SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE
2010 WORLD CUP
With only a few weeks to kick-off, South Africa’s readiness for the 2010 Fifa World Cup is evident, and tickets have been snapped up by South Africans – enthusiastic football fans and those simply caught up in the excitement. Despite widespread international doubts about South Africa’s capacity to host an event of this magnitude, all major preparations have been successfully completed; new stadiums have been built, public transport has been improved and enough accommodation will be available. But most importantly, South Africans are looking forward to enjoying the 2010 Fifa World Cup as an once-in-a-lifetime experience.

Notwithstanding the satisfaction that the “Afro-pessimists” have been proven wrong, South Africa’s successful bid for the 2010 Fifa World Cup triggered heated debates.

The organisers and South African government have heralded the tournament as a significant opportunity to fast-track economic development, combat unemployment, promote nation building and diffuse common stereotypes about Africa. Critics from civil society and academia, however, have voiced serious concerns about these promises and other aspects of the event.

Discussions in this issue of Perspectives.

Setting the scene, Justin van der Merwe documents South Africa’s role and participation in international football. He uncovers the political motives and aspirations underlying the country’s bid for the 2010 Fifa World Cup and the staging of other large scale sporting events.

One central political motive has been nation building. Since South Africa’s victory of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, sport has been understood in the country as a medium of social cohesion. Political commentator Eusebius Mckaiser, however, questions the sustainability of such interventions and argues that the 2010 Fifa World Cup is more likely to lead to the invention of a fake national identity than to the expression of real national unity.

The concern that the benefits of the World Cup will, despite all the fanfare, be rather short-lived is also illustrated in Dave Marrs’ analysis of the event’s economic and developmental windfalls. While acknowledging some of the positive short-term rewards, Marrs argues that initial forecasts of the event’s economic benefits were greatly exaggerated. Fifa’s overzealous protection of the rights of its official sponsors has meant that many small and medium businesses have found themselves marginalised and unable to capitalise on the event.

A failure to effectively engage with stakeholders also underlies the renewed debate the World Cup has triggered on the legalisation of sex work in South Africa. With a literary excursion through the streets of Hillbrow, Johannesburg, Marlise Richter provides a perspective from the ground up and eloquently tells us about the fears that sex workers have about “2010”.

Another aspect of the World Cup in South Africa that has led to widespread furore is its large carbon footprint. Given, however, that the event is symptomatic of South Africa’s carbon intensive economy and that its footprint is largely due to the distance international football fans have to travel, Anton Cartwright concludes that critics of the footprint should look to Fifa’s decision to award the event to a greenhouse gas intensive host.

We hope that the collection of articles gathered here will provide you with new insights into the impacts of and perspectives on the 2010 Fifa World Cup, as experienced by individual South Africans and the nation as a whole.

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Since first being introduced into South Africa and until the end of apartheid, football was affected by the politics of the country, and in particular, its system of racial subjugation. The all-white Football Association of South Africa (FASA) was formed in 1892, while the South African Indian Football Association, the South African Bantu Football Association and the South African Coloured Football Association were founded in 1903, 1933 and 1936 respectively. South Africa did not take part in the World Cup from 1930 to 1962, and from 1966 to 1992 the country was banned from Fifa.

This paper reflects upon South Africa’s role and participation in international football and Fifa World Cups from a historical and inevitably apartheid-based perspective. It also considers South Africa’s hosting of large sporting events leading up to the bidding process for 2010 and how such events were instrumental to the statecraft exercises of the state and corporate elites in a new democratic South Africa.

South Africa’s exclusion from international football

Although there had always been an informal policy of segregation within South African sport, the formal realisation of apartheid in 1948 further entrenched divisions on the playing field through legislation. Sporting activities had to comply with the broader policies of so-called “separate development” and there was to be no interracial mixing in sport. Non-white teams were barred from competing against white teams. Visiting teams were also expected to respect South Africa’s laws and customs. These developments were out of step with what was happening in most postcolonial football-playing countries – a tide of independent football associations swept through Fifa from the 1950s onwards, as affiliate countries started to come into their own as both independent political entities and as football-playing nations. Given the surge of nationalism and self-determination, particularly among the increasingly influential African bloc, South Africa’s membership to the Confederation of African Football (CAF) became increasingly untenable.

During the height of apartheid in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Fifa was divided on whether to grant membership to the white-controlled FASA or to the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF), which was an umbrella body representing the interests of non-racial football. FASA had already been excluded from CAF after it refused to send a mixed team to compete in the first African Cup of Nations in 1957. In the late 1950s, the SASF began lobbying Fifa to allow it to replace FASA as South

Biography
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Africa’s representative in the world body. The SASF succeeded in getting FASA suspended in 1961, but the all-white association was given one year to prove itself as a non-racial body. An investigative commission was established to assess the possible reinstatement of FASA. On the recommendation of the then Fifa president, Stanley Rous, FASA was readmitted into Fifa. Yet the general sentiment, particularly from the African bloc, was that Fifa had acted in a way that endorsed the apartheid policies and CAF was determined to push the issue further. At the Fifa congress in 1964, acrimonious exchanges led to FASA’s suspension from the world body.

Although by the 1970s South Africa’s race policies had led to its isolation in the football world, domestically the 1970s saw the apartheid regime’s forceful imposition of subjugation on the field of play. A black National Professional Soccer League emerged with the backing of the government and South African Breweries. Corporate sponsorship of black football increased after state television was launched in 1976, as companies looked to exploit the game and gain access to the black consumer base. The watershed 1976 Soweto uprising set in motion a series of events that ultimately led to a gradual deracialisation of professional football. School and amateur football, which comprised more than 95% of players, remained strictly segregated until the 1980s. In the latter half of the 1980s the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party started laying the foundations for a negotiated settlement, with anti-apartheid activists lobbying for a non-racial football body to be established (Alegi, 2004).

Many changes were in store for the early 1990s.

South Africa re-enters international football

With movements towards unity already afoot in the early 1990s, a non-racial football association was established. The divisions within the administration of football finally came to an end when the four different associations, representing black, white, Indian and coloured players, were merged into the South African Football Association (SAFA). Consequently, Fifa granted South Africa membership status in 1992 at its congress in Zurich. Football was mooted as being a forerunner in signalling the “new” South Africa, given its popular black support, and South Africa’s re-entry into international football prefaced the wider political negotiations. South Africa beat Cameroon 1–0 in its first game after re-entry and the initial success of Bafana Bafana – translated literally as “boys boys” – partly transcended the fractious history of the sport in the country.

