


WHO CARES?

South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme in the social sector and its impact on women

Editors: Penny Parenzee & Debbie Budlender



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PREFACE

Two decades after independence from white minority rule, mass poverty and unemployment among the country's black majority remain South Africa's most critical challenges. As is the case globally, women are disproportionately affected. Not only are they less likely to be employed, and earn less than men when they are, the burden of care – of the elderly, the sick and the young – rests primarily on their shoulders.

The Heinrich Böll Foundation in South Africa views this state of affairs not only as an injustice, but also as a profound threat to the country's young democracy. On the one hand, the state's limited ability to address unemployment and poverty undermines its legitimacy and corrodes citizens' trust in its institutions. On the other, state institutions which provide key public services such as health care in a manner unresponsive to the needs of women are state institutions that inadequately represent half of a country's population. Both deficiencies must be addressed if a democratic government such as South Africa's is to realise its transformational mandate, a necessary precondition for the country's democratic consolidation.

In the context of a grant system that does not directly cater for the country's unemployed, the Expanded Public Works programme is one of South Africa's flagship programmes for addressing poverty and providing limited income to those without work. Both the political emphasis placed on this intervention, as well as the resources spent on it, demand its critical assessment.

This publication sets out to provide a critical assessment of the EPWP from the perspective of those most vulnerable: impoverished women. The four papers present original research on the impact of the public works programme on the social sector: early childhood care, victim empowerment services and municipal janitorial services. An omission that could not be addressed within the limits of this project is the impact of the programme on health services through home based care EPWP. This is a gap that will be addressed in further iterations of this project.

It is our hope that the research provided in this publication provides a basis from which South Africa's social protection interventions can be strengthened and improved.

Keren Ben-Zeev

Deputy Director

Heinrich Böll Foundation, Southern Africa

The Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of the Green political movement that developed worldwide as a response to the traditional politics of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Our main tenets are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human rights, self-determination and justice. We place particular emphasis on social emancipation and equal rights for women and men. In Southern Africa we work to advance human rights, consolidate democracies, and encourage economic development based on social and inter-generational justice.

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INTRODUCTION: A GENDER PERSPECTIVE ON SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

Penny Parenzee and Debbie Budlender

Since abandoning the Reconstruction and Development Programme, South Africa's democracy has been marked by macro-economic frameworks that prioritise economic growth as essential for structural transformation of the society, with poverty alleviation as a separate and secondary priority. Even though poverty and unemployment are expressed priorities within government plans, budgets and speeches, the overarching macro-economic framework shapes the type of policy responses that are adopted. Considering that South Africa continues to face ongoing poverty, high levels of inequality and high rates of unemployment, critical examination of the 'suitability' of adopted policy responses to poverty and unemployment is necessary. The fact that the country's National Development Plan reflects contradictory targets¹ with respect to planned responses to poverty and unemployment confirms the need for and relevance of critical examination.

The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), which was launched in 2004/05, is one of the ways in which government has responded to poverty and unemployment. An extension of pre-existing departmental public works programmes that focused on poverty reduction, the EPWP aimed to 'alleviate unemployment for a minimum of one million people in South Africa'² over a five year period (2004-2009), through the provision of short-term, low-paid, labour-intensive employment opportunities. EPWP comprised four sectors, namely economic, infrastructure, environmental and social, each of which was required (through the Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes)³ to ensure that the programme met the targets set for the most vulnerable beneficiaries i.e. 60% women, 2% disabled and 20% youth aged 18-24 years. Throughout the first five years of EPWP, ongoing criticisms⁴ were leveled at this initiative. Concerns were raised, among others, about the lack of clarity as to what constituted EPWP, inaccuracy of information on the extent of the reach of EPWP and the overall effectiveness in responding to the needs of South Africans. Attention was specifically drawn to the inability of short-term, poorly paid work to allow beneficiaries to move out of poverty. Furthermore, questions were raised about the loose reference to 'job opportunities'. In particular, within the social sector provision of training was labelled as a job 'opportunity' even though there was no certainty that jobs would be available for those trained.

Despite the critiques leveled at the poorly conceptualized EPWP, 2009 saw the reintroduction of a further five-year EPWP strategy, referred to as EPWP II. This second phase saw some shifts in the conceptualization of EPWP. The four sectors were reconfigured into (1) infrastructure, (2) environment and culture, (3) social sector and (4) non-state sector (NGO programmes and the Community Works Programme), with distinctions

1 In the National Development Plan 2030, with respect to public employment programmes, which is explained (on page 132) as being expanded public works programmes, the targets reflected on page 132 ('...plan and budget for 2 million opportunities annually' differ significantly from those on page 37 ('...number of public works jobs should rise from the present level to about 1 million in 2015 and 2 million in 2030')

2 Expanded Public Works Programme: Creating opportunity towards human fulfilment. September 2004 at www.capegateway.gov.za

3 See ON PAR Development and CASE (2004: 4) wherein it is stated that the 'Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes had been drawn up for the preceding poverty alleviation programmes, and under which the EPWP automatically falls, requires targeting of those deemed most vulnerable, namely women (60%), disabled (2%) and youth 18-24 years of age (20%)'. This Code of Good Practice was gazetted by the Department of Labour in 2002, following discussions at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), an official forum which brings together government, employers and trade unions.'

4 See Anna McCord (2003) *Public Works as a response to Labour Market Failure* in South Africa Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper No.19

between activities in terms of (i) duration of employment opportunities and skill requirements as well as (ii) where responsibility for implementation is located⁵. The goal set for EPWP II was creation of 4.5 million work opportunities by 2014, with targeting of vulnerable beneficiaries as follows: 55% women, 40% youth and 2% people with disabilities. Additional differences to the previous EPWP phase were the introduction of incentive grants⁶ at municipal and provincial level as well as a minimum wage/stipend level. In the new phase the social sector was also seen as extending beyond early childhood development (ECD) and home - and community-based care (HCBC), which were the initial foci of the first years, but which had already been expanded on to some extent during the first five years. Even though there were marked differences in this second phase, the EPWP can still be questioned on many grounds.

Social sector EPWP - which is unusual in the global context - tends to focus primarily on work responsibilities that women have traditionally fulfilled (e.g. HCBC and ECD in phase 1 and Community Health Workers and ECD in phase 2). With the expansion of EPWP II to include the non-state sector (NGOs and Community Work Programme), there is undoubtedly overlap with work that could be considered to be within the domain of social sector EPWP⁷. Obtaining a comprehensive understanding of social sector EPWP requires an examination of: (a) projects located within this sector (much of which, especially in the social sector, involve work opportunities within NGOs), (b) the relationship to work within the non-state sector, as well as (c) the comparison with EPWP and related work outside the social sector which is often not traditionally associated with women. Such an undertaking serves to provide valuable insight into the extent to which these initiatives are responsive to the needs of vulnerable women (despite the reduction of the target from 60% to 55%) who are most negatively impacted on by poverty, unemployment and HIV, and whether they address the gender inequalities that confront women. This level of analysis is necessary as previous work⁸ has shown that EPWP maintains gender inequities, locking women into assuming care responsibilities; providing poor remuneration for their work and failing to consider the barriers that women face in accessing potential work opportunities.

The intensified social activism defined by service delivery protests, and demands for higher wages and improved living conditions that have been occurring in South Africa cannot be seen as isolated incidents. Instead these incidents form part of a continuum of growing dissatisfaction with the way in which government has failed to implement policy responses that ensure South Africans are able to have their needs fulfilled. The four papers providing a budget analysis of EPWP from a gender perspective aim to generate information that strengthens civil society advocacy in demanding government accountability. These four papers are as follows:

- Setting the Scene – an analysis of the role of EPWP as a form of precarious or informal work in South Africa
- EPWP in Early Childhood Development
- EPWP in Post-Rape Services
- EPWP in Municipal Services

An introductory overview of each of these papers is provided below.

⁵ See Department of Public Works (2014) EPWP Phase II: Presentation to the Select Committee on Public Services

⁶ Based on information drawn from National Treasury presentation to the Select Committee on Appropriations in 2012 which focused on 'Expanded public works programme for the social sector – conditional grant' the following was noted: "This grant is intended to incentivise provincial social sector departments to increase job creation by focusing on strengthening and expansion of social service programmes that have employment potential." Based on an incentive model that the Department of Public Works uses, provincial departments receive allocations from national government that they are supposed to use to pay stipends of volunteers, caregivers and other community workers. Incentive agreements are used between the provincial departments and DPW as a measure to ensure conditions are met and targets achieved in addition to submission of quarterly reports.

⁷ Vetten (2014) Post-rape services and their funding: A review of the national Department of Social Development's budgets between 2009/10 and 2013/14 Shukumisa Campaign.

⁸ Mastoera Sadan (2005) Gendered Analysis of the Working for Water Programme: A case study of the Tsitsikama Working for Water Project, Occasional Paper, IDASA, Cape Town; Lund (2010) Hierarchies of care work in South Africa: Nurses, social workers and home-based care workers International Labour Review vol 149, no.4.

1. SETTING THE SCENE

The title of Van der Westhuizen's introductory paper heralds a theme that continues throughout the papers that follow, namely the role played by the Expanded Public Works Programme as one form of precarious - or informal - work in South Africa. In situating EPWP in this way, Van der Westhuizen sees it as representing a key South African example of the impact of neoliberal capitalism. Her paper draws out how it is black working-class women, in particular, who have been negatively affected by related developments.

Van der Westhuizen argues that the government's view of EPWP as a solution to the challenges of poverty and inequality rests on two incorrect "conceits". The first is that the private sector is or must be the primary creator of jobs, and the second is that poor people "deserve" welfare only if they work for it. This point is implicitly referred to at various points later in the paper when she highlights how various policies were aimed at constraining public sector employment while advocating for employment growth in the economy as a whole. She points to research that suggests that EPWP creates jobs that replace other potentially formal jobs rather than creating jobs additional to those that exist. In doing so, EPWP contributes to labour flexibility which, she argues, benefits employers rather than (poor women) workers.

Van der Westhuizen presents facts and figures that reveal the extent of the problem of joblessness in the country. She shows how black women, in particular, are negatively affected, as are rural people and those who are less skilled. She uses the female-dominated clothing industry as a prime example to illustrate how policies linked to liberalisation have contributed to unemployment.

She then describes the macro plans and policies that set the scene for the EPWP, starting with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in the mid-1990s, and progressing through several other policies to the current National Development Plan. She highlights both similarities and differences across the policies, as well as the inconsistencies and contradictions within particular policies. With a particular focus on the various policies' approach to growth and redistribution, she highlights how they opened the way for EPWP in its current form where it plays a role of providing precarious jobs rather than creating new and sufficient decent jobs. In her discussion, she discusses what underlies various concepts, such as the "second economy" introduced into policy in the Mbeki era, and the imprecisely named "public employment" of the NDP. For women, the second economy approach can translate into employment equity and other interventions to support professional women, managers and women entrepreneurs in the "first" economy (including the public sector), alongside public works "job opportunities" for poor women in the "second economy".

Van der Westhuizen traces the history of the EPWP back to the pre-1994 framework agreement with the construction industry. She records the introduction of the Code of Good Practice and ministerial determination, as well as the expansion of public works beyond construction and infrastructure to the social and other sectors. She points to the uninspiring performance from the start in terms of job creation within infrastructure. She points also to its poor value for money in terms of poverty alleviation in comparison with social assistance grants even if one drops the expectation that EPWP will create permanent decent jobs. She argues further that the first five years of EPWP confirmed that the programme could not be expected to provide skills that would then enable participants to find or create jobs if, as is the case, there are serious challenges in terms of supply of jobs (or demand for labour), rather than supply of workers. She cites evidence from the first five years of EPWP job opportunities replacing what might otherwise have been formal sector decent work jobs.

Despite the weaknesses, government went ahead with a second phase of EPWP. The new phase saw some important changes, including a minimum wage. The expansion of the scope of the social sector, the sector most likely to employ women, continued. The NDP of a few years later set targets of one million job opportunities by 2015 within this sector.

Van der Westhuizen cites a range of sources on actual performance of EPWP over the years. However, she notes – as borne out in detail by the other papers – that EPWP statistics remain questionable and contradictory. In terms of gender, the picture is complicated by the fact that the target for women was initially set at 60%, later dropped (it seems unilaterally by the Department of Public Works that oversees the programme) to 45%, and subsequently raised to 55%.

EPWP budget analysis is complicated by incomplete reporting, a number of different funding channels, and the fact that EPWP is meant to occur both through more labour-intensive implementation using existing funds and through special allocations such as the conditional grants. Van der Westhuizen is therefore unable to provide a clear picture on the budget side, but presents evidence of a range of funding challenges, including cost-cutting and late payment resulting in fewer job opportunities and/or lower payments than envisaged. One might expect such problems to be especially rife in the social sector when EPWP is often implemented through non-profit organisations, which have for years (even before EPWP) faced problems of delayed notification of transfers, delayed contracts and payments, and the like.

In concluding, van der Westhuizen points to the small proportion of unemployed South Africans who have benefited from the EPWP even temporarily. The RDP proposed the EPWP as an interim measure until economic growth generated permanent jobs. The experience of subsequent years suggests that the “interim” is a very long time. Instead, the EPWP may be reducing the number of decent jobs, and replacing them with precarious, underpaid EPWP opportunities. In the absence of other opportunities, many people – including many poor black women – will take up the “opportunities” and provide important services. The provision of these services may lower the cost of providing the “social wage” for other workers and poor people, but EPWP will not help the EPWP workers escape poverty or see them enjoying the benefits of decent work.

2. EPWP IN EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT

Parenzee explores the early childhood development (ECD) component of EPWP. ECD, alongside home- and community-based care, constituted the social sector EPWP when this sector was first introduced in 2004. It was heralded as a sector that could more easily than infrastructure provide job opportunities for women, and provide an important service that had children and women as its most important users and beneficiaries.

ECD has remained an important element of social sector EPWP during a period when ECD has been a government priority more generally. Parenzee’s paper builds on earlier research, which questioned the ability of ECD in EPWP to address the needs of children and their (mainly female) caregivers in terms of quality services, and access to decently paid work.

The paper repeatedly comes back to the question as to whether ECD as implemented as part of EPWP is primarily a skills/training or job creation initiative. This question was already relevant during EPWP I given that ECD EPWP consists mainly of support for learnerships rather than creation of new work opportunities. Stated crudely, ECD EPWP supports existing and new ECD workers while they are being trained, but provides no support once they are qualified. This creates a range of challenges for the ex-trainees, ECD organisations, and for children and their caregivers when the training period is finished. This weakness of ECD EPWP arguably became even more problematic in EPWP II given the decision for EPWP as a whole that the second phase would place less emphasis on skills development.

In addition to the recurrent training-vs.-jobs theme, the paper examines available information on target groups, beneficiaries and users; financing mechanisms; government allocations and expenditure; and the expenditure that (poor) households incur in accessing ECD services for their children.

ECD EPWP is relevant from a gender perspective because most of the ECD workers and trainees (i.e. the “providers”) are women, and because in the absence of ECD services, it is mainly women caregivers (i.e. the potential “users”) who provide care for young children. ECD EPWP could thus contribute to employment of women both directly and indirectly.

Parenzee notes that the initial intention of EPWP ECD was to expand the National Integrated Plan for ECD both by growing the number of ECD centres (and hence the number of children) receiving subsidies, as well as by increasing the value of the subsidy; whilst upskilling the ECD workforce for children 0-4 years of age. Responsibility for the upskilling element which was the core of EPWP ECD was given to the provincial departments of education. However, the reference to subsidy in the framing of EPWP ECD led to some claims that previously existing non-EPWP funds allocated by provincial departments for social development (DSD) for subsidies to ECD centres were expenditure on EPWP ECD. This created confusion from the start as to how much was allocated for EPWP ECD and to what extent it was creating jobs. The confusion was increased by the fact that Phase I set targets for both training and the creation of job opportunities. Yet neither the provincial departments of Social Development nor the departments of Education made any allocations for ECD EPWP posts for non-trainees.

Another negative result of the different funding streams is that while ECD EPWP trainees could receive the minimum EPWP stipend during the training period, once qualified they are unlikely to receive the same level of pay should they secure a job. This is so because the DSD subsidy does not allow payment of wages at the same level.

While EPWP II as a whole saw less emphasis on skills development, within ECD EPWP training was expanded beyond the 0-4 year age category. This was motivated on the basis that it would create more jobs. This, combined with the greater availability (and higher pay and better conditions) of jobs serving older age groups, weakened ECD EPWP’s ability to address the needs of poor young children and their caregivers.

Parenzee provides detailed documentation of the available quantitative information in respect of work opportunities, training, and budget allocations and expenditure. As in other areas of EPWP, she finds substantial gaps in the information, inconsistency in how performance is reported and clear contradictions between sources even from the same agency. Adding to the confusion, the various provinces have widely differing ratios between the amount allocated and the number of work opportunities reported.

Despite the data challenges, there are clear indications that in EPWP II the ECD sub-sector has continued to focus on training rather than creation of job opportunities. On the financial side, the available information suggests that mid-way into EPWP II, EPWP ECD allocations are noticeably lower than in 2010/11, and – despite the reduced allocations – actual expenditure continues to be considerably lower than the allocations.

For the discussion on household expenditure, Parenzee draws on the national ECD audit as well as other research commissioned by DSD and other actors. She highlights the tension between increasing the level of fees charged so as to be able to pay adequate salaries and improve the ECD facility, and ensuring that services are affordable for poor caregivers.

In her concluding discussion Parenzee argues that while EPWP ECD has to some extent prioritised service provision for children, it has not prioritised the needs of their mainly female caregivers. Meanwhile, on the provider side, EPWP ECD reinforces society’s attribution of low value to women’s work. While EPWP ECD might result in some better quality services, those providing the services do not receive better pay once qualified if they remain in the ECD 0-4 age group field. In this sense, EPWP ECD does not prioritise even the needs of poor children.

3. EPWP IN POST-RAPE SERVICES

Vetten's paper focuses on EPWP within post-rape services. These services are primarily provided by non-profit organisations (NPOs), which in some cases receive partial funding from government. In recent years some of the funding has come through various forms of EPWP. This sub-sector thus became one of the areas of work beyond ECD and home- and community-based care identified initially for social sector EPWP. A further indication of the importance attached to post-rape (or "victim empowerment") services is that in recent years National Treasury has provided additional funds to provinces to support such services.

Post-rape services, like the other areas covered by this set of papers, has several different links with gender. In the first place, while South African law now defines rape in a way that recognises the possibility of rape of men and boys, it is primarily women and girls who are victims and survivors of the crime. Secondly, women dominate among the staff delivering post-rape services.

Vetten's paper draws heavily on information from NPOs that provide some sort of service to rape survivors. In the absence of a database of all such services, she draws her sample from the Thuthuzela Care Centres (TCC). These centres represent government's most comprehensive response to the needs of rape survivors and have won world-wide recognition. By February 2014 there were 51 TCCs in operation in the country, in which 29 NPOs provided a wide range of support services. The personnel providing these services ranged from "volunteer" counsellors and community workers through auxiliary social workers and social workers to psychologists. Vetten's paper focuses on the "volunteer" category. Despite being called volunteers, these individuals, often receive some sort of compensation for the work they do. The paper uses ten case studies to illustrate different experiences with EPWP even within a single area of service.

Vetten characterises the type of work done in post-rape services as care work. She presents statistics on paid and unpaid care work in the economy (and households) more generally, and in the NPO sector in particular, to illustrate the dominance of female workers in these areas of work. The dominance of female staff in post-rape services thus mirrors the female dominance in both paid and unpaid care work more generally. Similarly, the poor pay and conditions of post-rape care workers mirror those of care workers elsewhere in the economy.

Vetten includes a discussion on volunteer work, and how this might be conceptualised using frameworks such as the "care diamond", which sees care in different countries provided through different combinations of government, market (private for-profit), community (including NPOs) and household provision. She situates her paper against the background of a funding crisis among NPOs that has seen, among others, a major court challenge against the way provincial governments allocate and manage their financial support to NPOs. It is within this context, that some NPOs have taken advantage of funds coming through the EPWP route, often with some reluctance. Government, she argues, meanwhile sees the social sector as one which it can use to achieve the female percentage targets set for EPWP.

Vetten also provides a brief history of post-rape services, describing how they were initiated in Cape Town by feminist NPOs in the 1970s, and subsequently spread to other areas. She describes the crisis faced by these services in the 2000s as donors increasingly withdrew funding, arguing that a middle-income country such as South Africa should be funding its own service delivery. The rape service organisations also reported that some donors complained that despite all the funds and efforts that had gone into services related to survivors of violence against women, there was little to show. Instead, donors were interested in interventions related to involving men, and/or to prevention.

Within government, there is reluctance and confusion as to who should be responsible for funding NPOs as the TCCs are generally based in a health setting, yet it is the department of social development that would

usually fund such NPO service delivery. Meanwhile, Vetten shows, government has itself introduced initiatives that duplicate existing NPO services but at a much higher cost.

The NPOs referred to in the case study by Vetten received EPWP funding through different routes, and in one or two cases alongside other government funding. The largest number received funding through provincial offices of the Independent Development Trust (IDT), an agency sub-contracted by government to manage EPWP management. The IDT emerges as an organisation that had little interest in the services provided or how the organisation operated, but instead focused on achieving large targets of workers, regardless of the organisation's ability to take on these workers at short notice. The funding generally seemed to provide for the EPWP-prescribed minimum wage, but it was calculated in different ways across projects, and almost always at the lowest minimum rate possible even if workers had experience in and did higher-level tasks. Further, workers were often not employed on a full-time basis, which reduced the value of the wage as they were paid only for time worked.

In several cases workers who had previously been employed on better terms were transferred to EPWP funding and wage rates when other sources of funding dried up. In at least one case this happened because provincial DSD reported that their funding for victim empowerment had been reduced, and they therefore needed to fund the organisation through EPWP.

At the organisational level, the payments for associated costs such as administration were too low to cover the real costs incurred. In one case, funding was halted abruptly mid-contract on the basis that the provincial IDT had run out of funds. In several cases payments to the organisations were delayed, resulting in non- or late payment of workers and, in at least one case, a case being taken to the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration.

In summarising, Vetten points to payment of workers below market rates as one of the defining features of the EPWP. She observes that while below-market rate payment is also a feature of other DSD-subsidised care work, the EPWP payments are even lower than wages paid when organisations receive other forms of subsidy. The paper as a whole suggests that in at least some of the case study organisations EPWP was not creating new jobs, but instead replacing existing jobs, often at lower pay and with worse conditions. Her paper illustrates further how poor administration of payments resulted in late payments and insecurity, further diminishing the already low value of the work opportunity. At the organisational level, EPWP funding through the IDT imposed additional costs in terms of both time and finances.

Vetten concludes that if meaningful recognition is to be given to care work, this would require that it be removed from the EPWP rather than consolidated within it.

4. EPWP IN MUNICIPAL SERVICES

Budlender focuses on EPWP at municipal level, using the City of Cape Town and sanitation and cleansing services in particular as a case study. Cape Town is an interesting case study because it has won two awards for service excellence in EPWP job creation. It is also the capital of the province with the lowest unemployment rate in the country. Further, the metros in South Africa (of which Cape Town is one), together account for more than half of all municipal employment, even if one excludes the various categories of externalised workers. The paper compares EPWP service delivery (and the related work) with other forms of service delivery and work related to sanitation and cleansing services. In doing so it uncovers a range of different ways in which work that might be done by workers employed by the municipality is externalised and/or informalised.

Budlender's report asks four questions – who receives services, and of what quality; who pays for services whether through monetary payments for public or private provision or through their own paid or unpaid work; who is paid for delivery of services; and who determines how services are delivered and the related payments. The third question directly relates to EPWP and other types of precarious and non-precarious work done in delivery of sanitation services. All four questions raise issues of gender, race, class and geography (in the form of formal and informal areas in the City). Stated crudely, poor black women tend to be disadvantaged both as (potential) users of these services and as workers delivering the services, whether for pay or as unpaid workers in the community and in their homes.

The gender issues underlying the topic relate to apartheid legacies in terms of where (black and white) women and men live, the gendered norms that shape women's role and attachment to the "homes" which are the target for services, women's primary responsibility for the unpaid care work related to sanitation, biological differences between male and female that affect physical need for decent sanitation facilities, gendered risks attached to the absence of safe and adequate sanitation facilities, gender (and race and class) differences in terms of types of work done and considered suitable for women and men, and gendered differences in ability to pay for services.

The paper is organised in three sections. The first section provides background information on the sanitation challenges in South Africa in general, and in informal settlements in particular, and on municipal revenue and grants. The discussion highlights the particular challenges that relate to providing a sanitation service in informal settlements. The emphasis on a service, rather than facility, is particularly important as the Constitution provides for a sanitation service, and where non-flush facilities are provided the service aspect may be especially important. The budget discussion introduces the EPWP incentive grant for municipalities. However, subsequent parts of the paper reveal that this is by no means the only form of EPWP funding used in the City of Cape Town.

The second section of the paper focuses in on Cape Town. It provides an abbreviated history of disputes around workers providing municipal services and around restructuring, labour broking and casualisation in particular. It discusses relevant aspects of the City's budget, including mayoral commitments to provision of services for the poor, revenue channels relevant to sanitation, and capital and operating expenditure within the water and sanitation department of the Utility Services directorate, including allocations for a range of contracted service providers.

The description of EPWP operations and budgets in the City is complicated by the absence of a standard way for recording EPWP expenditure in budgets, as well as the fact that EPWP expenditure is distributed across virtually all votes of the municipal budget, and also incurred by provincial and national government departments in respect of EPWP projects in the City. Gendered analysis is hampered by the fact that many of the sources do not provide disaggregated statistics in respect of job opportunities. A further difficulty is that summary sources, and the EPWP website tables in particular, omit some EPWP work recorded elsewhere, including workers on the janitorial sanitation project.

Regardless of these difficulties, the available evidence confirms a wide variety of EPWP work in the City, even if the budgetary amounts involved are a very small proportion of the City budget – 0.9% in Utility Services. The janitorial service alone is fairly extensive, spanning 188 projects and providing work opportunities for 717 workers in mid-2014. However, academic and community-based research as well as media articles have highlighted the problems with these services both for the workers concerned, and for women and men in the communities that are the targeted "consumers" of the service.

A further short section of the paper discusses labour and budget issues associated with several other modes of providing sanitation and related services, including outsourced sanitation services for informal settlements, standard municipal employment, and special rating areas.

The final section of the paper provides summary answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the paper based on the evidence presented. It confirms the disparities in terms of who receives services, and the ways in which women in informal settlements, in particular, are likely to be adversely affected by lack of, or poor provision of sanitation and cleansing services. It notes that provisions of the City's indigence policy in respect of tariffs do not assist those who do not have household-based services, while some of those served through communal facilities are expected to "pay" through the unpaid work of cleaning the facilities. Where the work of providing services is paid, work related to provision of services in informal settlements is more likely to be done on an under-paid EPWP or contracted out basis, while work done in formal areas is generally done by regular municipal workers with a much higher wage, permanent contracts, and a full set of benefits. One exception in this respect is work contracted by special rating areas. Women are more commonly found in the lower-paid, less protected work.

Finally, while in theory, the elected councillors determine how services are delivered in different parts of the City, in practice municipal officials and the consultants who advise them probably have most influence in these decisions, particularly when it comes to the more technical aspects of sanitation services. The pay and conditions for municipal employees are determined through collective bargaining in the South African Local Government Bargaining Council, while the pay and conditions of EPWP workers are determined by the Minister of Labour on the advice of the Employment Conditions Commission. The pay and conditions of outsourced workers, labour broker workers and those who get work through the semi-privatised special rating areas are partly determined by the contractors and non-profit organisations that supply or employ these workers, and partly by decisions of government.



1: SETTING THE SCENE: PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT FROM THE RDP TO THE NDP

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1. INTRODUCTION

At first glance, the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) aims to ameliorate the effects of neoliberal capitalism. This version of capitalism is globally associated with liberalisation and deregulation, particularly the idea that labour should be flexible. Corporations, the World Trade Organisation, the Bretton Woods institutions and particularly western but also some other governments, all advance the idea of flexible labour. As this idea spread from the 1970s onwards, unemployment and socio-economic inequality increased. In the late 1970s, around two-thirds of South Africans of working age were employed. By the early 1990s, fewer than half were employed – a situation that persisted into the 2000s (DED, 2010:4-5). High unemployment was compounded by a low labour market participation rate of 41 percent (NDP, 2012: 360).

Labour flexibility is associated with the international increase of women's participation in paid labour, and is a construct shaped by gender, race and class, with black and working-class women predominating in unregulated, low-wage, low-skill, low-status jobs (Van der Westhuizen 2005:338). The multilateral neoliberal regime of trade rules and agreements and debt conditions remove state protections for citizens and replace these protections with conditions of insecurity. In those sectors where jobs are created, the feminisation of labour means the possibilities of work expand for women, but these jobs are frequently insecure, low-paying, unsafe and unhealthy. Poor women of colour absorb the social costs of liberalisation, as shown in the case of the clothing industry in South Africa since 1994 (Van der Westhuizen 2007b).

The outcome of persistently high levels of unemployment in South Africa is widespread poverty and inequality, which affect women disproportionately. Some 21.7% of South Africans live in extreme poverty and cannot afford basic nutritional requirements, 37% sacrifice food to pay for non-food essentials such as transport, while 53.8% of people fall under the widest definition of poverty, which is surviving on under R779 per person per month (StatsSA 2015a). Some 34% of black⁹ and 13% of coloured people fell below the poverty line at the 2010 level of R292 per capita (Finn, Leibbrandt & Woolard 2013a). Income inequality increased between and within racial groups between 1993 and 2008 (Finn, Leibbrandt & Woolard 2013b). The overall share of the middle classes dropped from 32% in 1993 to 27% in 2008, while the wealthiest decile boosted its share of income from 33% to 40% of total income. The top 20 percent (or 10 million individuals) received 74.7% of total income while the bottom 50% (or 25 million individuals) received 7.8% of total income in 2008 (Leibbrandt & Woolard, 2010 in Terreblanche, 2012). Doing a racial breakdown, in 2008 the 20% at the top of the income pyramid consisted of 83% of white people (3.7 million individuals), as opposed to only 11% of black people (4.4 million individuals), 25% of coloured people (1.1 million individuals) and 60% of Indian people (740,000 individuals) (Leibbrandt & Woolard 2010 in Terreblanche 2012). Black South Africans

⁹ Race is a fraught concept, especially in South Africa. The necessity of overturning the racial legacies of apartheid and colonialism requires further use of racial categorisations in post-apartheid government policy and statistical analysis. Therefore this and other breakdowns in this paper uses black as a separate category to coloured and Indian. In this paper, however, where 'black' is used on its own and not in comparison to other categories, it includes black, coloured and Indian.

(23.7 million individuals) constitute the majority of the poorest half of the population, with coloured South Africans (1.3 million individuals) making up the balance.

The government proffers the EPWP as part of the solution to unemployment. Public works programmes (PWP) are criticised for being 'make-work' programmes, 'involving fruitless activities such as digging holes and filling them again' (Phillips 2004: 2). Apartheid South Africa had its share of this type of public works. To prevent this problem, research suggests that 'labour-intensiveness' be strictly defined as making optimal use of labour as predominant resource while 'ensuring cost-effectiveness and safeguarding quality' (Thwala 2007: 2). Theoretically, PWPs can simultaneously achieve a number of objectives, ranging from the provision of public services and temporary increase in incomes, to a greater sense of dignity, less alienation, and valuable experience (Phillips 2004: 2).

That said, South Africa's EPWP suffers from two neoliberal conceits: the temporariness of EPWP jobs speaks to the conceit that 'governments cannot create jobs, only the private sector can' (see for example NDP 2012:379). The second conceit is that poor people abuse welfare and should be working for state assistance. Providing an EPWP rather than an income grant for the poor can be read as fitting into the New Right rhetoric prevalent in the US and Britain since the 1980s (Smith 1994). According to the New Right, grants create 'dependency' and poor people should demonstrate their deservingness by working for state support. The African National Congress's (ANC) rhetoric moved to this register as early as with the Reconstruction and Development Programme of the mid-1990s (Everatt 2008).

In South Africa, the EPWP is increasingly positioned as the answer to combating 'dependency' and ensuring that 'the poor' earn the state's social protection against the fall-out from neoliberal policies. For the authors of the latest developmental policy, the National Development Plan (NDP), public works employment serves as safety valve for social tensions arising from high unemployment that may hinder medium to long-term growth and development objectives. They regard the provision of work opportunities as 'one of the most effective forms of social protection' (NDP 2012:360). As no special grant exists for unemployed people of working age, 'a significant broadening of public employment programmes will... help to ensure that fewer households live below a determined income level' (p.53). Justified as 'labour market activation schemes', '[p]ublic employment opportunities provide a bridge between social grants and sustainable employment' (p.380). Thus the NDP emphasises the stimulation effect of public works employment on economic activity and labour market (p.379). State-created jobs allow unemployed people to become a 'productive' part of the economy while the structural changes required to create sustainable employment take effect, according to the NDP (p.380). But, it admits, the scope of the public works schemes is 'small relative to the magnitude of the unemployment challenge' (p.360). Therefore it stresses the state's social protections of no-fee schools, 'free' basic services and subsidised public transport. The underlying bias in favour of 'deserving' poor is demonstrated in the proposal of an unemployment assistance fund in the NDP. This would protect people who lost their jobs in the informal sector where they would have been unable to contribute to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which covers the formal sector. Such an assistance fund 'must not discourage re-entry into work' (p.371), a neoliberally minded proviso suggesting that poor people are adverse to work.

