the implementation of this agreement was made difficult by the continued presence of foreign security forces on the ground, the continued impact of Rwanda’s security interests, and a lack of clarity on the terms of a power-sharing arrangement. However, the UN envoy, Moustapha Niass, working closely with South Africa, helped facilitate agreement on this, culminating in the signing of the All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in December 2002.

Integrated with the terms of the Sun City agreement, this led to the Global and Comprehensive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002, thus coinciding with South Africa’s Day of Reconciliation. This laid the basis for the formation of a government of national unity, comprising all major players in the DRC and providing room for addressing the concerns of regional actors, principally Rwanda. This marked a successful end to Masire’s facilitation and a resounding success for South Africa’s formal and informal mediation efforts.

Congolese parties established a government of national unity in July 2003, headed by President Kabila, four vice-presidents and a representative council of ministers. A representative national parliament was also established in August 2003 amid much ceremony. The parties also agreed on the formula for integration of armed forces, marking an end to internal conflict – at least the main conflict at the time. While the period leading to the General Elections in 2006 was marked by much political squabbling and delays in the implementation of the agreements, it also ushered in a period of stability and engagement not seen in the history of the DRC.

It was a period of significant confidence building among parties to the DRC conflict (Zondi & Motsamai, 2008). The gravest concern witnessed was
the continuing conflict in the eastern DRC, involving new rebels under General Laurent Nkunda, allegedly supported by Rwanda. While there have been moves to resolve this problem, there has been limited success so far.

Other peace diplomacy initiatives

In Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa succeeded in facilitating dialogue between the government and northern rebels, building upon the French-facilitated Linas-Marcoussis agreement. But this mission was undermined by the failure to bring critical external players on board, especially Burkina Faso and France. Yet South Africa laid the basis for what has been a successful transition in Côte d’Ivoire by getting parties to frame the terms of their cooperation in a government of national unity.

In Zimbabwe, South Africa was mandated by the SADC in 2007 to facilitate dialogue between the government led by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. The protracted dialogue limped from one collapse to the next, but resulted in an unprecedented agreement between the two parties leading to a constitutional amendment. This laid the basis for a smooth election won by the opposition, but ZANU-PF refused to give up power.

South Africa also supported peace processes in Sudan, Liberia, and Comoros, where the country leads the post-conflict reconstruction processes. South Africa is also showing interest in the brewing conflict in Chad.

However, South Africa’s decision to recognise Western Sahara as a sovereign entity undermined its capacity to act as a facilitator of dialogue between the Polisario and Morocco – a drastic step in favour of the Saharawis’ struggle for freedom from Moroccan occupation. It was a natural consequence of unheard pleas at the UN and other forums for pressure on Morocco to implement several UN resolutions outlawing oppression and the peace deals it signed with the Polisario under the tutelage of Jimmy Carter.

The decision has reenergized the international spotlight on the Western Sahara issue and exerted pressure on Morocco and its supporters. But the decision has also closed avenues for South Africa to play its traditional role as a facilitator as it is seen as a backer of one side.

Post-conflict reconstruction and development

South Africa’s involvement in post-conflict stabilisation and development has grown. This does not only help prevent relapse to conflict, but more importantly, it lays the basis for permanent stability and peace, possible through reconstruction of the economy, nation building, and the reconstitution of the state. Countries like the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and the Comoros have benefited from South Africa’s post-conflict interventions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

South Africa’s approach is three pronged in practice. One element is political support to emerging states using its global presence. The second is attracting its own investors into these post-conflict situations, necessary for rebuilding the economy and for bringing investments necessary to finance stability and development. The third dimension, and an increasingly dominant feature of the South African strategy, is training and developmental support.

For example, in August 2004, South Africa and the DRC signed a three-year memorandum of understanding which solidified South Africa’s support for the strengthening of governance by helping establish diplomatic academy and the creation of an effective, people-centred civil service, and mechanisms for corruption busting in the DRC (DPSA, 2008). Since 2005, South Africa has supported the census project in the DRC (DPSA,
The country also supported the dialogue in the eastern DRC which concluded with ground-breaking agreements between government, and a plethora of destabilising elements in this no-man’s-land of the DRC.

Capacity building efforts with regard to Sudan have focused on state building in the southern Sudan with extensive and Pretoria-funded training programmes. The programmes covered capacity development on the conduct of international relations and diplomacy. Other training focused on state building, macroeconomic management, public administration, corruption busting, foreign policy, and diplomatic training. South Africa chairs the AU Commission on Post-Conflict Development in Sudan.

**Conclusion**

South Africa’s role in transitions from conflict to peace and democracy on the continent has helped redefine its relations with Africa and buttress its international standing. In doing so, South Africa has confronted many challenges and displayed its own bias in favour of a particular formula of peaceful transition – indeed it stands accused of displacing regional hegemons in some cases and of promoting its own economic interests. Whatever verdict history will pass on South Africa’s peace diplomacy, there is no doubt that its efforts have helped recast post-Cold War Africa as a rising continent.

**Notes**

1. Dr Siphamandla Zondi is grateful to Chris Mulaudzi, Dimpho Motsamai and Dr Abdul Lamin for reading earlier versions of this article, but errors are his.
2. This concept was first used to describe the desired South Africa by the President Nelson Mandela during his speech to the Council for Foreign Relations in 1993.

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Campaigning rhetoric or bleak reality? Just how serious a security challenge is climate change for Africa?

Oli Brown
The emergence of climate change as a security issue

If economics is the original dismal science, then climate change could be its understudy.

Hardly a day goes by without a new scientific report revealing more worrying news about the rapid progress of climate change. Reports on climate change typically make for grim bedtime reading – full of worrying statistics and doomsday scenarios. Sometimes it feels like the only question left is whether the rising sea levels, tornadoes or forest fires will get you first.