Carried by the wave of democratisation and spectacular early feats in different sporting codes, the early-to-mid-1990s heralded a golden era for South African sport and for football in particular. The football team’s achievements, often attributed to “Mandelamania”, included being champions of the African Cup of Nations. According to Fifa’s world rankings, South Africa was ranked as high as sixteenth in the world during the mid-1990s.

Despite various problems with the formation of a non-racial football body, the foundations were being laid for South African football to undergo steady change on a national level consistent with the broader societal changes. The chief custodians overseeing the transformation of football were the Department of Sport and Recreation, SAFA and the South African Sports Commission. Unlike the other major sporting codes in South Africa, football had an abundance of black talent. Yet rapid progress needed to be made in terms of the upgrading of existing and building of new football facilities and infrastructure. Importantly, under-21 leagues and supporting structures needed to be established in order to ensure a continuous stream of good players through the ranks.

Despite the many contradictions that emerged in the new South Africa, sport’s role in helping to strengthen a still fragile national identity was undeniable. South Africa had successfully negotiated the tricky transition period and averted a civil war. Football’s role in helping to strengthen and mould this malleable national identity was clearly evident. However, after the honeymoon period of democratisation, some of the initial good work came undone. Not unlike most other sporting codes in South Africa, football was plagued by a number of issues both on and off the field. Among them were issues related to the overall competence of SAFA, South African players’ commitments to overseas clubs above the national team, and issues around sponsorship and ownership.

By late 2008, South Africa had dropped to eighty-fifth place in the world rankings and did not even qualify for the 2006 Fifa World Cup. Part of the problem was that when South Africa re-entered world football, the game was a very different entity to what it had been before isolation. Having been ostracised from World Cups and the African Cup of Nations tournaments – and also not having been allowed to
play friendly matches with Fifa members – South Africa, black and white, had maintained tenuous links with the organisational, technical and economic changes that had revolutionised world football in the 1970s and 1980s (Alegi, 2004).

Crucial political developments took place within the governance of the game, developments which would later play directly South Africa’s favour as host nation. Rather fortuitously for South Africa, the political changes occurring within world football in the latter half of the twentieth century happened to coincide with the political changes taking place in South Africa. A gradual democratisation took place within the governance structures of world football in the latter half of the twentieth century and South Africa re-entered international football in the 1990s, just in time to capitalise on the steadily mounting pressure for an African-hosted World Cup.

Although South Africa struggled to convince its African counterparts of its suitability to represent the continent after years of white rule under apartheid, the country sought to project itself as a significantly reformed, modern, industrialised African state, ideally situated to further the cosmopolitan ideals and development of world football. Eager to shake off its former pariah image and consistent with various initiatives adopted by state and corporate elites in the early 1990s, South Africa was quick to read the mood in world football circles and did not waste any time trying to seize the initiative. Because of its largely peaceful transition and relative success in overcoming a history of racial discrimination, South Africa was also steadily being viewed as an ideal candidate to further the increasingly developmental focus of world football, particularly on the African continent. For a complex set of political and economic reasons, and arguably also through sheer luck and timing, South Africa managed to wrest the ascendancy from other, more established African contenders that, in purely footballing terms, were more deserving of host status.

Despite what was happening in football and parallel to this, sport – in particular major sporting events – took on increased importance for the post-apartheid South African government. Having outlined the nature of the role played by South Africa in international football, the next section looks more closely at the recent history of post-apartheid South African state and corporate elites’ drive to host sports mega-events, leading up to the decision to enter the bidding process for 2010.

South Africa enters the bidding process
During the early phases of democracy, sporting events were central to the statecraft exercises of state and corporate elites. Thus winning the rights to host the 2010 Fifa World Cup was a direct consequence of concerted and sustained efforts by state and corporate elites to attract sports mega-events for predominantly two reasons. Firstly, bid protagonists usually stressed the crucial economic and developmental corollaries such events would bring, fusing conventional political discourse with a developmental philosophy. Secondly, and related, is the promotion of a particular notion of Africa and the idea of an African revival consistent with the rhetoric propagated through more conventional political initiatives like the African Renaissance (Cornelissen & Swart, 2006). Therefore, it was not long before the South African government sought host status for the 2006 and later 2010 Fifa World Cups, having already successfully hosted the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 1996 African Cup of Nations, the 1999 All African Games and the 2003 Cricket World Cup.

The 1995 Rugby World Cup proved cathartic for South Africa at a time when the nation was galvanised through the “one team, one nation” slogan. The slogan, which extended into the identity building of the “Rainbow Nation”, became a cornerstone of Mandela’s presidency. However, closer inspection suggests that the lustre of the event was quick to dissipate, largely in light of ongoing transformation squabbles as a result of rugby’s pervasive image as a white, Afrikaans sport (Black & Nauright, 1998; Booth, 1996; Grundlingh, 1998; Steenveld & Strelitz 1998).

After successfully hosting the Rugby World Cup, South African political and corporate elites strategically seized the opportunity of hosting various pan-African events, such as the African Cup of Nations and the All African Games, to recreate some of the country’s mega-event glory, for which the Rugby World Cup had set high standards. These events were also supposed to signal South Africa’s emergent African identity, following years of white rule under apartheid. South Africa won and successfully hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations with the kind of euphoria which had marked the Rugby World Cup. However, setbacks were also to follow: South Africa lost the bid for both the 2004 Olympics and the 2006 Fifa World Cup.

The idea of hosting the 2006 Fifa World Cup was first mooted in the early 1990s. It was envisioned that the event would have three primary objectives.
Firstly, it would encourage capital construction and heighten the country’s international visibility for the purposes of attracting tourism. Secondly, it would elicit national pride, and thirdly, it would offer local power brokers in government, sport, media and business an opportunity to renegotiate or consolidate their role in the “new” South Africa. The 2006 bid also relied heavily on an emotive posturing of Africa similar to that used in the 2010 Fifa World Cup bid, by appealing to the socioeconomic marginalisation of Africa. South Africa lost the bid to Germany by one vote (Alegi, 2001). South Africa came under criticism for not doing all in its power to secure enough votes. The presence of then president Mbeki at the final voting round would also have helped. However, in hindsight these setbacks were learning curves for the country, and should the event have been awarded at that stage, it could have proved logistically problematic (Cornelissen, 2004a, 2004b; Griffiths, 2000).