While the EPWP is presented as a socially protective state intervention, research shows a number of failures. First, the requirement of labour-intensity for the success of PWPs is not met. Second, research discussed below shows that the EPWP's insecure jobs are being created instead of, rather than in addition to, secure, permanent jobs. Therefore, the expansion of the EPWP amounts to a displacement of permanent jobs with precarious jobs. In this sense, the EPWP seems to be the South African government's answer to the repeated calls for labour flexibility (see, for example, DA 2014 and IMF 2015). What seems like a positive development – the drawing in of greater numbers of women through the social sector EPWP – is in fact to be expected in a programme of flexible labour, as women are particularly targeted for precarious jobs.

2. STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa suffers 'structural unemployment', a condition of prevalent involuntary unemployment that started in the 1970s (Fedderke and Marriott 2002). The problem is intractable and perennial. Some job seekers have stopped trying to find jobs because they are trapped in long-term unemployment. The state agency responsible for official statistics, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), created a separate category to separate jobless people who are still hunting for jobs from people who have stopped looking. Trends show joblessness (using the expanded definition that counts both active and discouraged work-seekers) increasing from 6.7% in 1960, to 10.6% in 1983, to 33.7% in 1995 and to 45.0% in 2001 (Mahadea 2003). The latest figures put joblessness at 35,8% (Stats SA 2014a:13-4). In addition, some 66% of jobless people find themselves currently in long-term unemployment, which refers to being out of work for more than a year (Stats SA 2014a:41).

Women are worse affected than men. The latest data put the percentage of women at 39.9% who qualify for the expanded definition of unemployment (StatsSA 2014a:13-4). This is compared to 32,3% for men. Black women are disproportionately affected, as people counted under the category 'black Africans' experience an unemployment rate (expanded definition) of 40.4%, compared to coloured people at 28.0%, Indian people at 15.5% and white people at 10.0%. Black women are least likely to be employed compared to any other group and have been most affected by the international economic crisis, as their employment dropped from 34.6% in 2001 to 30.8% in 2011 (Stats SA 2013:28). One in five employed African women was a domestic worker by the late 2000s (DED 2010:4). Lack of jobs is particularly a problem in the more rural provinces, where two-thirds of the population are female: unemployment (expanded definition) ranges between 43.0% and 38.4% in the Eastern Cape, North West, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal (Stats SA 2014a:20-2). Youth are also affected disproportionately, as joblessness for 15-24 year old stands at 65.4% while 25-34 year olds are at 40.6% (Stats SA 2014a:17). Generally, women are more likely than men to be underemployed, in informal or unpaid jobs, while providing the bulk of unpaid work in households (Stats SA 2013).

South Africa's excessive unemployment and extreme rate of socio-economic inequality should be understood against the global background of similar figures across countries. Keynesian capitalism's promise of full employment held sway in western states after the Second World War. From the 1970s, however, unemployment as a feature of the neoliberal capitalist framework has been on the ascendance. Joblessness globally worsened in the mid-1970s, early 1980s and 2007-2009 (Tapia 2013). Simultaneously, the feminisation of labour occurred, alongside and interconnected with the informalisation of labour, as myriad low-paying, insecure jobs were spawned and mostly performed by women. The 2007-2009 global economic and financial crisis destroyed jobs and exacerbated South Africa's embedded conundrum of unemployment further.

The reasons for prevailing involuntary joblessness include 'an underperforming formal sector' and unemployed people finding it difficult to enter even informal labour markets (Davies and Thurlow 2010:437-8). The manufacturing sector could be a major source of labour-intensive employment but, instead, shows decline while failing to create jobs for lower-skilled workers. This is partly due to import competition, which intensified after South Africa acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 and joined the World Trade Organisation. The clothing industry is an example of an industry employing mostly women workers that was hit hard when the government signed on to GATT (Van der Westhuizen 2009, Van der Westhuizen 2005). The clothing sector is labour-intensive and absorbs especially low-skilled workers – the type of worker that the South African economy fails to provide sufficiently for even though vast numbers of people find themselves in this category. Despite clothing manufacturing's capacity to absorb workers that the South African economy

mostly fails to include, it was targeted for accelerated dismantlement of protective tariffs. Rapid or badly sequenced liberalisation of trade can cause long-lasting unemployment. Some 74,586 formal jobs were lost in the clothing industry between 1995 and 2005 (Van der Westhuizen 2007b: 113). The retrenched women workers of the clothing sector mostly live in under-resourced and stressed communities where re-skilling and re-employment are unlikely due to the lack of economic opportunities (Van der Westhuizen 2009). Against this background example of thousands of secure, long-term jobs held by women being destroyed and not replaced, the EPWP's insecure, impermanent jobs emerged for women, as discussed in the next section.

3. POLICY CONTEXT OF THE EPWP (1993-2012): ENTRENCHING 'TWO ECONOMIES'

This section sketches the evolving policy of job creation through public works since the genesis of South Africa's democracy, as developed in the following programmes:

- Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
- Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
- Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA)
- New Growth Path (NGP)
- National Development Plan (NDP).

Governments across the world use public works as a policy measure to create short-term employment. A well-known example is that of the US's 'New Deal', started by US president Franklin D Roosevelt to counter the disastrous social and economic effects of the Great Depression. In Africa, countries such as Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria used public works programmes to create jobs and expand their gross domestic product (GDP) (Thwala 2007). The initiative to utilise labour-intensive methods to address the staggering rate of joblessness started in South Africa with the construction sector when, in the early 1990s, government, employers and workers' organisations negotiated and signed a framework agreement in which the construction industry committed itself to labour-intensive construction methods (Watermeyer, n.d.). This agreement was absorbed into the national public works programme (NPWP), created in the Department of Public Works after the 1994 elections. It formed an integral part of the RDP.

The notion of the use of public works for job creation received impetus from the ILO in 2000. Well-known employment researcher Guy Standing and others suggested that temporary public sector jobs could provide the primary short-term mechanism for restructuring 'to combat the worst legacy of apartheid' (p.95). Instead, however, the evidence suggests that social inequality and exclusion, particularly affecting women, has been entrenched.

Over the course of these various government plans for economic and (sometimes) social development, shifts occur. At first, the early emphasis in the framework agreement and the RDP is on addressing structural unemployment with public works. This changes to a focus in GEAR on economic growth as primary panacea to create jobs. A similar shift happens with regards the accent on women as a group that suffers particular exclusion and inequality in the labour market. While the RDP shows a pronounced attention to corrective action regarding women, GEAR erases them from its programme. It took another eight years for GEAR's cousin policy ASGISA to bring women back in. However, despite ASGISA's specific mention of women in relation to the EPWP, its focus is on middleclass women with the means to start their own businesses, or who were already established as businesswomen.

Fast-forward to the NGP, and employment is back in centre space, due to the prominence of trade unionists in Jacob Zuma's political coterie that displaced Thabo Mbeki and his faction in the ANC in 2007. The NGP also brings back the social dimension and makes the necessary links between the actualisation of citizens' life opportunities as human beings and their economic welfare. Women re-emerge as a group demanding concerted corrective action. However, the NGP still clings to the notion of 'redistribution through growth', as first established in the ANC's reworking of COSATU's RDP and reaffirmed in GEAR. The hype around the NDP, closely associated with former finance minister Trevor Manuel, overtakes the NGP. The NDP reconfirms the pre-eminence of economic growth but does contextualise it within broader social conditions, unlike GEAR. Similar to ASGISA, women again receive specific, if scant, mention. The EPWP as medium-term measure is strongly emphasised as part of state-provided social protection to ameliorate the effects of intractable unemployment. This signals a significant change from GEAR, as the NDP acknowledges that public works employment remains part of the foreseeable future in South Africa even if a higher growth rate of 5% is achieved.

Overall, these shifts amount to a change in approach from public works job creation as temporary intervention, to public works jobs as a more permanent economic feature. It boils down to an entrenchment of public works jobs as stand-in for other forms of social protection, particularly cash transfers, for the millions of working-age unemployed people. Given the replacement of permanent public sector employment with temporary public works jobs, as discussed below, the entrenchment of public works jobs also means a smuggling in of labour flexibility despite the government's self-proclaimed commitment to 'decent work' (NGP 2010; Webster 2011) and economic security (RSA 1994a). Public works jobs as economic feature for the foreseeable future amounts to state-sponsored labour flexibility. This state-sponsored labour flexibility is gendered in line with the global feminisation of insecure labour. The expansion of the EPWP to the social sector, with its specific uptake of women, translates into insecure, temporary jobs being offered as the primary solution for the group that suffers the highest rates of unemployment, with associated social effects. Moreover, the latest economic plan, the NDP, continues a trend started in GEAR's cousin policy, ASGISA. It relegates working class and unemployed, usually black, women to the so-called 'second' economy and precarious jobs provided by the EPWP, with no mechanisms for poor women to shift into stable employment.

3.1 RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (RDP) - 1994

The idea for a public works programme as part of the solution to unemployment was expressed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) before the 1994 election. The RDP had sparked the idea for the framework agreement for labour-intensive construction as a social compact to create jobs in the construction sector (Watermeyer n.d.; Thwala 2007). The RDP was first conceptualised by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and adopted as the African National Congress's (ANC) primary policy vision for the country in the first democratic election of April 1994.

The ANC's version of the RDP differed from that of COSATU. COSATU's vision as expressed in its original version of the RDP was left-Keynesian, in that it proposed a policy of 'growth through redistribution'. After concerted interventions by local and global capital, western governments, the international financial institutions and the outgoing National Party, the ANC adopted the opposite position, namely of 'redistribution through growth' (Van der Westhuizen 2007). The original version of the RDP stated as its first priority: 'beginning to meet the basic needs of people: jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare' (Terreblanche 2003:89). But, being hatched at a time of neoliberal triumphalism, the RDP was amended to bring it in line with the globally ascendant ideological position and commit the future government to fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance. The revised version was brought before a special COSATU congress in September 1993 where it 'provoked considerable debate... over what was seen as the thin end of the neoliberal wedge' (Webster and Adler 1998). This version included an emphasis on the neoliberal mainstays of growth, competitiveness, trade

liberalisation, foreign investment, equal treatment of local and international investors, and fiscal and monetary discipline:

- 'Our RDP aims at the building of a new sustainable growth and development path which will achieve growth, create jobs and meet basic needs, redistribute incomes, wealth and economic power within the context of international competitiveness...' (SACP 1993: 19).
- 'We want to... allow our economy to be reintegrated into the world economy without continuing to rely on high protective barriers...' (p.20)
- '[W]e will ensure that international investment rules are based on principles of equality of treatment with local investors.' (p.20)
- 'We will therefore not jeopardise... the RDP by shortsighted... actions that will lead to excessive inflation... and unsustainable balance of payment deficits... We are fully aware that macroeconomic imbalances have resulted in many obstacles to well-meaning programmes of growth, redistribution and development in many developing countries. Macroeconomic stability is vital... [C]oherent, strict and effective monetary and fiscal policies will be a cornerstone of our reconstruction and development programme (p.29).

It continued to centre the objectives of the RDP as to 'eliminate hunger, house all our people, provide water, sanitation and electricity to all, eliminate illiteracy, provide good schooling for children and adult basic education and raise the quality of our health services and make them accessible for all' (SACP 1993: 21). Thus, the 'RDP soon became the paradigm within which all development policies were to be discussed, an extended wish list in which the homeless, the landless, workers, and international bankers could take equal comfort. In other words, it became all things to all people' (Webster and Adler 1998).

Nevertheless, in line with the original intention of creating a policy that would 'tie the ANC into a labour-driven development programme' (Visser 2004:6), the RDP was firm on the 'absolute requirement that we will pursue a living wage policy' (SACP 1993: 21). It also proposed a national public works programme (NPWP) in order to make 'an immediate rapid impact on job creation' (p.20). The programme would be community-based and focused on construction (housing, roads and infrastructure such as schools). After the 1994 election, the NPWP was launched under the auspices of the Department of Public Works, which was realigned to assume additional responsibilities to give effect to the RDP. As a reflection of this reorientation, the department made the national public works programme its 'flagship function' (Radebe 1995). With the target of '2.5 million new jobs in within the next 10 years' (RSA 1995: 2), the department was tasked with achieving the following objectives of the NPWP (Radebe 1995):

- To reduce unemployment and create labour-absorbing jobs.
- To create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets which serve the basic needs of poor communities and to promote broader economic activity.
- To educate and train those in the programme as a means of economic empowerment.
- To enhance the capacity of communities to manage their own affairs.

Despite this comprehensive swathe of objectives, the NPWP was narrowly focused on improving labour intensity in the construction sector. This included the implementation of the abovementioned framework agreement with the construction industry (RSA 1995: 2).

The White Paper on the RDP (RSA 1994a: 8) confirmed the neoliberal shift to 'redistribution through growth' by emphasising 'the challenge is... to generate growth and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of such growth' (p. 20). The white paper defined the RDP as integrating 'growth, development, reconstruction and reconciliation'. Neoliberal elements include financial and monetary discipline as part of

the 'basic strategy' (p.21); the proposed lowering of corporate tax (p.22); and the 'goal' of enhancement of export capacity.

The White Paper still had COSATU's Keynesian ring to it, as the RDP's 'fundamental goal' was stated as being 'an employment-creating, labour-absorbing economy that will ultimately lead to full employment' (p.22). The white paper foregrounded employment creation as 'the central priority' of economic policy (p.20). Two immediate actions were envisaged: reversing the outward flow of investments and facilitating labour-intensive methods in the public sector in the NPWP of the Department of Public Works (p.20). Combining infrastructure upgrading with human resource development is highlighted as 'key' to making the RDP possible (p.8).

The white paper contained contradictions. Prioritising the NPWP meant prioritising impermanent jobs with low wages. Still, the white paper claimed to envisage sustainable jobs. It asserted that poverty would be alleviated by redressing low wages and wage inequalities to ensure 'every' South African achieved 'a decent living standard and economic security' (p.20). The RDP also committed the government to making a break with the 'exploitative cheap labour policies' of the apartheid regime (p.21). Yet the NPWP did not by any means provide decent wages.

Notably, gender equality was singled out as a 'major objective' of economic policy (p.20), including ending discrimination against women in public works employment. 'Market failure' was fingered as exacerbating gender inequality, causing notions of 'women's work' and 'men's work'; employment discrimination in public works; unfair treatment on the basis of marital or pregnancy status; unpaid labour; and insufficient public resource allocation for child care (p.21). Policy objectives included, among others, overturning the gender-biased aspects of government practices, increasing training opportunities for women, ensuring public provision of child care and improving women's economic opportunities (p.21). The white paper stressed the RDP office's mandate as leading an empowerment programme for women on the basis that women often are 'the poorest, most exploited and most marginalised sector of our society' (p.41).

At that early stage the discourse of dependency and that deserving poor are those poor people who work can already be discerned. Jay Naidoo, minister without portfolio who was tasked with advancing the RDP in the first cabinet, stated: 'The RDP is not about the government making hand-outs to our people... we must put Operation Bootstrap into place which aims to solve the problems of our country by pulling up our bootstraps...' (SACS 1995:13).

The white paper expressed doubt about growth 'by itself' or redistribution 'on its own' resolving South Africa's 'serious crisis' (p.22). To achieve that, it stated that the integrated approach of the RDP was needed. Still, the RDP enabled the first severe tariff cuts: tariffs were phased down by an average of one-third over five years, starting in 1995 (RSA 1996:3). Despite the stated intention to expand labour-intensive employment and the purported concern to create opportunities for particularly women in the labour market, the repercussions of these steps include the decimation of the labour-intensive, women-dominated clothing industry.

3.2 GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION (GEAR) - 1996

Soon enough, though, murmurs of discontent could be heard from capital about the RDP's prioritisation of the fulfilment of basic needs, as opposed to economic growth, which featured lower down on the RDP's list of priorities. It was 'not edifying' to capital that the RDP was 'ambivalent' about the role of the state, in that it proposed that the state could step in where the private sector failed: '[T]he commitment in the RDP to freeing the market sits uncomfortably next to stated beliefs in the capacity of the state to deliver change' (SACS 1995: 11).

The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy saw the light in 1996 amid complaints that the presidency and finance ministry had sprung the policy on the country without consultation. Not even the ruling ANC's alliance partners COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were informed. GEAR replaced the RDP, as was demonstrated by the disappearance of Naidoo's ministry at the time.

However, as shown above, the neoliberal drift had already occurred during the lifespan of the RDP. The authors of GEAR were careful to couch the introduction to their policy in the language of the RDP and with explicit reference to the RDP: 'A strategy for rebuilding and restructuring the economy is set out in this document in keeping with the goals set in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. In the context of this integrated economic strategy, we can successfully confront the related challenges of meeting basic needs, developing human resources, increasing participation in the democratic institutions of civil society and implementing the RDP in all its facets' (RSA 1996: 1). However, while the RDP's claim of being people-driven was supported by its people-focused rhetoric, the register of the GEAR document is economic in nature. The section on economic developments emphasises growth, reducing inflation and the budget deficit, reforming taxation, easing the balance of payments, and liberalisation to facilitate international competition before mentioning the integration of the civil service and new social services policies (p. 1). The sluggish pace of job creation is proffered, implicitly, as a justification for the GEAR policy. The goal is again based on neoliberal precepts: GEAR advances 'accelerated growth' based on further fiscal and monetary tightening, outward reorientation of the economy, liberalisation of capital flows and trade, privatisation of state resources, labour flexibilisation and overall macroeconomic stability (p.2-5). This would deliver a growth rate of 6% and 400,000 new jobs per annum by the year 2000 (p. 1), GEAR's authors claimed. Instead, economic growth languished between 0.5% and 4.2% between 1996 and 2000 (www.data.worldbank.org). GEAR repeats the RDP's call for infrastructure development and service delivery 'making intensive use of labour-based techniques' (p. 2), but departs from the RDP in its suggestion of the flexibilisation of the labour market. Labour flexibility is associated with a removal of labour protections, causing worker insecurity.

Despite GEAR's stated intent of offsetting lower tariffs with lower prices for industrial inputs and poorer households to stimulate demand and prevent job losses in sensitive sectors (p. 12), the women-dominated clothing industry was devastated. An emphasis on the aggregate results of trade liberalisation allowed for an argument that the negative effects of trade liberalisation had been minimal, even while admitting that the GEAR data may not capture employment changes sufficiently. GEAR's authors also admit that trade unions might experience the adjustment costs of liberalisation differently (p. 24).

GEAR proposes 'regulated flexibility' despite its stated doubts about the actual impact of trade liberalisation on labour. This call seems based on its analysis of employers exhibiting a 'preference' for unregulated labour. Regulation increases the cost of job creation, hence employers opt for irregular, subcontracted, outsourced, semi-formal or part-time employment (RSA 1996: 4). The matter-of-fact tone belies the reality of large-scale deprivation and increasing inequality due to an economy unable to create jobs, or only substandard jobs – a condition exacerbated by neoliberal policy decisions such as trade liberalisation which destroyed jobs.

The obfuscation about the effects of trade liberalisation confirms the contradiction at the heart of GEAR. GEAR continues to express the RDP focus on labour-intensiveness: 'stronger growth of more labour-intensive components of industry... is vital' (p. 18). But the promised labour-intensiveness goes hand in hand with limited and more flexible public sector jobs. In line with its decidedly capital-oriented slant, the emphasis in GEAR is on the containment of the government's wage bill. Therefore, as it trots out the well-worn refrain of job creation through labour-intensive public works, without much detail, it spells out in intricate detail how to get rid of people in the employ of the state. This it did in the same breath as agitating for greater labour flexibility. First, GEAR exonerates the government from absorbing 'all potential job seekers'. Rather, public works projects would provide 'jobs and limited training opportunities' to 'a significant proportion of the unemployed poor' (p. 33). It would expand 'special employment initiatives' with a possible focus on rural land improvement and municipal infrastructure development. These scant details stand in contrast to the reams

of numbers and budgetary amounts about how the public sector would be 'right-sized' (pp. 8, 20). GEAR follows capital in what it so benignly describes as merely a cost-saving measure: ending permanent formal jobs with protections while proposing impermanent, informal, insecure jobs without protections. If '...the normal government wage bill is contained, it would be possible to increase capital spending by an average of R2.5 billion per annum... [and create] 250,000 jobs by 2000...[U]nskilled and semiskilled workers could be employed, bringing down somewhat the average wage of total public sector employment. Government-funded capital projects are important sources of demand for labour in the present context of widespread employment and should be targeted at the end of the market where employment needs are the greatest' (p.33).

Finally, in contrast to the RDP's stated emphasis on advancing women, GEAR contains no reference to women as a particularly marginalised group in the economy. Redistribution as concept disappears from the official vocabulary of socio-economic development in the shift from the RDP to GEAR. GEAR confirms and intensifies the neoliberal direction in the revised RDP, setting South Africa firmly on its path of self-imposed structural adjustment.

3.3 ACCELERATED AND SHARED GROWTH INITIATIVE (ASGISA)– 2006

The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA) states its goal to be a 'national shared growth initiative, rather than merely a government programme' (Presidency 2006: 3). However, it could never capture the national imagination as the RDP had. This may be due to ASGISA dropping the notion of redistribution completely, without any pretence after the reference to redistribution in GEAR's title amounted to little more than a nod in that direction. Growth was what it was about. ASGISA was not a new policy 'but an emphasis on initiatives to sustain higher and shared growth' (Presidency n.d.). ASGISA's targets of 4.5% between 2005-2009 and 6% between 2010 and 2014 (Presidency 2006:3) were trumped by an average of more than 5% between 2005-2007 but the global economic and financial crisis tipped the country into a negative growth rate in 2009 (-1.5%) from which it recovered to 3.2% in 2011 to drop back to 2.2% in 2012 (Stats SA 2015b). The growth that was achieved up until at least 2007 just fell short of the magical 6% at which substantive job creation supposedly occurs. Therefore the 'sharing' part of the plan could not come to fruition: it foresees that the 'economic focus most shift from growth to "shared growth"', with the stated goal of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014 (DTI 2006:4): 'the fruits of growth [were to be] shared in such a way that poverty comes as close as possible to being eliminated, and that the severe inequalities that still plague our country are further reduced' (Presidency 2006: 3).

GEAR ditches the RDP's 'people-focused' rhetoric and ASGISA follows suit. However, it signals a slight adaptation to GEAR's orientation by criticising the 'unfocused approach of the Washington Consensus' and proposing that 'binding constraints' be removed (Presidency n.d.). ASGISA identifies a series of 'key constraints' that include the following areas that affect labour: volatility and level of currency; the shortage of skilled labour; the labour cost implications of apartheid spatial patterns; the over-concentrated and uncompetitive economy; regulatory problems for small businesses; and deficient state capacity (Presidency 2006: 5). Similar to the RDP and GEAR, ASGISA emphasises infrastructure programmes as one among its six responses to these problems (Presidency n.d.).

While GEAR was mum on women, ASGISA proclaims its goal of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014 only achievable if attention were paid to women and youth (Presidency 2006: 11). Another of its six responses, education and skills development, includes the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) that specifically involves women (p. 11). The document works with then-president Thabo Mbeki's formulation of a 'second economy', controversial for denying its inextricable interconnectedness with the so-called first economy.

The response of 'eliminating the second economy' prioritises 'expanding women's access to economic opportunities' through:

- Human resource training.
- Access to micro and mega finance.
- Fast-tracking women out of the second economy.
- Ensuring their 'significant' participation in agriculture and the creative industries.
- Improving their access to basic services.
- Increasing their participation in the EPWP (p.12).

ASGISA also devotes more space and detail to public works: the EPWP is identified as a 'key second economy intervention', with ASGISA enlarging the programme beyond its original targets. The EPWP is expanded over the medium term expenditure framework period to employ 63,000 more people in maintaining roads and about 100,000 people building roads. Jobs would average time-periods of 6 months (p.14). Women and youth were also to be targeted for involvement in improved maintenance regimes for public infrastructure. It further proposes that major projects be identified at local level for labour-intensive methods, for example, dams and housing projects. ASGISA also identifies 'new elements' for the EPWP, prompting its expansion to the social sector in the form of early childhood development, home-based care and further support for local governments in developing larger EPWP projects. It aimed to 'massify' the EPWP by continually building on progress in the implementation of EPWP projects and broadening and integrating social sector programmes (Presidency, n.d.).

ASGISA is set apart from GEAR by its emphasis on the empowerment of women, which could be explained by then deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka being the lead person on ASGISA. The Department of Trade and Industry prepared a report titled 'Proposed Strategy on Engendering the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA)', which moves from the position that '[w]ithout a meaningful contribution of SA women in business, government and the rest SA has little chance of fully realising' the ASGISA objectives (DTI 2006: 3). ASGISA identifies the following areas for interventions to advance women: black economic empowerment; access to finance; investment; infrastructure development; and the second economy (pp. 4-8). Among others, it refers to the clothing industry as a sector with potential, despite being 'a dying sector' (p. 5), displaying obliviousness as to how the very policies espoused by GEAR and elaborated by ASGISA contributed to its 'death'. Despite ASGISA's emphasis on involving more women in the EPWP to expand their economic opportunities, a disjuncture can be seen with the engendering report, which is focused on established businesswomen. Its section on the second economy contains no reference to the EPWP or details about how it could be used to furnish poor women with a way out of insecure employment.

Therefore, ASGISA draws a line between women in the 'advanced', 'first' economy and women in the 'backward' 'second' economy. More women work in the informal than in the formal sector, while black people predominate in the informal sector (Devey, Skinner and Valodia 2006). Women are also more likely to be doing less lucrative work. These structural inequalities are further entrenched in ASGISA. It relegates women in the 'second' economy to impermanent and insecure jobs, such as provided in the EPWP, while women in the 'first' economy enjoy permanent jobs with expansive opportunities. Drawing more women into the EPWP coincides with the expansion of EPWP jobs understood as 'women's work', such as early childhood development and home-based care. Furthermore, the expansion of the EPWP in ASGISA, along with increasing women's participation, fits with the global trend of feminisation of newly created precarious jobs. Therefore, ASGISA continues GEAR's replacement of secure with insecure public sector employment, but with an added emphasis on the feminisation of newly created temporary work. While women are more affected by unemployment and need jobs, temporary work is not a viable solution.

3.4 NEW GROWTH PATH FRAMEWORK – 2010

The New Growth Path (NGP) was drafted and launched by the Ministry of Economic Development, one of a slew of new ministries in the administration of Jacob Zuma, who succeeded Mbeki as president of South Africa in 2009. As GEAR and ASGISA were both closely associated with Mbeki, the development of 'new' economic plans was in the offing even before Zuma assumed office. The NGP was also a response to the global economic and financial meltdown in late 2008. While ASGISA brings the focus on 'eliminating absolute poverty' to the fore, the NGP signals a shift in emphasis in that it not only aimed to defeat poverty and inequality but also to create 'decent work'. Whereas GEAR and ASGISA highlight economic growth, the NGP places job creation front and centre, to address 'mass joblessness' as 'core challenge':

- 'Identifying areas where employment creation is possible on a large scale as a result of substantial changes in conditions in South Africa and globally;
- Developing a policy package to facilitate employment in these areas, above all through:
 - A comprehensive drive to enhance both social equity and competitiveness.
 - Systemic changes to mobilise domestic investment around activities that can create sustainable employment.
 - Strong social dialogue to focus all stakeholders on encouraging growth in employment-creating activities.' (DED, 2010:2).

The plan is careful to combine reference to job creation with emphasis on 'sustained growth' (p.2). 'Trade-offs' are envisaged, in which government 'must prioritise its own efforts and resources more rigorously to support employment creation and equity', alongside business investing in new areas and labour and business collaborating in resolving inefficiencies across the economy (p.3). Among these trade-offs, a 'competitive currency' features with reference to export-led growth with a weaker rand, as opposed to a stronger rand and cheaper imports.

These elements suggest a significantly stronger emphasis on labour than GEAR and ASGISA, which can be attributed to the marked presence of former unionists in Zuma's cabinet, including Ebrahim Patel, the former secretary general of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union who became minister of economic development. The NGP pursues the 'decent work' agenda of the International Labour Organisation, which defines the concept in terms of the following strategic goals:

- Employment and income opportunities.
- Workers' rights and labour standards.
- Social protection.
- Social dialogue and tripartism (p.5).

The NGP, framed as being part of the sequence of policies starting with the RDP and including ASGISA, notes the effects of these policies without acknowledging them as such: 'The share of wages in the national income dropped from 50% in 1994 to just over 45% in 2009, while the share of profits climbed from 40% to 45% (p.4). The NGP goals include five million new jobs by 2020 and a growth rate of between 4-7% per annum. As mentioned above, the growth rate dropped from more than 5% in 2007 to 1.5% in 2014 (Stats SA 2015b). The NGP prioritises labour-intensive jobs and proposed a state active in creating such jobs.

Among these, public investment in infrastructure construction and maintenance features as 'jobs driver', to create 250,000 jobs per year by 2015 (pp.12-3). 'Jobs driver 4' includes reference to EPWP and, within that, the expansion of the community works programme to the poorest 40% of wards (p.37). Macroeconomically, the NGP shifts the previous policy position to a 'looser monetary policy' in targeting

low and stable inflation but with a view to supporting a more competitive exchange rate (p.17). Labour policies would be amended to reduce the vulnerability of workers in outsourcing, labour-brokering and contract work (p.13). All talk of flexibilisation, as seen in GEAR, vanished. The NGP represents a shift to a 'developmental state' which was not 'simply hostage' to market forces. However, it still had to 'articulate well with market institutions' (p.28).

Notably, in a departure from ASGISA, the NGP contains little reference to measures particularly aimed at advancing women. In a repeat of GEAR's gender-blindness, the NGP's emphasis shift from flexibility to decent work does not take account of possible effects on women, despite the interconnectedness of flexibilisation with feminisation of labour. This immediately raises questions about whether and how the disproportionate involvement of women in insecure forms of work would be addressed.

3.5 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN - 2012

The ink had barely dried on the NGP when the National Development Plan (NDP) saw the light in 2012. Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform Gugile Nkwinti (n.d.) explained the relationship between the two plans as follows: the NDP is the country's vision for 2030 and the NGP 'is a government strategy in pursuit of' the country's vision. 'The NGP is government's strategy to build an inclusive economy and thus create decent employment, sustainable livelihoods and eradicate poverty and income inequality. According to the NDP, the New Growth Path is the government's key programme (should read "strategy") to take the country on to a higher growth trajectory' (Nkwinti, n.d.). Despite attempts to align the NDP and the NGP, 'to avoid confusion as to the nature of the relationship between the two' (Nkwinti, n.d.), the comprehensive nature of the NDP suggests that Nkwinti's acknowledgment that, 'despite the order of coming into being, the NDP has come to take precedence over the NGP', is accurate.

The aims of the NDP repeat those of the plans before: to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality, this time by creating 11 million jobs by 2030. But, in the spirit of the RDP, the rhetoric employed was less economic than GEAR. A more socially holistic approach was also discernible from its poetic-sounding vision and call to mobilise all South Africans.

That the plan is couched in the 'redistribution through growth' mantra of those before it, becomes clear in the highlighting of 'employment through faster economic growth'. However, the NGP's emphasis on a developmental state is reaffirmed with the priority of building the capacity of the state to play this role. Also, as with the NGP's foregrounding of social measures as interlinked with economic measures, education and skills development are listed alongside innovation as priority (p.27).

The NDP is the first of the plans to underscore public works consistently, even as it refers to them as 'last resort employment schemes' (p.379). Public works is an 'essential part of the employment plan until 2030' and a 'key driver of change'. The NDP acknowledges that public works remain necessary even if the growth rate exceeded 5% and job creation took off (p.41), as the 'problem of unemployment and underemployment has become too big for market-based solutions to solve in the next 10 to 20 years. There is no doubt that market-based employment is the most sustainable source of job creation, but in even the most optimistic of scenarios, many people are likely to remain out of work' (p.153). 'Direct and immediate measures to attack poverty' include the proposal to grow public works jobs to 1 million people by 2015 and 2 million by 2020, with a view to scaling these jobs down when formal and informal sector jobs grow (p.28). These jobs would represent full-time equivalent jobs (p.61). Nevertheless, it does add that market-based opportunities must be created where possible (p.154).

The NDP approaches 'active labour market initiatives such as public works programmes' as guaranteeing income support to the unemployed working age population as part of a social floor by 2030 (p. 363). The

welfare function of public works employment is further affirmed with the inclusion, under 'social protection', of 'income support to the unemployed through various active labour market initiatives such as public works programmes, training and skills development, and other labour market related incentives' (p.69). The plan includes an expansion of EPWP's employment incentive aimed at increasing employment in non-profit organisations (p.134). Public works employment also features in the scenario planning exercises in the NDP, with different numbers cited but unexplained in each case, confirming that the EPWP will be embedded in the state's economic plans for at least the medium term. The differences in numbers indicate disagreements about aspects of the NDP, with the document trying to be all things to all people, as the RDP was.

The NDP's vision for public works is telling:

'To promote sustainable livelihoods, it is important that individuals or families, irrespective of income, can access services such as quality education, health care or public transport. It is also important for a person who loses their job to be able to access work from public works programmes or community-based employment schemes. In these ways, public policy and public action complements individual effort in the labour market, providing sustainable livelihoods to the working poor' (p.41).

If this description is re-read with full-time, secure employment in mind, rather than temporary, insecure EPWP jobs, it reveals the mind shift in which the goal of permanent full-time jobs is replaced with an acceptance of temporary, precarious jobs. This would explain the foregrounding of public works employment in the NDP over the medium term, compared to the other plans that assigned a more limited role to public works.