As the meteorological picture comes into focus, campaigners have begun to argue that climate change holds potentially serious implications for international security. The basic argument is that climate change – by redrawing the maps of water availability, food security, disease prevalence and coastal boundaries – will reduce the available food and water, increase migration, raise tensions and trigger new conflicts.

Africa and conflict

Africa, though the continent the least responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is almost universally seen as the continent most at risk of climate-induced conflict – a function of the continent’s reliance on climate-dependent sectors (such as rain-fed agriculture) and its history of resource, ethnic and political conflict (Brown, Hammill & McLeman, 2007).

The March 2005 Report of the Commission for Africa, which was chaired by the former Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, argued that “Africa has experienced more violent conflict than any other continent in the last four decades” (Commission for Africa, 2005). Most of the 24 major armed conflicts recorded worldwide in 2001 were on the African continent, with 11 of those conflicts lasting 8 years or more (Human Security Centre, 2005). Indeed, at the end of the 20th century more people were being killed in wars in Africa than in the rest of the world combined.

Much has been written about the causes and nature of instability in Africa. For example, the 2005 Report of the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) on Human Security in Africa noted that: “Several factors account for conflict in Africa: remote sources, immediate causes, and factors that exacerbate conflict. The remote sources include the colonial heritage of authoritarian
governance and artificial boundaries; conditions of widespread extreme poverty, and scarcity of basic necessities of life. Immediate causes include competition for land, oil or other natural resources; support for internal conflicts by outside actors; government policy; and resource misallocations. Factors that exacerbate conflict can include arms imports, pressures of refugees or internally displaced persons and food insecurity” (OSSA, 2005).

That said, a number of analysts have pointed to positive longer-term trends in conflict in Africa – referring to both a reduction in armed conflict as well as the contribution being made by the new wave of engagement by Africans and the international community. Recent years have seen reduced levels of conflict, the improvement of Africa’s economic prospects, and progress in the quality of governance and the number and nature of democracies (Human Security Centre, 2005 & 2007). The African Union, through its security architecture, and the continent’s regional economic communities have developed into key players in the reduction of conflict in Africa.

**A succession of new wars across Africa?**

There is concern that climate change could reverse some of this progress. In fact, some argue climate change is already playing a role in existing conflicts. A June 2007 report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) suggested that the conflict in Darfur has been in part driven by
climate change and environmental degradation. The UNEP report warned of “a succession of new wars across Africa” unless more is done to contain the danger of climate change. The report concluded that “Darfur ... holds grim lessons for other countries at risk.” In a 2007 Washington Post editorial United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon argued: “Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political shorthand – an ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.” (Ki-moon, 2007).

In short, the issue of the security implications of climate change has caught the political imagination. This led to a Security Council debate in April 2007 and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) later that year, dozens of conferences and reports, and a resolution by the UN General Assembly in summer 2009. By graphically illustrating some of climate change’s most worrying scenarios, the “securitisation” of climate change has generated significant political momentum for action on GHG emissions.

There are perhaps two reasons for this. The first is self-evident: it is becoming increasingly clear that future climate change threatens to exacerbate existing drivers of conflict in a way that could roll back development across many countries. The second reason is more political: it is part of a clear process to galvanise the climate negotiations with a greater sense of urgency in the run-up to the December Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen. If there is to be any chance of stabilising and eventually reducing global emissions, it is widely seen that the United States and the large developing country emitters, such as China, Brazil, Russia, India and Mexico, will need to be part of a post-2012 arrangement (Najama, Huq & Sokona, 2003). Appealing to the hard security concerns of these countries raises climate change to the realm of high politics and creates the political space for serious concessions on GHG emissions.

At the unprecedented 2007 UN Security Council debate on climate change, Basile Ikouébé of Congo Brazzaville observed there is some irony that Africa, the region least responsible for global GHG emissions, is likely to be the worst affected by the “excess consumption and carefree attitude of the rich” (UNSCDP, 2007). Indeed, African nations, on both aggregate and per capita bases, are insignificant sources of emissions. On average each resident of sub-Saharan Africa produces less than a tonne of CO2 per year, as compared with...
a European’s output of 8.2 tonnes of CO2 and a North American’s 19.9 tonnes (World Bank, 2007). Whether or not most sub-Saharan countries sign up to a post-Kyoto deal will have little impact on global emissions. However, cases such as Darfur are being held up as cautionary tales for the potential impact of climate change everywhere. In other words, Africans are not really the intended audience of the post-Kyoto debate, but they are part of the evidence being used to make it.

**Plausible security threats**

It is a truism that environmental problems don’t recognise borders. The imperative to reduce GHG emissions and manage the impacts of climate change demonstrate our global interdependence.

We are beginning to realise that the speed and the scope of climate change – the way it threatens to affect where we can live, where we can grow food and where we can find water – could undermine the economic and political stability of large parts of the world in the coming years. In so doing climate change could become a “threat-multiplier” that makes existing problems, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable. For the past few years, the International Institute for Sustainable Development has been researching these linkages (Brown, Hammill & McLeman, 2007; Brown & Crawford, 2009a & 2009b). There are four main dimensions to the challenge.

Firstly, reduced water supply and growing demand will, in some places, lead to increasing competition between different sectors of society, different communities and different countries. Under certain conditions, such as poor governance and existing ethnic division, these stresses may turn violent. Already one-third of all people in Africa live in drought-prone regions. Using a range of models, the IPCC estimates that between 350 and 600 million more people in Africa will be at risk of increased water stress by the middle of the century. Water can clearly be a cause of conflict at a local level, particularly where no formal rules or agreements on the use of water have been agreed.

At the international level the UN has already identified nine river basins in Africa where conflicts could arise. The stakes can be very high. For example, reductions of just 20% in the flow of the Nile could make irrigation very difficult in the Egyptian Delta. And Egypt has already threatened Sudan with military action if it were to unilaterally divert water (Brown & Crawford, 2009b).