South Africa’s decision to co-host the 2003 Cricket World Cup with Zimbabwe and Kenya went one step further in affirming the country’s African identity, while also being consistent with a pattern of foreign policy initiatives by president Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki. The event was tied into President Mbeki’s vision to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically through the African Renaissance. The overall “African Safari” motif of the tournament, which became the strategic marketing approach of choice, sought to stamp a uniquely “Africanised” version of a game bequeathed on former colonies by British imperialism, and aimed to broaden the cultural base of the game. What made the Cricket World Cup all the more interesting was the implicit attempt to undo a sport which had associated itself with the “civilising” mission of the British Empire. By “Africanising” the Cricket World Cup, South Africa was implicitly trying to reconfigure not only the hegemonic order of international cricket, but also the broader inequalities between the Anglo-Saxon world and Africa (Van der Merwe & Van der Westhuizen, 2007).

Although South Africa’s choice of Zimbabwe as co-host produced unnecessary political tensions – it contradicted the overarching theme of the African Renaissance, exacerbated tensions between the Afro-Asian and Anglo-Saxon contours within the cricket playing Commonwealth, and highlighted the weaknesses of South Africa’s overall foreign policy towards Zimbabwe – on a technical level South Africa was quite successful in dispelling the “myth” that Africa was not suited to hosting such events (Van der Merwe & Van der Westhuizen, 2007). South Africa’s appropriation of the event, coupled with the manner in which the event was punctured by the state, corporate elites and the media, revealed the country’s continental and international aspirations. These aspirations were well capped by South Africa’s successful bid for the 2010 Fifa World Cup. The bid was largely motivated as an “African” bid and tied into the “10 years of democracy” celebrations just after the April 2004 general elections. After failing the first time, South Africa rejuvenated its quest to host “the beautiful game” by appealing fervently through the well-publicised slogan, “It’s Africa’s Turn.”

What made this round of bidding truly unique in the history of the World Cup was the rotational system introduced by Fifa, which induced a continent-wide scramble for the rights to host the event. The sentiment was that Fifa had done something for Africa that it had never before done in the history of the World Cup. It had levelled the bidding playing fields. Africa had to compete with Europe and South America only on the field of play – and not against their beautiful cities and strong infrastructure. After Brazil was awarded the 2014 event the rotational system was subsequently revoked in 2007, adding to the exceptional nature of the decision for the African continent.

From the outset, the 2010 event was always going to be hosted by an African nation – just which nation was to articulate this vision remained contested. Although there were moments when South Africa was unsure whether it would secure host status – followed closely as it was by an aspirant Morocco that managed to secure 10 of the final votes, and by an equally buoyant yet shy-on-votes Egypt – for the most part South Africa was self assured after having successfully hosted a string of sporting events. With South Africa having arguably the strongest sporting, transport, media and hospitality infrastructure and facilities in Africa, partly a legacy of its apartheid past, the country had good reason to be confident.

Despite the structural problems due to apartheid and the almost 30 years out in the political wilderness, South Africa seemed an old favourite and a relatively known quantity, largely because of the stature and moral authority it had accrued within the international community in a relatively short period since readmission. From the viewpoint of
Fifa, hosting the World Cup in Africa provided an opportunity to further globalise the sport and had an explicit political edge.

**Conclusion**

This paper reflected on the role played by South Africa in international Fifa and World Cups, and its increased significance because of its apartheid history. Although the steady inclusion of African states in World Cups is perhaps most clearly demonstrated through the structural changes made to the tournament in the twentieth century, these trends have been strengthened and paralleled by broader cultural, political and socioeconomic forces. An African Fifa World Cup not only forms part of a broader drive towards a more equitable international footballing order, but also towards a more equitable realignment between Africa and the developed world more generally. Hosting the 2010 Fifa World Cup therefore promises to be a crowning achievement of not only South Africa’s re-entry into the international community, but also for Africa’s journey towards a more equitable and just global order.

**References**


viii Griffiths, E (2000) *Bidding for glory: Why South Africa lost the Olympic and World Cup bids, and how to win next time*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball


Notes

1 A version of this paper appeared in the book *Development and Dreams: The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup*, 2009

2 The South African Sports Commission (SASC) was established in 1998. The organisation that was the precursor to the SASC in the period under discussion was the National Sports Council.
The lure of the rainbow
Who could possibly say no to warm and fuzzy feelings smack bang in the middle of a cold South African winter? Only, one might guess, the most cynical, unreconstructed anti-nationalist. And even he – or she – will quietly smile when South Africa is put on colourful, cultural display when the biggest sporting event in the Milky Way, the Soccer World Cup, kicks off sooner than you can say “Afro-pessimism”. South Africans, who suffer from collective manic depression, will experience instantly delivered ecstasy. Thoughts about the high volumes of violent crime, near-endemic corruption within the state, the worst income inequality on earth or compromised service delivery that impair the quality of our lives, will all be forgotten. For a little while at least. Instead, we will be One Nation, as implored by an old Castle Lager advertisement with the pay-off line, “One Nation, One Beer”. The depression of yesterday will give way to the escapist preference for hedonistic joy. And, of all the bits of reality that we will temporarily forget in a fit of passionate nationalism, it is our amnesia about our differences as a diverse group of individuals and communities that will be the most spectacular.

Put most bluntly, South Africans will again pretend to be the Rainbow Nation that is a perfectly coherent and a multicultural dream. Why do we invent this “reality”? Is it honest? Does it play a useful, lasting utilitarian role in our lives? Or, did we not learn a lesson from the 1990s when we hosted – and won – the Rugby World Cup partly on the basis of a fake unity that turned out to be unsustainable in the years thereafter?

Let me be the party pooper, the one to keep it real. Yes, we will slide into nationalism-speak. Indeed, we will feel and be unified as One Nation. And, yes, yet another liberal political or sociological master’s thesis might be written off the back of the Soccer World Cup about the ability of sport to galvanise an otherwise divided society. But I think this is not a remedy for “dealing with” differences: we need to stop “dealing with” differences; rather, we should embrace diversity – and genuinely so. Differences are not things that should be feared. They should be understood, accepted, and explored. Around the world, human beings should cut down on the enormous and unrealistic faith they place in, and needless pressure they put on, giant sporting events to affect meaningful nation building. But, I had better fully explain these upsetting thoughts.

South African sport and nation building: an unglamorous history
South Africa is a fascinating case study for the relationship between sport and nationhood. As apartheid laws and policies became most deeply and most savagely entrenched during the twentieth century, so the international community expanded the various ways in which it sought to isolate the
immoral apartheid state. One of the most effective, and most emotionally hard-hitting, tactics was to exclude national South African teams from participating in international sporting events. This was not just a general rebuttal of the apartheid state’s overall architecture, values and principles – all of which was regarded by the United Nations as morally odious; it was, on a more micro-level, also a rejection of the racial exclusivity of sporting codes in South Africa. Different race groups could not play against, and with, each other in the sporting arena, lest blacks started believing they had the same moral status as whites.