The NDP avoids the silence on women that prevailed in the NGP. It acknowledges discrimination in the education system and labour market, which encumbers access for women to jobs that provide learning opportunities or personal growth. 'The net effect is that women are particularly likely to be locked in a cycle of poverty,' particularly in the rural areas. Despite the evidence of increasing female participation in the labour force since 1994, more was needed to eradicate patterns of inequity (p.459). The plan aims for 'massive absorption of young people and women into economic activity' (p.155-6). The recommendations for women include:

- 'Public employment' (unclear whether this only refers to the EPWP) should be expanded, with a specific focus on youth and women.
- The transformation of the economy should involve the active participation and empowerment of women.
- The role of women as leaders in all sectors of society should be actively supported.
- Social, cultural, religious and educational barriers to women entering the job market should be addressed with concrete measures that are evaluated over time. Access to safe drinking water, electricity and quality early childhood education, for example, could free women from doing unpaid work and help them seek jobs.
- By 2030, especially women should have no fear of crime.
- Security of tenure should be created for communal farmers, especially women.
- Coverage of antiretroviral treatment to all HIV-positive persons requiring such drugs should be expanded (p.43).

However, as Gouws (2013) points out, the NDP approaches women as a monolithic group, not acknowledging how race, class and location affect different groups of women differently. Significantly, the NDP perpetuates the 'first' economy/'second' economy divide first instituted with ASGISA: while public works employment programmes prioritise women as beneficiaries, providing a measure of income relief, they do not include

business training or capacity-building measures, Gouws argues. Meanwhile, the NDP suffers from a lack of measures to enable women-headed businesses to enter the formal economy.

In summary, despite improved economic growth between the mid-2000s and 2009, the predictions made from the RDP to the NDP that mass jobs would be created through growth largely came to nothing. The South African economy becomes ever more capital intensive while mostly creating jobs on the skilled end of the labour market, while demand for unskilled labour has diminished since the 1970s. High unemployment, a global characteristic of neoliberal capitalism, continues. Since the early 1990s, the drift across the five government programmes is away from an emphasis on the creation of stable, permanent jobs in the formal economy towards an acceptance of temporary jobs created through public works. This is due to government being hamstrung by the basic precepts of neoliberal policy, namely that the state is not a creator of permanent jobs and that social security should be 'deserved' by poor people – that is, worked for. Therefore, successive ANC governments do not meet the effects of neoliberal capitalism head-on but increasingly opt for the insufficient alternative of temporary public works employment. Most affected by this inadequate response are (black) women as the social group most likely to be poor and unemployed. Women are either ignored (as in GEAR) or are separated by class. In the latter case, they are either targeted for support as successful businesswomen in the 'first' economy, or positioned as 'the poor', to be relegated to temporary public works jobs in the 'second' economy (as in ASGISA and the NDP). While bridging this divide was on the agenda in the RDP, with training and the promise of preparation for the formal job market, the EPWP failed at these aspects. The focus on future employability diminishes by the time of the arrival of the NDP. The next section discusses the EPWP in greater detail.

4. THE EPWP: A BACKDOOR FOR LABOUR FLEXIBILITY

The framework agreement with the construction industry became part of the Department of Public Works' national public works programme (NPWP) after the 1994 elections. The principles of the agreement form the basis of a 'code of good practice for special public works programmes' that the Department of Labour gazetted in 2002. The code conceives of public works programmes as 'a mechanism for providing unemployed people with a combination of work experience and training' (Phillips 2004: 3). It establishes:

- Employment targets for women (60%), youth (20%), and people living with disabilities (2%).
- Special conditions of employment for workers employed by contractors on labour-intensive projects, including using task-based payment systems and basing payments on the local going rate for unskilled labour.
- Limits on length of employment, as no person may be employed for longer than 24 months in a five-year cycle (Phillips 2004).

At the time, in return for the deviation from minimum wage rates, public works participants are entitled to training of two days for every 20 days (McCord 2009).

Key to the notion of public works employment is the use of labour intensive methods. For example, when compared to conventional capital-intensive methods in the infrastructure sector, labour-intensive work can result in a significant increase in employment opportunities of between 300% and 500% (McCutcheon 2001). 'Employment-intensive' can be defined as '[p]rojects or approaches where labour is the dominant

resource for carrying out works, and where the share of the total project cost spent on labour is high (typically 25 – 60%)’ (Bentall, Beusch and de Veen 1999: 219).

Despite the framework agreement, the NPWP had little positive effect on job creation in the construction industry (McCutcheon 2001). In 1996 the public works department estimated that 100,000 jobs could be created through ‘accelerated labour-based infrastructure development and maintenance of public works in urban and rural areas,’ but employment rose minimally – from 64,424 people in 1995 to 75,387 people in 1998 – even though over 80% of funding for civil engineering came from the public sector (McCutcheon 2001: 280). Further, in a study of public works programmes from 1993 to 1997 in the Western Cape, ‘there seems to be no correlation between the percentage of women participating in the projects and the programme’s ability to transfer resources to the poor’, despite the programmes being aimed at empowering women (Haddad and Adato 2002:218-9). This was due to the short-term nature of the jobs created.

Despite these failures, the EPWP was still launched in 2004, mainly as a labour-based infrastructure programme. GEAR moots the expansion of employment beyond infrastructural projects at local government level to social development projects (RSA 1996:33), which started in the EPWP I. The focus expanded beyond infrastructure to environment and culture (for example, ‘working for water’ and ‘investing in culture’) and the social sector (for example early childhood development and community-based care). While 75% of the ‘job opportunities’ – ‘a single short-term episode of employment’ – were in the construction sector, the other 25% were opportunities in social services (early childhood development [ECD] and home-based care [HBC]), development of small, medium and micro enterprises and environmental rehabilitation (McCord 2009).

According to the Department of Public Works (DPW 2014c), the EPWP’s budget ran to R54.2 billion by 2008/2009, creating almost 1.5 million work opportunities, surpassing the target of one million a year ahead of schedule. The department omits that the original 2004 budget for the whole EPWP was R21 billion. It also omits that the actual 2004-09 budget allocations were more than four times the actual expenditure, exposing ‘a severe inability to spend the allocated budget’ (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2012: 39). The department’s claim also distorts the reality of the jobs created, as these ‘work opportunities’ are not permanent or stable employment but merely temporary jobs.

	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
Net number of work opportunities created	393 441	503 843	592 990	1107 162	1449 806
Total expenditure (including professional fees) in billions	R7.8	R6,1	R11,2	R30,2	R54,2

Source: Department of Public Works. Republic of South Africa (available at: www.epwp.gov.za)

Research also shows that the income transfers are modest and only reach a limited number of households (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent 2010: 52). For example, while R11.2 billion was spent on the EPWP in 2006/07, the wage bill was below R1 billion, compared to the unemployment insurance fund paying out R2.8 billion that year or social assistance grants amounting to R57 billion that same year (p.49). Therefore the cost of running the EPWP far exceeds the amount paid out in wages, suggesting wastage while the unemployed do not receive the full benefit of the programme. Also, the total wage earned per ‘work opportunity’ between 2004/05 and 2006/07 declined by 43% in real terms (p.52).

These findings are borne out by another study that found the work opportunities had been generated at between two to three times the original budget estimate (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2009: 202). As an example, infrastructure jobs cost about R34 billion in the first five years of the EPWP, instead of R15 billion as projected in 2004. In direct contradiction of the basic premise of public works job creation, there

was 'little or no enforcement' of labour-intensity. Across the EPWP sectors, labour-intensity declined from 26% in 2004/05 to about 11% at the end of 2008/09. The social sector in particular dropped from 85% to 43%, which suggests that 'either administrative costs rose considerably over time or the data is faulty' (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2012: 39). As a consequence, no additional employment was generated per unit of expenditure, as envisaged at the start of the EPWP (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2009: 202).

Moreover, using calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of 2007, research finds that about 250,000 people participated in an EPWP programme in the six months prior to the survey (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent 2010: 50). While these findings should be approached with caution, given concerns about the reliability of the survey data, it is worth noting that the figure of 250,000 contrasts with the expected figure of half a million participants, which should have been involved if more than a million job opportunities in the 2007/08 fiscal year were created (p.50). According to the survey, the participation rate for women was also lower than for men in the 2007/08 year, despite women being a targeted group (p.50).

When it comes to the training component, the researchers in the same study note that education is a 'weak' proxy for socio-economic status due to a lack of data. Still, it is worth mentioning their finding that 33% of recent participants completed high school, which is contrary to the stated objectives of providing jobs and skills training to unskilled people (p.51). This adverse outcome could be due to the EPWP not working as a comprehensive development programme but rather as 'an ad hoc collection of existing and new projects' (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkin 2009: 202).

The developmental function of the EPWP ultimately collapses because, as McCord (2009) finds, the extent of the training that is possible in a short-term episode of EPWP work cannot provide participants with significant new technical skills. Moreover,

'the formal training offered to the majority of workers is not skills-oriented and the on-the-job training tends to be low skilled ... No skills shortage has been identified for the genre of low-level skills acquired by most workers through participation in the EPWP, and given the high skills growth strategy adopted by the government, it is unlikely that demand for low and unskilled labour with the skills and experience acquired through participation in the EPWP will increase significantly in the short or medium term' (p. 168).

Therefore, the EPWP does not provide a bridge into the formal economy for the economically and socially excluded, of whom the majority are women. Rather, it relegates poor people and especially women to temporary jobs. Indeed, the EPWP creates the very second economy conditions that the programmes from the RDP to the NDP purport to redress. An analysis of two waste management public works programmes showed that the initiatives halted the generation of new jobs while creating inferior jobs (Samson 2007):

'They therefore contributed to the production of the very problem that they were meant to overcome, belying both the myth that the two economies are separated by a structural divide, and the policy claims that the EPWP will help bridge this divide. The framing of the EPWP as a mechanism to assist the 'unemployable' relegated to the 'second' economy is an attempt to discipline both those employed on the projects to accept their marginalized status and organized labour to accept the de facto creation of a two-tier labour market' (p.244).

The social sector could overcome some of these difficulties, argues McCord (2009), as employment in this sector tends to be longer term – provided up to the legislated maximum in EPWP I of two years – and formal accredited training can be provided to more participants to qualify them for HBC or ECD. However, funding

for HBC and ECD would for the foreseeable future emanate from the state as market demand is unlikely to take its place in a resource-poor context (p.167).

Despite the EPWP ultimately deepening social and economic exclusion, a second five-year phase, known as EPWP II, was approved in 2008 and commenced in 2009. It included plans for better administrative arrangements and new targets to extend the duration of jobs. The number of 'full-time equivalent' job opportunities was to grow to over 400,000 over five years. The EPWP II also aimed at enhancing the developmental, social and environmental impact of jobs. Its focus included:

- 'Longer-term public sector employment, such as in home-based care and community health services, directly funded by departments and supported by targeted training and skills development.
- Project-based employment in construction, rehabilitation and environmental programmes, with scope for increased labour-intensity' (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent 2010: 50).

The NDP highlights the social sector and the community works programme as sites of intensified EPWP job creation (NPC, 2012: 153). These schemes were to complement social-delivery programmes to extend community reach. The NDP promises the creation of up to one million opportunities annually by 2015, mostly through community-based services (NPC, 2012: 119).

Statistics SA released figures that show improvement in aspects identified as problems in the EPWP I. Awareness of the EPWP improved from 42.8% in 2011 to 49.7% in 2013. Women's level of participation was at 61% (Stats SA, 2013:30). Unskilled people formed the majority of participants (68.2%) by 2013 (p.31). Black women particularly benefited, as they formed 85% of the women participants in 2011, growing to 92% in 2013 (p.31).

Nevertheless, despite black rural women being hardest hit by poverty, participation in the predominantly rural provinces is low when compared to Gauteng, the most urbanised province. In 2013, 26% of participants were in Gauteng, as opposed to 3% in the Northern Cape, 5% in Mpumalanga, 6% in North West and about 11% each in Limpopo and Free State (p.32). KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape clocked slightly better figures at 18% and 16%, respectively, but still below Gauteng. Critics identified this focus on Gauteng as a problem during the EPWP I (McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins 2012). Another issue of relevance to the rural areas is the unintended strengthening of the gendered division of labour that designates domestic reproduction as 'women's work'. Rural women take up public works jobs because their part-time nature allows the fulfilment of women's 'domestic responsibilities' (McCord 2009: 242).

The EPWP II's target was 4.5 million job opportunities and two million full-time equivalents (FTEs) between 2008/09 and 2013/14. According to the Department of Public Works, the EPWP created just over four million job opportunities from 2009/10 to 2013/14 (DPW, 2014c). The EPWP social sector achieved over 800,000 work opportunities by December 2013 against the set target of 750,000. Overall, the department claims, the EPWP trumped its target for women and youth, with 60% of the participants being women and 50% being youth, compared to the targets of 55% women and 40% youth (DPW 2014c). However, it should be noted here that the original target for women was 60%, adjusted downward to seemingly boost the impression of success, therefore 60% represents an achievement of the original target.

The figures are in question, as the Department of Public Works (2014d) also admits that data collection is a problem. Critics expressed misgivings about the prospects of achieving the EPWP II targets (Meth 2011). At the end of 2012/13, job opportunities only stood at three million, against a target of 4.5 million, and FTEs at 869,000, against a target of two million (Lukwago-Mugerwa 2013). Suspiciously, while it took four years to create three million job opportunities, in excess of a million such opportunities were created in the last year.

The public works department admits the social sector was less successful at creating FTEs than job opportunities, despite social sector programmes being more long-term in nature. It ascribes the failure to reach some of the EPWP targets, such as the social sector FTEs, to projects starting late, affecting time duration negatively (DPW 2014d). Data collection is also a problem, due to 'under-reporting' by departments. The failure to achieve targets is due to either faulty data because of incorrect reporting by departments, or to budget cuts, which reduces the duration of projects (Lukwago-Mugerwa 2013).

Regarding budget cuts, the social sector programme experienced funding pressures between 2010-2013 at provincial level. Expenditure dropped from R2.2 billion in 2010/11 to R1.5 billion in 2011/12 and R1.4 billion in 2012/13 (DST 2013). Part of the problem was inconsistent management of funding and calls were made for the strict ring fencing of allocated funds for projects (Rule 2014). Due to these pressures, stipends were cut to below the minimum level of R70.59 per day, contravening the EPWP ministerial determination (DST 2013). At a government workshop held in 2013, it was acknowledged that low stipends negatively affected the EPWP's effectiveness with regards poverty alleviation (DST 2013: 7). Moreover, regarding cutting short the duration of projects, length of employment has been found to be a critical precondition for the EPWP to exert any positive impact on poverty:

'PWPs should provide households with an opportunity to save and accumulate assets as well as allow participants to take part in additional developmental activities such as training for permanent employment or establishing income-generating activities' (Ghiassi-Razavi 2012: 67).

A study on the infrastructure sector in the EPWP shows that the short duration of employment does not allow developmental activities and therefore does not contribute to the employability of the participants and, hence, the eradication of poverty (Ghiassi-Razavi 2012). The social sector programme potentially holds the benefit of longer-term employment (McCord 2009). However, this potential is destroyed if projects start late or are cut short due to funding constraints. This directly negates whatever capacity the EPWP might have to overturn the social and economic exclusion of participants.

Shorter job duration also means less training, which directly detracts from the possibility of future employability, ostensibly a key goal of the EPWP. It also adversely affects service delivery in the ECD sector, where frequent disruptions and terminations undermine the relationships that providers need to build with children (September 2007). Therefore budget constraints and cost-cutting in the programme exacerbate the existing limitations of the EPWP, given that public works jobs are found to be 'unlikely to have a significant impact on skills development or unemployment in contexts of chronic unemployment [and] excess supply of low and unskilled labour' (McCord 2009: 155).

Tension exists between the provision of quality services and job creation. In practice, the latter takes precedence over the former in the EPWP (DST 2013). Providing quality services depends on training. The authors of the NDP (NPC, 2012) admit that while it was assumed initially that the EPWP would provide training to enhance the employability of the participants in full-time jobs, this aim ran up against difficulties. Service delivery through PWPs is beset with quality concerns, as rapid employment expansion can be at the expense of training, management and supervision (McCord 2009: 132). These are real problems facing the social sector EPWP (DST 2013).

Furthermore, the provision of training and work experience in the EPWP may amount to no more than labour substitution. In the absence of the aggregate creation of new jobs, those workers who do manage to access jobs after their stints in the EPWP represent the displacement of 'one set of low-skilled workers by another'. This means a repositioning of workers in the labour market rather than a net increase in employment (McCord 2009: 165, 252).

In summary, the execution of the EPWP exacerbates the existing shortcomings of such programmes. The infrastructure sector EPWP is found to suffer from jobs that are too short term to have any developmental effect, also due to a lack of time for and bias against training (Ghiassi-Razavi 2012). The social sector EPWP is positioned to provide longer-term job opportunities and therefore to fare better in the creation of FTEs. Instead, cost-cutting and delays in starting projects reduce the time allocation and therefore the potential benefit. It has a knock-on effect on training, which affects both service delivery and future employability negatively. As workers do not spend enough time on a project, they cannot build assets to reduce their poverty. Whatever little potential remains for development is destroyed by the reduction in stipends. Against the backdrop of chronic unemployment, these conditions of precarious employment displace permanent and stable jobs. This is because (a) public works jobs are substitutes for secure jobs and (b) EPWP workers who find jobs afterwards take the place of other low skilled workers, as no net employment creation takes place. The worst affected by these failures are the most socially and economically excluded South Africans, namely black, poor women who predominate as workers in the EPWP.

5. CONCLUSION: THE CONFINEMENT OF POOR WOMEN IN INSECURE LABOUR

McCord warned in 2005 that the EPWP's possible results are insignificant when compared to the extent of unemployment. Some 3.6 to 7.7 million additional jobs were required to halve unemployment in South Africa, as per the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. The EPWP since its launch a decade ago created a total of 5.5 million work opportunities (DPW, 2014b), with the emphasis on opportunities, as these are neither permanent nor secure jobs. In all, only 8.3% of unemployed people in South Africa have benefited from the EPWP (Ghiassi-Razavi 2012). This 'benefit', however, is temporary and precarious.

The RDP proposed the EPWP as an interim measure until economic growth kicked in and generated permanent jobs. However, the structural conditions of the economy are such that jobs are not created for unskilled workers. The government's adherence to neoliberal macroeconomic policy, from the RDP, GEAR and ASGISA to the NGP and the NDP, does not resolve this labour market failure. In step with the policy, public works employment serves as a social security measure where the structurally poor and impoverished people of the country have to work to 'deserve' state assistance. But international experience shows that temporary public works programmes merely provide short-term relief as they do not dismantle structural unemployment and do not extract participants from poverty (Ghiassi-Razavi 2012).

Instead, as the prospect of permanent and stable employment for millions of economically excluded South Africans recedes, the government's development plans shift to an acceptance of temporary public works employment as a more permanent feature. GEAR prescribes as a cost-saving measure the ending permanent formal jobs with protections while proposing impermanent, informal, insecure jobs without protections. The EPWP entrenches a two-tier labour market in which the 'unemployable' are corralled in a 'second' economy of inferior and insecure jobs. ASGISA draws a line between women in the 'advanced', 'first' economy and women in the 'backward', 'second' economy. By 2012 the EPWP's second tier of 'temporary or contract' jobs at 40 hours a week was confirmed by a ministerial determination, as per the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (RSA 2012: 6). The ministerial determination sets full-time hours for what is still precarious work. In other words, workers are expected to work full-time hours without the benefits and security of full-time employment.

The people most affected by this adverse division of the labour market are black women. They form a majority of unemployed South Africans and of people living in poverty. At 92.2%, they also represent the vast majority

of EPWP participants (StatsSA 2014b). Ironically, the 'benefit' that they work for in the EPWP is to be structurally confined to temporary, low-paying work. Evidence suggests that public works jobs also strengthen the gender division of domestic labour as 'women's work'. Drawing more women into the EPWP coincides with the expansion of EPWP jobs understood as 'women's work', such as early childhood development and home-based care.

Research shows public works programmes do not pull people out of poverty and that the infrastructure sector EPWP fails in improving workers' employability. Those workers who do find work, merely displace others. The social sector EPWP should be marginally better at producing developmental effects, as jobs are supposed to last two years, which should allow some time to build assets. Due to unjustifiable budget strictures and failures in the execution of the EPWP, however, the supposed benefit of working in the social sector fails to reach the predominantly female workers. Job periods and stipends are reduced, so the time periods and earnings are insufficient to build assets. Training possibilities shrink and, with that, the potential for future employment. Meanwhile, the social need far surpasses what the state is prepared to offer, as government funding is at only 17% and 25%, respectively, of the level required to reach all potential beneficiaries of ECD and HBC (Lukwago-Mugerwa 2013).

To conclude, the EPWP is South Africa's contribution to the worldwide neoliberal demand for labour flexibility. As is the case elsewhere, it is associated with a workforce predominantly consisting of women of colour relegated to low-wage, low-skill, low-status and insecure jobs. The expansion of the EPWP with increased women's participation fits in with the global feminisation of newly created part-time jobs. The various developmental plans, of which the NDP is the latest, increasingly reinforce the bifurcation of the economy. This leaves especially poor black women with little option but to accept public works jobs that only temporarily alleviate the worst effects of poverty, but do nothing to dismantle the structural iniquities of the South African economy.

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2: EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND THE EPWP: WHAT IS THE VALUE-ADD AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES?

Penny Parenzee

1. INTRODUCTION

The rationale for 'investment' in Early Childhood Development (ECD) is premised largely on its potential to address poverty and unemployment. The Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) ECD reportedly sets out to contribute towards the expansions of quality ECD services and the provision of training and job creation. However, there is much uncertainty about what constitutes EPWP ECD and about its contribution to quality ECD services as well as to provision of skills and job opportunities. Based on the criticisms leveled at EPWP ECD, it can be argued that the shape and form of EPWP ECD undermines the potential to address poverty for children as well as their caregivers.¹⁰

In order to substantively input into the debates surrounding the contribution of EPWP ECD, this paper will undertake to ascertain clarity with respect to:

- a. Implementation (jobs or training)
- b. Target groups, beneficiaries and users
- c. Financing mechanisms
- d. Government allocations and expenditure
- e. Household expenditure

Throughout the process of obtaining greater certainty about the details of EPWP ECD, critical attention will be given to establishing how women, children and caregivers are located within this programme and the benefits they are meant to, and actually, derive. It is crucial to understand the way in which women are positioned in EPWP ECD, since it is predominantly women who are employed within the ECD sector as 'providers' of these services. Women are also the majority of 'users' of these services. The degree to which EPWP ECD enables women to access opportunities that move them out of poverty, as providers and users of these services, has to be interrogated and prioritized in shaping developments within the ECD sector.

In order to answer the overarching questions, it will require an analysis of EPWP ECD to determine whether:

- the cost of delivering EPWP ECD yields adequate benefits for the 'poor and unemployed'
- EPWP ECD is an appropriate policy mechanism facilitating access to quality services, responding to unemployment and poverty
- EPWP ECD subverts or reinforces gender inequalities

¹⁰ See Giese S, Budlender D, Berry L, Motlatla S and Zide H (2011). Government funding for early childhood development: Can those who need it get it? Parliamentary Liaison Office (2010). Early Childhood Development: What's government doing? Briefing Paper 293

1.1 METHOD

Information was gathered through a literature review that included recent assessments of ECD, reports on EPWP ECD including on the Department of Public Works website, available budgetary data for EPWP ECD from National Treasury, relevant costing research as well as fiscal modeling. In addition to the literature, information was gathered through interviews with identified key stakeholders within government and civil society.

1.2 LIMITATIONS

The key limitations in undertaking this investigation into the value-added to and implications of EPWP ECD for women and their families, include:

- Limited access to budget information that allows for a distinction between allocations for EPWP ECD specifically and that of ECD in general and
- Limited access to key informants within government and civil society during the timeframe that the research was conducted.

2. UNPACKING EPWP ECD

'When the EPWP was introduced, it was agreed that the immediate need in the sector was not for new employment creation, but instead for skills upgrading – and accredited training in particular – of those already in the sector. Already at this stage, there could have been questions as to whether this was really a public works programme, or something else that – while laudable – deserved another name given that public works programme are about employment creation that provides useful assets or services.'¹¹

The introduction of social sector EPWP was unusual, with EPWP having never been implemented in this sector previously. While challenges were anticipated in the implementation of EPWP in the social sector, the conceptualization of EPWP generally, and within the social sector particularly, served to exacerbate these difficulties. The confusion of this 'goodness-of-fit' was evidenced in relation to EPWP ECD.

The initial conceptualization of EPWP ECD was to advance the National Integrated Plan (NIP) for ECD, by:

- i. Expanding the provision of ECD through increasing the number of ECD centres and subsidised children, as well as increasing the value of the subsidy,
- ii. focusing training on the provision of ECD for children 0-4 years of age.

Whilst the aim of EPWP is to address unemployment and poverty, it is apparent that EPWP ECD did not relate explicitly to this agenda. Instead, the underlying assumption was that job opportunities would arise eventually through the implementation of the two aspects of EPWP ECD mentioned above.

However, the actual conceptualization of EPWP ECD and the subsequent implementation thereof were not specifically geared towards having the underlying assumption (of job creation) realized. Instead, as will be

¹¹ Budlender D (2009) in National Treasury Technical Assistance Unit (2010) *Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Employment of Extension Worker Study*. (This is a quotation of Budlender from 2009 which appears in the 2010 Treasury paper)

reflected below, EPWP ECD is unable to contribute towards addressing poverty and unemployment, more especially for those most affected in this sector, namely poor women.

This disjuncture between what EPWP ECD is and the underlying assumption can be attributed to the conceptualization and subsequent systems put in place for its implementation.

Rather than starting from a point that prioritized job creation within ECD, the conceptualization of EPWP involved determining what already existed in the path mapped out for ECD that could be reframed as EPWP. The orientation adopted at this early stage thus provided a platform for re-labeling, giving way to a multitude of confusion with respect to implementation – practices and systems.

'...many of the challenges at an implementation level can be traced back to design of the programme at national level'¹²

2.1 TRAINING VS. JOBS

'The expansion of ECD employment has been conceptualized in a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, EPWP through the Department of Education provides the foundation of the necessary training and capacity building of those employed, and on the other, Department of Social Development provides the long-term funding for the posts into which the EPWP participants will exit.'¹³


Thus, in theory, EPWP ECD commenced with the expectation of it being about training as well as, or more than, job creation. For 2004 – 2009, targets for EPWP Phase 1 were set for providing skills training to approximately 19 800 practitioners. Also, during this period, targets for job opportunities were collectively 30 000 (inclusive of ECD practitioners and support staff). Through the research, no clarity was attained as to the rationale for these selected targets.

However, the practice indicated that EPWP ECD was more often about training and not job creation, with the provision of stipends during training referred to as 'job opportunities'. At no point has the provision of funding for posts to accommodate EPWP participants exiting training been prioritized within Department of Social Development's implementation of EPWP. This emphasis on training is unsurprising when considering that far more attention was given to the training and skills development component than to actual jobs, with a progressive learning path from NQF 1 to NQF 5. Diagram 1 reflects the EPWP Social Sector Plan model for the progression from a lower level of skill to a higher skill level. In practice this means that when people are trained, they move out of practicing as ECD practitioners for 0-4 year olds and take up positions as Grade R practitioners, where salaries are better.

12 Phillips S, Harrison K, Mondlane M, van Steenderen W, Gordon R, Ooshuizen M, Weir-Smith G and Altman M (2009). *Evaluation of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in the North West* HSRC. Centre for Poverty, Employment and Growth (page 12)

13 National Treasury Technical Assistance Unit (2010). *Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Employment of Extension Worker Study*

DIAGRAM 1: EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR PLAN: MODEL FOR PROGRESSION OF SKILL¹⁴



While there were identifications of exit opportunities and matching of the types of exit opportunities with the various training and skills development components, there was no definitive action plan for how these exit opportunities would materialize. Such a plan is vital in a sector that requires long-term employment so as to meet needs that are ongoing. During this phase of EPWP, no funding was allocated towards the training of existing ECD practitioners, instead the focus was only on registering greater numbers of ECD centres.

The emphasis on training became more explicit with the second phase of EPWP, and in addition to this emphasis on training, an expansion of EPWP ECD to existing practitioners working with children in the 0-4 year age category. This decision was reportedly a consequence of the need to create more jobs. The job count was also increased by inclusion of non-practitioner (teaching) jobs. In the North-West Province for example, job training identified as EPWP ECD was inclusive of the cook and gardener at the ECD centre.¹⁵ Thus, while it counted as job training, it was not job creation and not within ECD core skills. The provision of training to an entire ECD staff team would be in keeping with the spirit of a holistic approach to child development, however, the absence of any monitoring and quality control of the full spectrum of training calls into question the contribution towards improving the quality of ECD services. Again, this expansion of the training to practitioners who work with children beyond only the 0-4 age category reflects that the rationale for the decisions were not motivated by the prioritization of job creation for improved ECD service provision. The desperate scramble to increase the 'job count' creates a conceptual shift away from improved ECD service provision for the youngest children, which at an implementation level will inevitably have significant consequences on ECD service provision. This shift calls into question the expressed commitment of addressing the developmental needs of children.

¹⁴ Department of Social Development, Department of Education Department of Health, Expanded Public Works Programme Social Sector Plan 2004/5 – 2008/9

¹⁵ Phillips, S, Harrison K, Mondlane M, von Steenderen, W, Gordon R, Ooshuizen M, Weir-Smith G and Altman M (2009) Evaluation of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in the North West HSRC: Centre for Poverty, Employment and Growth

On a positive note, the emphasis on EPWP ECD as training has seen the up-skilling of existing ECD practitioners. This is important for improving the quality of ECD services and is responsive to the recognition that many practitioners are unskilled. However, this does not address the 'promise' of EPWP ECD being a vehicle for creating jobs for new practitioners.

While reporting on EPWP ECD refers to 'training' as well as 'job opportunities', it is not clear how EPWP ECD provides for job creation, as the programme's emphasis is on training (albeit still plagued with uncertainties). Information provided is neither detailed nor disaggregated, making it impossible to determine the training and job opportunities created for EPWP ECD against set targets. The information is either categorized as ECD, with no indication of what constitutes the EPWP component or it is categorized as social sector EPWP with no specification of what refers to EPWP ECD. These challenges with respect to the available information were apparent during EPWP Phase 1 and although improved during Phase 2, similar challenges continue to exist.

During EPWP Phase 1, the manner of reporting across departments responsible for EPWP ECD was not consistent, thus preventing cross-checking of the data. For example, Table 1 reflects the work opportunities and training days provided for EPWP ECD for the 2006/07 – 2008/09 period as per Department of Public Works (DPW) reporting. However, the Department of Education (DoE), as the department responsible for the training component of the EPWP ECD, reports on the number of ECD practitioners trained. The relationship between training days provided and number of practitioners trained was not explained, neither was there an adequate description within the DPW report or the DoE annual report as to whether the training was solely for ECD practitioners or inclusive of other staff members at ECD centres. However, the provision of training to other staff members at ECD centres appears to have been fairly well-established, with reference in the current draft ECD policy, to unit standards that have been used in EPWP with respect to training for cooks.

TABLE 1: WORK OPPORTUNITIES AND TRAINING DAYS PROVIDED FOR EPWP ECD DURING 2006/07 - 2008/09

	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
Work opportunities created	12 144	9 125	7 531
Training days provided	62 258	204 045	90 362

Further confusion arises with the inconsistency in the figures reported. For example, Department of Public Works, within the same report provided different figures for job opportunities created in Social Sector EPWP during the 2008/09 financial year. It stated on page 53 of the document that a total of 60 910 jobs were created (see Table 2). Yet on page 54 of the same document it claims that a total of 59 508 jobs were created (See Table 3). In addition, the DPW annual report presented a figure of 101 459 training opportunities provided through social sector EPWP for 2007/08 financial year, which is markedly different to the 61 018 reported in its Five Year review of EPWP (See Table 2). For EPWP Phase 1, DoE also had inconsistency in its reporting. For example, in its annual report, the Department stated that for the 2008/09 financial year, a total of 2 661 practitioners received ECD training level 4. Yet, when providing a more detailed breakdown of the ECD training figures, it reports the number of practitioners trained for ECD training level 4 as 2 309. Unfortunately, the reporting on the number of trained practitioners is not distilled to reflect how many of the practitioners admitted into a training course complete the course successfully and how many fail to complete the course, either due to dropping out or not being declared competent.

Information across departmental reports was also not consistent during this phase of EPWP. For example, while DoE provided no reporting on ECD practitioners trained in 2007/08, DSD reported that DoE trained 8 525 ECD practitioners for that financial year as part of the EPWP.