Secondly, reductions in crop yields and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns around the world may lead to higher prices for food and greater food insecurity, and increase the stakes for control over productive agricultural land. Already roughly 230 million people in Africa are undernourished. Most African farmers rely on the
climate change could become a “threat-multiplier” that makes existing problems more complex.
homes and their communities by the middle of the century – a large percentage of who are likely to be in Africa. Migration itself is not inherently problematic, and indeed it can be an important way of adapting to climate change, but migration has been linked to violent conflict in both transit and destination countries, and large scale population displacement has already been recognised by the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and stability (Brown & Crawford, 2009b).

The final dimension is that the cumulative impacts of all this, as well as more frequent natural disasters, and increases in diseases such as malaria threaten to increase poverty and to overwhelm the capacity of governments to meet the basic needs of their people. Fundamentally this could mean more fragile and more failed states.

But don’t exaggerate
It seems that there are plausible and very serious threats from climate change but we have to be careful not to oversimplify the relationship or to exaggerate the story. There are at least two important caveats we need to bear in mind.

Firstly, there are significant variations in the climate models. The impacts of climate change are not consistent across the continent and some areas are likely to be worse hit than others. The second warning is that we shouldn’t assume that people will automatically fight when conditions get difficult. Experience shows that environmental stress can increase the severity, duration and the impacts of a conflict but it’s rare that environmental factors are ever the sole cause of violent conflict. Instead climate change seems like
to act as a “threat multiplier” that makes existing problems more pressing and intractable. Whether those problems develop into violent conflict depends on the specific context. It is poverty that puts vulnerable people in marginal situations, it is bad leaders that stoke ethnic divisions, and it is a failure of national, regional and global diplomacy that allows local problems to escalate into confrontation and war.

**Talking it up?**

The extent to which the climate change debate has become a debate about security presents both risks and opportunities.

First, the more dire predictions border on scaremongering. There is a risk that this could lead to “climate change fatigue” among the general public - a sense of hopelessness and resignation in the face of an unbeatable challenge. Second, dire predictions about coming “climate wars” imply that climate change requires military solutions; to secure by force one’s resources or erect barriers to large-scale migration. But focusing on military response both raises the stakes and draws attention (and donor dollars) away from the very real, and current, development problems that already pose immediate threats to vulnerable societies, such as extreme poverty, access to education, HIV/AIDS and so on. Third, the international community needs to ensure that this does not become a northern, donor-driven agenda, perceived as yet another way for northern interests to interfere in southern affairs.

On the positive side, a “securitised” climate debate might just be able to marshal sufficiently compelling arguments to encourage the politicians
to do something about reducing emissions and investing (carefully) in adaptation. These are the sort of things that the international community should be doing anyway. So, if hanging the climate change debate on the security hook speeds their implementation, it may serve a useful purpose.

Conclusions

In fact, the recent focus on the “security” implications of climate change has been tremendously effective at raising the profile of climate change as an issue of international importance. The “security link” conveys added, and arguably necessary, gravitas to the debate on climate change, and an appreciation of the security implications of climate change could give new impetus to the climate change agenda.

However, it is clear that the picture is nuanced and the relationships are not necessarily linear. The impact of climate change in fragile states around the world may not be so much a case of entirely new security threats, but more of enhancing existing instabilities and threats. Fundamentally, climate change threatens to undermine governments’ ability to ensure security and stability. But there is no clear, mono-causal link between climate change and conflict.

The projected impacts of climate change for Africa and other regions do indeed hold the potential to reduce the reliability of food and water supplies, to increase the frequency and severity of droughts and storms, and to exacerbate flooding in low-lying coastal areas. In turn, livelihoods may be undermined, key resources may become scarcer, and violent conflict may result. However, we should be extremely cautious before assuming that a straight-line progression from scarcity to conflict will ensue. This is because the question of whether climate change helps tip fragile states into conditions of violence and conflict will be heavily influenced not only by the nature of the biophysical impacts of climate change, but also by a given area’s susceptibility to conflict and
the capacity of the population to adapt - factors that are determined in the first instance by non-climatic processes.

In fact, many factors influence the probability of violent conflict. Poverty and education levels, natural resource endowments, demographics, ethnic and religious fractionalisation, geography and prior conflict are all factors that constrain or facilitate conflict. Climate change is only one of the many security, environmental and developmental challenges facing Africa. It is non-climate factors (such as poverty, governance, conflict management, regional diplomacy and so on) that will largely determine whether and how climate change moves from being a development challenge to presenting a security threat.

References

Africa’s natural resources: driver of African development and (in-) stability

Sarah Wykes
Drawing upon the presentations of Claude Kabemba and Tim Hughes, this article outlines the governance and economic impediments to sustainable development and security associated with mineral-dependent states in Africa, while also highlighting the role multinational companies can play in positively or negatively influencing this outcome.

In terms of the substantive issues, while a global consensus has now been generated about how tackling the “resource curse” must begin with strengthening resource governance, in particular through enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms along the “value chain”, the challenge posed by climate change must also now be factored into any debate over responsible natural resource management. This is particularly important in the African context, given that Africa will be the most impacted region by climate damage.

**The paradox of plenty: Africa’s natural resource wealth**

Over 50 countries worldwide are categorised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as natural resource-rich. The IMF definition is based on a country’s revenues from hydrocarbons and/or minerals averaging either at least 25% of total fiscal revenues or of total export proceeds in the period from 2000-03 (IMF, 2005).

Half the population of sub-Saharan Africa live in such countries, which account for about 70% of Africa’s GDP and receive most of its foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2008). Africa holds a significant proportion of known resources of non-energy raw materials, for instance: 75% of phosphate, 60% of cobalt, 73% of diamond and 40% of gold (Kabemba, 2009). For many African countries, raw materials are important export products and represent a significant part of state revenues.