Despite having a black majority, therefore, the apartheid government laboured under the false belief that it could project a South African identity to the world that was lilly white. No one in the international community bought this lie. Domestically, most South Africans also boycotted the official national teams. And so, for example, if the so-called Springboks would be playing the New Zealand rugby team, then the All Blacks (a nickname that had multiple political meanings, and convenient evocative caches, for countless black South African supporters) could count on local (black) South African support. Sport became wholly political. It did not galvanise the country as One Nation. It did, however, galvanise a dispossessed and marginalised majority to fight against a national identity that was racially exclusive and whose racial exclusively was displayed with brazen nakedness on sports field across the world, until isolation became widespread.

These were not warm and fuzzy post-democratic feelings felt by blacks in relation to national sports teams; these were feelings of profound disconnection from the patriotic symbolism that national sporting teams are supposed to evoke in us when they participated in events like the Soccer World Cup.

This history of how our racist past infused the usually innocuous business of sport demonstrates that sport can both unite and divide. It can also be used for political subjugation. And, in a calculation often missed by perpetrators of prejudice, it can also whip up and sustain the desire for freedom among the very people who are supposed to be excluded from the perpetrator’s vision of who is South African – and so fit to play – and who is not South African – and so fit only to clean the locker-room. Sport, and black South Africa, had the last laugh, we now know with historic hindsight.

But we expected too much from sport ...

But, as much as sport triumphed over prejudice, that too was an exaggerated victory for sport itself. It is a victory which, we will soon see again, has had the consequence of putting undue pressure on events like the Soccer World Cup. What do I mean by an exaggerated victory? Well, in a sense South Africans, both black and white, were enormously relieved when sport became deracialised and (for the most part, though not entirely) depoliticised after 1990. We started having national teams that had greater moral and political legitimacy which made it easier for the majority of South Africans to feel they could own these teams as truly theirs. And so, for example, despite containing only one black player, the national South African rugby team that won the 1995 Rugby World Cup stole the hearts and minds of the vast majority of South Africans, black and white. Warm and fuzzy feelings were flowing both in the townships and in the suburbs. That iconic image of Nelson Mandela wearing a Springbok rugby jersey, standing next to Captain Francois Pienaar, represented as much of a break from our divisive past as the images of blacks standing in long voting queues the year before. It truly is very hard to exaggerate the effect that the Rugby World Cup had on the national mood and the psyche.

The recent film Invictus relived those moments and one cannot but help to feel Castle Lager-goodness when watching that kind of docu-film.

It is also hard to understand what it is, psychologically, about sport that make it such an effective catalyst for this kind of nation building. One element, of course, is that the sheer euphoria of seeing one’s team do well is like popping a dose of Prozac. It is for the same reason that when teams do badly, supporters can become hooligans and, as one macabre study I once came across claimed, there is even a correlation between some men’s favourite team’s losing and the likelihood of them being involved in domestic violence afterwards. Tragically. So it is possible that it is not just sport per se that matters, but winning or doing well that matters too.

It will therefore be interesting to see how long our warm and fuzzy feelings will last during the Soccer World Cup should Bafana Bafana not reach the second round. At any event, whatever the sociological or psychological drivers underpinning mass hysteria, there can be little doubt about the visible relationship between a national team participating in an international competition and a diverse group of people momentarily putting aside differences
and becoming one. That, in a nutshell, is what happened in South Africa in 1995. Democracy has unburdened national sport, and now we can get on with enjoying the jingoistic benefits of supporting a team that is a truly South African – as opposed to an apartheid – creation.

Oops, wait .... there are dangers!

Sadly, it is not all smooth sailing. The problem is that the notions of nationhood and national identity that underpin the collective feelings of oneness during these sporting events are fake notions. 1995 is an excellent example. South Africans emerged from the Rugby World Cup with a recalcitrant belief that the Rainbow Nation – a phrase popularised by Archbishop Desmond Tutu – was real and would last forever. In other words, black and white and blue and brown, and all other colours in between, would hold hands and get along until Jesus comes. Racial tensions were no more. And intergroup differences, if any, are benign. Indeed, a non-racist and non-racial society had thus been born. The Population Registration Act of 1950 which created race groups in the face of biological impossibility was dead and buried. This motif of a Rainbow Nation was boosted by the escapism induced by the hosting of the Rugby World Cup and was sustained, for a little while longer than one might have expected, by the victory in the final. A sport crazy society was the perfect template on which to demonstrate the kind of dizzying impact that sport can have.

However, this socially constructed Nirvana cost us. The basic problem was that reality was neither colour nor class-blind. And it is still not so. You cannot wipe out deep distrust and prejudicial attitudes and beliefs across various linguistic, cultural and political groups overnight, just because someone kicks a ball over a set of rugby poles in the dying seconds of a match. We mistook catchy phrases – Rainbow Nation, “democratic miracle” – and iconic images – Mandela and Pienaar – for national identity and nationhood. The boring truth was that we did not even know each other’s names as ordinary South Africans, let alone were in the enviable position of being able to start a conversation about overlapping values, principles and the like which could form the basis of a meaningful national identity and so a more enduring sense of nationhood.

The irony, of course, is that Mbeki – who was to be squashed in between Mandela’s Rainbow Nation and now Zuma’s attempted revival of that nation (not that citizens are playing along with him) – re-racialised political discourse and debate on nationhood in a way that was, in a rather macabre terms, laced with honesty. Mbeki deserves blame for not doing his bit as national leader to build social cohesion across different groups, but he himself, and what he stood for, actually symbolised and evidenced the reality that Mandela’s and Tutu’s Rainbow Nation was never really genuine.

It is not that a big sporting event cannot occasion a sense of national identity and nationhood. It can. But it cannot constitute national identity.

The BIGGEST mistake to watch out for, however, is to assume that just because we feel united, the feeling is underpinned by genuine national identity and nationhood. That need not be the case. As a scientist might put it with more clinical precision, the feelings of nationhood we experienced in the mid 1990s were a simple instance of a “false positive”. In reality, there was no nation.

Are we condemned to difference?