TABLE 2: BREAKDOWN OF WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN SOCIAL SECTOR EPWP BETWEEN 2004/05 AND 2008/09 BASED ON DPWP REPORTING¹⁶

WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN SOCIAL SECTOR EPWP					
Programme Name	2004/5	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
Early Child-hood Develop-ment	-	2 200	12 144	9 125	7 531
Home Com-munity Based Care	1 316	12 769	20 893	35 721	42 473
Safety and Security	0	734	1 075	882	2 493
Other	334	2 156	220	15 290	8 413
Grand Total	1650	17 859	34 332	61 018	60 910

TABLE 3: WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED WITHIN EPWP SECTORS DURING 2004/05 - 2008/09 BASED ON DPW REPORTING¹⁷

WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN EPWP SECTORS						
	Target	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09
Infrastructure	750 000	158 277	103 343	136 035	236 951	377 356
Environment and Culture	200 00	58 796	78 855	117 502	115 686	96 882
Social	150 00	16 50	17 858	34 332	61 018	59 508
Economic	12 000	4 687	1 833	3 231	3 697	6930
Annual Total		223 410	201 889	291 099	417 351	540 676
Cumulative Total	1 000 000	223 410	425 299	716 399	1 133 749	1 674 425

From the information that was sourced for EPWP phase 2, it appears that these challenges with data have persisted. For example, during 2011/12, the Department of Social Development reported that 152 109 work

¹⁶ This table is taken directly from the National Treasury Technical Assistance Unit (2010) Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Employment of Extension Worker Study, which draws on information obtained from the DPW Report (2009) Five year review of EPWP 2004 – 2009, page 53

¹⁷ This table is taken directly from the National Treasury Technical Assistance Unit (2010) Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Employment of Extension Worker Study, which draws on information obtained from the DPW Report (2009) Five year review of EPWP 2004 – 2009, page 54

opportunities were created in Social Sector EPWP (Table 4)¹⁸, whereas the Department of Public Works reported 164 662 work opportunities for the same financial year (Table 5)¹⁹. Information on social sector EPWP was inconsistently reported, thus not allowing for comparative analysis of the data for all years. For example, in 2012/13 Department of Social Development (DSD) reported work opportunities, but DPW only had available reports on the cumulative total of work opportunities created for the same financial year, rather than sector disaggregation.

TABLE 4: WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN SOCIAL SECTOR EPWP FOR 2011/12 AND 2012/13 AS REPORTED BY DSD

WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN EPWP SECTORS		
Reporting dept	2011/12	2012/13
DSD	152 109	171 668

TABLE 5: WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED WITHIN EPWP SECTORS DURING 2009/10 - 2013/14 AS REPORTED BY DPW

WORK OPPORTUNITIES CREATED IN EPWP SECTORS						
		2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14
Infrastructure		263 457	277 100	374 591		
Environment and Culture		95 942	107 189	164 475		
Social		206 421	131 979	164 662		
Non-state sector	Community works	60 039	92 136	100 179		
	NPOs		34 712	39 552		
Cumulative Total		625 859	643 100	843 459	941 593	1 012 664

Despite the challenges with disaggregated information, the description of EPWP ECD indicates that for EPWP Phase 2 training was primarily what constituted job opportunities. This focus on training for EPWP Phase 2 was reiterated in interviews with social sector EPWP staff, with a member stating that “*Our focus was on creating work opportunities and recruitment in phase 1 but we looked at training in phase 2. The emphasis was on training in phase 2*”. As noted above, the problem remains that within the ECD sector, the prospects of moving from training opportunities into longer-term employment are not readily available options.

In determining the impact of the training programmes, the available information is also limited. In fact, no information was available to allow the tracking of the proportion of trainees, not previously employed within ECD, who were linked either to general job opportunities or specifically within ECD. The existing information about trainees speaks more to the migration away from ECD upon receipt of the training opportunities, which is unsurprising as the potential to earn higher – or indeed any - wages is greater outside of ECD.

¹⁸ Information obtained from National Department of Social Development Budget, 2012/13

¹⁹ Department of Public Works, Expanded Public Works Programme Quarterly Report Quarter 4, financial year 2011/12

While some practitioners move into Grade R, many start their own crèches but are not necessarily able to meet the registration standards.²⁰

2.2 TARGET GROUPS – DEEPENING THE UNDERSTANDING OF BENEFICIARIES

As is clear from the above, nothing with respect to EPWP ECD is uncomplicated. This is also true when considering who the target groups are, namely who is benefiting and in what way they are benefitting from EPWP ECD. In an attempt to unravel the conceptualization and practice of EPWP ECD, different categories were created to identify the various target groups of this programme, with further detailing of how they are deemed beneficiaries of these services.

Within EPWP ECD, according to social sector EPWP²¹, the targeted workers are defined as being unemployed and/or underemployed parents and caregivers in ECD programmes. However within this broad reference to 'unemployed and/or underemployed', there are three target groups, to whom engagement with EPWP ECD is supposedly tailored, namely (i) existing practitioners, (ii) unemployed persons and (iii) unemployed parents. According to a DSD presentation on social sector EPWP Phase 2, learnerships will be a vehicle to improve the skills of existing practitioners. For unemployed persons, work place employment and skills programmes will be offered at sites receiving a subsidy. Unemployed parents will be provided with a programme (Parent-Informing-Parent) that provides short three-month employment opportunities at existing ECD sites. In addition, support staff will also be targeted for EPWP funded training. It is worthwhile noting that while learnerships were provided, parent programmes never materialized. In addition no details have been provided on the number of learnerships that were awarded to each of the three target groups, and no information has been shared on the number of people who completed training/skills opportunities (per target group) and then moved into more secure employment. Despite the targets set for the number of women²², youth and persons with disabilities who should benefit from EPWP, as well as targets for youth and persons with disabilities, reporting never provides the exact number of beneficiaries disaggregated along these lines, instead narrowly reflected as targets that have been 'met or exceeded'

In addition to targeted workers, ECD sites will also be targeted, not only for per-child subsidies, but also as sites that provide the work place employment and skills opportunities. The reference to per-child subsidies in reporting on EPWP is interesting given that these subsidies for ECD centres existed long before EPWP was introduced in this area of service provision. Furthermore, there is also inadequate reporting on how many new ECD centres have been registered and whether the 'owner' of the ECD centre is a beneficiary of the training opportunities provided through EPWP ECD.

For EPWP Phase 1, the beneficiaries of the ECD were children aged 0 – 4 years, with specific targets set with respect to the number of children of this age group accessing ECD services.. However, no information exists on whom and which ECD centres were receiving learnerships. Such information will provide a more detailed understanding of which children aged 0-4 years are in fact benefiting from ECD services and whether the quality of ECD services is being improved for the children most in need of these services.

20 Biersteker L, Burns J, Desmond C, Fez N, Harrison D, Martin P, Saloojee H and Slemming W (2012) *Diagnostic Review of Early Childhood Development*

21 *The impact of the CSG on ECD in South Africa presentation by Dept of Social Development at ECD conference Eastern Cape 2012*

22 *Previously set at 60%, then 45% and currently 55%*

2.3 FINANCING STRUCTURE

The financing structure for EPWP ECD reflects and contributes to the confusion within EPWP ECD. When EPWP ECD was first introduced, no new funding was diverted to ECD, resulting in some existing ECD interventions being reported as EPWP (hence the re-labeling). When additional funds were made available subsequent to the identification of EPWP as an APEX national priority, they were included in the equitable share allocations to provinces, thus allowing for discretionary practices within provinces. However, it did not necessarily lead to increased expenditure on EPWP as the funds were generally used for the per-child subsidies – both to increase the amount per child, and to increase the number of centres reached²³. The conceptualization and implementation systems therefore saw EPWP ECD being implemented differently, if at all, within provinces. Funds reportedly under the banner of EPWP ECD have included ECD centre subsidies and/or stipends paid to training participants. For EPWP Phase 2, a minimum stipend level was introduced for payment of training participants alongside all other EPWP workers. The stipend was initially set at R60 per person day in 2010, and is reportedly widely recognized and implemented. Considering that training is provided to up-skill existing ECD practitioners, the payment of stipends for training has meant that employed ECD practitioners have been able to supplement their low wages for the duration of the training, since ECD worker wages are often less than R60 per person per day. However, post the training opportunities, the reduction of income (despite improved capacity) encourages movement away from ECD. Since 2011, the financing structure was adjusted with funds being provided by way of a conditional incentive grant to EPWP social sector. This incentive grant involves the quarterly provision of additional funds when an entity/provincial department has generated at least 35% of their target number of EPWP jobs, with the requirement that 80% of the grant is used towards stipends.²⁴ These grants are deemed unsuitable for EPWP ECD, since the funding is a) reliant primarily on centre-based subsidies and b) ECD requires long-term employment, which is discouraged with the condition of this incentive grant of creating 'new' job opportunities²⁵.

The constraints and confusion in the financing structure requires a critical examination of whether ECD services can be improved through job creation.

2.4 GOVERNMENT BUDGET ALLOCATIONS AND EXPENDITURE

The responsibility for EPWP ECD is spread across various departments, with provincial DoE and DSD being the key departments. Determining the allocation and expenditure for this component of Social Sector EPWP across all 9 provinces, is therefore challenging.

The conditional incentive grant, referred to earlier as confusing in its structure, is also problematic with respect to how it is presented. The format of the budgets for incentive grants does not allow a determination of how much is allocated for EPWP ECD specifically because it is for the social sector as a whole. What is included in the social sector has expanded beyond ECD and home-based care over time. While lump sum totals are given with respect to social sector EPWP and also a breakdown of these allocations for the Department of Social Development and Department of Education, the exact portion of this grant that is for ECD is not stipulated. As shown in Table 6 and Table 7, the incentive grant increased exponentially between 2011/12 and 2012/13, with significant decreases in subsequent years²⁶.

23 Giese S, Budlender D, Berry L, Motlatla S and Zide H (2011) *Government funding for early childhood development: Can those who need it get it?*

24 Parliamentary Liaison Office (2010) *Early Childhood Development: What's government doing? Briefing Paper 293*

25 Giese S, Budlender D, Berry L, Motlatla S and Zide H (2011) *Government funding for early childhood development: Can those who need it get it?*

26 Information on these incentive grants for social sector EPWP was sourced through the Division of Revenue Acts (DORA) 2011 – 2014.

If one considers the conditions that determine the provision of conditional incentive grants to state departments, it is not likely that ECD received much of this allocation²⁷.

TABLE 6: SOCIAL SECTOR EPWP INCENTIVE GRANT TOTAL ALLOCATION AND SPECIFIC ALLOCATIONS FOR DEPTS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION FOR 2011/12 - 2016/17

Province		2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Eastern Cape	Total	5070	200825	49728	41714	11054	
	SocDev	5606	6 708	6 862	2 580		
	Education		973	3 000	2 580		
Free State	Total	15 586	231 399	8 545	11 700	21 379	
	SocDev		6 240	9 377	3 694		
	Education		5 941		2 846		
Gauteng	Total	34 848	281 469	27 652	73 338	72 702	
	SocDev	8 2 89	12 873		22 627		
	Education			3 000	36 016		
KwaZulu-Natal	Total	30 269	551 100	24 306	19 544	21 502	
	SocDev	3 821	-	14 610	2 000	-	-
	Education	-	-	-	2 580	-	-
Limpopo	Total	28 332	35 399	57 717	18 632	26 935	
	SocDev	3 382	11 168	8 985	2 772	-	-
	Education	-	18 557	27 768	13 280	-	-
Mpumalanga	Total	13 407	76 870	1 961	18 844	29 733	
	SocDev	-	-	-	3 988	-	-
	Education	9 901	12 613	-	6 312	-	-
Northern Cape	Total	13 890	43 911	19 879	22 018	16 004	
	SocDev	5 651	1 506	5 745	6 161	-	-
	Education	-	1 000	5 845	2 025	-	-
North West	Total	42 222	178 185	50 870	26 306	31 254	
	SocDev	10 955	8 834	16 431	4 323	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-		
Western Cape	Total	16 734	319 501	16 906	25 876	10 000	
	SocDev	4 704	-	2 580		-	-
	Education	8 066	23 903	12 298	13 354	-	-

Note: No specified figures for NW Education budget. Grants just captured as 'EPWP Grants'.

²⁷ Conditional incentive grants are provided when an entity/provincial department has generated at least 35% of their target number of EPWP jobs, with the requirement that 80% of the grant is used towards stipends.

TABLE 7: INCENTIVE GRANT EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR PER PROVINCE FOR 2011/12 - 2014/15

INCENTIVE GRANT EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR					
Province	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
Eastern Cape	5 070	200 825	49 728	41 714	11 054
Free State	15 586	231 399	8 545	11 700	21 379
Gauteng	34 848	281 469	27 652	73 338	72 702
Kwazulu-Natal	30 269	551 100	24 306	19 544	21 502
Limpopo	28 332	35 399	57 717	18 632	26 935
Mpumalanga	13 407	76 870	1 961	18 844	29 733
Northern Cape	13 890	43 911	19 879	22 018	16 004
North West	42 222	178 185	50 870	26 306	31 254
Western Cape	16 734	319 501	16 906	25 876	10 000
TOTAL	200 358	1 918 659	257 564	257 972	240 563

The problems experienced with reporting on allocations and expenditure for EPWP ECD is not the sole reserve of the incentive grants. Even though departments are expected to submit quarterly reports of the expenditure and number of job opportunities created with respect to EPWP, this is not necessarily happening and the information shared is not reliable. Differences in what constitutes EPWP ECD and double-counting as a result of re-labeling occurs frequently. Table 8 below reflects information compiled from second quarter 2010/2011 EPWP report of the Department of Public Works²⁸. As evidenced from this table, information is provided for only 6 of the 9 provinces and expenditure is significantly lower than the allocations. Table 9 reflects information compiled for the second quarter 2012/13 EPWP report of the Department of Public Works²⁹. More than mid-way into EPWP Phase 2, as indicated in Table 8, information is provided for all 9 provinces, however, the table reflects that the social sector EPWP ECD allocations are not only significantly lower than the 2010/11 period but that even with the reduced allocations, expenditure continued to be considerably lower than the allocations.

Furthermore, when looking comparatively at Table 8 and Table 9, queries have to be raised about the work opportunities reported relative to the expenditure. For example, in table 5, the Free State ECD for Department of Social Development reports 455 work opportunities against an expenditure of R16.7 million, whereas in 2012/13, this same department reports 428 work opportunities against an expenditure of R6.6 million - an almost equivalent amount of work opportunities against a budget that in 2012/13 is close to three times less than that of 2010/11.

²⁸ The information is taken from the report by Giese S, Budlender D, Berry L, Motlatla S and Zide H (2011). Government funding for Early Childhood Development: Can those who need it, get it?

²⁹ Expanded Public Works Programme Quarterly Report for 2012/13, Quarter 2 Annexures A-E, www.epwp.org.za

TABLE 8: EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR ALLOCATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND WORK OPPORTUNITIES PER PROVINCE FOR SECOND QUARTER 2010/2011

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR REPORTING				
Province	Projects	Allocated	Expenditure	Work Opportunities
EC - ECD DOE	1	57,057,000	6,748,500	949
EC - ECD DSD	197	98,192,584	5,453,884	526
EC – ECD (no dept.)	9	1,011,120	201,316	23
WC - ECD DSD	7	607,506,099	63,114,131	1184
WC- ECD DOE	11	1 5,630,667	3,360,099	1385
WC - ECD (no dept.)	2	776,000	6 9,000	60
FS - ECD DOE	112	491,568,000	80,640,000	112
FS - ECD PSSL	1	515,736	257,868	6
FS - ECD DSD	158	36,153,243	16,764,877	455
FS - ECD DOH	1	4,389,000	720,000	1
MP - ECD DHSS	1	76,000	114,000	19
MP - ECD DOE	3	588,000	147,000	35
LP - ECD DHS	686	32,029,200	8,644,900	1591
LP - ECD DOE	1505	64,158,400	18,146,800	2957
LP - ECD Agric	1	48,000	12,000	2
LP - ECD (no dept.)	157	6,924,800	1,583,700	303
NW - ECD DOE	2	1,639,000	552,000	162

TABLE 9: EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR ALLOCATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND WORK OPPORTUNITIES PER PROVINCE FOR SECOND QUARTER 2012/2013

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS EPWP SOCIAL SECTOR REPORTING				
Province	Projects	Allocated	Expenditure	Work Opportunities
EC - ECD DSD	19	2 432 925	1 185 648	50
EC – ECD (no dept.)	8	990 000	479 878	19
FS - ECD DSD	185	14 061 623	6 613 204	428
FS - ECD (no dept.)	2	108 000	54 000	2
GP – ECD – DPW	1	12 652 160	6 326 080	338
GP – ECD – DOE	10	177 135 201	50 844 940	8 167
KZN – ECD – DSD	55	12 291 996	2 742 23	244
KZN – ECD (no dept.)	1	205 920	51 480	3
KZN – ECD DoE	105	49 777 922	19 551 750	2 089
LP - ECD DoE	1101	22 115 680	7 783 575	1 449
LP – ECD (no dept.)	4	64 200	16 050	5

MP – ECD DoE	82	33 319 655	9 598 321	104
MP – ECD DoH&SD	1	16 680	4 172	1
NC- ECD – DoE	1	2 870 000	621 000	128
NW – ECD – DoE	16	1 220 630 400	306 095 040	1 618
NW – ECD – DoH	1	316 800	79 200	19
NW – ECD – DSDWCPD	158	7 879 428	2 116 190	839
WC – ECD – DSD	11	11 021 140	9 085 337	591
WC – ECD – DoE	26	30 704 704	7 664 059	2 165
WC – ECD (no dept.)	4	12 983 586	1 028 692	13

While budgetary information for EPWP Phase 2 is a marked improvement on information available for EPWP Phase 1, ascertaining the exact allocations for EPWP ECD remains difficult, at both national and provincial levels, as the allocations are not clearly reflected in the relevant departmental budgets.

With respect to the national Department of Social Development reporting on EPWP, in the 2014/15 budget vote, budgetary information is provided in relation to EPWP Social Sector³⁰, without distinguishing between the various Social Sector EPWP initiatives (Table 10). DSD reflects EPWP within Programme 5 'Social Policy and Integrated Service Delivery', sub-programme 'Special Projects and Innovation'. The budget breakdown for this sub-programme reflects the allocation as approximately 5% of the total budget in 2010/11, decreasing to 3% in 2013/14. Over the 2014/15 MTEF, the allocation declines to 2% of the total budget. In reporting on its budget, the department states that during 2012/13, 171 668 work opportunities were created through social sector EPWP. Yet, given that historically social sector EPWP has emphasized HIV home and community based care, it is likely that these opportunities are primarily for these functions, rather than ECD.

TABLE 10: DSD PROGRAMME 2: SOCIAL POLICY AND INTEGRATED SERVICE DELIVERY

Sub pro-grammes	Audited outcome			Adjusted Appropriation	Medium-term expenditure Estimate		
	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13		2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
R Thousand							
Special Projects and Innovation	6680	11 719	9847	9762	8375	8523	9049
TOTAL	144 310	244 858	260 301	289 731	323 166	341 572	360 639

Even though expansion of ECD is a key aspect of EPWP ECD with respect to the role of DSD, no mention is made within budget documents as to the number of ECD sites registered nationally nor the number of children subsidised at ECD centres nationally. While a standard indicator for reporting is 'children in registered centres', information pertaining to subsidized children is not easily provided. With the national audit on ECD, the National Department of Social Development reported that provincial social development departments provided subsidies to just over 70% of registered ECD centres, benefitting a total of 1.1 million children nationally³¹. While in its 2014/15 budget, the national department of social development makes no reference to the number of registered ECD sites (although previously a key indicator in 2013 and 2014 reporting) and number of children benefitting for the financial year, Although some information is provided at a provincial level, it is not consistent across the departments. Table 11 presents the information that was

³⁰ National Department of Social Development. 2014/15 Budget Vote

³¹ Provincial Budgets and Expenditure Review 2010/11 – 2016/17

obtained from provincial budget information for 2010/11, 2011/12 and 2013/14 financial years³². When departments have reported on the number of registered ECD centres rather than on the number of funded centres (as not all registered centres are funded), information has been excluded from the table below. There are also departments that do not provide any specific information on the funded sites and/or on the number of children benefitting from ECD at these funded sites. This inconsistency in reporting is of concern especially when one of the standard indicators that provincial departments are required to report to National Treasury is the number of children accessing registered ECD sites.

TABLE 11: NO. OF FUNDED ECD CENTRES AND CHILDREN BENEFITTING FROM THESE CENTRES FOR 2010/11, 2011/12 AND 2013/14

Province		2010/11	2011/12	2013/14
Eastern Cape	No. of funded centres			1 315
	No. of children benefitting			53 590
Free State	No. of funded centres	884		917
	No. of children benefitting	43 772		45 500
Gauteng	No. of funded centres		1 013	1 172
	No. of children benefitting	67 557		69 995
KZN	No. of funded centres			
	No. of children benefitting			
Limpopo	No. of funded centres		1 800	
	No. of children benefitting	110 675		114 296
Mpumalanga	No. of funded centres		697	
	No. of children benefitting	52 180		
Northern Cape	No. of funded centres			
	No. of children benefitting	32 420		
North West	No. of funded centres			983
	No. of children benefitting			
Western Cape	No. of funded centres			
	No. of children benefitting			

For example: within the national Department of Education, EPWP is captured in terms of Programme 2 'Curriculum, Policy, Support and Monitoring' sub-programme 'Kha Ri Gude Literacy Project' (Table 7). This project is described as one that provides literacy and numeracy skills to adults targeted for job opportunities as 'volunteer facilitators' -

"With an allocation of R1.8 billion over the medium term, this project has to date provided 2.9 million adults with the opportunity to become numerate and literate in one of the 11 official languages. In 2013/14, the project registered 673 743 additional learners and provided a stipend to 42 371 volunteer facilitators"³³.

32 Information sourced from provincial Department of Social Development 2014/15 budget documents and also from Budlender, D & Proudlock, P (2012) *Funding the Children's Act: Assessing the adequacy of the 2012/13 budgets of the provincial*. University of Cape Town

33 National Department of Education 2014/15 Budget Vote

However, this reference to EPWP does not pertain to training ECD practitioners, and instead is about providing subsidies to adult educators.

Even though the DoE also makes reference to ECD as a strategic goal to *'improve the quality of early childhood development'*, and in relation to Programme 2, the 2014/15 national DoE budget does not explicitly illustrate a sum total (nor a provincial breakdown) of the amount of money that has been allocated to ECD. As the Department funds learnerships and stipends for ECD, such budgetary reflections should be made explicit.

TABLE 12: DOE PROGRAMME 2: CURRICULUM POLICY, SUPPORT AND MONITORING

Sub pro-grammes	Audited Outcome			Adjusted Appropriation	MTEF - estimates		
R Thousand	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Programme Management: Curriculum Policy, Support and Monitoring	763	2 002	2 727	2 676	2 455	2 590	2 756
Curriculum Implementation and Monitoring	89 312	237 707	228 565	263 730	267 771	280 387	295 661
Kha Ri Gude Literacy Project	466 760	497 339	572 457	608 933	634 939	544 683	570 545
Curriculum and Quality Enhancement Programmes	180 602	963 256	897 885	989 683	1 049 762	1 098 438	1 157 181
TOTAL	737 437	1 700 304	1 701 634	1 865 022	1 954 927	1 926 098	2 026 143

The shared responsibilities for ECD also present challenges in determining not only the allocations and expenditure for ECD, but also the specific EPWP components. For example, aside from EPWP ECD allocations residing with DSD and DoE, allocations are also housed within the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, with respect to Community Works Programmes (CWP). Even though CWP do not directly fund ECD-related activities, they do contribute in that allocations are made towards payments for community workers, of whom some are based at ECD centres as well as for related services such as provision of food to ECD centres³⁴. Again, the budgets that are specifically tied to ECD-related components are not clearly specified.

Even though clear reference may be made to ECD within the provincial departments of Social Development and Education budgets, the allocations for EPWP ECD are not obvious. For example, table 13 reflects the provincial allocations identified in relevant budget documentation as ECD and then also tries to reflect those aspects indicated as EPWP ECD. However, based on the information in table 13, it emerges that the

34 Giese S, Budlender D, Berry L, Motlatla S and Zide H (2011) Government funding for early childhood development: Can those who need it get it?

allocations for EPWP ECD do not correlate with the information for the same financial years reflected in table 9.

Furthermore, the description of EPWP ECD allocations within provincial budget documentation does not enable a distinction between the various components of ECD. For example, the 2014/15 Western Cape Department of Education's budget attributes considerable growth in multi-year allocations to Early Childhood Development (Programme 7) to 'additional resources (...) provided to promote participation in Grade R *as well as* for the Expanded Public Works Programme Integrated Grant for Provinces (EPWP) that provides for ECD practitioner training and resource kits for ECD sites'³⁵. While there has been an increase in the allocation to ECD therefore, it is not clear how much is for practitioner training, and how much is for resource kits for ECD sites.

TABLE 13: EPWP BUDGETS WITHIN ECD ALLOCATIONS FROM DSD AND DOE

Province	Department	Programme	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Eastern Cape	DSD	ECD and Partial care		135 545	136 523	158 425	172 621	162 474
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP					1 000	
	DoE	ECD	365 451	363 356	453 808	558 513	699 134	736 887
		Pre-Grade R Training (EPWP)	6 336	3 055	20 197	22 276	23 478	24 746
Free State	DSD	ECD and Partial care	174 105	164 365	177 134	185 811	185 004	185 295
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	3 092	2 366	878	3 000	4 478	4 478
	DoE	ECD	86 298	86295	134 229	121 763	130 091	133 534
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	4 412		763	1 800	1 926	2 060
Gauteng	DSD	ECD and Partial care	232 008	266 697	304 521	404 090	435 082	437 966
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	340 828	338 659	635 631	733 958	923 212	972 835
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	37 646	16 809	41 547	43 583	45 588	48 004
KwaZulu-Natal	DSD	ECD and Partial care	246 851	166 249	206 333	219 108	220 943	232 653
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	345 625	462 867	506 152	651 468	855 420	900 756
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	5 498	59 007	56 416	128 894	135 053	142 211

35 Department of Education Western Cape, Vote 5 2014

Limpopo	DSD	ECD and Partial care	-	-	-	227 000	193 588	197 253
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	163 901	112 089	146 345	169 823	239 510	252 231
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	91 698	42 744	21 126	28 503	30 045	31 664
Mpumalanga	DSD	ECD and Partial care	154 342	140 779	175 538	207 688	205 753	218 947
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	154 964	177 786	196 274	192 402	199 536	211 346
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	116	8 780	14 328	15 044	15 856	16 696
Northern Cape	DSD	ECD and Partial care	49 737	62 943	73 545	76 030	79 831	83 823
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	56 330	72 184	78 547	84 402	110 421	116 237
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	404	5 793	1 710	3 272	3 404	3 584
North West	DSD	ECD and Partial care	39 784	72 874	64 354	83 569	99 557	106 787
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	223 279	238 778	352 265	413 206	457 648	496 741
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	26 347	28 080	30 000	31 766	33 620	35 402
Western Cape	DSD	ECD and Partial care	183 813	186 813	246 427	257 000	275 504	287 586
		ECD & Partial Care EPWP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	DoE	ECD	339 593	383 894	456 712	522 449	545 030	578 273
		PRE-GRADE R TRAINING	86 031	101 250	94 932	100 153	105 562	111 261

2.5 THE NON-FACTORED COSTS: HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON ECD

Often when it comes to considering cost factors, the contribution of households tend to be overlooked, with the focus primarily on government budget allocations and expenditure. Education and care impose costs for households and with respect to EPWP ECD these costs have to be considered, as it informs the financing structures as well as budget requirements for ensuring access to ECD services.

According to the national audit on ECD, all provinces reportedly provide subsidies of R15 per child per day to attend registered ECD centres (although some provinces such as Free State Department of Social Development³⁶ have reported subsidies of R14 per child per day with increases planned for 2014/15). However, even though accessing a subsidy is means tested in order to reach poor children, there is no guarantee of equal access to services nor, as with fee-free schools, a guarantee that there will be no fees for ECD. The reality is that these services generally involve user fees, with costs estimated between R50 and over R1 000 per month, thus excluding children from poor families. Considering that facilities are not necessarily available

³⁶ Department of Social Development Free State Province 2014/15

(or sufficiently available) in all areas, transport costs can also be incurred, providing an additional hurdle for low-income families.

Research, undertaken jointly between the Department of Basic Education, Department of Social Development and UNICEF in 2010 explored the cost implications of ECD. It revealed that the emphasis was on improving the financial situation of the facilities and that very few facilities had children who were exempted from paying fees. However, the research reflected that the subsidies are recognized as playing an important role in pitching fees at a more affordable rate “*Grants clearly reduced the outlays that poor parents had to make and thereby made ECD much more affordable*”³⁷. The study also revealed that in the absence of the grants, not only would the fees be significantly higher, but many facilities would not be able to operate. This study further indicated that whilst ECD services were reaching those in need, there were concerns about the quality of care, particularly with respect to unregistered sites.

Well into EPWP Phase 2, a study conducted on the use of the Child Support Grant (CSG) for ECD services³⁸ found that while many people do use the CSG to access ECD services, the cost of ECD services remained a significant barrier. Within this study, costs attributed to ECD were inclusive of direct costs such as fees as well as the hidden costs relating to transport, food, toiletries, buying and also washing of clothing. The decisions to not use ECD services appeared to be informed by the cumulative costs (direct and indirect) that are incurred when accessing these services.

Amidst the recognition of the value-add of ECD services, the research also made explicit the relationship between cost and quality of services. According to the research, the cheaper ECD services, while in high demand, do not provide quality services, with concerns expressed about the poor food, lack of sanitation and also uncertainty as to the child’s safety. The more expensive the services, the better the quality of care, however, the less accessible it is for those who are most vulnerable in our society. The relationship between higher fees and quality care is further supported in a Western Cape study that audited the quality of ECD facilities (2010).³⁹ Concerns were raised about the implications of this relationship, namely that the most deprived children are not accessing the level of care required to enable them to ‘offset the deprivation’ they experience.

The extent of the inaccessibility of ECD becomes stark when examining the budgets for subsidies against the cost of services relative to the number of children in need of these services. Budlender, in comparing ‘needed funds’ to actual ‘budget allocations’ for ECD in 2014/15 (Table 14) illustrated that the allocations were insufficient to provide for all children aged 0-4 years in funded centres within 6 of the provinces.

37 Department of Basic Education, Department of Social Development and UNICEF (2010) *Tracking public expenditure and assessing service quality in Early Childhood Development in South Africa*

38 *The impact of the CSG on ECD in South Africa presentation by Dept of Social Development at ECD conference Eastern Cape 2012 (author not named) See www.dsd.gov.za*

39 Dawes, Biersteker, Tredoux and Hendricks (2011). *Final Report Western Cape Department of Social Development 2009 Audit of Early Childhood Development Facility Quality*. HSRC.

TABLE 14: ECD - COMPARING NEEDED FUNDS WITH 2014/15 BUDGET ALLOCATIONS USING 2013 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (R'000)⁴⁰

	Monthly cost	Budget	Cost as % of budget	Children in funded centres	As % poor 0-4
EC	11 753	174 784	81%	35 615	6%
FS	21 287	185 811	137%	64 505	37%
GT	18 397	404 090	55%	55 748	14%
KZ	24 824	219 108	136%	75 225	9%
LM	21 942	227 000	116%	66 491	13%
MP	13 379	207 688	77%	40 541	12%
NC	6 128	76 030	97%	18 569	24%
NW	6 290	83 569	90%	19 060	8%
WC	19 634	257 000	92%	59 498	29%

This gap in adequate resourcing adds to the family burden because more expenses will be required from the household to cover the under-budgeting of ECD services.

3. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF EPWP ECD TO EXISTING DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ECD SECTOR?

It is widely recognised that early childhood development (ECD) programmes are beneficial not only for children, but also for families and communities. ECD initiatives have been known to develop and improve children's social and emotional behaviours, reduce drop-out rates, contribute to intellectual development, increase school enrolment, improve nutrition and health and reduce grade repetition.⁴¹ The government of South Africa has expressed great concern about the development of children. The commitment to addressing the developmental needs of children flows from the Bill of Rights and is evident from South Africa's ratification of international child rights conventions such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

A series of national laws, policies and plans around ECD have also been developed over the years. Four of the most important are (i) The White Paper on Early Childhood Development (2001); (ii) the National Integrated Plan for ECD (2005-2010) which is currently under review; (iii) the Children's Act No. 38 of 2005 (and corresponding regulations and norms and standards); (4) The Norms and Standards for Grade R Funding (2008) in accordance with the South African Schools Act (1996).

Department specific policies that relate to ECD have also been formulated. DoE first addressed ECD in its *Interim Policy for Early Childhood Development (1996)*, which referred to the broad framework for ECD that the 1995 *White Paper on Education and Training* had sketched. Subsequent to that, the 2001 *Education White Paper 5 on Early Childhood Development* identified a number of critical areas to be addressed in an integrated ECD strategy.

⁴⁰ Table 14 reflects information generated by Budlender and Francis (2014) *Budgeting for social welfare in South Africa's nine provinces, 2010/11 – 2016/17* DG Murray Trust. The table is directly taken from the Budlender and Francis (2014) paper.

⁴¹ Briefing Paper 23, Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2012. *Early Childhood Development: What's Government Doing?*

The White Paper 5 also called for:

- An inter-sectoral strategic plan that would target appropriate and integrated services and programmes for children younger than five years;
- An improvement in the quality of pre-Grade R programmes, inclusion of health and nutrition, appropriate curricula and practitioner development and career pathing⁴²

ECD is also addressed in the DSD White Paper on Social Development which refers to the provisioning for children from birth to nine. This white paper places emphasis on a family oriented approach to childcare. The intention is to not only target childcare-givers and social service professions but to include parents. Addressing ECD is also a focus in the DOH's aim to address the health needs of children, as is evident in the Health Sector Strategic Framework and the National Strategic Plan's (NSP's) acknowledgement of a 'Primary Health Care Package' targeting pregnant women and children under five.