Until last year’s global economic and financial crisis, most analysts would have concurred with the view that: “The current boom in commodity prices presents a unique opportunity for developing country governments … to mobilise home-generated wealth from natural resources for sustainable development.” (World Bank, 2008).

In the case of minerals, the three largest mining corporations (Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Anglo American) saw their accumulated profits increase from US$4.3 billion in 2002 to US$26.9 billion in 2006 (Kabemba, 2009).
However, December 2008 saw a sharp drop in demand for commodity-based assets, with copper prices, for instance, slashed by up to two-thirds (Kabemba, 2009). With the collapse in prices, the prospects for commodity exporters in Africa now look much less sanguine – according to the African Development Bank (AfDB): “Export revenues will decline by 40% this year for the continent as a whole, leading to shortfalls of US$251 billion in 2009 and US$277 billion in 2010 with oil exporters suffering the biggest losses.” (Wallis, 2009).

As this shows, oil and mineral-dependent countries are exceptionally vulnerable to “bust and boom” cycles, one aspect of “the paradox of plenty” or “the resource curse”. The latter terms refer to the phenomenon whereby resource-rich states tend to be characterised by a toxic combination of poor economic performance and low human development (Gelb 1988; Karl 1997; Ross, 2001a & 2001b; Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz, 2007; and Collier 1999 & 2007).

Citizens in Africa have, overwhelmingly, not benefited from their natural resource wealth. For instance Angola, which in 2008 became sub-Saharan Africa’s top oil producer, ranks 42 places lower than it should on the Human Development Index, given its GDP per capita (Human Development Index, 2009). Paradoxically, non-resource-rich countries often perform better in terms of economic growth and human development than their resource-rich neighbours, with non-resource-rich coastal countries in Africa outperforming resource-rich countries by an average of 1.4% from 1981–2006 (African Development Bank, 2007).

Resource-rich countries are more likely to experience poverty and income inequality; high levels of corruption and authoritarianism; higher spending on military and security forces; high child mortality; low life expectancy; and low spending on health and education (Collier, 2007; Ross, 2001a & 2001b).

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Natural resource wealth is also associated with a decrease in the transparency and accountability of state structures, as “easy” (unearned) money – or rents – render governments less or non-reliant on earned income (for example from taxation). Without strong institutions and governance structures, resource-rich countries are more likely to experience poverty and income inequality; high levels of corruption and authoritarianism; higher spending on military and security forces; high child mortality; low life expectancy; and low spending on health and education (Collier, 2007; Ross, 2001a & 2001b).

The ongoing conflict in the mineral-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo is perhaps one of the
most poignant illustrations of the role of natural resources in driving or exacerbating conflict.

**Obstacles to economic growth and development in mineral-rich countries**

One fundamental reason why countries in the region have failed to mobilise their mineral wealth for development entirely is the general governance failings of African states, including the prevalence of corruption. Their poor performance in terms of transparency and accountable governance is regularly illustrated by rankings such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index or the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, where the majority of resource-rich countries in the continent feature in the bottom half of both lists (see www.transparency.org, 2009; www.moibrahimfoundation.org, 2009).

The inadequacy and unfairness to the state of current regulatory frameworks for managing access to minerals poses another major obstacle (Kabemba, 2009). Some of these frameworks have been promoted by the World Bank and exacerbated by the lack of negotiating capacity of African governments as well as by the power imbalance between the latter and foreign multinationals during negotiations.

What is needed is, firstly, a root and branch overhaul of governance. More specifically, investment in the mineral sector must take place in a “rule-based business environment” (Kabemba, 2009). Enhanced civil society and parliamentary oversight of investment arrangements is one key way to ensure transparency. Moreover, contracts whose fiscal terms benefit private operators to the detriment of the state and which were negotiated without proper oversight (for instance,
the first oil contracts in Equatorial Guinea) should be renegotiated, since they deprive the state of much-needed revenues for service delivery.

More efficient revenue collection is also needed, along with fair and progressive tax regimes. Companies should be prepared to pay reasonable rates of tax and desist from opaque practices such as transfer pricing, which harm the national economy of the country in which they are operating (Kabemba, 2009).

Good fiscal governance and the quality of public institutions, with transparency and oversight mechanisms as key building blocks, ensure that oil and mineral wealth is translated into tangible development outcomes (Kabemba, 2009). This is a view shared by most “resource curse” analysts. According to development economist Paul Collier: “Checks and balances significantly and distinctively raise growth in the context of large natural resource rents (Collier, 2006)”.

**Economic diversification and “adding value” to mining activities**

Government fiscal policy should also aim at addressing the “boom and bust” cycle associated with mineral-export dependency by introducing policies to ensure revenue smoothing, stabilisation mechanisms and diversification of the economy. Investment in building the skills of the local workforce and in infrastructure, not just at the
governments should aim at developing a world class public administration for the mineral sector, ideally with public representation on the board of mining companies so as to ensure effective administration and oversight of the mining sector (Kabemba, 2009).

How do mining companies obtain a “social licence to operate”? – Lessons from Tanzania

Clarity and harmonisation of the roles and responsibilities in economic and social development of mining companies with those of the state are also key to sustainable development of the mining sector. Mining companies can play a positive role through a genuine corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach which prioritises local investment of financial resources, job creation and the transfer of technologies and skills (Kabemba, 2009).

Such an approach should also include policies to protect human rights and the environment and a strategy for meaningful engagement with local communities. One international multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at increasing oversight over revenue management in the sector that is gaining support among different stakeholders is the Extrac
tive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)¹. The role played by companies is particularly important where mining operations occur in remote geographical areas and/or where local government capacity is weak. Mining operations alter an area’s entire demographic, economic and infrastructural profile, bringing capital investment and with it the potential for job creation, but also placing extra burdens on (often weak) existing local services and infrastructure (Hughes, 2009).