The good news is that it does not matter. Really. Instead of panicking about whether the Soccer World Cup will (again) deliver us a sense of national identity, we should happily reject that expectation as unnecessary. We should do so because we recognise that differences are not inherently divisive. It is perfectly understandable that in a pluralistic society individuals and communities will have a variety of values, principles, tastes, etc. Yet, there is senseless pressure on us to conform and fake oneness – again. Why? We should have learnt in the 1990s that the day after the foreign press and international players and fans leave, divisions that were swept under the carpet come back to haunt you. So faking unity is counter-productive, dishonest and unnecessary. I suspect that what fuels this dishonesty is not so much an overriding conviction we all have about the positivity of global sporting events. Instead, it is driven by a correlative fear about what happens when you dare to acknowledge to each other that you have divergent views, tastes, and beliefs. What happens, in other words, when Jane says to Sipho, “Bru, I have a confession to make. I HATE the vuvuzela!”? Well, quite frankly, if sixteen years after democracy we cannot safely declare innocent preferences to each other, then our democracy is much more fragile than a sporting event of any magnitude would be able to repair. Fortunately, it is not that fragile. Rather, it is up to
South Africans to be comfortable with the possibility that no overarching, substantive sense of national identity and nationhood will ever emerge, let alone one that can be truthfully expressed during the 2010 World Cup. The best we can do is to fake unity just because warm and fuzzy feelings, whether real or fake, are useful in the middle of winter, in the shadow of a recession and as a break from the stresses of day-to-day living in a still developing democracy.

So there’s nothing for “the nation” in the Soccer World Cup then?
None of this implies that we should not have braais, practise our vuvuzelas, drink gallons of beer and be excessively friendly to foreigners in displaying our multicultural melting pot. Just because something is a construction rather than reality does not mean it cannot be useful. And so, if we can engineer feelings of nationhood for a few weeks, and doing so can help us as a country to rally behind our team, promote South Africa as a fun tourist destination, begin some positive conversations about who we are and where we are headed, as a society, then the World Cup would have served us very well.

The point of the reflections in this essay should therefore not be seen as an ode to depression. Rather, my central point really boils down to this: we must simply scale down our expectations about what will happen the morning after. And, more importantly, we need to be aware that we are inventing a national identity rather than expressing a real one. That is not to say one could not, maybe, find or develop a national identity somehow or somewhere, but that is a conversation we have never had as a country precisely because we have got into the habit of faking it. It’s time to keep it real.
The closer the daily countdown to the kickoff of the Fifa World Cup 2010 has gotten to zero, the clearer it has become that initial predictions of the impact the event would have on the South African economy were greatly exaggerated. Early forecasts of half a million visitors – representing a 15% increase on the usual number of foreign tourists – soon dwindled to 450 000, then 330 000, and recently as low as 150 000. While the latter seems to reflect undue pessimism, the trend is not dissimilar to the experience of previous host countries. But concluding that international sporting events seldom live up to their hype does not necessarily mean they are not worth bothering with. In the case of South Africa, the timing was unfortunate because of the global financial crisis and subsequent recession, which has inevitably put a dampener on fans’ travel plans. But it was also fortuitous, since like most other countries in the world South Africa was forced to provide financial stimulus to the economy when the credit squeeze hit, and for a developing country spending on infrastructure was the obvious way to go. Whether the World Cup-related infrastructure – especially the expensive new stadiums – will be fully utilized after the event is another matter entirely.

A few South Africans have undoubtedly regarded the World Cup as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to get rich quickly, and media reports of “rip-off” pricing have caused great consternation both among local politicians and the local organising committee. Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies issued a stern warning in March that the government would not hesitate to unleash the Competition Commission if there was any suspicion that business cartels were colluding to inflate prices and thereby placing the success of the competition in jeopardy. An investigation has in fact been initiated into price fixing in the airline industry, and Tourism Minister Marthinus van Schalkwyk has commissioned a survey of prices in the hospitality industry to ascertain whether they have been raised unreasonably.

Reinforcing the perception that the event will not be as well attended as initially hoped, Match, Fifa’s exclusive hospitality partner for the World Cup, recently returned more than 400 000 hotel bed nights unsold, while South African National Parks, which had agreed to allocate up to a third of its inventory to foreign visitors, put some 14 000 bed nights back onto the local market when demand failed to materialise. There is now considerable concern within the South African hotel industry that too many new establishments have been erected and that some are going to struggle to remain viable after the event.

Brett Duncan, Chief Executive Officer of the Federated Hospitality Association of South Africa (Fedhasa), told the South African Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Tourism that some hotel groups could face closure after the Fifa circus had left town. “Hotels will be under enormous pressure. There will be job losses as some won’t be sustainable,”

What legacy?
The economic and developmental benefits of the 2010 World Cup

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Biography
David Marrs
David is Cape Editor of South African financial daily newspaper Business Day, and editor of its trade supplement, The South African Exporter. He has been working as a journalist and commentator on the South African political economy for more than 20 years.
he said. Too much emphasis had been placed on accommodation and not enough on logistics like air travel and vehicle hire, without which fans would not be able to reach the various destinations to stay in the hotels that were eagerly awaiting them. In addition, Duncan said many hotels had made the mistake of relying too heavily on Match to fill their rooms, and had been left stranded when a large chunk of these were handed back to them with only a few months to go before the event.

Gillian Saunders, the Grant Thornton Supervisory Director of Research, when the consultancy released its initial estimates of visitor numbers and the economic impact of the tournament on South Africa in 2008, said the outlook was quite different before the collapse of US investment bank Lehman Brothers triggered the global financial crisis and plunged much of the world into recession. This original survey assumed football fans would stay in South Africa for an average of 15 days and spend as much as R15bn in total, including R6bn in ticket sales and the rest on accommodation, catering and entertainment. Were these expectations to be fulfilled, the direct impact on South Africa’s gross domestic product would be a boost of as much as 0,5% this year. However, with visitor numbers no longer expected to be as high, and fans likely to reduce their time in the country to cut down costs, economists are no longer as confident in these figures. Efficient Group Chief Economist Dawie Roodt estimates that the economic fillip could be as little as 0,2% of gross domestic product.

Citigroup economist Jean Francios Mercier said in a “ballpark assessment” report released in early March that the biggest beneficiary of any Football World Cup was invariably Fifa in the short term, while the host nation almost always carried a disproportionate share of the cost burden. Mercier nevertheless believes that hosting the competition “probably will bring tangible but small economic benefits to the South African economy”. He expects tourism inflows to boost real gross domestic product by 0,5% this year, and that both the balance of payments and the rand could strengthen on the back of the inflow of foreign currency. Potentially the most important benefit is the effect hosting a successful World Cup would have on South Africa’s image, but this is also the most difficult benefit to quantify. Mercier believes there will be some positive legacy, but he doubts it will have a major economic effect.