Amidst all these policy developments pertaining to ECD, there has been a national audit and a draft ECD policy has been made available for public comment. The policy recognizes that ECD is complex and involves a range of stakeholders to ensure access to quality ECD services for all children. The draft policy distinguishes between provision of ECD services in the short-to-medium term (Essential Package) and the medium-to-long term (Comprehensive Package), and places a strong emphasis on strengthening the provision of the essential package of ECD services. Within the policy, the shortcomings of the existing funding model for ECD are raised, with recognition of its negative impact on the availability, access to and quality of services for poorer children and their caregivers. The draft policy provides a comprehensive approach to ECD that prioritises the coherence and co-ordination of ECD services for the most marginalised children and caregivers.

However, there is a need for the new policy to give strategic consideration to the role of EPWP in relation to ECD. As stated above, the relationship between ECD and EPWP has not been well conceptualized, and this policy provides a platform to critically engage with the extent to which ECD can be instrumental in the provision of work opportunities in relation to where most poor children reside. A concern is that the current draft policy, while making reference to a holistic approach to ECD does so in the absence of any engagement with EPWP. For example, while indicating a home visiting programme could be implemented through ECD specific home-based carers, the relationship to EPWP is only alluded to rather than explicitly stated. The inclusion of a critical analysis of EPWP ECD as well as a clearly articulated position of how EPWP should be considered, if at all in the provision of ECD services, needs to be reflected within the draft ECD policy. Based on the analysis within this report, EPWP does not appear to be an appropriate funding stream and, if in line with this analysis, the draft ECD policy needs to stipulate this very clearly.

4. WHAT ARE THE GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF EPWP ECD?

It is clear that EPWP, with its set targets for the number of women beneficiaries, recognizes the need for unpaid work, (largely undertaken by women), to become – at least partially – paid work. However, with respect to EPWP ECD, as illustrated below, there does not appear to be much evidence that the interventions are structured to address gender inequalities.

The conceptualisation and implementation of EPWP ECD undermines gender equality, thus reinforces women's marginalised status in society. The conceptualization is problematic in that it has failed to adequately

⁴² Briefing Paper 23, Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2012. *Early Childhood Development: What's Government Doing?*

prioritise women's needs from the perspective of women as predominantly the 'providers' of ECD services as well as women as 'users' of these services.

With respect to the role of 'users', EPWP ECD has extended the prioritization of service provision for children in the absence of prioritizing their caregivers. In failing to prioritise young mothers, working mothers as well as mothers who wish to seek work, the structuring of ECD services inadvertently fails to allow women with children to access further studying and work opportunities to improve their life circumstances⁴³. For example, ECD services are either in the form of half-day services or these services are not provided every day. The policy also emphasises home-based provision for the 0-2 year olds, and proposes that as soon as a woman works, she has to pay for the ECD services.

If one considers the emphasis within the new draft ECD policy, this blindness to the needs of mothers exacerbates the lack of access to study and work opportunities.

In terms of the role as 'providers' of the service, EPWP ECD reinforces this lack of value of women's work. Not only is it a low paid sector, but also one in which inadequate consideration has been given to how women working in this sector can meaningfully be moved out of poverty. While the value of women's work is not addressed in EPWP generally, this oversight in a sector which predominantly has women in its employment is especially concerning. The implementation sees the prioritization of training opportunities in order to up-skill ECD practitioners. Stipends are paid for the duration of the training opportunities but limited prospects of more secure jobs post the training opportunities exist. The incentive grant has been structured so that it encourages 'the creation of new job opportunities', thus placing women in a precarious employment situation. With the EPWP ECD training component focused also on the up-skilling of existing ECD practitioners, in some provinces such as the North-West, the stipend has been an additional source of income, thus supplementing the low wages of ECD practitioners. For places where this practice does exist, once the training concludes, there is no access to a supplementary income, sliding ECD practitioners into a situation where they are 'back to being worse off', namely better skilled but still poorly paid. In reality, while there are concerns about the movement of ECD practitioners to Grade R (post training opportunities), there are limited opportunities for them to move into Grade R and receive better payment. Furthermore, in the absence of funding for salaries proposals for payment related to qualification are fruitless – thus falling into the common trap of confining women's work to 'voluntary work'.

It is true that the structuring of EPWP ECD allows progressive professional development, with skilled practitioners able to move to better paid opportunities. Unfortunately this progression, while positive for practitioners who are able to access better job opportunities leaves poor families who wish to access quality ECD services, unable to do so as skilled ECD teachers move into better paid Grade R teaching positions.

The lack of prioritization within EPWP ECD of the household cost implications for accessing quality ECD services is another way in which gender inequalities are not addressed. With many women adversely affected by poverty and unemployment, the absence of a strategy for minimizing the household costs means that the opportunities for children from poor households to access ECD services, are limited. While EPWP ECD cannot reasonably be expected to address all problems, this intervention, pitched as one that contributes towards addressing poverty and unemployment, should give some consideration to the ways in which it should improve the circumstances of those most affected.

43 Budlender D (2009) *Budgeting for mothers* and Vargas-Varon E (2009) *Going to Scale: Early Childhood Development in Latin America*

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

ECD is internationally recognized as a critical factor in improving the life circumstances of children. In South Africa, with high levels of poverty and inequality, providing access to ECD for children from poor families is undoubtedly a much-needed intervention. However, the linkage of ECD with EPWP appears to be an intervention that has placed greater emphasis on being responsive to the political environment, with minimal emphasis on addressing poverty and inequality. This bold statement is based on the overarching questions that informed this paper, namely whether:

- The cost of delivering EPWP ECD yields adequate benefits for the 'poor and unemployed'
- EPWP ECD is an appropriate policy mechanism facilitating access to quality services and responding to unemployment and poverty
- EPWP ECD subverts or reinforces gender inequalities

Based on the information presented above, it emerges that a critical analysis is required of EPWP ECD as it does not prove to be an appropriate policy mechanism in responding to unemployment and poverty.

While there is recognition of the shortcomings within the ECD sector (both from government and civil society), the EPWP ECD component does not appear to address these or facilitate access to quality services. Instead, the provision of services under the umbrella of EPWP ECD has operated in a way where training, which is not within the ambit of EPWP, has been the sum total of what is considered EPWP ECD. Furthermore, as job opportunities have not been provided for ECD practitioners to remain within the sector, trained ECD practitioners have exited ECD, in search of job opportunities outside of the sector, with many going into better-paid positions such as Grade R. Consequently, the quality of services within the sector has not improved. In addition to the training not being complemented with job opportunities where these newly acquired skills can be applied within the ECD sector, the training has also not been solely geared towards ECD practitioners, but inclusive of those in positions within ECD facilities that are not relevant for the educational development of the child e.g. gardener or cook. The labeling of EPWP ECD within this educational sector that is essential in creating a strong foundation for improving children's life chances, has done little to demonstrate improved ECD services for 'the poor and unemployed'.

Access to ECD services in general (without even factoring in quality of services) has also not been facilitated by way of the EPWP ECD component. Even though reporting on EPWP ECD makes reference to subsidies, these payments to ECD facilities are not within the scope of EPWP, and have not precluded payment of fees. Hence, not only is the contribution of EPWP ECD questioned when it comes to provision of improved ECD services, but also with facilitating access to ECD services.

The exact cost of delivering EPWP ECD for poor and unemployed people has not been quantified. Not only are the reported allocations and expenditure for EPWP ECD unclear, but also detailed costing of ECD services for poor families have not been undertaken. However, in considering the cost implications for poor families to access ECD services – in the form of direct fees as well as indirect expenses – EPWP ECD hardly appears to be yielding benefits in response to poverty. In a sector where employment opportunities are recognized as being scarce and low paid, EPWP ECD has also not generated employment within the sector, and where opportunities have been created outside of the sector, it is not clear how many of these opportunities have been taken up by those previously engaged in EPWP ECD initiatives.

An additional concern is the way in which EPWP ECD reinforces gender inequalities. As illustrated in this paper, through EPWP ECD, women are being locked into a sector that continues to be poorly paid, thus their contribution to improving the circumstances of children undervalued, and the lack of regard for women's needs

as users of ECD services has resulted in women's potential to seek and partake in the formal economy being undermined.

A careful analysis of EPWP ECD is required, that critically examines whether the troubled ECD sector can afford to have attention diverted to include EPWP. The new draft ECD policy provides an opportunity to examine the relationship of EPWP with respect to ECD. Based on the challenges and uncertainties surrounding EPWP ECD as outlined above, this draft policy cannot remain silent on EPWP ECD. Given the concerns raised in this paper, it does not seem wise or correct to include EPWP within the ECD sector. With the introduction of social sector EPWP, the inclusion into ECD was a strategic choice to direct funds and recognition to this sector. However, in hindsight this appears to have led to unfortunate outcomes, and the creation of funding mechanisms that are not sustainable.

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3: WHO CARES? POST-RAPE SERVICES AND THE EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME IN SOUTH AFRICA

Lisa Vetten

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1994 35% of the country's working age population was out of work in terms of the expanded definition of unemployment – and by 2014, 35% of the country's working age population had continued to remain out of work (Statistics South Africa, n.d.). Democratisation has not coincided with a decrease in unemployment in South Africa, even as it has been marked by the introduction of public employment schemes intended to reduce the stubbornness of these rates. The most durable of these schemes has been the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) first introduced in 2004 and now in its third phase. Characterised by short-term, labour-intensive work paid below market rate, the EPWP was initially offered in the areas of infrastructure, environment and culture, and the social sector, and from 2009, the non-state sector programme, comprising both the community works programme and non-profit organisations (NPO). What makes this menu of programmes unusual is the inclusion of the social sector.

During its first phase the social sector was confined to programmes addressing early childhood development (ECD) and home and community based care (HCBC). In 2009, with the inauguration of EPWP II, the sector was expanded to include a school nutrition programme; mass sports programmes; *Kha Ri Gude* (a mass literacy programme for adults) and community crime prevention programmes. With its strong emphasis on care work the social sector is neither an easy nor obvious fit with a public works programme – not least because of the difficulty of such programmes recasting palliative care as well as childhood development and nutrition as short-term, unskilled work. Further, because it simply absorbed and relabelled as EPWP pre-existing HCBC and ECD programmes the social sector did not create new jobs either (Budlender, 2009). But perhaps the real appeal to bureaucrats of the social sector is its targets to include large numbers of women. This feature was certainly highlighted by a representative of the Department of Public Works (DPW) in a briefing to parliament's portfolio committee on public works (Parliamentary Monitoring Group [PMG], 14 February 2012). While the Code of Good Practice for employment and conditions of work for Special Works Programmes had proposed a quota of 60% women across all sectors of the EPWP, the other sectors of the EPWP had experienced difficulty in meeting this target, which had also been reduced to 55% by 2012 (*ibid*).

Given that women's rates of unemployment exceed those for men, with African women's rates of unemployment highest of all (Statistics South Africa, 2013a), there is an undeniable need to prioritise their employment. But to do so, without reproducing South Africa's underlying gendered and racialised structure of employment in the process, is no small challenge. Indeed, to what extent does the EPWP, through its inclusion of the social sector, and assignment of resources to care work, disrupt gendered aspects of the economy? This is the central question explored by this case study of NPO services addressing rape.

Post-rape services provided by the non-profit sector form part of South Africa's care regime – the institutional arrangements which, taken together, contribute to societal well-being. The state is central to this architecture,

both for how it regulates, as well as finances, these arrangements. This design, its distribution of responsibilities for care work, as well as remuneration of those who do the work, form the next section of the article. The EPWP, rendered a care policy by virtue of its allocation of resources to care work, is considered here too. This general discussion serves to contextualise the final section of the article which concentrates on the web of resources in which post-rape care is located, again emphasising the EPWP. This section draws on data generated by a larger study examining the range of post-rape services provided by 29 organisations⁴⁴ based in the Thuthuzela Care Centres (TCC) – the state’s most comprehensive response to the needs of rape survivors.

The initial consultation around the study took place in November 2013 and was followed by a second presentation in February 2014 to a larger group of organisations based in the TCCs. After ethics approval for the study was obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand, study participant information sheets were distributed to all organisations inviting their participation in the study and followed up with a telephone call confirming the organisation’s participation in the study. The subsequent interviews were either conducted in person (where cost permitted) or via telephone by the study author. In each instance either the Director or the programme manager overseeing rape services was interviewed. On occasion, up to three different people in the organisation were interviewed to ensure that information about the service was complete.

The interview comprised both open and closed questions and focused on three broad areas: the organisation’s work overall; their post-rape services both within the TCC as well as other sites; and factors shaping the provision of post-rape services, including the resources available to organisations. While this article draws on aspects of the larger study, particularly in relation to the experience of seeking funding, the main focus of the article is the EPWP whose workings are described in relation to all 10 organisations which, in one form or another, had been brought within its orbit. While these narratives illuminate the particular experiences of TCC-based organisations, they are not generalizable to the entire NPO sector providing social welfare services generally. They do, however, provide detailed insight into the workings of the EPWP, as well as its effect upon this sample of organisations.

1.1 THE DISTRIBUTION AND REMUNERATION OF CARE WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA

Care work refers to the direct care provided to children, people with various disabilities or illnesses, the frail elderly, as well as able-bodied adults. These activities include the washing of clothing, dishes and sheets, cleaning, and shopping for and preparing food (Razavi 2007: 8). As a domain of activity, care work is deeply feminised. According to the 2010 Survey of Time Use three times as many women over the age of 18 participated in the care of persons than men did (59.1% versus 18.8%) (Statistics South Africa 2013b: 24). In terms of time, unemployed women spent a mean of 265 minutes daily on household maintenance (“housework”), compared to unemployed men’s 135 minutes, and 53 minutes on care of persons, as opposed to men’s 11 minutes (Statistics South Africa 2013b: 32). While the amount of time women spent caring for persons and/or undertaking housework decreased upon their employment, a disparity in time usage could still be observed in comparisons between employed women and men. Employed women spent 21 minutes on caring for persons, versus employed men’s four minutes, and 153 minutes on household maintenance compared to men’s 66 minutes (*ibid*).

Paralleling the gendered division of care work within the private sphere, is the gendered division of care work within the public sphere and market, where approximately 43.6% of women, versus 19.2% of men, are employed within the community, social and personal services sectors (Statistics South Africa, 2013a). The

⁴⁴ Although one organisation’s services were terminated by the TCC as the study began they remained part of the study. A second organisation collapsed completely during the course of the first six months of the study and could not be included due to its staff becoming uncontactable.

community and social services sector, encompassing health workers, teachers and social workers, employs the greatest proportion of women (28.7% versus 15.9% of men), with the private household sector being the third-largest source of women's employment. Overwhelmingly comprised of domestic workers, the private household sector accounts for 14.9% of women's work (*ibid*). Care work is thus provided in a diversity of sites and settings.

Since 1937, and the establishment of the first department of welfare, South Africa's care regime has been constituted by the state, the private sector and the voluntary welfare sector (Patel, 2005). Later policy documents issued by the Department of Welfare (later renamed the Department of Social Development [DSD]) such as the White Paper for Social Welfare (Department of Welfare, 1997), the Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy (DSD, 2011) and the White Paper on Families (DSD, 2012) are also explicit in emphasising the importance of communities and families in promoting social well-being. Four sites of care may thus be discerned: the family/household, the state, the non-profit/community sector, and the market – a form of architecture that Shahara Razavi (2007) conceptualises as a 'care diamond.' The extent and nature of care responsibilities allocated to each of these four nodes is not fixed but shifts, contracts and expands – as the emergence of home and community-based AIDS-related care in South Africa illustrates. Here palliative and other care was relocated from state health facilities to people's homes, as it simultaneously shifted from professional health staff, to volunteers and HCBC workers – with concomitant changes to the costs of the service, as well as who bears those costs. This sort of downward task-shifting by the state, couched in the language of communitarianism and familialism implicitly depends on women's unpaid, or underpaid, care work (Sevenhuisen et al., 2003; Gouws and Van Zyl, 2014; Makina, 2009). However, this redistribution of care has also provided women with an entry point into employment via the precarious and ambiguous route of the 'volunteer' (Lund, 2010).

Care work, when paid, would also appear to be remunerated differently to work performed largely by men. Francie Lund and Debbie Budlender (2009) compared professional nurses (91% female) and associate professional nurses' (89% female) salaries with those paid to professional engineers/architects (92% male) and natural and engineering science technicians (68% male). Both categories of worker had similar educational profiles (matriculation and more for the lower level among the male- and female-dominated, plus at least one degree for the higher level). Comparison between these categories showed 56% of the professional nurses and at least 65% of the engineers to be earning R6 000 or more per month, while 36% of the engineering professionals and 8% of the engineering science technicians earned in excess of R16 000 per month. By contrast only 1% of the professional nurses' and associate nurses' earnings fell within this range (Lund with Budlender 2009: 13). This gendered valuation of work, coupled with the longer hours men spend at paid work, may help to explain why South African men, on average, earn more than their female counterparts.⁴⁵

However, pay differentiation also exists within the care sector.

In 1997 the White Paper for Social Welfare noted that in the past "social welfare programmes were not considered to be critical social investment priorities and were under-resourced" (Department of Welfare 1997: 7). Consequently "salaries are extremely low, and working conditions and service conditions are poor for all welfare personnel" (Department of Welfare 1997: 33). While this characterisation may no longer be as applicable to personnel employed by DSD, it still appears accurate for NPOs. Because it has never been DSD policy to fully subsidise NPO services, government seldom contributes to the running costs of organisations and pays only a percentage of organisations' salary costs (set at 75% in some provinces), who are expected to fund the balance. Very few are able to raise this balance and as a result, the salaries they offer are well below the market standard. Posts either remain empty for months, or are filled by inexperienced staff (Patel, 2014). In an attempt to challenge this policy three NPOs – the National Association of Welfare Organisations

45 While all women earn less than their male counterparts belonging to the same racial category, white women earn, on average, almost three times per hour what black African women earn. The pay differential is also greatest between white women and men, but smaller between black African and Indian men and women (Statistics South Africa, 2013a).

and Non-Governmental Organisations (NAWONGO), NG Social Services Free State and Free State Care in Action – took both national and Free State DSD to court over the irregularities in the implementation of the provincial DSD’s funding policy to NPOs in mid-2010. This included challenging DSD’s assumption that NPOs could provide the same standard of care as a state facility – despite being provided with less funds than the state facility.

The replying affidavit by DSD justifying the lesser subsidies to NPOs, illustrated clearly the department’s unquestioned acceptance both of the gendered division of labour between couples managing children’s homes, and the assumption that care work performed by women in households did not require remuneration:

Government facilities must of necessity employ sufficient numbers of laundry and cleaning staff. (C)hildren’s homes run by NPO’s utilise the services of the spouse it employs to render these services, who may have one person assisting her; ...government facilities must of necessity either employ sufficient numbers of catering staff or outsource its catering services to private companies, children’s homes run by NPO’s utilise the services of the spouse it employs to render these services, who may enlist the assistance of the older children in the house for this purpose (Linstrom, 2010: paragraphs 41.3 and 41.4).

What is also implicit from this case is the greater expense associated with government services, accomplished not only by paying for work taken for granted when performed by NPOs, but also by paying government personnel more than NPO personnel. Indeed, Debbie Budlender and David Francis’ review of provincial budgets for social welfare services between 2010/11 and 2016/17 show an increasing share of the budget being allocated towards the compensation of DSD employees, due both to an increase in staff numbers, as well as departmental salaries having increased faster than inflation. But while compensation of government employees increases over this period, transfers to NPOs decrease, with the exception of Gauteng and Northern Cape (Budlender and Francis 2014: 22-23). Moreover, the additional funds allocated to NPOs through the 2013/4 medium-term expenditure framework’s equitable share is being used by some provinces for institutional support over this period, rather than funding of NPOs (*ibid*: 74).

Personnel in the NPO sector work under far less advantageous circumstances than their government counterparts. This encourages a high turnover of staff who migrate from the NPO sector in search of the higher salaries and benefits paid by government and the private sector (Lund, 2010). The effect of DSD funding is a care economy characterised by self-exploitation and low-wage, high-turnover labour strategies which compromise the quality of care.

The EPWP provides another example of how state policies contribute to the devaluation of care work, as is evident in comparison of payments to those participating in the four different sectors of the EPWP.

Although the data are imperfect, a 2007 analysis of the minima paid to participants in 2006/07 found social sector participants to be the lowest-paid – an implied average minimum rate of R593 per month – while those in infrastructure were the best-paid – an implied average minimum rate of R1 154 per month (Mitchell, 2007 cited in Budlender 2009). In the fourth quarter of 2007/08, at an average of R32.70 per day, social sector wages were still the lowest while infrastructure, at R62.54 per day, remained the highest. In the second quarter of 2008/09 the average daily amounts had increased to R36.29 and R67.04 per day respectively (Budlender, 2009). This pattern has persisted, as Table 1, compiled from the EPWP’s most recent report (covering the period 1 April to 30 September 2012), illustrates (DPW, 2012). What it suggests is that as the percentage of women increases in any sector, so the average daily wage declines, with the lowest amounts paid to the social and non-state sectors.

TABLE 1: SECTORAL AVERAGE DAILY WAGES AND PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN EMPLOYED BY EACH SECTOR 1 APRIL - 30 SEPTEMBER 2012

Sector	Women	Avg daily wage	No. projects	Allocated budget	Expenditure (% total)
Infrastructure	51%	R101.79	2 915	60 093 833 954	4 538 533 922 (7.6%)
Environment and culture	53%	R82.23	2 045	7 626 812 352	1 243 352 700 (16.3%)
Social sector	85%	R40.19	6 976	4 594 900 576	1 035 536 536 (22.5%)
Community works	72%	R58.90	65	478 931 797	87 430 820 (18.3%)
Non-profit organisations	75%	R43.48	187	809 050 121	68 618 790 (8.5%)
Average/totals	62%	R62.00	12 188	R73.6 billion	R7 billion

Source: DPW, 2012

In 2010 the Minister of Labour introduced a minimum wage for EPWP of R60 per day (Department of Labour, 2010). Yet the daily amounts recorded by Table 1 as being paid to the social and non-state sectors in 2012 were below this 2010 Ministerial determination. The 2012 determination increased the minimum to R63.18 per day, to be adjusted annually on 1 November in line with inflation (Department of Labour, 2012), but like the 2010 determination did not seek to equalise the different sectors' wages.

1.2 POST-RAPE SERVICES, THEIR FUNDING AND THE EPWP

Rape is of significant concern in South Africa, with more than a third of men in some provinces admitting to having perpetrated at least one rape in their lifetimes (Machisa et al., 2010). These high rates have sparked concern and outrage leading to law reform, parliamentary debates, marches and campaigns, as well as a range of policy interventions intended to reduce the numbers of people who fall victim. An equally important component of these responses has been post-rape care. However, the way such care has been distributed across South Africa's care diamond has changed over time and been subject to shifts that have resulted in services which cycle through periods of contraction and expansion (Britton, 2006; Shukumisa Campaign, 2014). But what has remained constant over time is disproportionate involvement of women's organisations in the provision of services.

Prior to democracy the state played a negligible role in post-rape care, with the emergence of such services in South Africa entirely the work of women inspired by the international feminist movement to end violence against women. Rape Crisis Cape Town (RCCT) was initiated in 1976 (Russell, 1989), with two former RCCT volunteers establishing People Opposing Women Abuse (POWA) in Johannesburg in 1980. By the decade's close, in addition to POWA and RCCT, a further five feminist rape crisis organisations were in existence in Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Grahamstown, and the 'coloured' areas of Heideveld and Belhar in the Western Cape and another four rape crisis agencies had been established by 1991 in Port Elizabeth, George, Pretoria and Bloemfontein. The last four were characterised by RCCT member Mikki Van Zyl as working within an individualist, welfare paradigm, rather than a feminist framework (Van Zyl, 1991). A distinctive feature of the feminist organisations of the time was their flat, non-hierarchical structures chiefly composed of volunteers who, in the main, provided telephonic assistance to women (Segel and Labe, 1990). Further, because of their affiliation with the anti-apartheid movement, and as a matter of principle, neither POWA nor RCCT sought funds from the state due to the restrictive nature of the services allowed (such as counsellors being permitted

to provide services only to people of the same racial group). Their funding came instead from international donors, as well as the private sector (Vetten, 2013).

A very particular post-rape care regime was thus constellated under apartheid which depended significantly on women's organisations and their volunteers, as well as the support of international and private sector donors. This architecture was significantly reconfigured on South Africa's transition to democracy. Organisations professionalised and replaced their non-hierarchical structures with paid, full-time staff organised within management structures headed by a Director, while volunteers largely ceased to function as the core upon which organisations depended (Vetten, 2013). Organisations were also absorbed into the formal voluntary welfare sector funded by the state (Britton, 2006), while volunteering was increasingly being recast as a kind of livelihood (Lund, 2010). Nonetheless, post-rape care still largely appears the preserve of NPOs, judging from an analysis of provincial DSD budgets for the period 2010/11 to 2016/17. In 2012/13, 74% of provincial departments' budgets for victim empowerment services (which includes services to rape survivors) were transferred to NPOs, decreasing to 68% in 2013/14 (Budlender and Francis 2014: 42).

Organisations' dependence on the state deepened following the global economic recession of 2008 as new players emerged and funding priorities shifted. The next section of the article, drawing on interviews with organisations, begins to map the implications of these shifts for the provision of post-rape care.

1.3 POST-RAPE CARE AND ITS FUNDING POST-2008

The struggle to secure – and sustain – funding had created a stratum of organisations within the sample which are characterized both by volatility and survivalism.

At least one in four of the 29 organisations interviewed had experienced serious stressors between 2012 and 2014. One organisation had informed its staff that they would not be paid in the month of the interview – and perhaps for some months to come – unless a donor provided bridging finance. A second organisation ceased operating altogether as study preparations commenced, while a third was still recovering from the effects of having retrenched all but one member of staff in 2012. A fourth organisation discontinued its services at four hospitals and three police stations during the course of the study when further funding for these services could not be obtained. As the research began a fifth organisation was recovering from the worst financial year in its 26-year history, while the entire staff complement of a sixth organisation had had their salaries cut for a seven month-period. A seventh had to approach a donor for emergency funding when it became apparent that many of the services they provided to rape survivors at the TCC and surrounding police stations and courts were not going to continue.⁴⁶

According to organisations one of the most common reasons for their financial difficulties was South Africa's designation as a middle-income country in less need of aid than lower-income countries. In addition, donors no longer wished to subsidise services such as counselling, sheltering and other support, which they considered the responsibility of the South African government. While these explanations are broadly applicable to the NPO sector as a whole, another seemed very specific to the sector and this was the perception amongst donors that work with women had proved ineffective: "they all say that a lot of work has been done with women and it's obviously not working" (Director, Organisation D, Interview November 2014). According to this particular respondent preventing violence had become the new focus and with it, an emphasis on changing men's behaviour. Thus organisation D was finding their men's programme attracted the greatest interest from donors, as well as the most funding.

46 The shock of reduced funding was not confined to TCC-based organisations alone. In 2014 the Shukumisa Campaign reported on the circumstances of 17 organisations addressing violence against women, finding that between these 17 organisations 100 positions were lost in the four-year period between 2010 and 2013. While some organisations had been able to reinstate a few posts, this was not on a full-time basis. In other organisations the work was either being performed by temporary staff or volunteers, or one person was doing the work of two. Some staff continued working even though they were not always paid regularly or in full. As a result, because they could not afford to cover their transport costs, their work attendance was often erratic. In addition to job cuts, a number of programmes had either been reduced or terminated altogether, while some services had been closed down. These services had not been replaced and the need merely shifted elsewhere (Shukumisa Campaign, 2014).

Organisation D's observation is borne out by some donor programming shifts evident in South Africa.

In 2012 the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), in partnership with Save the Children, South Africa (also supported by Britain's Department for International Development [DfID]), launched a project entitled 'A Safer South Africa for Women and Children: Improved Security and Justice for Women, Girls and Boys' (or the Safer South Africa programme). Noting that: "There is increasing recognition across the international community that there has been insufficient focus on prevention and tackling root causes and risk factors in GBV [gender-based violence] programming" (Ntanyiya, Mac Roibin and Ogoweng 2012: 17), the programme elected to focus on primary prevention because "primary prevention to stop violence from occurring in the first place is the most beneficial and cost-effective in the long-term" (ibid: 19). This logic results in a hierarchy of programming priorities which frames the care work that follows rape's aftermath as being of less benefit, as well as less effective and more costly.

Outcome two of the Safer South Africa programme thus sought to strengthen prevention and protection measures inside and outside of schools in all provinces, while outcome three sought to mobilise social change around violence against women and children in the Eastern Cape and Free State. Activities under these two outcomes consumed the bulk of the \$6 015 078 (or estimated R60.2 million) budget, with outcome two allocated \$2 727 095 (an estimated R27.3 million) and outcome three \$1 013 814 (an estimated R10.1 million).⁴⁷

Internationally, DfID launched its 'What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls' Programme in 2014. Planning to invest £25 million over five years to support primary prevention of violence against women and girls in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, it awarded support to 18 'ground breaking' research programmes on 10 December 2014. Two of these were awarded to South African agencies: Sonke Gender Justice for their One Man Can intervention, and Project Empower in partnership with the Health Economics and HIV and AIDS Research Division (HEARD) of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.⁴⁸

A different sort of funding shift is evident in USAID which had funded organisations to provide counselling services from the TCCs between 2008 and 2012. When USAID's contract with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) ended in September 2012 so did the funding associated with it, leading organisations to withdraw from the TCCs. When a new five-year contract was signed between the NPA and USAID no funding was allocated towards existing NPO counselling services – but R33 million, over a five-year period, was made available for activities publicising the TCCs.⁴⁹ In late 2013 the Networking HIV, AIDS Community of South Africa (NACOSA) stepped in and began, once again to support organisations based in the TCCs with a grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. Unless DSD begins funding those organisations it currently does not support, the dwindling of services in 2012 will be repeated in 2016 when NACOSA's funding comes to an end.

In addition to the international funding pressures, interviewees in this study reported the failure to fund organisations' post-rape care in the TCCs to be the outcome in some instances of disagreement between the Department of Health (DoH) and DSD over whose responsibility it is to fund NPOs. Because counselling is seen as a DSD service, the DoH argues that DSD should fund NPOs. To DSD the fact of NPOs' location within a health setting makes their funding a DoH responsibility.

⁴⁷ All calculations based on an exchange rate of R10 to \$1.

⁴⁸ A third award was made to a project involving a consortium of organisations from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana which focused on preventing violence towards sex workers.

⁴⁹ Personal communication, Sharon Kouta Gender-based violence programme specialist, NACOSA, March 2014. Information also contained in the NACOSA portion of a funding application in the author's possession by the South African National Aids Council to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.

State support to NPOs providing post-rape care is also complicated by the duplication of services. In the 2013/14 financial year DSD introduced a Gender-based Violence Command Centre with a budget of R13 million in its first year of operation, much of which was to go towards its running by Advance Call – a private sector ‘boutique call centre.’ This budget allocation represented a 1 140% increase in the use of consultants over the previous year, with expenditure jumping from R1.1 million, to R13.9 million between 13/14 and 14/15 (Vetten, 2014). At the same time, both the national and Gauteng departments of social development also funded the national ‘Stop Gender Violence Helpline’ established in 1999 and managed by the NPO Lifeline. By contrast the Lifeline helpline costs R1.2 million per year and is run by a staff of 23 versus the Command Centre’s staff of 75 (65 are retired social workers apparently). Where the Helpline was assisting about 18 000 callers annually, the Command Centre expected to reach 2 400 callers annually. The Command Centre was currently only available in five areas of Gauteng and two in KwaZulu-Natal – areas where women’s organisations were already providing services (PMG, 17 October 2014).⁵⁰

Like the NAWONGO matter described earlier, the Command Centre provides another illustration of the two-tier structure of welfare services i.e. one which sees a state service very similar to a NPO service being very much better-resourced than the NPO service. Also evident is the involvement of the for-profit private sector which, unlike the non-profit sector, is paid in full for its services.

This short overview illustrates how the care diamond applicable to rape services has altered with time. While care is still chiefly provided by the non-profit/community sector, funding to these organisations has altered considerably over the years, as perhaps, has the prioritisation of these services. With international funding for this work on the decline, organisations have turned to different institutions in the state to support their care work – including the EPWP.

1.4 THE EPWP AND THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR

The non-state sector has appealed to the designers and managers of the EPWP for particular reasons, not least being its ability to innovate and act unfettered by pre-determined bureaucratic procedures, norms and standards. Policy makers have seen in this adaptability the potential to considerably broaden the EPWP’s range of activities and outcomes by creating projects more likely to be determined by community needs, rather than the pressure to establish “make-work” initiatives. Further, because NPOs were seen to already engage large numbers of people working either in a purely voluntary capacity, or in receipt of a stipend, providing a wage subsidy to NPOs would therefore bring this category of worker into employment. (NPOs were however, also to be encouraged to take on as many poor and unemployed people as possible) (DPW, 2011a). In this reasoning lies more than an echo of the logic which saw existing ECD and HCBC projects relabelled as EPWP during its first phase.

The DPW has noted both duplication and overlap between the social sector and the NPO sector (PMG, 5 March 2014) and it is possible that EPWP funds towards victim empowerment are being distributed through the social sector. It is however difficult to gauge either the existence or extent of any such support from recent EPWP quarterly reports. While no activities have been labelled victim empowerment, there are a few captured as ‘not part of a programme’ which may include victim empowerment activities (DPW, 2012). However, because organisations in this study largely drew on the funding made available to the NPO sector, Table 2 (drawn from the EPWP quarterly report for April to September 2012) focuses on provincial allocations to the NPO sector, as well as expenditure to date.