In Tanzania, Canadian-based mining company Barrick Gold Corporation is the biggest mine operator and it has invested substantial financial and human resources in its CSR programmes in an attempt to secure a “social licence to operate”.

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However, simply focusing on infrastructure directly linked to extraction of minerals will produce an imbalanced economy with productive and infrastructural capacities built up around its core sectors (mining), but not integrated into the rest of the economy. National governments and regional bodies need an integrated macroeconomic and industrial strategy with clear plans on how infrastructure investments can promote wider industrial development.

The constraints on the technical capacity of policymakers, the civil service and other local stakeholders also need to be addressed, along with a radical improvement in data flows from the mineral sector. Policy-makers often lack sufficient expertise and the analytical skills required to elaborate sound legislative, fiscal and industrial policies, or to negotiate mining contracts, which results in inequitable deals being struck. Equally, governments should aim at developing a world class public administration for the mineral sector, ideally with public representation on the board of mining companies so as to ensure effective administration and oversight of the mining sector (Kabemba, 2009).

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Nevertheless, Barrick’s mine operations range from exemplary practices at its profitable Tulawaka Mine to highly-criticised environmental and operational practices at North Mara Mine (Hughes, 2009).

**Tulawaka Mine – moving towards best practice?**

The Tulawaka Mine is located in the far north west of Tanzania and is 70%-owned by Barrick. According to Hughes, Barrick has earned its “social licence to operate” at Tulawaka (and other mines in the country) for several reasons (Hughes, 2009).

Firstly, Barrick mines in Tanzania have laudable safety records. In the case of Tulawaka, the mine has gone up to six million man-hours without a loss of time incident. Another key reason is that the company or its subsidiaries have established successful tri-partite, public-private partnerships between the individual mine, the respective local authority (District Council) and the local community in order to understand how best to assist community development.

At Tulawaka, Barrick partnered with local and national educational authorities to provide educational facilities; provided a local community clinic; and supplied building materials for the construction of a mosque. Barrick also operates a successful seed/seedling community out-grower programme which at Tulawaka received the 2007 Tanzanian Presidential Environmental Award.

However, despite these initiatives and the job creation opportunities provided by the mine, as well as the small business development and supplier opportunities, the community surrounding the Tulawaka Mine area remains impoverished and
faces an uncertain future after the mine closure in 2011 (Hughes, 2009).

**North Mara mine – social licence under threat**

North Mara is located in the far north east of Tanzania, and Barrick has yet to be granted a social licence to operate at this mine. Much of this appears to be due to a legacy of very poor practices on the part of the mine’s previous owner, including persistent complaints that the mine was established in an opaque fashion and did not secure the support of the local community for its operation.

A sense of general dissatisfaction at the poor quality of community development initiatives undertaken by the previous owner is pervasive in the area. The geographic, social, economic and ethnic histories of the Tarime district are also important factors in determining its social licence to operate. The physical proximity of the pit, its waste rock dump and tailings to local villages is problematic and there is also legal uncertainty and opacity over land and restitution rights, in particular with regard to compensation for relocation. The long history of related legal disputes has further exacerbated social tensions.

North Mara is also plagued by much more serious issues that go beyond social mistrust and antipathy. These include a high rate of criminal activities targeting the mine. In this regard, a clear distinction needs to be made between small scale miners who operate legitimately under licence, as well as artisanal miners who operate legitimately on the outlying gold deposits, and illegal miners who work either without a licence or – at the extreme end of the scale – steal, crush and process ore belonging to the North Mara Mine.
Barrick has made efforts to operate harmoniously with the licensed miners and to implement an artisanal mining development programme. However, the company has been severely criticised by the community, NGOs and international activists for its operations in and around North Mara Mine, including accusations of the use of excessive force against “intruders”.

Barrick is a signatory to the UN’s Global Compact, but not the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which attempt to regulate the role of company security forces in the extractive sector. Barrick has taken the decision not to use lethal ammunition against “intruders” on North Mara Mine and to call upon the local police force to protect its personnel and equipment.

Despite this litany of problems, there are also positive aspects to the North Mara Mine operations. The mine employs over 1,500 people, 88% of whom are Tanzanian, and total taxes for the state generated in 2008 from the mine exceeded US$45 million. The North Mara Mine Community Relations Department is now the biggest in the group’s African operations and its development initiatives have included water projects, hospital rehabilitation, the building of schools and teachers accommodation, the provision of scholarships, and promotion of local business and agricultural development.

The company has acknowledged that not only does it have no social licence to operate North Mara Mine, but that the very viability of the mine is under threat. Securing the support for the mine’s operations while simultaneously boosting the development of the local community is fundamental.

**Conclusion and outlook**

The example of Barrick’s operations in Tanzania clearly illustrates Kabemba’s argument that gov-
ernance structures in the mining sector should be strengthened, including by fostering greater transparency and stakeholder participation in oversight mechanisms. In addition, in the Tanzanian case, information flows from mining companies to stakeholders also need radical improvement and all government agencies involved in the mining value chain should adopt a “joined-up” policy approach in order to maximise the sector’s development potential, with the mining areas classified as preferential development zones and receiving a greater share of revenues.

However, the Tanzanian case shows that by working transparently and collaboratively with the government (at all levels) and with other stakeholders – most importantly affected communities – progressive mining companies can secure a social licence to operate and make a significant and positive developmental impact in the medium to long term (Hughes, 2009).

As stated above, a global consensus has now been generated about how tackling the “resource curse” must begin by improving governance structures, starting with enhanced transparency and accountability mechanisms for managing revenues. However, the threat from climate change and its implications must now be factored into any debate over responsible natural resource management, particularly in Africa. Africa is the region most vulnerable to climate change, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007).

How this global phenomenon will impact on the political and economic environment in resource-rich countries in the continent is a key area for further research. While Africa’s own citizens are among the most energy-poor in the world (International Energy Agency, 2008), the continent is an increasingly important exporter of the fossil fuel whose emissions are a key cause of climate
change. Overall, around 60% of carbon emissions come from energy-related use, and these are set to almost double by 2030 (IEA, 2009).