“In the five years prior to the World Cup, the country benefits from spending on stadium building and upgrading of other infrastructure necessary to the event; in the year of the event the main benefits occur from the holiday and ticket spending by spectators, as well as participating teams, Fifa officials and visiting VIPs; in the years following the World Cup, the country can draw benefit from a successful staging of the event in the form of higher tourism inflows and other intangibles, such as international reputation and even political clout,” Mercier says.

The International Monetary Fund argues that hosting mega events such as the Olympic Games or Football World Cup can be important image boosters, especially for a third world countries like South Africa. An article in the Fund’s journal suggested recently that just bidding to host an event of this size sends out a signal that the country is serious about engaging the outside world, especially in terms of trade and tourism. This could go some way towards countering negative perceptions of South Africa as an investment destination arising from the ruling African National Congress’s (ANC’s) internal political battles and calls for the nationalisation of mines and farms.

While the economic “big picture” seems likely to turn out to be rather smaller than expected, there are several sectors of the South African economy apart from long term tourism and the construction industry that are grateful for the World Cup, and especially its timing. South African motor vehicle manufacturers have been particularly hard hit by the recession and the collapse of export markets, so restocking by car hire companies in anticipation of the influx of football fans could not have come at a better time. Imperial Holdings, a listed South African company that owns both car dealerships and rental businesses, said in its results announcement for the six months to December that a forecast recovery in new vehicle sales could be attributed partly to the expected rise in tourism-related vehicle purchases and the World Cup. Imperial, which is supplying the buses that will transport all 32 teams during the competition, said the usage of South Africa’s bus fleet would increase by about a fifth over last year and the “defleeting” that is usually a feature of the winter months would therefore not happen this year. Rental periods are also expected to be extended.

In addition, a study by Cadiz Securities concluded that retail spend would increase by about 0,2% during the World Cup, adding some R800m to the tills of established businesses in the host cities. However, little of this is expected to filter down to the informal sector or rural poor. This is partly a function of the unavoidable urban focus of the tournament due to
the location of the majority of the stadiums in South Africa’s bigger cities, but also because of stringent Fifa-imposed regulations covering business conduct during the period of the World Cup.

The South African Treasury estimates that South Africa will have spent about R33bn on infrastructure in preparation for the tournament, some R12bn of this on the stadiums alone and about R13bn on upgrading transportation systems. Indeed, transport infrastructure is destined to be the most useful and visible legacy of the 2010 World Cup. This is not because upgrading public transport was not an urgent necessity before South Africa won the bid to host the tournament, but the event made it a priority for the authorities and forced all levels of government – local, provincial and national – to cooperate in ways that had largely eluded them during the first decade and a half of South Africa’s democratic history. Projects such as the Gautrain high speed commuter rail service linking OR Tambo Airport to Johannesburg and Pretoria were not officially initiated specifically for the World Cup, but there can be no doubt that national pride has played a part in ensuring that it stayed on track and that sections of the line will play a part in getting fans to games across South Africa’s sprawling and congested industrial heartland.

Similar uncharacteristic energy has been devoted to expanding the country’s major airports, investing in undersea cables to add broadband capacity, improving satellite broadcast links, adding lanes to highways and fast-tracking integrated commuter rail and bus rapid transport systems. These have not been without their problems, not least cost escalations that have caused considerable taxpayer anxiety. They have also caused conflict with existing providers of public transport such as privately owned minibuses that dominate many urban transport routes in South Africa and are not above using violence to defend their perceived economic rights. But few could argue against the fact that such infrastructure will form a lasting legacy, or that it would have happened even in the absence of the World Cup.

South Africa’s public transport system was neglected during the apartheid era, with better-off whites generally using private transport and the government actively discouraging black people from settling and working in urban areas. In addition, escalating crime post apartheid, and poor management of the rail infrastructure, discouraged the expansion of the existing rail commuter network and development of integrated rail, bus and taxi transport systems. Winning the bid to host the 2010 Fifa World Cup provided both the necessary incentive and inflexible deadlines to compel the various levels of government and private operators to work together efficiently. The result is that all of the host cities have implemented improved public transport systems, based largely on fleets of buses using dedicated lanes and newly constructed terminals and boarding points. These facilities, along with the integration of other forms of public transport such as rail and the national fleet of privately-owned minibuses, will continue to serve the cities well long after the World Cup final has been played.

According to Mercier, economic theory suggests the impact of infrastructure spending on a country’s economy is not limited to direct outlays but gets magnified by the “multiplier effect”. He points out that a 2008 study aimed at assessing the impact of sporting events in South Africa concluded that public spending related to the World Cup was likely to raise real gross domestic product by about R16,3bn or 1,2% if the indirect effect on manufacturing, business, financial services and internal commerce was taken into account. Previous research had concluded that while the multiplier effect would extend the benefits of World Cup-related spending well beyond the construction, engineering and transportation sectors and create as many as 50 000 jobs, most would be short-term contracts and therefore not make a meaningful dent in South Africa’s high structural unemployment.

Job creation was a big selling point of the World Cup to South Africans prior to the bid to host the competition, and the potential loss of this benefit has been used by government officials to neutralise objections from those who feel they have been prejudiced by the use of state resources to fund a sporting event. Incidents of unrest and organised protest in deprived communities have been rising steadily since before last year’s national election, with anger at a perceived lack of service delivery sometimes spilling over into violence and destruction of property. The ANC has conceded that some residents have legitimate grievances, especially in areas where corruption and inefficiency have caused the effective collapse of local government, which is constitutionally mandated to deliver a range of essential services. Gauteng Local Government and Housing Minister Kgaogelo Sekgoro warned recently that violent protests could derail progress towards staging a successful tournament, since the government was being forced to spend more money than planned
on infrastructure that was being damaged during protests. However, it is evident that many South Africans still see the World Cup as a diversion of scarce resources that could have been better utilised to build houses for the millions of economic migrants who continue to flock to South Africa’s cities from the rural areas, only to end up living in shacks.

Trade union federation Cosatu, ostensibly an ally of the ANC government, has been particularly vocal on this point while simultaneously strongly supporting South Africa’s staging of the World Cup. Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi warned recently of “mass action” in protest against a decision by the independent energy regulator to allow a 25% electricity tariff hike could run “at a particular speed that we cannot control” and continue beyond the start of the World Cup. Anger over the tournament’s failure to deliver immediate socioeconomic benefits to the poor erupted into the open in March when Fifa was forced to halt production of the official World Cup mascot toy in China, when it was alleged that workers there were being forced to endure “sweatshop” conditions. It emerged that an ANC Member of Parliament had won the Fifa contract to produce the mascot, nicknamed Zakumi, and promptly outsourced production to a factory in Shanghai. Cosatu argued that the government’s failure to ensure that all such World Cup merchandise was sourced locally defeated one of the main objects of staging the event in South Africa. Cosatu has also called for an official inquiry into corruption arising from the awarding of World Cup-related tenders following the granting of a R30m contract to “beautify” the main highway leading to Gauteng’s OR Tambo international airport to a company with links to senior political figures, without a competitive and open tender process.