⁵⁰ This is not the only duplication of initiatives by the state. There is both a National Child Protection Register managed by DSD in existence, as well as a National Register for Sexual Offences managed by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. In 2009, during a briefing to the Portfolio Committee for Women, Youth, Children and People with Disabilities, the SAPS representative stated that it would cost in the region of R300 million to establish the IT systems needed to establish a register effectively (Vetten et al, 2010). A comparison of the two departments’ expenditure to date on their respective registers is not available.

Where the consolidated national average daily wage for the NPO sector was R43.48 – and below the legislated minimum for 2010 – the provincial breakdown reveals this to have dipped as low as R30.00 per day in four provinces (this low is also evident in some payments for the social sector). Given that this is an average, some projects will have paid workers even less than R30.00 per day. The Free State, which had the least projects and was among the provinces paying the lowest daily average, also had the biggest budget – of which it had spent a scant 1.3%. Both the Western Cape and Gauteng, also paying the lowest daily average wage, had spent less than 20% of their budgets.

TABLE 2: NPO SECTOR BY PROVINCE

Province	Women	Avg daily wage	No. projects	Allocated budget	Expenditure (% total allocated)
Eastern Cape	86%	R30.00	16	24 649 044	6 171 246 (25.0%)
Northern Cape	67%	R46.59	12	12 931 682	4 554 331 (35.2%)
Western Cape	67%	R30.00	25	41 713 963	5 189 866 (12.4%)
Free State	67%	R30.00	10	594 468 202	7 646 675 (1.3%)
Mpumalanga	83%	R59.44	18	20 167 056	6 256 531 (31.0%)
Gauteng	72%	R30.00	14	7 944 405	1 581 222 (19.9%)
Limpopo	82%	R47.78	28	36 810 223	13 432 357 (36.5%)
KwaZulu-Natal	78%	R45.14	46	41 919 384	14 621 149 (34.9%)
North West	65%	R63.17	18	28 446 163	8 185 413 (28.8%)
Average/Totals	75%	R43.00	187	R809.1 million	R68.6 million

Source: DPW, 2012

The organisational narratives which follow provide both texture and depth to these figures.

I. ORGANISATION A

Organisation A received a call for proposals in terms of EPWP II from the Independent Development Trust (IDT) in 2012. After attending a briefing they then submitted a proposal to the IDT. According to the programme manager this was a time-consuming exercise for the organization that represented wasted effort as the IDT disregarded the organization's proposal in its entirety by stating the organization would be funded for the placement of 70 volunteers in the first year of the agreement. For the most part these 70 included the organisation's existing volunteers, with a few new volunteers recruited for projects the organization was in a position to expand.

With the second year imminent the IDT announced that it expected the organisation to take on 120 volunteers for the next year. This number exceeded the organisation's volunteer component and represented too rapid and sudden an (undesired) expansion of the organization. It was not one the IDT was willing to negotiate however. In order to keep the funds for the existing 70 volunteers, the organization then approached a second organisation to enquire if they could take the balance of 50 volunteers. While this was agreed to by the IDT, it was an arrangement not entirely to the project manager's liking on two counts: they had no oversight over the second organisation's volunteers (despite having to account for them); nor could they determine who the second organization employed, the manager of the first organisation observing that the pressure to fill numbers might well lead to family and friends being taken on to meet the IDT's quota. Ultimately, it was the project managers' impression that the IDT was as little interested in the organisation's progress reports as they had been in its proposal; meeting the numbers was their primary concern.

The organization was offered the minimum wage determined by the Minister of R63.18 per volunteer per day, for a maximum of 14 days per month, plus 1% of the total to cover their administration costs. The IDT also contributed a further 2% to the unemployment insurance fund. The project manager considered the administration fee insufficient to cover the travel and telephone costs, the personnel costs and the audit fee incurred by the EPWP initiative. Further stretching the organisation's resources was the IDT's unexplained cessation of payments in the seventh month of the second year of the project. The organization then paid this and the next two months' wages from its reserves, before the entire EPWP project was halted in the ninth month, reportedly because the provincial office of the IDT had no further funding for the project. Correspondence with the national office of the IDT led to the organization finally being reimbursed for these payments.

II. ORGANISATION B

Organisation B also receives EPWP funds through the IDT but is based in a different province. Like organization A they found the initial processes onerous. In their case they were provided with five days' notice in which to supply the identity numbers and names of the volunteers. This proved extremely difficult because the organization had not as yet recruited volunteers, not having been assured of the funds. In addition, both the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 32 of 2007 and the Children's Act, 38 of 2005 require the names of all prospective employees likely to work with children to be checked against the National Register for Sexual Offences and the National Child Protection Register respectively. This was not possible in the time frames set by the IDT.

Organisation B partners with another organization on this project and shares approximately 50 volunteers who support children in after-hours homework programmes, and residential therapeutic programmes. One of these residential programmes attends to child victims of sexual abuse, while the other is focused on assisting boys displaying inappropriate sexual behavior. A far smaller group of volunteers is placed with the online help service replying to children's text messages. For their efforts volunteers are paid R71 per day, in line with the 2014 Ministerial determination for EPWP, on the expectation that they will work for a maximum of 14 days.

Like organization A, organization B found the 1% administration fee to be insufficient. All the volunteers received a minimum of one week's training (and some even more), as well as ongoing supervision and mentoring. The costs incurred in providing these services were in addition to the time required to complete the extensive progress reports demanded by the IDT and manage the funds. The contract with the organization also stipulated that they could not pay volunteers any moneys in addition to the EPWP stipend.

III. ORGANISATION C

By the close of 2011 organisation C was left with just three members of staff after being forced to retrench 25. They had however, responded to an IDT call for proposals and so in 2012 were able to take on approximately 100 EPWP volunteers, some of whom included former members of staff. Volunteers initially received R67 per day until the new Ministerial determination of R71 per day was announced. EPWP volunteers were expected to work 80 hours per month (or the equivalent of 10 days) engaging in prevention work and counselling. The project was distributed across five sites, with 20 people placed at each site. An additional five people also participated in the project at each site as unpaid volunteers. When a paid EPWP volunteer dropped out an unpaid volunteer took their place. EPWP volunteers were expected to reach at least 20 people per month with information about different topics including sexual violence, trafficking and domestic violence. They also assisted with counselling at a small counselling centre the organization had established in addition to their main office.

In 2013, at the start of the EPWP project's second year, some of the existing volunteers were moved up a notch in terms of job status and given additional supervisory responsibilities over the other EPWP volunteers. However, because the EPWP grant did not allow for this, there was no increase in these volunteers' payment. A

new set of volunteers was trained with the result that over the two years of its existence, this project ultimately took on 150 people.

Again the 1% administration fee was found to be insufficient to cover the amount of time required to complete the IDT's "mountain of paperwork." The administration fee did not cover the time the organization spent in equipping the volunteers with some basic counselling skills, as well as the information they were expected to impart. In addition, because the IDT seemed to have no system for monitoring the project, the programme manager designed pay slips, registers and other tools documenting their compliance with the project. It was her impression that the IDT took these, copied them and then distributed them for use by other organisations.

These were not the only difficulties experienced with the programme. Volunteers within the same geographical communities talked to volunteers placed in the infrastructure sector of the EPWP and discovered that they were both paid more and received protective clothing. They subsequently approached the organization requesting an increase as well as T-shirts, neither of which could be accommodated. While payments were supposed to have been made two months in advance by the IDT this was never honoured in practice. Payments to the organization were always late, leaving volunteers unpaid for up to three months. This caused even further unhappiness and, on one occasion, resulted in death threats to the manager of the EPWP project. A different volunteer approached the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The organization chose to discontinue the EPWP project at the end of 2013 because of the damage being done to the relationship of more than two decades between this particular community and the organisation. None of the EPWP volunteers continued in the employ of the organization.

Late payment by the IDT to NPOs was not confined to organisations A and C. In a 2012 presentation to the portfolio committee it was stated that in some provinces departments were either paying EPWP beneficiaries less than the daily rate agreed upon, or paying different NPOs different rates that also departed from the set rate, while in still other provinces NGOs were not being compensated at all (PMG, 14 February 2012).

IV. ORGANISATION D

Organisation X had been managing four volunteers at the TCC with funding support from USAID. When this ceased in September 2012 the organization, which saw the service as important, attempted to maintain it with their reserve funds and topping this up by placing the volunteers on the community works component of the EPWP. By early 2014 they were no longer able to sustain the service and handed the TCC programme over to organization D which kept its structure intact. Organisation D has consciously chosen not to involve itself with the EPWP, finding it to be a "confusing pot", but have allowed the agreement with the EPWP to continue on the advice of the volunteers' previous employer. The EPWP volunteers work according to a roster of three eight-hour shifts per day and are paid R1 500 per month. This is added to by an independent arrangement between the volunteers and the community works component of the EPWP. The organization is not part of this arrangement, but estimates the volunteers receive an additional R750 per month each from the EPWP. The organization manages more than one TCC and one consequence of this arrangement is a situation where staff performing the same type of work are being paid different amounts by the organization and through different mechanisms.

V.ORGANISATION E

Organisations E and F, based in different rural provinces, provide some insight into how NPOs can involuntarily become part of the EPWP.

In 2014, unable to obtain funding to continue providing some of its services, organization E closed three hospital-based services and six police station-based services. With ongoing funding to the remaining station-based services appearing ever more uncertain, organisation E then met with the police to explore what financial support they could provide to the service. This followed the refusal by the provincial department of social development to fund their post-rape care on the grounds that services based in a police station were the police's responsibility to fund. The police had then pointed to EPWP funds available through the province's Department of Community Safety which would have enabled the organization to maintain their volunteers at 25 stations in the province. In terms of the guidelines the funds could not apparently be routed directly to the organization, the Department of Community Safety needing to both advertise and recruit the volunteers for these services. These discussions did not materialize in anything concrete for reasons not entirely clear to the organisation's director. But had this arrangement transpired, then it this would have resulted in the organisation's existing volunteers having to apply for their prior positions at a rate lower than their current remuneration. The organization was paying volunteers according to the number of shifts worked every month, with the minimum number of shifts required earning volunteers no less than R2 500 per month.

The organization then turned to the IDT's EPWP programme, but were informed that the size of their budget precluded them from consideration. The IDT also stated that it was focusing on ECD, which did not make the organization's services a priority for support.

VI.ORGANISATION F

Organisation F provides both home-based care and a range of services addressing violence against women. In 2004 the organisation initiated a crisis centre for rape survivors at the local hospital which became a TCC in 2008. In 2013 they began providing counselling services at a second TCC in the province. By 2012 the six lay counsellors based at the first TCC were earning R3 500 per month, their salaries having increased over the years in tandem with the development of their skills and experience. By contrast, when the six lay counsellors began working at the second TCC they earned R2 700 per month as a consequence of their lesser experience and skill. This TCC was also only half as busy as the first TCC and thus had only one volunteer as opposed to the three based at the first TCC. The TCC lay counsellors were paid through a provincial DSD subsidy and were earning somewhat more than the HCBC workers, who were paid through the EPWP. The Director justified the distinction on the basis that where the HBC workers worked a five-day week from 8am to 4pm, the TCC counsellors worked a series of 12-hour shifts amounting to 180 hours per month. The TCC counsellors thus worked a longer day, as well as a greater number of hours in a month. In addition, the counsellors were judged to be more skilled, having received a greater amount of training intended to equip them to support survivors in the immediate and acute aftermath of the rape.

However, at the start of the 2014/15 financial year, the provincial department of social development decided to equalise the rates paid to the two sets of TCC counsellors, simultaneously adjusting them downward to R2 500 per month. There had also been a point in 2012 when the department's second six-monthly tranche to the organisation was delayed by three months and the counsellors not paid. To ensure that the service continued, counsellors, of their own accord, began sleeping at the TCC to save on their transport costs. The organisation, which at that point was obtaining their food parcels at a discount, utilised the savings to put together food parcels for the counsellors.

In 2014/15 the department began proposing that the TCC counsellors be placed on the EPWP, a move the organisation successfully resisted. The department was promoting the move to EPWP even more strongly as the 2014/15 financial year drew to a close on the basis that the province's budget for victim empowerment

services had been reduced from R12 million to about R10.8 million. TCC counsellors' salaries were thus projected to drop for a second, consecutive year to R1 700 per month. While the organisation had been able to mitigate the drop in salaries during 2014/15 with funding received from NACOSA, NACOSA's funding was also scheduled to come to an end in 2016.

VII.ORGANISATION G

Organisation G started receiving EPWP funds in April 2014 from both the IDT as well as DSD and uses this money to cover the costs of 15 volunteers placed at five police stations in the area. These volunteers provide victim empowerment services both to women reporting either rape or domestic violence at the station, as well as victims of crime generally. They are paid approximately R900 per month to work a maximum of 14 days, with the bulk of the subsidy drawn from the DSD funds. The organisation's pre-existing pool of unpaid volunteers became the staff placed on the EPWP.

Like the other organisations they received no funds to train their counsellors in victim empowerment services. The five days of basic counselling skills training and the additional day spent on report writing were all subsidised by organisation G. The organisation is entirely dependent on DSD for any further training around legislation addressing domestic violence or maintenance and other topics having a bearing on victim empowerment. They also do not have the human resources to monitor and mentor the EPWP volunteers on a routine basis either. At the time of the interview, which took place about one third into the month, the volunteers had still not been paid for the previous month. As the project co-ordinator pointed out, EPWP funding is intended to alleviate poverty but cannot do so when paid on such an erratic basis. Volunteers did not have savings to tide them over these periods and suffered from low morale, which affected their performance.

1.5 EPWP BY ANOTHER NAME?

One of the defining features of EPWP is its payment of workers below market rate. Arguably, this is also characteristic of some DSD subsidies to organisations.

Organisation H, for example, was awarded a subsidy of R30 000 for the year by the province's DSD, with the stipend to volunteers in the TCC set at R500 per month. While the organisation discontinued its funding agreement with DSD in 2012 on the basis that its costs outweighed its benefits, the R500 per month stipend remained in place. As the research was being designed in late 2013, the organisation's volunteers went on strike and did not arrive at the TCC. Within a week the organisation's services were terminated by the NPA.

In a different province, the DSD subsidy to organisation I's staff of lay counsellors working in the TCC was R1 500 per month, while organisation A's subsidy towards the shelter manager's salary was also R1 500. At R1 250 per month the DSD subsidy towards organisation G's TCC volunteers was even lower. Lowest of all was organisation J, which received R1 000 per month for the staff involved in their community outreach and awareness programmes around rape and domestic violence. When divided by the 20 working days in a month, these amounts translate into payment of approximately R71 per day and less – amounts fitting well within the parameters of the daily minimum wage set for the EPWP by the Minister.

DISCUSSION

The objectives of EPWP II were identified as drawing significant numbers of the unemployed into work enabling them to earn a wage, stipend or income; providing unemployed people with education and skills; halving unemployment by 2014 and alleviating poverty; and enabling EPWP beneficiaries to exit the programme by either starting their own economic ventures or becoming employable (PMG, 14 February 2012).

These objectives were not met by the case studies offered in this article. Firstly, organisations were not always turning to the EPWP to create jobs. In some instances recourse to the EPWP was being motivated by the need to retain existing staff, while the examples of organisations E and F illustrate the EPWP's potential to erode existing jobs – despite the DPW's injunction that projects and programmes should not result in the downgrading of existing workers' employment conditions (DPW, 2011b), an injunction DSD would also do well to heed. For, in the event of organisations' E and F staff being placed on the EPWP, no new jobs will be created but an existing set of workers will have their current working conditions reduced to less advantageous circumstances. The case studies also illustrate how the late payment of tranches, whether by the IDT or DSD, not only stresses already fragile organisations, but also forces a vulnerable category of worker into even more precarious living circumstances. Thus, while recognising that employing volunteers at the low rates offered by the EPWP – as well as the DSD on occasion – provides some respite for those who are desperate, some directors are ambivalent about the EPWP (and DSD), seeing their funding practices as exploitative and unfair because they neither recognise the skill and value of the volunteers' services, nor do they adequately compensate these services.

Funding from the IDT also did not enable organisations to provide volunteers with education and skills, (except where they were able to source the funds from elsewhere, or could absorb these costs) and also forced them to absorb the administrative burden imposed by IDT. Indeed, for organisations A, B and C, participation in the EPWP imposed additional costs they had not anticipated and could not afford. What this points to then, is the EPWP shifting its costs to the non-profit sector, which can ill-afford these. Further, while volunteers may indeed have learnt skills that made them more employable, the source of this employment would most likely be the struggling NPO sector. Organisation J illustrated the challenges inherent in the hope that EPWP volunteers will start their own venture.

After attending organisation J's training programme for volunteers, some individuals then went on to register their own NPO – in one example even using the organisation's forms but erasing I's name in order to replace it with theirs. However, because these services were located within the same geographical area as organisation J, this only fostered competition between the organisations, as well as further thinning existing resources; while the number of organisations may have increased, the resources available to them had not.

The case studies within this sector do not suggest that EPWP II mounted significant challenges to South Africa's gendered structure of employment. While both the social and NPO sectors do unquestionably target large numbers of women this is not to be confused with the meaningful recognition of care work. Indeed, for meaningful recognition to take place, care work should be removed from the EPWP altogether, rather than being consolidated within a field of precarious employment. Targeting also does not redistribute care activities in a more gender-equitable manner and thus continues to reinforce the notion that care work is women's work.

What also deserves serious consideration is the consequences of some donors' decisions to prioritise a particular understanding of violence prevention work over care work. The potential effect of this decision is to inadvertently reinforce the notion that care work is of secondary value. Indeed, because prevention work largely addresses men, and care work women, it is a distinction deeply gendered in effect. Ironically, it may

even be reproducing a gendered division of labour within a field of endeavor that began as a strong feminist challenge to gender inequality.

CONCLUSION

Public employment schemes have their place within the arsenal of strategies intended to address unemployment and poverty. But post-rape care, as well as other forms of care, is not a species of work which should fall within their remit for when it does, it serves to further reinforce and buttress the undervalued nature of care work in South Africa. Indeed, if the state and other sources of financial support are unwilling to guarantee adequate support to organisations assisting rape survivors, what does this ultimately say about the depth of public commitment to rape survivors?

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4: EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL

Debbie Budlender

Poor black people – including both women and men – live in areas where they have access to minimal and/or bad quality municipal services, yet they contribute in different ways to ensuring that wealthier people have access to quality services. This is seen in:

- Municipal workers (mainly men) who remove the refuse in white areas, but live in much poorer less-serviced areas;
- Homeless people for whom access even to places to sleep under bridges is made difficult, but who might get EPWP-type work such as cleaning which is paid for through ratepayer-funded and -controlled special rating area funds;
- Ordinary residents of areas such as Khayelitsha in Cape Town who look for work in white areas – including as domestic workers – but have to struggle to get sanitation, and then get poor quality sanitation serviced by (mainly female) janitorial workers who get paid EPWP wages;

People living in ex-homeland areas, where the adult population is heavily female-dominated, who often have no municipally-provided services at all.

The financial inequalities incorporated in the budget (in charging for, and funding of services and related workers) reinforce gender, race, class and locational inequalities.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides some facts, figures and situations that illustrate the “story” told above, and draws out some of the gender issues. The paper has, at its heart, a comparison of service delivery to wealthy (mainly white) and poor (black) areas - including, and differentiating between urban, informal and deep rural areas. This comparison harks back very clearly to the apartheid years and the spatial patterns that it left behind as a legacy. The paper explores the extent to which this legacy remains in respect of services for which local government is constitutionally responsible. In particular, it looks at the areas of sanitation and, to a lesser extent, cleansing - including both refuse removal and cleaning of public spaces.

Given the large number of local governments in South Africa, as well as the challenges that exist in terms of information, the paper does not aim to present a comprehensive picture. Instead, it uses the metropolitan City of Cape Town in the Western Cape as a case study to illustrate the different issues. Providing examples within one city helps highlight inequalities and the extent to which there is – or is not – redistribution.

Cape Town is an interesting case study because it has won two awards for service excellence in EPWP job creation. It is also the capital of the province with the lowest unemployment rate in the country. There is also more information available on Cape Town than on some other cities, in part because of previous research and also because Cape Town has been in the spotlight over the years in respect of sanitation in informal areas. Civil society engagement around the issue has ranged from dumping of faeces, through a court case⁵¹,

⁵¹ *African National Congress Youth League Dullah Omar Region (on behalf of Ward 95 Makhaza residents) v City of Cape Town*, File Ref No. WC/2010/0029, cited in South African Human Rights Commission report, 2010.

to the social audits of the Social Justice Coalition. Public protests have been focused, in particular, on sanitation problems in Khayelitsha – a large African township in Cape Town, which will be referred to frequently in this paper.

The paper compares EPWP service delivery (and the related work) with other forms of service delivery and work related to these services rather than focusing in specifically on EPWP service delivery (and the related work). In doing so it uncovers a range of different ways in which work that might be done by workers employed by the municipality is externalised and/or informalised. This focus builds on previous research by Theron & Perez (2012) that highlighted seven different categories of workers providing waste management services in the City, yet with widely varying pay, conditions of work, job security and protection. Taing et al. (2014) note that outsourcing or externalisation has been particularly popular in the sanitation sector.

The questions underlying the current exploration include:

- Who receives services – and the quality of services received;
- Who pays for services – through paid work, unpaid work, rates, special rating area private provision?
- Who is paid for the delivery of the services, what type of work is involved?
- What is the nature of the payment and conditions of EPWP, municipal, externalised, and unpaid work?
- Who determines how services are delivered and the related payments?

2. WHY IS THIS A GENDER ISSUE?

In addition to the racial, class and geographical inequalities inherited from apartheid and sustained in the post-apartheid era, gender inequalities are clearly present in respect of sanitation and cleansing services. Stated crudely, poor black women tend to be disadvantaged both as current (and potential) users of these services, as well as workers delivering the services, whether as paid or unpaid workers in the community and in their homes.

The services for which local government is primarily responsible are delivered both to individual households and to the community more generally, as well as to other entities, such as businesses, schools, etc. At first glance, it might seem that there are minimal gender issues as gender relates to individuals whereas households usually consist of more than one household and may include both male and female individuals. Similarly, communities are made up of male and female individuals. There are, however, clear gender issues related to municipal service delivery and work even without using the problematic concept of household head⁵².

- There are gender differences in who lives in urban informal and deep rural areas versus who lives in urban formal. During the apartheid years, African people in general, and women, children and older people were more likely than working-age men to be found in deep rural homeland areas. These patterns have continued into the post-apartheid years despite the dismantling of formal restrictions of movement as early as the later 1980s. Census 2011⁵³ found women accounting for 50% of the adult population in urban areas, compared to 56% of adults in ex-homeland (“tribal rural”) areas. The General Household Survey provides a further distinction between formal and informal urban areas. According to this source, in 2013, 51% of the population was female in urban formal areas

⁵² Budlender. 2003. ‘The debate about household headship’ in *Social Dynamics* 29(2): 48-72. Winter 2003

⁵³ Own calculations from Census 2011 10% sample, and General Household Survey 2013 datasets.

and 48% in urban informal areas. It seems that urban areas, and particularly informal urban areas, are less welcoming of black women.

- There is a gendered public-private divide in terms of women's role and attachment to the home. Women tend to spend more time than men in the home, which is the domain arguably most affected by municipal services such as sanitation. The Time Use Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa in 2010 found that adult women spent an average of 81% of their time in or around their homes, as against 70% for adult men.⁵⁴ Adults in ex-homeland areas tend to spend slightly longer than those in urban areas in or around their homes, but the size of the gender difference remains the same.
- There are gender differences in the need for services which arise from women's primary responsibility for unpaid care work, biological differences between male and female that affect physical need for decent sanitation facilities, as well as gendered risks attached to absence of safe and adequate sanitation facilities. Research on shared sanitation facilities provided in Khayelitsha also found that women tended to avoid using the toilets during the day as well as at night because of the lack of washing facilities and a system for disposal of sanitary pads (Taing, personal communication).
- There are gender differences in terms of types of work done and considered suitable – for women and men, with further differences relating to race and class. To give but one example, the Labour Market Dynamics Dataset of 2010 suggests that 70% of cleaners, other than domestic workers, are female and almost none are white (Budlender, 2013).
- There are clear gender differences in ability to pay for services. Basic employment, income and earnings data illustrate the extent of women's disadvantage. For example, the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of 2012 recorded a median male wage of R3,500 per month as against a median female wage of R2,600 per month⁵⁵. These inequalities affect women's ability to pay for quality services.

2.1 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

The remainder of the paper is organised in three sections.

The first section sets the scene by providing background information on the sanitation challenge in South Africa in general, and in informal settlements in particular. It also provides information on municipal revenue and grants in relation to these services.

The second of the three sections focuses on the city of Cape Town. It starts by providing background on recent history of disputes around workers providing municipal services. It then discusses different aspects of the City's budget, namely the mayoral message, revenue, expenditure and the Utility Services budget, which includes provision for sanitation infrastructure and services. Information on EPWP budgets and projects within the City, as provided both by the City itself and by national and provincial departments within the City's area is then presented. A sub-section provides more detail on the janitorial services - an EPWP project which relates to sanitation. This is complemented by a discussion of budget information relating to categories of workers other than EPWP in the municipality, including a discussion of the work opportunities created by special rating areas funded by ratepayers in the City.

The final section discusses what the evidence presented in the previous sections tells us about the answers to the four questions underlying the paper as listed above.

⁵⁴ Own calculations from Time Use Survey dataset.

⁵⁵ Own calculation, Labour Market Dynamics Survey dataset, Statistics South Africa

3. SETTING THE SCENE

3.1 SOUTH AFRICA'S SANITATION CHALLENGE

The recent report of the South African Human Rights Commission provides a clear picture of the challenge facing South Africa in respect of sanitation (South African Human Rights Commission, 2014). After investigating cases where municipalities provided open toilets in different communities, the Commission ruled in 2011 that the Presidency's Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) must provide a report to the Commission on the right to sanitation across the country. The DPME provided its report in two phases in 2012 and 2013 and reported on both water and sanitation. The DPME reports confirmed serious systemic problems relating to lack of adequate funding, poor revenue collection, lack of technical, management and business skills, political interference and corruption, and confusions over municipal powers and functions. The commission then tabled its own report soon after the 2014 budget speech.

The DPME's findings included the following:

- Approximately 11% (1.4 million) of formal and informal households in South Africa have never had government-supported sanitation. These households are concentrated in rural settlements in KwaZulu-Natal, North West and Eastern Cape;
- More than a quarter (3.8 million) of households within formal areas have below-standard sanitation services. The maintenance problems are most severe in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape and Eastern Cape.

The Commission's report also highlights contradictions in the statistics provided from different sources by the DPME. For example, the number of households with sanitation provision below the level prescribed in the Reconstruction and Development Programme in early 2012 was given as 22,717 by one source against 80,962 households by another source. The Commission notes that one of the sources cited by the Commission listed the City of Cape Town as having no households which did not have adequate sanitation. The Commission's own site visits had shown that this was not true.

In its 2014/15 budget the City discusses backlogs, which it "is persistently striving to eradicate". The City states that "Cape Town's population, both formal and informal settlements, receives sanitation services in accordance with the National minimum standards. Funding has still been provided to further improve the service levels in Informal Settlements in line with the City's strategy. The bucket toilet system (600 households) reflected in the 'below minimum standards' category is not seen as a backlog as these households declined alternative available and accessible sanitation services."

The Commission reports that the DPME estimated that, using 2011 prices, R44.75 billion was needed nationally to provide basic services to the un-served (R13.5 billion) and to refurbish and upgrade existing infrastructure (R31.25 billion). This excludes funding for the bulk infrastructure required for both new services and upgrading. They contrasted these amounts with Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) allocations for sanitation of about R3.2 billion per year. The Commission also heard from the South African Institute of Civil Engineering and Council for Scientific and Industrial Research that census and other statistics suggest better access to sanitation than is available in reality. This is due to service failure because of poor design and maintenance.

The Commission pointed out that the insufficient provision of sanitation violated a range of human rights and disproportionately affected particular groups. Women, in particular, were affected as the main caregivers, and also in terms of physical safety. They suggested that government's approach favoured economic needs

and growth over the needs of poor households. The Commission further called for cross-subsidisation of poorer districts by wealthier ones.

The lack of sanitation services occurs despite the Free Basic Services policy of 2001 which aimed to ensure that the ability to pay of poor households did not affect their access to basic services. For sanitation, the national indigent policy requires that households have, at the least, a ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) or toilet connected to a septic tank or to water-borne sewerage. For waste, there should be collection and disposal of refuse.

Municipalities are meant to finance the improvement of infrastructure through the Municipal Infrastructure Grant. The design of the local government equitable share is meant to ensure cross-subsidisation across municipalities so that municipalities are able to cover the cost of providing free basic services. Municipalities need to ensure that within municipalities the available resources are used to achieve this. The two finance streams go hand-in-hand as households cannot benefit from free basic services unless the infrastructure exists to deliver services to their homes and communities.

The Minister of Finance told the Human Rights Commission that in 2013/14 more than R30 billion was allocated to municipalities for delivery of water and sanitation services to poor households – R7.1 billion from the Municipal Infrastructure Grant and R16.1 billion from the equitable share. The Minister felt that the funds allocated were not being used optimally and that this resulted in slow rollout of delivery. The report of a Human Settlements Ministerial Sanitation Task Team noted, among others, that many municipalities were using available funding on maintenance rather than eradicating backlogs. Further, many municipalities had such serious debt that they would not be able to eradicate even the maintenance backlogs for existing facilities.

3.2 SANITATION IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Apart from the systemic challenges, the country also faces challenges relating to expectations. Taing et al. (2013) argue that poor households generally expect that they will receive a service similar to that received in wealthier suburbs, including those in which many women work as domestic workers.

A person who has a flush toilet (or toilets) in their home might think that all that is needed is to provide the hardware in the form of pipes and actual toilet, and to ensure that the charges for the water for flushing are affordable. However, Taing et al. (2013) note that a sanitation service differs from a sanitation facility in that the latter provides only the possibility that waste will be safely and effectively removed, whereas the former ensures that this happens. Where there are not flush toilets in a home, a basic sanitation service will usually require more than the hardware. Taing et al. argue that, regardless of the type of sanitation technology used, the municipality should be responsible for provision of the service.

Water-borne sanitation is the primary approach used in most formal settlements. In this set-up a series of pipes connects household water disposal points for the toilet, bath, shower, and basins to another series of pipes that take the wastewater and sewage to wastewater treatment works. Water-borne sanitation thus relies on a reliable water supply. Where possible, the system is constructed to operate under the forces of gravity, and does not require electricity or other power. Ideally, the wastewater is treated until it can be safely discharged into a river or the ocean.

One of the challenges with informal settlements is that it is easier and cheaper to provide services such as roads, pipes, electricity cables and telephone cables before people move into an area. Where informal settlements already exist, a number of different sanitation options are possible. One solution is to provide flush (water-borne) toilets along the outskirts of the settlement and link them to a neighbouring sewer. Other options

include chemical and “container” toilets, the latter being a sophisticated form of bucket toilet. If flush toilets are provided, there are again several different ways in which this can be done. Each of the types has been used in Cape Town, and each has its own problems.

The City of Cape Town defines an informal settlement as one on an erf where informal structures were built in an unplanned fashion, without an approved building plan. In 2013, there were 204 informal settlements in the City of Cape Town, accommodating approximately 145,000 households (City of Cape Town, 2013). The City classifies informal settlements into three categories:

- Category A settlements are those where in situ upgrading is planned and funding is already approved;
- Category B settlements are those identified for possible in situ upgrading if other land is identified to which some of the residents can be moved; and
- Category C settlements are those that the City plans to move at some time in the future, because the location is hazardous.

Which category a particular settlement falls into will affect the decisions made about whether and what type of sanitation will be provided. In the case of Khayelitsha, the need for improved sanitation is not confined to the informal settlements within it, as some of the formal sites were provided with only a bucket toilet when Khayelitsha was first established.

Research undertaken by academics from the University of Cape Town (Taing et al, 2013; Taing et al, 2014) for the Water Research Commission suggested that technology was not the main challenge. The larger problem was that the City did not have the experience and knowledge to manage alternative systems to flush toilets. An additional challenge is that sanitation is handled by a different part of the municipality than other services that may impact on it. For example, one of the reasons that sewage systems get blocked in informal settlements is that, in the absence of adequate refuse removal, people use the sanitation system to dispose of refuse.

3.3 MUNICIPAL REVENUE AND GRANTS

All municipalities depend, to some extent, on grant funds received from National Treasury, although the extent of the reliance varies enormously between municipalities. All municipalities receive funds through the equitable share. There is also a range of conditional grants. As noted above, both the equitable share and Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) are relevant for funding of sanitation services. Several other grants are also used for the delivery of sanitation services and the related employment generation.

The local government equitable share (LGES) for a particular municipality is calculated according to the formula:

$$\text{LGES} = \text{BS} + (\text{I} + \text{CS}) \times \text{RA} \pm \text{C}$$

where BS is the basic services component; I is the institutional component; CS is the community services component; RA is the revenue adjustment factor; and C is a correction and stabilisation factor. The basic services component accounts for 77.7% of the equitable share in 2014/15. This component multiplies the monthly subsidy per household by the number of households below the “affordability threshold”, taking into account the functions of each municipality. In the case of the City of Cape Town, it was allocated R1,497.1 million in 2014/15 for the equitable share, predicted to increase to R1,796.3 million in 2015/16.