In terms of its potential security implications, climate change is likely to be a “threat multiplier”, intensifying existing problems in the continent such as water or food scarcity, and hence the potential for conflict over (lack of) access to, and control of, such resources (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2009). However, the precise impacts of climate change will fundamentally depend on how other, systemic challenges such as weak governance and poverty are managed by states in the region (ibid).

In “resource curse” states, without serious improvements in governance and accountability structures climate change is likely exacerbate their existing governance deficiencies which, in turn, could render them less capable of adaptation. In fact, it can be argued that the urgent need to plan for climate change adaptation and mitigation adds even more urgency to the calls for serious governance reforms.

This is, perhaps, particularly pertinent to oil-exporting countries. While it may be politically unrealistic for new and existing oil producers not to push ahead with further development in the light of the role played by fossil fuels in depleting our limited carbon budget, it can surely no longer be a question of “energy business as usual” and, at the very least, there is added impetus for states to plan for economic diversification away from oil dependency. As a very basic step, the fostering of informed public debate on the interlinked issues of responsible resource management, climate security and energy sustainability and access is urgently required.

Notes

1 EITI is a voluntary initiative aimed at increasing transparency over fiscal flows from the extractive sector. Participating governments agree to publish their receipts from oil, gas and mining companies (including state agencies) and the extractive sector companies their payments to governments. There follows an independent reconciliation of the amounts, with any discrepancies being published and explained. Around 30 countries and 40 oil, gas
and mining companies currently support and participate in the EITI, along with extractive company home countries, international financial institutions and investors (www.eitransparency.org, 2009).

References


Migration, climate and human security: who migrates, who manages, and who matters

Loren Landau
As a result of climate change, changes in the global economy, and the perennial threat of conflict, the coming decades will see significant shifts in the magnitude and, potentially, the nature of human mobility. Most of these movements will take place within the developing world, and a significant part of them will take place in Africa.

This paper is based on the presentations by Kate Lefko-Everett and Loren Landau on the nature of migration driven by what could be called the three ‘Ps’ of migration in Southern Africa: the pursuit of profit (i.e. work), protection (i.e. asylum), and passage (i.e. transit or the desire to move elsewhere). Although the panellists did not expressly engage with themes of migration and climate change, their insights are equally applicable to people moving to escape failing livelihoods due to drought or the dangers of flooding.

That said, the presenters expressed considerable scepticism about those who claim climate change will result in massive displacements in the coming decades. Desertification and rising tides will exacerbate existing sources of social conflict in sending and receiving communities and frustrate efforts to expand livelihood options. Nevertheless, given regional inequalities and governance challenges, meteorological phenomena are likely to remain a secondary or tertiary cause of human mobility in Southern Africa.

Accepting that migration induced by climate change will not fundamentally alter regional migration patterns, we must resist efforts to link migration with efforts to solve the challenges of climate change. While there is every reason to solve the climate problem by collectively finding sustainable and equitable forms of development, we must avoid seeing migration as a problem. Rather, it is a choice families and individuals make - and should make freely - to improve their circumstances, to pursue their objectives, and to consciously alter the circumstances in which they live.

Movements of people do raise challenges to how government agents think and plan, how civil society provides assistance, and how societies are structured and relate to each other. However, ignoring movement or treating it as a sign of failure or pathology in its own right all but ensures we will minimise its development potential while putting more people at immediate and long term risk.
Who moves?

For much of the 20th century, international migration within Southern Africa was dominated by young men crossing borders in search of work (McDonald, 2000). Policy frameworks during this period often discouraged permanent settlement, although many people took up residence – if not always citizenship – in new countries (Peberdy, 2009). During this period, movements within countries were also restricted, whether as a result of apartheid-style segregation efforts (such as Rhodesia and South Africa), Maoist anti-urban bias (Mozambique and Tanzania), or simply a form of class bias or political engineering (Kenya and Zimbabwe).

As a result of political liberalisation, the decline of state supported agriculture, and changing social norms, many of the long-standing restrictions on both domestic and international migration have been eroded or effectively collapsed. The result has been more people moving in a variety of different ways: to cities and peri-urban areas; through cities; among cities; and across borders for both short and long-term forays into new countries and communities (Simone, 2006). Wars and political crises across the sub-continent also continue to generate people fleeing for safety, often living under the ostensible “protection” of other states and the international community, for years or decades.

In a migration system once dominated by temporary, male labour migrants, women have become a visible and important presence among the region’s migrant “stock”. Qualitative work on women’s migration experiences in Southern Africa conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) shows that since 1994 there has been a significant increase in migration to South Africa, and a rise in numbers of women migrants. This trend is likely to be particularly pronounced in terms of domestic migration as current generations become more permanently urbanised (Lefko-Everett, 2007).

Wars and political crises across the sub-continent continue to generate people fleeing for safety

According to SAMP research, most women migrated due to unfavourable or untenable conditions in their home countries, including poverty and unemployment, drought and natural disaster, and food shortages. Women’s migration is often related to changing productive and reproductive roles in households, in which they became the main bread winners for their families. In spite of these negative “push factors”, migration nevertheless had a number of positive developmental impacts: women were able to improve their livelihoods and better provide for their dependents, including children, parents and siblings.

Such findings reflect those of the 2005 Global Commission on International Migration that argued that migration can be empowering for women through moving away from patriarchal societies, earning money and exercising more decision-making power in their own lives, learning
new skills, and changing their socioeconomic status (Piper, 2005).