The South African Local Government Association (Salga) recently issued a warning to all municipalities about the possibility of strikes and violent protests during the World Cup, pointing out that June and July traditionally fall in South Africa’s “strike season”. The competition would be seen by some as an ideal opportunity to get a quick, positive response from management so as to avoid negative publicity, Salga said, and councils should develop contingency plans or negotiate in advance to get written agreements from unions that disputes would not be allowed to disrupt the World Cup.

There has also been a lot of unhappiness among the business community and nongovernmental organisations over Fifa’s aggressive defence of the World Cup brand, its overzealous protection of official sponsors at the expense of small local enterprises, and its demand that host cities deal with vagrancy and other antisocial activities before the event kicks off.

The football world body’s uncompromising stance concerning “ambush marketing” was relatively well publicised at the time of the bid, and there have therefore been relatively few instances of heavy-handed action against large companies trying to make a quick buck riding on the coattails of the World Cup brand. However, the owners of small businesses in the vicinity of the stadiums in several South African cities have complained that their ability to capitalise on the dollar and euro-toting pedestrian traffic that will flood these areas before and after games has been severely restricted by the zealous application of bylaws criminalising any reference to the competition, football in general and even the national flag. Vendors selling products considered to compete with those of Fifa’s major sponsors are particularly aggrieved, with some predicting that their sales will be reduced, rather than inflated, as a result of restrictions placed on their ability to advertise and trade.

One organisation, Ecumenical Service for Socio-Economic Transformation, has gone so far as to take the City of Johannesburg to court to stop it from clearing out street vendors ahead of major events, specifically the World Cup. The City of Cape Town responded to complaints from informal traders who are to be prevented from trading at their usual sites because of Fifa’s contracts with the city by moving to temporarily suspend certain bylaws for the duration of the event. This would allow informal traders to set up their stalls in the vicinity of fan parks and other planned public football viewing areas.

Overall, it seems likely that hosting the 2010 Fifa World Cup will benefit South Africa economically by means of a relatively brief injection of foreign exchange during the event, significant capital investment at a time when liquidity is in short supply due to the global recession, and significantly improved transport and communications infrastructure that might otherwise have been delayed or not occurred at all. However, it will not be the panacea for the country’s many serious social and economic backlogs that some may have hoped it would be. The biggest potential for long-term benefit lies in the opportunity to market the country as a tourist destination in the coming years, while it has the undivided attention of billions of football fans watching on television and wishing they were there to join the party.
The highest court of the land, ensconced on
Constitution Hill, looms over the sprawling
city of Johannesburg. Its lavish architecture
sits awkwardly amid the symmetrical blocks
of flats and peeling offices on the edge of Joburg’s
city centre. The Constitutional Court, its symbolism
and the hope it holds for a truly democratic South
Africa, barely get a second glance from its bustling
neighbours-across-the-street. It is no small irony
that the court’s closest neighbours make up one of
Hillbrow’s most vivacious economic sectors – the
ladies of the night (and day) who sell their bodies for
cold hard cash.

Hillbrow was called Joburg’s “flatlands” in the
1950s. It was originally intended for low-density
housing for an expanding white population. After
World War II, large investment buildings shot up
to maximise profits, leaving Hillbrow with a forest
of high-rise concrete constructions where little
sun penetrated and open spaces were a rarity. The
90-storey high Hillbrow Tower – now a symbol of
Joburg – was built in the late 1960s and keeps watch
over its teeming inhabitants. In the 1970s, Hillbrow’s
flats were thronged with a high proportion of young,
white single people – and the night life buzzed.
Hillbrow was the beating disco heart of Joburg.
By the early 1980s landlords increasingly let their
premises to aspirant middle-class Indian and coloured
families, in clear contravention of the apartheid
Groups Areas Act which deemed Hillbrow for whites
only. Black families followed in the late 1980s and
“white flight” increased. The northern suburbs of
Joburg became plum with middle-class bellies and
bling, while indigent migrants to Joburg – from South
Africa’s rural provinces as well as new arrivals from
other countries – filled up the empty buildings left
behind. The term “hijacked buildings” became part of
the jargon that described the one square kilometre
of tight structures nestled between Berea, Parktown,
Braamfontein and Houghton Estate. Researchers
are apt to point out that the population density in
Hillbrow is five times that of New York.

Hillbrow bursts with life, colours and languages.
Its streets teem with fast-walking pedestrians, even
faster minibus taxis, and stationary hawkers who sell
anything from individual sweeties for a couple of cents
to indignant chickens squawking in cramped wiry
cages. One might wonder how the chickens arrived on
a particular street corner, where they will go tonight,
or how in this tight utterly urban space, they are likely
to meet their end.

The same holds true for Hillbrow’s sex workers.
Informal trade is the mainstay of Hillbrow’s cash
flow, and many a (female) newcomer who cannot find
a job soon realises that there are only two choices
left, both grim: selling your body, or returning

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**Biography**

**Marlise Richter**

Marlise has a BA (Hons) and LLM degree from Wits University and an MA
in International Peace Studies from the University of Notre Dame (USA).
She worked as a researcher for the AIDS Law Project and Reproductive
Health & HIV Research Unit. Her research interests lie in feminism and
HIV/AIDS with a particular focus on sex work and gender based violence.
Marlise is currently working towards her PhD at the International Centre
for Reproductive Health at the University of Ghent (Belgium), and is a
visiting researcher at the Forced Migration Studies Programme,
Wits University (South Africa).
empty-handed and hungry from whence you came. That is, if you can return at all.

I am sitting on the step of the Hugh Solomon building in Hillbrow. People are spilling out of its front door, chatting, their tummies rumbling for an overdue lunch, mostly mamas with pleated skirts and 

*Ibo with* outifts. They are probably nurses who have come for additional anti-retroviral therapy training at the Hillbrow Health Precinct and the Reproductive Health & HIV Research Unit (RHRU), I reckon.

I am waiting for Pauline to come and fetch me. She is to be my guide me through the maze that is Hillbrow, towards her boyfriend’s flat, where I will be treated to a manicure and pedicure. Pauline is a vigorous 

Jill-of-all-trades: she is an HIV/AIDS counsellor, peer educator, sex worker and mobile beautician.