The Human Settlements Development Grant provides funding, among others, for basic infrastructure, and has “improved rates of employment and skills development in the delivery of infrastructure” as one of its specified outcomes, while the outputs include “number of work opportunities created through related programmes.”

The Division of Revenue Bill 2014 specifies an amount of R1,350.5 million for this grant for Cape Town in the 2014/15 financial year.

The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) Integrated Grant for Municipalities has, as its purpose, to “incentivise municipalities to expand work creation efforts through the use of labour intensive delivery methods” in eleven different specified focus areas. These focus areas include basic services infrastructure, including water and sewer reticulation, sanitation, pipelines (excluding bulk infrastructure); and waste management. The allocations to municipalities for this grant are based on reported performance in the previous period in terms of number of full-time equivalent jobs created, labour intensity, need for EPWP in the municipal area as indicated by unemployment poverty and service backlogs, and rurality. In 2014/15, the total for this grant is R595 million, of which City of Cape Town received R21.2 million, with a performance target of 2,873 full-time equivalent work opportunities (WOs).

The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) is also a key grant in respect of sanitation and other services. The Division of Revenue Act describes the purpose of the grant as being to “provide specific capital finance for eradicating basic municipal infrastructure backlogs for poor households, micro-enterprises and social institutions servicing poor communities.” For 2014/15, an amount of R14,684 million is allocated for this grant. The total amount for the grant is first allocated “vertically” between sectors, and then “horizontally” between municipalities taking into account levels of poverty and backlogs, as well as municipal powers and functions. The vertical division groups together all basic residential infrastructure, including water supply and sanitation alongside roads, solid waste removal and services such as street lighting. This component accounts for 75% of the total in 2014/15, with water and sanitation accounting for 72%. To address lack of prioritisation of eradication of bucket sanitation, the 2014/15 MIG grant included conditions requiring such prioritisation. The annexure, explaining the Division of Revenue Bill, warned that if this condition was not observed, national government might in future convert this to an indirect grant that it would manage on behalf of municipalities. For 2015/16 and 2016/17 some of the MIG will be diverted to the regional bulk infrastructure grant. This is intended to fund the bulk water and sanitation infrastructure needed for future household connections. The City of Cape Town was not allocated any MIG funding for 2014/15.

4. CITY OF CAPE TOWN: BUDGET, SERVICES AND JOBS

4.1 LABOUR IN THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN

In 2012, women accounted for over half (55%) of the City of Cape Town’s workforce. By the following year, the proportion had dropped to 46%.⁵⁶ Utility Services, which is responsible for sanitation, has always been among the more heavily male-dominated parts of the City’s workforce. Refuse collection, in particular, has very few women workers. In contrast, in street cleaning, women possibly account for about 30% of workers, higher than in other parts of Utility Services.

A National Treasury publication of several years ago noted that the six metros, including the City of Cape Town, accounted for more than half of all municipal employees, and for 1% of total national employment (National Treasury, 2011). It noted further that over the period 2006–09 many municipalities outsourced various activities, including refuse removal in particular. Once outsourced, these workers are not counted as part of municipal employment, but instead listed under “contracted services” or “other expenditure” in the

⁵⁶ Information from Mario Jacobs, former member of South African Municipal Workers Union.

municipal budgets. Tshwane decreased its workforce by 4,601 jobs between 2007 and 2008. Cape Town was the only metro to expand its workforce over the period – from 23,420 in 2006 to 26,196 in 2009, although with a temporary decrease in 2007. For all metros combined, personnel expenditure dropped from 40% of total operating expenditure in 2006/07 to 35% in 2010/11-2012/13 (National Treasury, 2011: 118).

The South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) has taken up the issue of loss of municipal jobs and their replacement with inferior jobs in Cape Town and elsewhere. Even before the first national democratic election in South Africa, a major SAMWU strike in 1990 included demands for an end to casualisation and the filling of all vacant positions. In 1990/01 many African workers employed by municipalities had their jobs graded for the first time with the addition of about five extra levels for “unskilled” workers to the job evaluation scheme. The job grading went together with a conversion of the status of these workers from temporary to permanent and SAMWU’s joining of the old Industrial Council that preceded the current Local Government Bargaining Council. Over the period 1997 to 2009 the minimum wage increased by 335% in nominal terms, while inflation increased by only 80%. Increases for lower-paid workers tended to be higher than for better-paid workers (Jacobs, 2014).

The background to the 2009 strike in Cape Town was a “restructuring” exercise which saw the number of municipal employees fall from 32,000 serving a population of approximately 1.5 million people to 20,000 serving a population of approximately 2.8 million people (Jacobs, personal communication). SAMWU contended, however, that this restructuring brought about virtually no reduction in the number of municipal staff serving wealthier areas, while the limited services available in poorer areas were provided by “cheaper” workers.

SAMWU’s campaign and the 2009 strike focused, in particular, on labour brokering⁵⁷, although the union has also at times challenged the City of Cape Town on its use of EPWP workers (Theron & Perez, 2012). In 2009 labour broker workers were paid an hourly rate of R11.98 per general worker, yielding a monthly wage of R2,075. At that time the national minimum wage for municipal workers doing exactly the same work and working under the same supervisors was R3,850 per month. Labour broker workers were initially used within the cleansing department for refuse collection and street cleaning, but the practice was later extended to other departments and also to higher levels of staff.

A SAMWU press statement at the time of the 2009 strike commented on the relative invisibility of municipal work, and in particular cleansing work. The press statement went on to highlight the large gap between payments for these workers and those for municipal managers and other high-level workers:

Many of our members are invisible to the public. They clean the streets at night, and gather in the trash that the public expects to be taken away, and often at great human cost. Our members do the work that many of the commentators would never dream of doing. Maybe the commentators and others should spend just one shift with the City night cleaners and open their eyes to the appalling conditions they have to endure. We collect dead animals and worse on the roadside, we unblock sewers, we fix water pipes in the freezing cold, respond to emergencies and much more besides....

The strike and litigation resulted in a settlement agreement that saw a large portion of the labour broker workforce converted into direct employment in Cape Town. Cape Town was not the only metro affected. The eThekwin Municipality, for example, converted approximately 1,300 temporary positions into permanent ones in mid-2010 (National Treasury, 2011).

⁵⁷ Labour brokering is a system in which workers are procured from another company remains the legal employer of the workers while they are working for the client company (or municipality, in this case).

The rate of pay for the Cape Town ex-labour broker workers increased from R2,075 to R4,800 per month plus benefits. The agreement stated that the City could use labour broker workers only under exceptional circumstances and for no longer than six months. The terms of the agreement are still in place today.

4.2 THE MAYORAL BUDGET MESSAGE

The City of Cape Town's budget is a very bulky document with many annexes. The City produces a four-page pamphlet that summarises what it sees as highlights. The Mayor's introduction to the pamphlet produced in respect of 2014 states: "Our high level of service delivery is testament to our commitment to redress while our exemplary financial management is the best homage we can pay to our ratepayers." This statement asserts the City's concern about redress, but also highlights the extent to which the City takes ratepayers into account. This statement, however, already introduces a class, race and gender aspect in that ratepayers will be primarily male (because it is only property owners who pay rates), and white people are more likely than black people to own property and to own more expensive properties. The statement is also interesting because, as seen below, rates are not the main source of revenue for the City. However, the pamphlet's graph of "Municipal services per every R1 000 of property rates" suggests that the City has a special accountability to ratepayers.

The Mayor states further that 67% of the City's spending is "targeted towards the poor". The calculations underlying this assertion are, unfortunately, not found in the main budget document.

The Deputy Mayor's introduction is also relevant for our purposes in its statement: "The City's budget ... continues a strong commitment to building the economy of the City through infrastructure provision and consistent service delivery." This statement seems to talk about job creation, infrastructure and service delivery. The Deputy Mayor states that R3.6 billion is allocated for new assets, compared to R2.5 billion for refurbishment and upgrading of existing assets. This suggests that new communities should be reached by service delivery.

4.3 REVENUE

Property rates accounts for 23% of Cape Town's total operating revenue in 2014/15. Charges for services accounted for a much larger 59%. While electricity alone accounts for 40% of total revenue, sanitation accounts for 5% and refuse for a further 4%. In absolute terms, sanitation accounts for R1,243m and refuse for R990m of the total operating revenue of R28,359m.

On the operating side, the equitable share from national government amounts to R1,503m in 2014/15. This accounts for about 5% of total operating revenue. Total capital transfers and grants received for 2014/15 stand at R2,516 million. This includes R0.4 million from National Treasury for EPWP and R0.3 million from the provincial government for community development workers. The City receives a much larger amount of R1.245 million as part of Urban Settlements Development Grant and R263 million from the Integrated Housing and Human Settlement Development Grant. As noted above, Cape Town does not receive any money for the MIG.

Cape Town's tariff structures for water and sanitation aim to discourage high consumption through a per kilolitre charge that increases with increasing consumption. The budget book states that 2014/15 tariff increases (mostly of around 8%) "are necessary to address essential operational requirements, maintenance of existing infrastructure, new infrastructure provision and to ensure the financial sustainability of the service." There are additional charges for installation of water connections and testing of meters. In 2014/15 these increased at a lower rate (6.8%) than the main tariffs. The rate is nevertheless at the rate of inflation or above.

The National Treasury requires that municipalities justify tariff increases above the 6% upper bound of the inflation target. The City of Cape Town justifies the average 8% increase in water and sanitation revenue, and even higher for the next two years, on the basis of “the additional cost required to service informal settlement” alongside five other reasons.

The sanitation charge is calculated on the assumption that a set percentage of the water usage relates to sanitation. In single residential properties there is no sanitation charge for the first 4.2 kilolitres (kl) per month, R8.25 per kl is charged for between 4.2 and 7.35 kl per month, and R16.81 per kl for between 24.5 and 35 kl per month. This tariff is clearly progressive except to the extent that poorer households tend to have more members, and a given number of kilolitres per household will therefore mean a smaller number per person. The commercial and industrial rates – at R10.39 per kl regardless of amount consumed, is lower than the amount charged to ordinary households for between 7.35 and 14 kl per month.

There are also rebates for waste removal charges. The rebate is 100% (i.e. no charge) for owners whose property has a value of R100,000 or less. There are no rebates on the standard R95.92 per month for properties with values of R400,000 or more.

In addition to free basic services provided on the basis of the value of the property, households with properties above the cut-off rate, but with gross monthly household income of R3,500 or less can apply for rebates. Overall, each of the various rebates are provided to between 85,000 and 250,000 households, with about 2,200 residents registered as indigents through the application process, and 56 households as non-indigent but deserving of a rebate as their gross monthly household income is R5,000 or less. There are also rebates for “senior citizens” and people with disabilities whose income is less than R12,000 per month. The equitable share does not cover the full cost of the rebates, which are therefore supplemented from the City’s other revenue sources – either cross-subsidisation by other consumers or rates income.

The City of Cape Town’s “social package” provides the following, at an estimated total cost of R2.5 billion in 2014/15:

- 6 kl of water per month per household, free of charge
- 4,5 kl of water, including sewerage charges for all properties valued at R300,000 or less, free of charge
- 4,2 kl sanitation per month per household, free of charge
- 60 kWh of electricity per month per household, free of charge for users who have a pre-paid electricity meter and use less than 450 kWh per month and with property values of R300 000 or less
- Waste removal rebates between 0% and 100% for consumers whose properties are valued at R400 000 or less
- A total of R1.1 million in rates rebates on various properties depending on ownership and usage.

Rebates and free services are available only to those households which are in areas where services are available. Analysis using the 10% sample from the 2011 Census suggests that 88% of City of Cape Town households have a flush toilet connected to the main sewerage system, while another 2% have septic tank flush toilets, 4% use bucket toilets, and 3% have no toilet at all. In terms of refuse collection, 94% of households have their refuse collected weekly or less often by the municipality, but 3% use a communal dump, 1% use their own dump, and 1% report no rubbish disposal system at all.

The City notes that the discussion of tariffs does not include the “free services provided to the households in informal settlements”, which include “water via standpipes, refuse removal via skips or bags and access to

rate funded services such as clinics, libraries, etc.” This statement makes no reference to communally-provided “free” sanitation.

4.4 EXPENDITURE

Table 1 shows the consolidate budget – operating and capital combined – for the City of Cape Town in 2014/15. Utility Services, which includes sanitation, accounts for close on half of the total – far outweighing any of the other votes.

TABLE 1: 2014/15 CONSOLIDATED (OPERATING AND CAPITAL) BUDGET

Vote	Expenditure (R000)	% of total
City Health	907929	3%
City Manager	132613	0%
Community Services	1507629	5%
Compliance & Auxiliary Services	592374	2%
Corporate Services	1661637	6%
Economic, Env't & Spatial Planning	545065	2%
Finance	2022344	7%
Human Settlements	1892239	7%
Rates & Other	902820	3%
Safety & Security	1629626	6%
Social Development & ECD	137782	0%
Tourism, Events, Marketing	482822	2%
Transport	2232622	8%
Utility Services	13995866	49%
Total	28643368	100%

Electricity was budgeted to make a 16% operating surplus in 2014/15 (R1,635m), water and sanitation an 18% surplus (R788m), and solid waste management a 34% surplus (R363m). In all these areas, revenue thus exceeded expenditure.

The capital budget is R6,221 million in 2014/15. Of this, R2,857m (46%) is allocated for Utility Services. Of the major items listed under Water & Sanitation, Completion of Cape Flats III Bulk Sewer perhaps relates in some way to new sanitation facilities for informal settlements. This item is allocated R90m – 3% of the Utility Services capital budget.

The National Treasury states that at least 40% of the capital budget of municipalities must be used for renewal (such as maintenance) rather than new infrastructure. The City’s long list of major projects and programmes to be implemented over the medium term (i.e. three years) includes R60m for installation of sanitation in informal settlements. However, this can be compared with the R181m allocated for the new head office for Water & Sanitation.

The basic service delivery measurement table shows plans to have 1,043,129 households with flush toilets connected to sewerage in 2014/15; 31,740 with ventilated improved pit latrines (VIPs), and 67,623 with other options above the minimum service level. The number of connected flush toilets is slightly less than the 1,045,000 listed for 2013/14, while the number with chemical toilets is more than the 24,000 for 2013/14.

It is not clear if these numbers include those with communal rather than household-based toilets. For both 2013/14 and 2014/15, 600 households are noted for bucket toilets. The number of households to receive free minimum level of service of sanitation is given as 1,143,092 for 2014/15, very slightly more than the 1,141,000 in 2013/14, but substantially more than the 881,000 for 2010/11.

4.5 UTILITY SERVICES

As seen above, Utility Services is Vote 14 in the City of Cape Town's budget. The Reticulation Branch of the Utility Directorate's Water and Sanitation Branch is responsible for the distribution of water to end-users and for collecting and distributing sewage and waste water to wastewater treatment works. The Bulk Water branch provides treated water to the Reticulation Branch while the Waste Water Treatment branch is responsible for processing wastewater at the Waste Water Treatment Work.

The discussion in the City's budget notes that the "principal challenge for the [Water and Sanitation] department is to maintain an existing water and sanitation service for the City while also providing services for an ever-increasing number of households in a sustainable way. This has to be achieved in the context of providing basic needs, ensuring economic growth, maintaining an ageing infrastructure, limiting negative environmental impact, managing water resource scarcity and consolidating a transformed metro administrative infrastructure."

The discussion on the department notes that the City "has made significant progress in providing water and sanitation services to the City's residents since the formation of one metro administration." However, it notes that the number of households in informal settlements has increased "due to urbanisation, natural growth and changes in household size. If the trends continue to increase, it will eventually force more and more households into the indigent bracket or even within informal sector... Increased city sprawl will increase the cost of infrastructure to new households."

Large amounts of money are allocated for maintenance and upgrading of existing infrastructure – an estimated R150 million per annum and R85 million per annum for replacement of water pipes and sewer pipes respectively. The eight goals of the Solid Waste Management Department do not refer to expansion of waste services to new areas beyond wastewater treatment works projects. However, the long-term vision sees expansion named, although in a hesitant way. The vision sees the City "improve access to basic services for residents to as close to 100% as possible within the constraints of available funds and unplanned growth".

A table showing capital expenditure on new assets by asset class has R283 million allocated for sanitation reticulation and R1 million for sewerage purification. The two amounts together constitute 12% of the R2,422 million allocated for new infrastructure assets. The key question is where the new sanitation infrastructure will be located. The list of projects does not inspire much hope that this will be in informal settlements.

However, on the sanitation side a contract worth R165 million with Imvusa Trading (trading as Mshengu Services), provides for rental, delivery, placement and servicing of portable non-flush chemical toilets in informal settlements, while two smaller contracts with Sannicare provide for servicing of container toilets (R38 million) and servicing and maintenance of portable flush toilets (R48 million) in informal settlements. In terms of cleansing, a table listing "external mechanisms", has Masiphume Trading, Ntandani Construction and Maintenance Cleansing, Inyameko Trading, OCS-Colour control Solutions, Nokwindia Yindani Trading and Projects, Waste-Mart, Waste Plan, Lolla's Care Giving Agency, Camel Rock Trading, Linamandla Business Enterprise, and Suburban Services providing various waste-related services. Most of these relate to (mainly African) informal settlements. However, Waste Plan provides a recycling service in Sea Point and Green Point, Waste-Mart provides a "wet/dry" refuse collection service for Pinelands, Parklands, Melkbos and Blouberg, and Suburban Services cleans municipal courts. The

Khayelitsha agreement is by far the largest in monetary terms, at R25 million. The Sea Point/Green Point agreement is the next largest, at R9 million.

The annexure with multi-year capital allocations shows no allocation for informal settlements sanitation installation in 2014/15, but R23 million planned for 2015/16 and R20 million for 2016/17. The location is specified as “multi-ward” for all these allocations. These amounts are very small when compared with the total of R2,856,654 for water and sanitation in 2014/15, R2,936,658 in 2015/16, and R2,793,929 in 2016/17.

The estimates above are found in the 2014/15 budget document. Taylor (2015) analyses expenditure in 2013/14 using the on-line monthly financial reports to the City’s Utility Services Portfolio Committee. She reports that in 2013/14, total operating expenditure for water and sanitation was 5.5 billion of which R147 million (2.7%) was for informal settlements. She contrasts this with the 13% of City households that the 2001 Census found were living in informal settlements. She reports further that 81% of the R147 million going to water and sanitation operating expenditure in informal settlements went on “contracted services” for “toilet cleaning/ human waste removal”. Contracted services, in turn, constituted 71% of total (including capital) water and sanitation expenditure in informal settlements.

In 2011/12 four contractors were awarded sanitation-related contracts. Mshengu received R51.5 million for supplying chemical toilets, Sannicare R20.0 million for porta potties, Queztal R1.3 million for porta potties and SSD R19.9 million for container toilets. Combined the four contractors received R92.7 million, equivalent to 76% of the total water and sanitation operating expenditure in informal settlements in that year, and more than three times the total capital expenditure on sanitation in informal settlements at R27.2 million.

4.6 EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

There is no standard way for recording EPWP expenditure in budgets. For the Community Work Programme the wage element is recorded as transfers to households. Within the Department of Social Development, the EPWP amounts are generally incorporated into transfers to non-profit institutions, although at least one province (KwaZulu-Natal) records the payments under compensation of employees. In the environmental sector, EPWP amounts are likely to be incorporated in expenditure on contracts for the various services. Given these challenges, we look to other sources for information on EPWP expenditure and performance. However, we note that for most of the sources the amounts reflected for EPWP projects include all the other expenditures related to the projects alongside the wages paid to workers. The national EPWP office within the Department of Public Works advises the projects in which less than 5% of expenditure is spent on wages should not be counted as EPWP. If this rule is obeyed, it means that as much as 95% of the expenditure recorded for EPWP may go on other expenses. If the rule is not obeyed, the expenditure on wages could be even lower.

The most recent quarterly report available on the EPWP website at the time analysis was done was for the first quarter of the national government financial year, i.e. 1 April 2013 to 30 June 2014. This is, in fact, the last quarter of the 2013/14 financial year for municipalities. The report is based on information submitted by reporting bodies, namely the various national and provincial departments and the various municipalities. The notes state that the infrastructure budgets reported might be for multiple financial years, and might include some equitable share funds alongside funds from infrastructure grants. Expenditure could indicate either actual expenditure or transfer of funds. Work opportunities reflect paid for work for an individual, whatever the period of time. If an individual is employed on different projects, they would be counted more than once. For infrastructure, agencies are meant to report both gross and net amount of work opportunities, with the difference reflecting the number of jobs/opportunities created by choosing a labour-intensive approach. The

reported wages are calculated by multiplying the minimum wage rate by the person-days of work, assuming a person-year of 230 paid working days including paid training days. Person-days of training are subtracted from the person-days of work.

Unfortunately, very few of the tables in this data source provide a gender breakdown in respect of “work opportunities”. However, the summary information in Annexure G2 does provide this information. Table 2 below summarises what is reported for City of Cape Town in Annexure G2. It shows Cape Town reporting that 59% of EPWP workers are women. The average minimum daily wage rate is about double the minimum specified by Ministerial Determination 4 for Expanded Public Works Programmes.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF CITY OF CAPE TOWN EPWP ALLOCATIONS AND EXPENDITURE, APRIL-JUNE 2014

Item	City of Cape Town
Allocated budget including professional fees ¹	R37.0 m
Expenditure April-June 2014	R21.3 m
Gross and net work opportunities	2,062
Youth	63%
Women	59%
PWD	0.0012
Average minimum daily wage rate	R145.36
Wages paid out	R3,921,389

Annexure H of the report on the EPWP website for April-June 2014 lists the different EPWP projects for the City of Cape Town. There seems to be no item for the janitorial service. Other items that seem to relate to waste, cleansing and sanitation are italicised. They include two of the largest projects in terms of work opportunities created. However, neither of these large projects seems to refer to service delivery in informal settlements.

TABLE 3: CITY OF CAPE TOWN

Project Name	Budget	Expenditure	WOs
Infrastructure			
PTI Security – Blackheath (Water)	300,000	300,000	6
Construction of Okavango Road (LIP)	300,000	235,752	47
PTI Security – Eerste River (Water)	300,000	300,000	6
PTI Security – Grassy Park (Water)	300,000	300,000	27
PTI Security – Athlone (Water)	300,000	300,000	9
PTI Security – Mowbray (Water)	300,000	300,000	9
EPWP (LIP)	300,000	77,000	25
PTI Security – Claremont (Water)	300,000	300,000	1
Mitchell’s Plain WWTW Clean Up (Water)	110,000	110,000	13
PTI Security – Elsies River (Water)	300,000	300,000	6
Manenberg Infill-Down Housing Project (Water)	7,000,000	7,000,000	24

Construction New Sewer Manholes (Water)	1,500,000	1,500,000	10
EPWP Cleaning of Meters (Water)	3,200,000	3,200,000	41
Mowing at Kraaifontein WWTW (Water)	15,000	15,000	4
N14 86002-WS-WV (Water)	350,000	350,000	14
PRI Security – Lotus River (Water)	300,000	300,000	1
Environment and Culture		,	
Kader Asmal Integrated Catchment (WoWaste)	8,095,026	711,284	519
Solid Waste Cleansing High Season (WoWaste)	82,979,827	434,111	529
Establishment, promotion & implement (WoWaste)	95,002	4,454	2
Maintenance Noordhoek Depot (Parks)	119,440	1,120	4
Area cleaning, street sweep, litter (WoWaste)	19,497	3,385	7
Social			
Clinic clerk (data capturing interns)	400,000	400,000	58
Queue marshals for clinics (comm-based services)	490,000	490,000	4
Queue marshals for clinics (comm-based services)	24,769	24,769	32
Street people (community-based services)	550,000	550,000	43
Street people (community development workers)	750,000	750,000	306
Youth development	1,500,000	1,500,000	105
Home-community based care learners	1,000,000	1,000,000	116
Community-based services	500,786	550,786	94

The lists of EPWP projects implemented by national and provincial government departments add a considerable number of further projects for the City of Cape Town – 26 by national departments and 89 by provincial departments. These are summarised in Table 4 and Table 5. It seems that the EPWP website may not have a full listing as, for example, there are no projects listed for the Western Cape Department of Community Safety. However, a later section of this paper describes how this department provided funding for placements for Chrysalis Academy learners.

The Department of Environmental Affairs accounts for more than half of the projects, budget, expenditure and work opportunities at national level. At provincial level, the picture is more complicated. Education has the most projects and the second most work opportunities, but relatively low budget and expenditure. Transport and Public Works is the largest in financial terms, followed by Human Settlements. These seemingly contradictory patterns are probably explained by the fact that the Transport and Public Works and Human Settlements EPWP project are far less labour-intensive than those in Education and some other sectors. The budget and expenditure thus includes large amounts that relate to items other than workers' wages.

TABLE 4: NATIONAL EPWP PROJECTS IN CITY OF CAPE TOWN

	Projects	Budget	Expenditure	Work opportunities
Agriculture & Forestry	1	18,446,618	7,540,996	341
Environmental Affairs	3	111,572,062	10,499,335	1,768
Public Works	20	1,093,890	176,400	16

Tourism	2	3,638,896	2,564,965	221
Total	26	134,751,466	20,781,696	2,346

TABLE 5:PROVINCIAL EPWP PROJECTS IN CITY OF CAPE TOWN

Department	Projects	Budget	Expenditure	Work opportunities
Cultural Affairs & Sport	17	3,294,112	453,733	73
Economic Affairs & Tourism	1	398,156	45,470	10
Human Settlements	7	268,063,659	39,398,135	662
Social Development	11	6,341,244	1,286,689	320
Transport & Public Works	16	263,088,323	68,296,180	480
Health	10	126,321,667	5,528,787	3,427
Education	27	38,940,681	6,299,044	2,270
Total	89	706,447,842	121,308,038	7,242

Annexure I lists ten non-state funded projects in the City of Cape Town. The combined budget for these amounts to R18.4 million and expenditure to R0.9 million. With a total of 931 work opportunities created, this gives an expenditure per opportunity of R984. None of the projects seems to relate to sanitation or cleansing.

As noted above, the above tables relate to the final quarter of the 2013/14 municipal budget year. Other sources provide information relating to the current, 2014/15 financial year for the City of Cape Town.

The City's 2014/15 budget document notes that the national Medium Term Budget Policy Statement required, among others, that municipalities promote "sustainable job creation" through exploring opportunities to promote labour-intensive approaches to service delivery and ensuring "full participation" in the EPWP. (Use of the term "sustainable" in respect of EPWP is, of course, questionable.) The City reports that its 2014/15 budget incorporates cuts in areas such as national and international travel and entertainment alongside expansion in the EPWP.

The City of Cape Town's EPWP activities occur across all the directorates and through different employment arrangements. Some workers, for example, are paid directly by the City, while others do work that is contracted out and are paid by the contractors concerned. Some of the EPWP activities reflect the City's efforts to comply with the national EPWP guidelines that ask that government agencies reorient existing budget to increase labour intensity of service delivery and infrastructure. The City refers to these activities, which span both capital and operating expenditure, as "mainstream" EPWP. In addition, the City has a Special Job Creation Programme, usually referred to as the Mayor's programme, that consists mainly of operating budget projects.

The EPWP activities of all directorates are overseen by a Corporate EPWP Office. The Corporate EPWP Office is responsible, among others, for checking that the wages and conditions of work of the workers concerned are in line with the Ministerial Determination. If this is not the case, the workers cannot be counted as EPWP workers.

There is an allocation for the Mayor's special job creation allocations and EPWP in each of the eight categories of expenditure included in the four-page budget pamphlet produced by the City. (There are, in fact, 12 rather than eight votes in the City budget.) These are shown in Table 6 below. The job creation and EPWP allocations listed in the pamphlet amount to 1.3% or less of the total for each category except for Transport. The amount for transport includes contracted services for MyCiti vehicle operating contracts and other items

alongside EPWP, and is thus misleading. In addition to the allocations shown in the table, under Utility Services a further R24m is allocated for sanitation for informal areas and R36m for EPWP for janitorial services. Even if these are added to the amount in the table below, these expenditures still account for only 0.9% of the Utility Services category.

TABLE 6: MAYOR'S SPECIAL JOB CREATION PROGRAMME AND EPWP

Category	Total (Rm)	Category as % of total	Mayor's EPWP (Rm)	EPWP as % of category
City Health	930	3	6	0.6%
Community Services	1711	5	22	1.3%
Corporate Services	2021	6	4	0.2%
Human Settlements	2753	8	12	0.4%
Safety & Security	1712	5	11	0.6%
Transport	3837	11	372	9.7%
Utility Services	16786	48	35	0.2%
Other	5116	15	15	0.3%

Source: City of Cape Town. 2014. Budget 2014/15 – 2016/17

The budget documents reflect the City's plan before the start of the financial year. Table 7 shows the performance and expenditure of the City of Cape Town's directorates in respect of EPWP in the second quarter of the 2014/15 financial year i.e. up to end December 2014. The expenditure includes all costs related to the project, including material, transport, overheads and other related costs alongside direct labour costs such as wages. Overall, the City had 674 EPWP projects in this period, and created 20,034 job opportunities at a total cost of R1.36 billion. Transport and Utility Services dominate in terms of the number of projects and jobs created, as well as expenditure. Utility Services alone accounts for 29% of projects, 42% of jobs and 42% of expenditure, with expenditure of more than half a billion rand in the six months ending December 2014.

TABLE 7: EPWP PERFORMANCE AND CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE, 2ND QUARTER 2014/15

Directorate	Projects	Jobs	Expenditure (R000)	% Female	% Youth
City Health	13	260	2,772	40%	70%
Community Services	151	2,129	9,343	36%	35%
Compliance and Auxiliary Services	4	66	3,260	23%	90%
Corporate Services	57	832	6,633	26%	57%
Economic, Environment and Spatial Planning	2	962	6,473	31%	66%
Human Settlements	35	1,455	204,641	16%	53%
Safety and Security	6	129	1,209	41%	60%
Social and Early Childhood Development	14	1,170	5,747	43%	58%
Tourism, Events And Marketing	11	202	1,450	28%	58%
Transport of Cape Town	184	4,418	547,635	19%	56%
Utility Services	197	8,411	569,813	49%	57%
Total	674	20,034	1,358,975	32%	60%

Source: Corporate EPWP Office, City of Cape Town

The table shows that close on half (49%) of EPWP workers in Utility Services were women, while more than half (57%) were youth. The female percentage is lower than the 59% recorded on the EPWP website for the City of Cape Town, as reported above. In the second quarter of 2014/15, Utility Services had the highest female percentage across all directorates, while Human Settlements had the lowest female percentage (16%). The high female percentage for Utility Services contrasts with the generally low female percentage of workers in this directorate among municipal employees.

Table 8 shows the different types of jobs done by EPWP workers in Utility Services. Water & Sanitation, in particular, has workers in a wide range of jobs.

TABLE 8: TYPES OF EPWP JOBS IN UTILITY SERVICES, CITY OF CAPE TOWN

Department	Job types
Solid Waste	Street sweeping; collection of refuse bags and bins; recovering and sorting of recycling material
Water & Sanitation	Meter reading; janitors; water maintenance (plumbing); general plant clean-up; removing vegetation, cleaning of manholes (removal of vegetation inside manholes); cleaning around digesters (unwanted vegetation); assisting with build maintenance and general plant maintenance; water meter cleaning (done through door-to-door visits by fieldworkers trained by in-house meter reading senior staff)
Electricity Services	Trenching; sweeping; raking, assisting with civil activities.

Source: Corporate EPWP Office, City of Cape Town

As seen above, the Department of Environmental Affairs accounts for the bulk of EPWP projects, expenditure and jobs created by national government in the City of Cape Town. The Department extracted a database for this paper reflecting performance of projects initiated by all spheres of government in the EPWP Environment and Culture sector operating in the City of Cape Town in the second quarter of 2014/15.

The database included information on 456 projects, of which 386 (85%) were municipal, 41 (9%) provincial, and 29 (6%) national. Of the 386 municipal projects, 182 relate to community parks, while 201 relate to Working on Waste. The remaining three projects relate to the Integrate Catchment Management Programme, People and Parks, and Working for Forests. Waste/cleansing-related projects thus account for more than half of municipal projects, and 44% of the projects across all three spheres combined.

Of the provincial projects, 40 were funded by the Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport and one by Environmental Affairs. The provincial projects are thus of less interest for this paper. Of the national projects, 24 were funded by the Department of Environmental Affairs (mostly the "Working on/for" suite of programmes) and two by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The table below shows the number and distribution of women and total job opportunities as well as the percentage of job opportunities going to women across the three spheres. The table shows the provincial projects – which are least likely to be related to cleansing and/or sanitation – having a higher share of women than the other two spheres. Only the provincial projects achieve the old female target of 60% women.

TABLE 9: EPWP ENVIRONMENT AND CULTURE SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN CITY OF CAPE TOWN, SECOND QUARTER OF 2014/15

Sphere	Women		Opportunities		% women
	Number	% of total	Number	% of total	
Municipal	5944	72%	11419	73%	52%
National	2187	27%	4105	26%	53%
Provincial	101	1%	169	1%	60%
Total	8232	100%	15693	100%	

The municipal projects account for close on three-quarters of all job opportunities as well as of all women. The average expenditure per job opportunity ranges from R4,751 in the municipal sphere, to R17,040 in provincial and R18,871 in national projects. As in other tables, these amounts are calculated on the basis of all costs associated with a project, rather than only the cost of the wages.