Despite the human development potential of female migration, policies across Southern Africa have not adequately considered women’s migration, although women face vulnerabilities due to migration controls, patriarchy, and insecurity. Zimbabwean women in particular struggled with the onerous costs and bureaucratic procedures associated with getting a visa for South Africa. As long as they continue to “jump the fence”, they will face an extremely arduous journey, and be confronted with persecution, exploitation and assault from smugglers, security guards and even the police (CORMSA, 2009). In recognising the particular challenges women face, policy needs to increasingly focus on ensuring safe and regular modes of travel and reducing travel restrictions, potentially consolidating the anti-poverty and developmental benefits of migration while reducing scope for exploitation and abuse.

Further, the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa has demonstrated that there are considerable risks associated with being a migrant in the country. Women often reported problems accessing even the most basic services, such as emergency healthcare – they were told services were “for South Africans only” and to go back to their home countries. Far more work is needed in terms of recognising and upholding the rights of migrants in South Africa.

Who manages?
Changing patterns of migration in Africa raises the important question about who manages migration and what the movements mean for state and human security. In trying to address these concerns, there are two important points to consider. Firstly, there is a need to distinguish who is legally
There is a need to shift from discussing facilitating (or restricting) movement at the border

responsible for migration management and who, in practice, manages migration. Secondly, there is value in reconsidering what managing migration means in the kind of places and political environments we are talking about: sites where state institutions are weak, where the law and policy are often as meaningful as rain clouds passing overhead, and where movement of people within countries and across borders is ever more central to the lives of migrants, their families, and the communities in which they live.

As such, if we are to talk about “managing migration” or migration and conflict, there is a need to shift from discussing facilitating (or restricting) movement at the border – or in the case of the European Union, at someone else’s border – to developing mechanisms to address developmental and human rights concerns (including conflicts) in receiving communities, in sending communities, and in assisting their movement in between places.

Let us now return to the first issue of who we should be speaking about: the actors involved in managing migration. In particularly, we need to consider who is legally responsible for managing migration and the motivations behind their efforts. In mid 2009, Dr Siyabonga Cwele, the South African Minister of State Security, announced that government was developing a framework to establish a new Border Management Agency
(Cwele, 2009). Why? In his own words, it was to maintain South Africa’s territorial integrity, expedite the legitimate movement of people and goods, and deter and identify illegal or hostile cross-border movement.

In the minister’s statement, we see the classic view of migration management: something done in the state’s interest by the central state with the primary locus of action at the borders. But unless we confuse intention with practice, these frameworks risk drawing our attention away from those who, in practice, manage migration and the places where that management takes place.

We must begin to realise that what national and regional governments are doing very little to regulate movement in Africa. True, South Africa deported more than 300 000 people in 2008 (about 10 times the number in Sarkozy’s France), but this is exceptional by African standards (DHA, 2009). Apart from South Africa and a recent spat between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), only Botswana has really gotten into the deportation game. But even here – as in the United States and Europe – these extraordinary and extraordinarily expensive efforts did little to disrupt the movements of people across the border. What they have done is disrupt livelihoods within South Africa and the lives of those who depend on migrants (including employers and consumers). All the same, the number of people moving remains relatively unchanged.

The limits of state intervention suggest that we must move beyond the idea of managing or redirecting the flows of people. Migrants are not like water, easily diverted by a dam or drainpipe even though we often use the language of flows, influxes, or, in the case of one South African Department of Home Affairs Official, a human tsunami. Unlike water, we can’t build dykes and seawalls to stop them – not ethically and not practically.
Who matters?
Recognising the degree to which human mobility is and will remain a critical part of African social, economic and political realities, we must focus on who engages with migrants away from the border. And this is where we need to start thinking in new ways about migration management. At a formal level – at least in South Africa – local government and the local police are the foremost actors in addressing migrants; promoting (or limiting) social integration; protecting the health of communities; and arresting and detaining undocumented migrants.

In countries as decentralised as South Africa, these responsibilities fall within their constitutional mandate (although many are reluctant to engage in anything but migration control because they feel threatened by migration, are afraid they will only encourage more migrants, or simply don’t have the skills or resources to act). Even in formally centralised countries, local authorities are usually the only ones who care about, use, or abuse international and domestic migrants (Landau & Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2009).

But in cities across Africa, local government, or rather local governance, does not always follow constitutional mandates or official organograms. Instead, what we often see are heterogeneous legal orders and practical systems of authority that are syncretic, not always ethically consistent, and almost always irregular in their application. At the edges of law – although often shaped by it – traditional authorities, citizen groups, and other bodies often take on the most significant role in managing migration.

Quotations about anti-foreigner violence in South Africa’s townships help illustrate the point, as follows: “If the government does not do something, people will see what to do to solve the problem because it means it’s not the government’s problem, it is our problem.” (Local Induna (Headman), 2009)

In that quotation, we oddly see the evocation of a classic position on migration management: it should be the role of the state. But, if the state’s not doing its job to the satisfaction of the locals, then they must do it themselves.

The second quotation is perhaps more telling. Here, a township resident explains that: “We are not trying to kill anyone but rather solving the problems of our own country and community ... so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of foreigners.” (Madondo, 2008).

In townships across South Africa, similar language is used against citizens: we are trying to solve our community’s problems and people coming from elsewhere in the country are stopping us from doing that.

What these quotations reveal are environments in which national laws often have limited
effects in protecting territory, on one hand, or rights on the other. On the positive side, the fragmentation means we are unlikely to see nationally organised purges against foreigners. It also means we have few centralised levers for promoting positive change. Doing so means finding the community organisations, religious groups and chiefs and getting them involved in the project. But in practical terms it is unclear who has the moral authority or even the coercive power to do that in the kinds of communities where migrants settle.

Understanding the effects of migration

We need to draw attention to two other points about promoting better migration management and looking for sources of conflict associated with migration.

The first is to focus on sending countries and communities. When we talk about sending communities, we often portray them as impoverished societies that have been forced to surrender their residents. Remittances provided by former (and potentially future) residents can help salve the effects of deprivation and conflict. Patterns of mobility and remittances can also exaggerate rather than denude political conflicts. There are three potential sources of conflict associated with migration in sending communities:

First and most obviously is a conflict over resources. As water and arable land become scarcer, someone is going to get dislodged or divested of their assets. You can be almost sure this will be those who are already politically disempowered: ethnic minorities, the poor, women, and other groups;

Second, there will be conflicts among those who leave and those who stay – especially when people who have left have an opportunity to return and claim back their land or other resources. This has been a major source of conflict already and may increasingly become so; and

Third, there may well be conflicts over remittances. Global literature often portrays remittances as a positive thing – the lifeblood of migrant sending communities. They serve this purpose, but as economies fail, these will become the primary source of income and may well become a primary source of conflict. Unless managed carefully, remittances can create inequality and other forms of social transformation within sending communities that can generate conflicts. We can also bet that there is likely to be conflicts as local authorities try to snatch some part of what remain largely private resources.

As we try to address these tensions, we must recognise that sending communities are often outside the state’s purview and regulatory authority. If these conflicts are to emerge, who is going to intervene?

Lastly, let us briefly touch on some of the people who manage migration along the way, such as smugglers, police, and border guards. As
Whose security we think these initiatives are likely to promote?

noted earlier, controls on migration tend to do little to change the demographics of movement. What they do is make it more expensive; like other prohibitions they foster ever more sophisticated criminal networks, and - of course - result in exploitation and human rights abuses. In South Africa, we are now looking at a new border agency. It is unclear what this agency is supposed to do, but if it is anything like Frontex in Europe or the United States’ wall, it will do little to improve South Africa’s moral authority or, for that matter, keep away unwanted migrants (Jimenez, 2009).

Unfortunately, under pressure from its own population and donors, South Africa and other African countries have moved in that direction. With anti-trafficking and anti-terrorist legislation encouraging militarising (or at least more heavily policing) the border, the trend is towards more border controls. Given what we know about African police forces and militaries, granting them expanded authority and mandates are almost never a good thing. When we look at this new security apparatus, we need to ask whose security we think these initiatives are likely to promote?

Conclusion
As we move forward, we need to recognise that policy reform will only take us so far. It is important
symbolically, but we must be humble in our expectations. Policy makers’ continued but misplaced faith in border control is only likely to create human rights abuses and legitimise discrimination, but will do little to stop people moving for whatever reasons. We must also be wary of those who are trying to strengthen borders and regulatory laws, which is potentially a Trojan horse.

Instead we must now shift our attention to understanding the circumstances under which local authorities and bodies are likely to accept outsiders. And even in xenophobic and hostile South Africa, there are local leaders and communities that tolerate and occasionally welcome those from outside.

Unfortunately, we have yet to recognise that in many parts of Africa, the nation state as a unified actor is a fiction. As such, the central state remains at the centre of how we understand security. An approach to economic and human security in the future will require that we rethink these modalities and the institutions that support them. While we must find ways of protecting women and other potentially vulnerable migrant groups, more laws and more policing are likely to result in greater insecurity, not more.

**Notes**

1. It is worth noting that internal migration has long been and continues to be the most significant form of mobility within the region (see Posel, 2003).

**References**


Monday, 03 August 2009

16:30 Welcome and Official Opening
Dr Antonie Nord, Regional Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Cape Town
Ambassador Dieter W. Haller, German Embassy South Africa, Pretoria

16:45 Keynote Speeches
Co-operation or chaos: which kind of world order?
Ralf Fücks, Co-President, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin
Evolving or standing still? Africa’s security architecture.
Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Deputy Minister, International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa

17:45 Opening Panel
New challenges = new opportunities? Security, regional cooperation in Africa and South Africa’s role in it.
Chair: Lerato Mbele, CNBC Africa, Johannesburg
Speaker 1: Prof. Ulf Engel, Institute for African Studies, University of Leipzig, Germany
Speaker 2: Dr Monica Juma, Executive Director for Research, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria
Speaker 3: Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Programme Director Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand

19:30 Reception

Tuesday, 04 August 2009

8:30 Registration

9:00 Climate Change Panel
A climate of conflict: climate change as THE future challenge for human security in Africa?
Chair: Prof. Owen Sichone, Department of Anthropology, University of Pretoria
Speaker 1: Oli Brown, Programme Manager, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Geneva
Speaker 2: Elvin Nyukuri, Research Fellow, African Centre for Technology Studies, Nairobi
Speaker 3: Trusha Reddy, Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Cape Town

10:45  
**Tea Break**

11:15  
**Resource Panel**

*Africa’s natural resources: driver of African development and (in-) stability.*

Chair: Dr Sarah Wykes, Researcher and Campaigner on Natural Resource Governance in Africa, London
Speaker 1: Tim Hughes, Head, Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs, Cape Town
Speaker 2: Claude Kabemba, Director, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Johannesburg

13:00  
**Lunch Break**

14:00  
**Migration Panel**

*Migration and human security in Africa: how can we turn migration from a perceived threat into an actual opportunity for humans and states?*

Chair: Prof. Sally Peberdy, Department of Geography, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town
Speaker 1: Dr Loren Landau, Director, Forced Migration Studies Programme, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Speaker 2: Kate Lefko-Everett, Researcher, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town

15:45  
**Tea Break**

16:15  
**Concluding Panel**

*Stony road: how can we make Africa’s security architecture fit for the new challenges?*

Chair: Dr Monica Juma, Executive Director for Research, Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria
Discussant 1: Vasu Gounden, Executive Director, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Durban
Discussant 2: Prof. Mandivamba Rukuni, Director, Wisdom Afrika Leadership Academy, Zimbabwe
Discussant 3: Ernest Ansah Lartey, Research Associate, Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Department, Kofi Anan International Peace Keeping Training Centre, Ghana

18:00  
**Closing Remarks**

Ralf Fücks, Co-President, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin
Heinrich Böll Foundation – Regional Office Southern Africa
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