4.7 JANITORIAL SERVICES

As seen above, one category of EPWP projects in Water and Sanitation in Cape Town involves the employment of janitors. The janitors are community members who are employed to clean and monitor communal toilets shared by households in the neighbourhood. Cape Town was not the first municipality to introduce janitorial services. Overstrand (Hermanus) municipality and eThekweni metropole introduced such services before Cape Town. However, Table 9 shows that by mid-2014 there were more than 100 EPWP janitorial projects in Cape Town, providing work opportunities to more than 700 people. Of the total projects, 22% were in Khayelitsha, and Khayelitsha accounted for 26% of all workers employed through this project.

TABLE 10: EPWP JANITORS EMPLOYED IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN CITY OF CAPE TOWN, MID-2014

Project location/district	Number of projects	Number of workers
Ebenezer District	2	24
Helderberg District	17	65
Hill Star	24	81
Mitchells Plain District	41	168
Northern Panorama	13	70
Tygerberg District	5	101
Khayelitsha	26	190
Total	118	717
Khayelitsha share	22%	26%

Taing et al's (2014) ethnographic study explores the views and experience of users, officials and workers and uses the following three examples as case studies of different approaches:

- Overstrand Municipality's employment of janitors through a municipal sub-contractor;
- Cape Town's direct employment of cleaning, supervisory and clerical staff on fixed-term EPWP contracts for the Mayor's Project

- Cape Town's indirect employment of Community Workers and Mayor's Project supervisory/clerical staff on fixed-term contracts through labour brokers

The detail of their research is not repeated here, but provides a rich understanding of the challenges faced by the various actors, and the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches. For example, they note that Overstrand's approach had the advantage of promoting local small business, but resulted in workers receiving much lower wages and no benefits, and having very little job security.

The Water and Sanitation Informal Settlements Unit (WSISU) in the City of Cape Town's Utilities Directorate administers all of the janitorial services in Cape Town's informal settlements. WSISU was established in 2007, and in 2014 had three teams – Capital Installations; Operations and Maintenance; and Monitoring and Evaluation, Contracts and Finance.

When WSISU initially provided flush facilities to informal settlements the City aimed to provide one toilet to a set of neighbouring households. Users were to be responsible for cleaning of the toilet while the municipality would be responsible for repairs and maintenance. The expectation that households would share toilets and responsibility did not work well, and the janitorial service was introduced as a result.

Planning for Cape Town's janitorial programme started in 2011. At that time the plan was to employ local residents as janitors and monitors in 67 informal settlements. The monitors would assist with reporting faults and supervising contractors. The janitorial programme followed on an earlier Community Workers sanitation programme started in 2006 in which the City appointed 100 people through a labour broker. The initial intention was that the workers would clean and monitor the toilets and report weekly to the City on where maintenance was needed. In practice, the workers were also responsible for repairs and maintenance and community education. The workers' six-month contracts with the labour broker were extended repeatedly until 2010. The programme ended after the workers were assisted by trade unions to advocate for conversion of their jobs into permanent posts in Operations & Maintenance.

In the second Community Workers janitorial programme the workers again argued that they should become permanent workers. The City at first argued that it could not do this because it was not certain it would be given the necessary budget each year. The 67 workers therefore signed one-year contracts with a labour broker, but became permanent municipal employees from July 2012. The Community Workers' salaries were paid from WSISU's Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget. They all became permanent employees of WSISU from July 2013, which meant that they received health insurance, paid leave, and paid maternity leave. At the time of Taing et al's research they were not receiving a 13th cheque. They were, however, provided with uniforms, clipboards and pens, and a radio and charger.

The City subsequently, starting in 2012, scaled up the Community Workers janitorial component as the Mayor's Project on the basis of short-term contracts. The EPWP clerks were initially, like the janitors, employed on six-month EPWP contracts, but subsequently contracted through a labour broker for nine months. In August 2013, the workers were offered one-year contracts funded by the EPWP programme. The Mayor's Project works in areas where there are flush toilets housed in individual concrete stalls rather than the toilets in communal block layouts that the Community Worker janitors oversee. The shift to the Mayoral Project was, at least in part, an attempt to use the City's under-utilised EPWP grants.

In 2012/13 operational costs of the programme were funded mainly by grants from National Treasury (R2.3 million) and the national Department of Water and Sanitation (R26 million). The grants were used to train workers, rent vehicles, and purchase equipment. In addition to the janitors, site supervisors, district "EPWP clerks", and general workers to support the existing O&M teams were hired. The number of workers employed in Khayelitsha increased from 24 in mid-2012 to 313 by February 2013. Overall, more than 1,700 people were employed as janitors in the Mayor's Project between May 2012 and February 2013. By April, the service was operating in 144 of the City's 400-odd informal settlements, and employed 860 temporary staff.

Comparison of these number with those shown in Table 10 above suggest some reduction in this EPWP programme over the last two years.

A business plan for EPWP Janitorial Services in the City of Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2014c) names the EPWP programme as Labour Intensive Programme, and the Sector as Infrastructure. The municipal area is given as Khayelitsha and the description is “informal settlements”. The amount allocated to the EPWP Janitorial Services for the period July 2014 to June 2015 is R36 million, distributed evenly across the four quarters. The total number of people to be employed is 15 – five “adult” men, five adult women, and five male youth, with a minimum daily wage of R100. Presumably further business plans were developed for janitorial services in other areas. If the other business plans are similar, a clear bias in favour of men is incorporated into these projects.

However, Taing et al. (2014) report that in the Khayelitsha case study site with Community Workers there was an equal number of male and female janitors, while the majority of the Mayor’s Project janitors were women. The Mayor’s Project workers were paid R14.13 an hour, equivalent to R113 per day for their eight-hour shift. This is somewhat higher than the minimum prescribed by the ministerial determination.

The use of janitors has not necessarily solved the problems related to sanitation services for residents. Swana (2015) reports that residents’ concerns include safety, the number of households sharing a toilet, the poor maintenance of some toilets, the employment of janitors from outside the areas where the toilets were based, and that toilets were not disabled-friendly. The electronic news service GroundUp reported in October 2014 that janitors told the Social Justice Coalition audit, that they worked on weekends. Yet, more than half of residents said that they did not. Residents said that a third of the toilets had not been emptied in the previous week. A resident interviewed by GroudUp claimed that there were about 15 families to one toilet (Gontsana, October 2014). The same resident said it was too dangerous to use the toilets at night, as they were situated on top of a hill about 10 minutes from her dwelling. Taing et al. (2014) found many blocked and unusable toilets, toilet paper was provided only from 2011, washing facilities and sanitary bins were absent, toilets were often locked and janitors did not have the key because residents had learned, from experience, that the way to ensure clean toilets was to restrict access.

Where toilets are locked, residents often clean toilets themselves. In BM Section men and women of all ages were observed cleaning these toilets, but in Masiphumelele interviewees said that it was mainly women who cleaned locked toilets. Some community groups had drawn up a roster for cleaning the toilets. A consultant estimated that the City would be able to provide janitors with area-based master keys to the toilet at a cost of R140 per area. With this relatively small expenditure the City would solve the problem of janitors not being able to service locked toilets.

In terms of worker rights, the researchers note the findings of Social Justice Coalition audits in terms of non-, late or incorrect payment of workers, contracts of less than six months, erratic training, inadequate equipment, protective clothing and cleansing materials, among others.

The researchers provide the history and evolution of different approaches as told to them, in particular, by officials of the WSISU. These officials reported that the community and labour protests over Sannicare-managed services, which led to the court case cited above, also resulted in their recognising that they needed to ensure that service providers complied with labour legislation. The City also learnt through bitter experience that they should not hire temporary workers (whether directly or through labour brokers) on contracts longer than six months, and that there should be a gap of several months between contracts for a particular worker to avoid claims to a permanent jobs. This lesson was not learnt only in Cape Town. One official reported that they had been told at a national EPWP workshop in 2013 that they were introducing measures were to be introduced to ensure that EPWP workers employed for more than a year would not be able to claim that their contracts must be made permanent.

The WSISU officials also noted, however, that the need for high turnover of staff increased administrative burdens, led to disruption of service, and limited the type of work that EPWP workers could do. For example, originally the intention was to create EPWP maintenance teams. However, this is difficult because of short contract periods and because there are regulations around the qualifications need to do certain plumbing jobs. Problems also arose where temporarily employed EPWP workers worked alongside permanently employed janitors. To avoid the latter problem, the City was planning to discontinue the Community Workers janitorial programme.

In January 2015, Groundup reported that City Councillor Ernest Sonnenberg had announced that the janitorial programme would be phased out in some areas “because of ongoing disputes with community leaders, excessive vandalism and concerns over the safety of workers” (Maragele, 2015). He reported that Council staff would take over responsibility for cleaning and maintenance of flush toilets. The areas affected include parts of Khayelitsha, Phillippi, Gugulethu and Hangberg. Residents interviewed by Maragele were upset that local people would no longer be employed.

4.8 OUTSOURCED SANITATION SERVICE

In July 2014 Ntongana & Swana (2014) reported that the Social Justice Coalition had conducted several social audits of sanitation services in Khayelitsha. The first audit, in April 2013, looked at chemical toilet provision.

The chemical toilets were provided by a company called Mshengu which – as seen above – still has a contract with the City. The audit found that half the toilets were damaged, inaccessible, and/or very dirty. Community members employed to monitor the toilets claimed that they were not provided with all the necessary clothing and protective equipment such as gloves. They were given one pair of overalls and one pair of boots for a six-month period. Additional items of clothing and equipment were subsequently provided, but not masks.

The SAHRC subsequently concluded that the City’s roll-out of chemical toilets violated the rights to basic sanitation and dignity of informal settlement residents. The City appealed against the findings of the Commission. In addition to violation of the rights of potential users, Groundup found evidence of violation of rights of workers. In January 2015 Swana (2015) interviewed Sannicare contract workers responsible for cleaning portable toilets at Borchard’s Quarry Depot in Airport Industria. The toilets are collected from informal settlements on Tuesdays and Thursdays and cleaned on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The work involves emptying and washing the portable toilets, and sluicing the contents and the dirty water down a drain in the floor of the depot. The workers did not have access to the canteen, flush toilets or showers at the depot, which were reserved for municipal employees. They used a chemical toilet provided by Sannicare. The workers were given protective clothing, but there was nowhere to change so they wore this over their own clothes. The workers earned R120 per eight hour shift, and worked three days a week, giving average monthly earnings of R1,560 per month. Sannicare’s Operations Manager said that the City had not allowed them to provide mobile showers because of a lack of space.

The City (Sonnenberg, 2015) responded that its contract with Sannicare placed the onus in terms of health and safety standards on the contracting company. The City said further that Sannicare workers started and ended their day at the Sannicare depot, and could wash and change there rather than at Borchards Quarry. The City was planning to increase the level of mechanisation to reduce the number of workers required to clean the portable toilets. In March, Groundup reported that Sannicare had provided a container to serve as a canteen where workers could eat their lunch (Swana, 2015).

4.9 BUDGETS FOR MUNICIPAL STAFF AND OTHER FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT

The janitorial worker payments and payments to Sannicare workers are not directly visible in the City's budget. There are, however, payments for some other categories of workers that are visible.

A total of R134 million is allocated in the 2014/15 budget for salaries, housing, cellphone and car allowances and other benefits and allowances for the 221 councillors and political office bearers. R24 million is allocated for senior managers and R8,908 million for other staff. The mean salary and related for councillors and office bearers is R523 thousand per annum, as compared to R1,819 thousand for the senior managers and R338 thousand per annum for employees (including higher-paid senior managers).

The 2014/15 budget sees staff costs within Utility Services increase by 9.8%. Overall, employee-related costs increase by 8.2%, with a higher cost-of-living increase of 8.8% to allow for notch increments. In contrast, EPWP wages increase by inflation each year i.e. by less than these amounts.

In 2014/15, total contracted services amount to R4,205 million. Within this, the City notes an expenditure of R56 million on labour brokers, as well as R9 million on "contracted services ex Payroll", R458 million on contracted services for waste water management, and R533 million for waste management. These are, however, not the only "outsourced" worker costs. There is, for example, also R174 million for consultants' fees, and R242 million for security services and charges.

4.10 SPECIAL RATING AREAS

In cases where local government does not deliver (or is deemed not to deliver adequately), some private households may feel forced to provide services for itself – either through the unpaid work of its own members (e.g. getting rid of refuse), or through buying in private services (e.g. security services – although this is not predominantly a local government service). In both these cases households and individuals are "paying" with their own resources.

In Cape Town, many middle class areas have established special rating areas (SRAs)⁵⁸ where ratepayers (i.e. a particular, and generally privileged class) pay higher rates and then have decision-making powers over how the extra money is spent, with one of the common areas of spending being cleansing.

Cape Town's Special Rating Areas Policy, which forms part of the 2014/15 budget documents (Cape Town, 2014c), states that the purpose of an SRA is to:

"4.2.1 enhance and supplement the municipal services provided by the City;

4.2.2 facilitate investment in the special rating area;

4.2.3 facilitate a co-operative approach between the City and the private sector in the provision of municipal services;

4.2.4 halt the degeneration and facilitate the upliftment of distressed business and mixed-use areas; and

4.2.5 promote economic growth and sustainable development and in this way assist the Council in the fulfilment of its objects and developmental duties as set out in its Integrated Development Plan (IDP)."

The additional rate is imposed on all ratepayers in the area after a majority of ratepayers has voted for the establishment of the SRA. Rebates are granted to any ratepayer who has a partial rebate in respect of the

⁵⁸ These are commonly referred to as City Improvement Districts.

standard rates. The City collects the additional rate payments through its standard monthly accounts, but a non-profit company established by interested ratepayers decides and controls how the money is spent. Tenants and people who live or work on the street have no decision-making power.

The South African Constitution states that the objective of a local authority is to provide all its residents with certain basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal in a sustainable and equitable manner (South African Constitution of 1997, as amended, 2008: s152 and s153). It does not define the terms “sustainable” or “equitable”. One can argue that the establishment of a SRA must serve all those who live (and perhaps also work) if it is to comply with the following clause: “The special rating area will not be used to reinforce existing inequities in the development of the City’s area of jurisdiction” (Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act, No.6 of 2004, as amended, 2012: chapter 10). However SRAs, by definition, provide an increased level of public services in the area in which it is established, depending on the ability of property owners in the area to pay the additional levies. This is likely to increase inequality rather than assisting with redistribution. It also seems questionable the City administration collects revenue over which a select group – defined on the basis of the privilege of owning property – has primary decision-making power. This is, in effect, a qualified franchise, in which this select group’s decisions affect the wellbeing both of others living in “their” areas and those living in other areas (because the additional revenue is not redistributed).

The City puts a limit (cap) on the amount that can be imposed as extra rates. Combined, the SRA revenue and budgets amount to approximately R140 million, a very small proportion of the R7 billion City budget. On average, the SRA generates an amount equal to 16-17% of the general rates for the area. The City does not directly channel any of its own budget funds to the SRAs. Indirectly, it provides a service through collecting the revenue at no cost to the SRA. The City also incurs some overhead expenditure, including one full-time and two part-time staff members and a senior manager who works several days a week on SRAs. The staff members ensure compliance with SRA legislation. They do not monitor compliance with other legislation, including labour legislation in respect of workers employed directly or indirectly by the SRAs, on the grounds that the SRAs should be subject to the same monitoring and enforcement as any other company.

The City has established an SRA forum which brings together the City officials with the managers and chairpersons of the SRAs. The forum is intended to encourage compliance and share experience, and is also consulted at the time the City budget is formulated. More recently, some of the SRAs have come together to establish their own representative forum. The intention is that this group will be able to interact directly with the chairperson of the City Finance portfolio and a grouping of elected councillors.

Cape Town currently has 31 SRAs, of which some are purely residential, others purely commercial, and other a mix of the two. SRAs activities are limited to municipal functions. They tend to focus on four “pillars”, namely security (“crime”), cleaning (“grime”), environment, and social responsibility. Gopal’s (2014) study of three SRAs in Cape Town gives some sense of how the SRAs allocate their funds.

Cape Town Central City Improvement District (CCID) was established in 2000. Three core services – social development, urban management, and security. In 2013/14, security accounted for 48% of total expenditure, urban management for 18%, and social development for 3%. Marketing accounted for nearly double the amount allocated to social development. Social development was previously even less, but in 2012/13 the CCID started training homeless people to clean the streets rather than relying on private cleaning companies. This saw a decrease in urban management expenditure alongside an increase in social development expenditure. The decrease in the former was greater than the increase in the latter – resulting in what Gopal terms a “cost-effective” change.

Groote Schuur Community Improvement District (GSCID) was established in late 2010. The two core top-up services provided are security and cleaning. Security accounted for 57% of the budget in 2013/14, and cleaning for 17%. There was no separate allocation for social development. GSCID collaborates with

non-governmental organisation Straatwerk in employing homeless people to do the cleaning. The relevant expenditure is included under the cleaning budget, which decreased between 2011/12 and 2013/14 as a result of a greater shift in strategy from private cleaning companies to the homeless – with the number of homeless cleaners increasing from 24 to 65.

The Observatory Improvement District was established in 2009. The three core services offered are security, social development and repairs and maintenance (the term used for what other SRAs refer to as urban management). In 2013/14 security accounted for 59% of the budget, repairs and maintenance for 1%, and social development for about 0.2%. The large allocation for other categories of expenditure is explained by the SRA's strategy – especially since 2012/13 – of employing staff and providing many of the services itself rather than, as in the other SRAs, outsourcing most service delivery. Security is, however, outsourced and the security company has proposed that it also provide cleaning services in the future.

For this paper, our primary interest is the role played by SRAs in terms of job creation. The three pen-sketches above already give some indications of this. The pen-sketches suggests that SRAs usually employ unemployed people in cleaning functions, although sometimes they are also employed on security or in other functions. Some workers are employed directly by the SRA, while others are employed through other agencies funded by the SRAs. Cleaners may be employed by private companies, through non-profit organisations (NPOs) or directly. In particular, SRAs have contracted with Christian church-linked organisations to employ cleaners and sometimes other workers. In some cases the cleaners are employed by management companies contracted to manage the SRA.

Both the GSCID and CCID have contracted with the NGK-linked Straatwerk. Straatwerk characterises its Ophelp/Opruim project as rehabilitation rather than job creation, and see the R5059, R55⁶⁰ or R60⁶¹ that workers receive for a four-hour shift as a "reward" for completing the work to the satisfaction of the foreperson rather than a wage. These amounts are less than the minimum daily rate prescribed by the ministerial determination. The short shifts are justified on the basis that many of the intended beneficiaries will not have the strength to work a full day. Unemployed people – primarily street people – place their names in a "queue" at the City Centre or Mowbray Straatwerk depots and are provided with four hours of work per day on a rotating basis. Participation in the cleaning and other tasks is seen as one element of participation in the "school of life" that will make them a disciple of Jesus. On average, a worker might do two or three shifts a week. However, "first teamers" who have proved themselves by, among others, having an identity document, living in a shelter or some other accommodation other than the street, and joining a church in the area, get double the number of work shifts that other workers get. Forepersons work every day.

For the CCID, Straatwerk has also created two small teams of four⁶² permanent full-time workers. The Dignity Team, do more skilled work, which includes additional cleaning on the street, night work, work after events, graffiti removal, tree trimming, basic road maintenance and gardening. As with the other cleansing workers, the CCID pays Straatwerk which manages and pays the permanent workers. GSCID has been working with Straatwerk since 2010 and currently pays approximately R75,000 per month to Straatwerk, of which about 20% is for management. Straatwerk provides bibs for the workers which are sponsored by other donors, but they wear their own clothes rather than uniforms. They are provided with some tools to do the work and limited safety equipment.

59 According to Hannes van der Merwe of Straatwerk

60 According to Anthony Davies of the GSCID

61 According to Pat Eddy of CCID

62 The CCID annual report for 2014 refers to six road maintenance workers

In January 2015, the City Depot recorded 275 people on the “queue” list for participation in the Opruim project, of whom 55 (20%) were women. The CCID’s website claims that 300 cleaners are employed, but in effect it funds 300 shifts per month. The Mowbray depot had 50 people on the “queue” list, of whom 15 (30%) were women. Overall, 70 (22%) of the 325 participants were women. Approximately 16 people get work each day in the GSCID through Straatwerk.

The City has provided GSCID and Obsid with an ablution facility for homeless people under the N2 bridge. The facility is not open every day, or even each day for working hours. Instead, GSCID’s social outreach manager allows homeless people who want to improve themselves to use the facility, for example when going for a job interview. She also uses the facility to distribute food, such as donations from Pick ‘n Pay of food that has gone past its “sell by” date, and Chrysalis (see below) uses the facility to meet with its “clients”.

The SRAs see the Straatwerk initiative as one to which they can channel homeless people when they need money. GSCID gave the example of a person who needed trainfare “to go home”. The CCID’s three social development fieldworkers also refer homeless people to Straatwerk, although there is some concern that the queue system means that work may not be available for several days, and then only for one day at a time.

In addition to the Straatwerk workers, the CCID has contracted with Iliso Protection Services to provide the services of approximately 230 staff to supplement its own three security staff. On the cleansing side, it has contracted with J&M Cleaning for between 50 and 60 cleaning workers. Teams of these workers are deployed for 16 hours every day of the week.

Because Straatwerk is only able to offer intermittent work, does not provide any referrals to other services, and has no exit strategy, CCID has also funded U-Turn Homeless Ministries, who have skills development programmes. For the last two years U-Turn has provided additional training in soft and hard skills to members of the Dignity Team in an attempt to move them “to a higher level” through the Siyakaha Coaching project. The CCID has also worked through NPOs to provide work in security kiosks over the holiday period, and in Friday-night caravans. The hope is that these workers will subsequently be able to find other jobs with businesses in the area.

In contrast to CCID and GSCID, Obsid employs all its workers directly. For cleansing it is a team of five people and a supervisor. Four of the ordinary workers sweep the streets, pick up and put refuse in bags, and remove weeds. The fourth “roving” person is responsible for other tasks such as removal of graffiti and posters and dumping. The supervisor, who was recruited through Straatwerk, assists with these tasks. A sixth worker, a driver, collects the refuse bags on every second day and takes them to a central space from which the City collects them. The City’s own workers collect the bags along Lower Main Road and empty the green municipal refuse bins. The City also deploys EPWP workers on cleansing in the Observatory area, but does so on an irregular basis that is not coordinated with Obsid.

Obsid moved to the current approach after outsourcing cleansing to a private company for one year. The SRA decided to insource so as to have more control and took over the workers who had worked for the private company. The SRA noted that an advantage of outsourcing was that one could require that the NPO or company responsible remove any worker that was not considered “up to standard”. Obsid’s cleansing worker work every day from 6am to 3pm, with an hour for lunch and tea breaks. The minimum daily wage is R21.60, with increases linked to annual increases in the SRA rates. The wage is thus higher than the EPWP minimum. The workers are employed on a permanent basis. Previously there was one woman in the team, but the team has been all-male since the woman left when she had a baby.

The CCID, GSCID and Obsid all operate relatively independently, although GSCID shares some services with the smaller Obsid. A different model is used by five SRAs – Strand, Stikland, Maitland, Salt River, and Gloderry (Kenilworth) – all of which have outsourced management to the Geocentric Information Systems

consultancy. Geocentric “specialises” in SRAs with budgets of less than R2.5 million per year. These SRAs are likely to allocate only about R100,000 per year for “social upliftment” that might offer work to unemployed people.

The five SRAs have partnered with smaller church-based NPOs such as MES (Methodist Evangelical Services) and Haven shelters. In the latter case, the shelter might offer accommodation for a short period until government services can provide assistance, and the SRA will pay a stipend in return for work such as basic street cleaning and litter picking for four hours in a day. Some of the workers paid through NPOs also do maintenance work alongside the Geocentric staff. In addition, about half of Geocentric’s 20 staff members were recruited from the street, shelters or rehabilitation centres through what Geocentric refers to as Social Work Action Teams (SWAT), working first through the NPOs and later being employed on a permanent full-time basis.

Geocentric was unwilling to provide information on the amount paid to workers on the basis that this might prejudice the NPOs involved, but said that they took the hourly market rate for this type of work into account when determining the payment as well as the amount needed to cover transport costs. The fact that the Geocentric system is considered more “economical” than Straatwerk suggests that the pay levels are lower than R50 per four-hour shift. The numbers who get work through NPOs differ across the five SRAs. For example, in 2014 Maitland provided some work for 38 people, while in Salt River four people from Loaves and Fishes did some work.

Geocentric has only one woman on its permanent staff. Some other women have received temporary work opportunities. However, the Geocentric representative noted that women do not want to do this sort of work and noted further – like others – that some of the work was not suited to women and their “skill sets” because of the heavy physical nature of the work. An additional challenge for Geocentric is that it does not have its own premises in most of the SRAs it manages. It is therefore reliant on what is offered by businesses in the area, and the ablution and changing facilities offered are often only for men.

The work opportunities provided by SRAs that are described above are not part of the EPWP. The SRAs are described here because they present another way – where workers may be paid less than for EPWP work – in which City functions are provided. There are, in addition, some instances where there is a more direct link between SRAs and EPWP.

Some of the SRAs receive indirect government EPWP funding through the Chrysalis internship programme. GSCID, for example, currently has a receptionist through this programme, as well as other young people who work with homeless people doing interviewing, headcounts, and assisting with visits to Home Affairs, hospital visitations or home visitations. Geocentric SRAs have also benefited from Chrysalis EPWP interns, two of whom were subsequently employed on a permanent basis by Geocentric. The Department of Community Safety pays the Chrysalis interns a stipend as part of its EPWP programme.

Chrysalis is a non-profit trust that was established by the provincial government in 2000 and continues to be partly funded by the Department of Community Safety (DCS). The Academy runs three-month programmes for about 600 students each year, two programmes for male youth and one for female youth. The programme is seen as a crime prevention initiative and the gender ratio of courses is therefore based on crime statistics. However, youth with a criminal record are not accepted for the course.

After students complete the three months of study, DCS funds a nine-month work placement using EPWP funding. The students sign contracts with DCS, while Chrysalis monitors and supports the students during the placements. The pay rate in 2015 is R85 per day, slightly higher than the EPWP minimum rate. Where students work well, they may be kept on for longer than nine months and paid at a higher rate, but still using EPWP funds.

DCS approached SRAs, as their “strategic partners”, to provide some of the EPWP placements. GSCID, Wynberg and Voortrekker Road SRAs all host placements. Other students are placed in police stations, disaster management, other municipalities with smaller numbers in NPOs and private companies.

Another SRA-EPWP link is that the CCID has collaborated with NPO Khulisa in establishment of a new municipal-funded EPWP project that began operating in February in Roeland Street, Bokaap, just outside the SRA area. Businesses in the area were asked to contribute to an initiative that will provide skills training and payment to 30 homeless people who will clean the streets. Eligibility criteria included living in a shelter. The majority of the 30 workers chosen were men, but at least four were women.

DISCUSSION

The questions underlying the current exploration were listed in the introduction to the paper. This final section of the paper provides summary answers to the questions based on the evidence presented above.

- Who receives services – and the quality of services received;

The Census statistics confirm that the majority of households in Cape Town have access to flush toilets. However, most of the more than 10% of households that do not are found in informal settlements, areas in which the majority of residents are black, and African in particular. Further, for those that have access to flush toilets in informal settlements, in most cases it is a shared toilet. These toilets are more likely to be broken and dirty than those in individual households. Individual households are also far more likely to have washing facilities, toilet paper, sanitary bins and other elements that contribute to a quality service.

The paper also highlights the difference between a sanitation facility in the form of hardware, and a sanitation service in the form of something that serves needs. Where communal toilets are provided, or non-flush portapotties, chemical toilets and the like are provided, the City needs to provide more than just the hardware to ensure that there is a service and not simply a facility. This is an area in which the City has much less experience than in provision of individual flush toilets, which often contributes to poorer quality services or no service at all.

Women are particularly badly affected in that they are less likely to have formal housing, and biologically and sociologically have greater need of the privacy and comfort of a working toilet both for themselves and the children and other people for whom they care through their unpaid work.

When it comes to cleansing services, people living in informal settlements again get poorer services. Those living in formal settlements will generally have weekly collection of refuse, as well as some street cleaning services provided by the City as well, in some case, as by an SRA. Those living in informal settlements will not have household-based refuse collection and are unlikely to have street-sweeping and litter-cleaning services provided by the City.⁶³

- Who pays for services – through paid work, unpaid work, rates, special rating area, or private provision?

National policy, mirrored in the policy of the City of Cape Town, provides for free sanitation for the indigent as well as a tariff structure that provides a small amount of sanitation at no cost. The policy is, however, only of benefit to those who have individual flush toilets. Those who are (meant to be) serviced by communal toilets do not usually pay a direct charge for this. However, in some cases in the past they have been expected to

⁶³ For example, analysis of data from the General Household Survey of 2014 for the country as a whole reveals that 88% of households in formal urban areas have refuse collected by municipality as against 54% of households in informal urban areas.

clean and monitor the toilets on an unpaid basis, and in other cases they still do this because they want to keep the toilets locked and unavailable to paid workers such as janitors so as to ensure a better service. Where communal toilets are cleaned on an unpaid basis, it is usually women who do this work.

Sanitation is not usually among the services secured through special rating areas. It is secured through private provision in the sense that households decide when building, purchasing or renovating a dwelling how many toilets, bidets and the like they want, and the type of toilet they will pay for. Such choices include whether the facility will have water-saving dual-flushing.

Property owners are charged a flat fee for refuse collection, but there is no specific payment for general cleansing services such as street sweeping and litter collection. In contrast to sanitation, SRAs commonly provide extra services in respect of cleansing. Further, people living in wealthier areas are more likely than others to pay for a domestic worker who will do their personal cleaning, while in informal settlements people – and particularly women – do their own household cleaning.

- Who is paid for delivery, what type of work is involved and what is the nature of the payment and conditions of EPWP, municipal, externalised, and unpaid work?

The paper has shown that municipal services in Cape Town, and sanitation services in particular, can be provided by diverse categories of workers with differing contracts, wages and conditions of work. The categories include municipal employees, EPWP workers, labour broker workers, workers employed by sub-contractors, and casual workers who receive work on a daily basis through SRAs. The work of these paid workers is supplemented by the unpaid work done by (generally female) residents in their own homes and the community.

In formal areas of the City, sanitation services are generally provided by municipal employees. Municipal employees are also responsible for most of the bulk infrastructure construction and maintenance work associated with provision of sanitation services, whether in formal or informal areas. Most of these workers are men. The minimum rate for local government employees as at 1 January 2014 was R5,869 per month. Municipal employees also receive a full set of benefits, and are employed on a permanent basis.

EPWP workers – and janitors in particular – provide some of the sanitation services in informal settlements. Although the City planned it otherwise, it seems that more women than men do this work. The EPWP minimum of R70.59 per day translates into R1,552 for a 22-day month. There are virtually no pay-related benefits attached to EPWP work other than Unemployment Insurance. The janitors have contracts for a maximum of six months.

Externalised sub-contracted workers, such as Sannicare workers, provide other sanitation services in informal settlements. While their daily rate is similar to that of EPWP workers, they work fewer days a week and thus earn less than EPWP workers who work every day. They are employed on fixed-term contracts.

In cleansing, formal areas are served by a combination of municipal employees and workers employed by SRAs through a range of different arrangements. In most cases it seems that the pay rate for the cleaning workers employed through SRAs is even lower than the minimum set in the ministerial determination. The municipal refuse collectors are mainly men, as are the street cleaners, although the female percentage is higher in the latter. The workers employed through SRAs are also predominantly men, although again the female share may be higher than for municipal refuse collectors. Many of the SRA workers are employed on what is essentially a casual daily basis.

- Who determines how services are delivered and the related payments?

In theory, the elected councillors determine how services are delivered in different parts of the City. In practice, municipal officials and the consultants who advise them probably have most influence in these decisions, particularly when it comes to the more technical aspects of sanitation services.

The pay for municipal employees is determined through collective bargaining in the South African Local Government Bargaining Council. The minimum pay rate for EPWP workers is determined by the Minister of Labour, on the advice of the Employment Conditions Commission. Where EPWP workers are paid at a higher rate than the minimum, the decision is made by municipal officials.

The pay for outsourced workers, labour broker workers and for those who get work through SRAs is partly determined by the contractors and NPOs that supply or employ these workers. The municipality and SRAs also have influence over these pay rates in that they can push them down by insisting on getting the services as cheaply as possible, or allow for higher pay by refusing to contract with contractors and NPOs that do not pay a decent wage and provide decent working conditions and benefits.

The paper confirms the differences in the ways in which, and extent to which, basic services are delivered to residents of formal and informal areas of the City of Cape Town. The paper reveals that while EPWP is used extensively by the City for delivery in poorer areas, it is not the only mechanism used which entails less secure and less well-paid work for those providing the services. The use of EPWP and these other mechanisms impacts negatively not only on the existing and potential service users, but also on the workers.

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WHO CARES?

South Africa's Expanded Public Works Programme in the social sector and its impact on women

In 2004, South Africa's government launched a public works programme that included work and training opportunities in the social sector. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), focused not only on 'typical', labour intensive public works such as building and maintaining roads, dams or housing projects, but also integrated work and training related to early childhood development, home-based care and victim empowerment services. With the underlying rationale being that halving unemployment and poverty by 2014 would only be achievable if attention was paid to women, this new approach sought to expand women's access to employment. On the surface, such an approach focusing primarily on the responsibilities that women have traditionally fulfilled, could also address the burden of care-work that disproportionately falls on women. Almost a decade after the introduction of this innovative approach to public sector employment, this publication presents the findings of original research into the impact of the social sector EPWP on South Africa's women and the country's progression towards gender equality.