Pauline is late and I shift the weight of my bum on the uncomfortable cement step. This is unlike her – we spoke half an hour earlier and agreed to meet at the front door. I don’t have my cellphone with me, and I feel quite lost. In Joburg, not having your cell phone on you is like being naked. No defences against the urban forces and the Unknown. I have locked my Blackberry in my car with my purse, my ID book and anything else of earthly value. This is Hillbrow. The wisdom is: one doesn’t take any chances.

The group of nurses is dispersing into the street, on their way to find taxis back to their homes and lunch. I decide it is time to find my lifeline phone. I nod at the security guard looking after my car and spot Pauline at the entrance of the Esselen Street Clinic. We laugh about the misunderstanding – she has been waiting on the clinic steps probably thinking similar thoughts to me.

We take off into the busy streets, exchanging stories about our respective trips back from Cape Town. We were both at a consultation last week in which NGOs and government brainstormed strategies on sex work, HIV and the 2010 Soccer World Cup. There, Pauline spoke eloquently about the fears that foreign migrant sex workers have about 2010 – everyone uses the year as shorthand for an event of a mere four weeks. Sex workers are understandably anxious about the changes that will come with international scrutiny and hype. They whisper to me often about their fear of being rounded up by the police and being locked up in jail for the duration of the games. These are not unfounded fears: sex workers in Hillbrow are regularly arrested and beaten by police. Some are raped and killed – the perpetrators never found (or never sought). Sex work is illegal in

South Africa and sex workers cannot rely on the law to protect them – much less take the enforcers of the law to task. If you are an “illegal” in the country – a *Makwere* – your problems are even greater. Indeed, at the Cape Town Consultation we decided to call on government to place a moratorium on all sex work-related arrests during the World Cup period in order to alleviate some of these problems.

City clean-ups during international events often include not only picking up litter and repainting of rusty street signs, but making sex workers, hawkers, migrants and the homeless “disappear”. Even the mobile clinic staff of the RHRU has felt the dangerous disquiet that comes with this clean-sweeping of Johannesburg. Only last week they were providing health care services in a nearby brothel, when Metro Police descended in a raid, forcing the nurses and community health workers to the floor at gun point. They were, they said, looking for drugs. On this pretext they manhandled the slightly built male community health worker, who counsels sex work clients during clinic consultations. The nurses tried explaining that they were conducting a clinic. At this, the officers left the room, only to kick and punch people further down the passage. Why the Metro Police were violently harassing people for drugs when they should rather have been issuing speeding fines wasn’t clear to anyone present.

The debate on law reform on sex work has been raging in South Africa for years. The South African Law Reform Commission – the statutory body responsible for making recommendations on law reform – has been mulling over this question since the early 2000s, and no end is in sight. The commission released an Issue Paper in 2002 containing their research, and a Discussion Paper in 2009 which was understood to contain their recommendations and draft legislation. The latter document cunningly avoided the latter components, stating that too much time had passed since the 2002 document and that more input from the public was required. Human rights and sex work activists chewed their nails in despair.

Unlike Germany, that reformed its laws on sex work in 2002 in ample time for the 2006 World Cup, South Africa is still relying on outdated ideas and laws. Indeed, South Africa has almost the exact same legal framework in place with regards to sex work as it did under apartheid. The Sexual Offences Act (Immorality Act) No 23 of 1957 made it an offence for a white person to have sex with a black person or to commit any “immoral or indecent act”. Most of the provisions
in this Act have been struck down as being against South Africa’s new democratic values and ideals, yet sex workers and their clients could still be prosecuted under this act.

While Pauline and I walk, I carefully skirt puddles of stinky water and mounds of earth. Roadworks have been going on forever in Hillbrow and many of the traffic lights are still not working. Deep in thought, listening to Pauline, I step onto the pedestrian crossing where green lights beckon us across. In a flash, Pauline pulls me back out of the way of a speeding car. “Let’s wait here, Marlise,” she says. I notice the opposing traffic lights show no sign of life, which seems to be an invitation for cars to treat the intersection as a highway. There is plenty of work here for the metro cops, I think. We cross carefully when there is no car in sight. Pedestrians do not count for much to the ever-rushing motors of this city.

We stroll past hawkers selling anything from plastic toys and fresh spinach to cellphone chargers. People call out in a variety of languages, and indeed it seems as if every so-called “developing” nation is represented in Hillbrow. Ethiopians selling clothes. Nigerians displaying a rainbow of cellphones. A Pakistani-run cafe spills goods onto the sidewalk. Congolese car guards. Zambian vegetable hawkers. Zimbabwean security guards. An energy pulses through these streets that draws people to Hillbrow, into Hillbrow. It is lively and upbeat and people are driven to eke out their survival here, if they can. This energy fills the streets and splashes colour on the otherwise dour, often dilapidated buildings. Affable calls and loud conversations create a Babel of magic that embellishes the poverty, squalor and threat of crime for a second.

Pauline marches determinedly through this all, seemingly oblivious. She only appears to register the business when a man passes us by and shouts at me “Hi Madam, I need a job”. My white skin advertises my class, my education and my money, and cannot go unnoticed in this street of black-only faces. I smile at him and we walk on.

Within a few minutes we reach Pauline’s building. It seems like a typical Hillbrow block of flats. The paint is peeling and the name has become so faint that it is barely readable. She asks if I have brought my ID book and I shake my head, puzzled. We enter the building to be confronted by three separate signs that shout “No ID, No Entry”. She exchanges a few words in Shona with the security guard. He shakes his head vigorously in dissent. I enter the conversation by saying I can leave my bag and jersey with him. He asks me matter-of-factly: “Are your bag and jersey an ID book? No? So, no entry”. I tell him it will take an additional 15 minutes to go and get my ID. He is not convinced. He still shakes his head. Pauline says: “Come” and walks towards the lift. I look at the guard questioningly and he glances away. I quickly scuttle into the lift and we are carried into the belly of the building. Pauline giggles and says he comes from the same place as her in Zim and is her friend. A cockroach bums a lift with us and scampers across the elevator buttons as if to double-check that we are on our way to the eleventh floor.

Pauline opens two front door locks and invites me into the small flat she shares with three others. The lounge is decorated by “Jesus is King” pictures, carefully needle-pointed into dark fabrics. She unlocks the room that she shares with her boyfriend and I make myself comfortable in a chair next to their bed.

Looking through the murky window, it feels as if I am on top of the world and overlooking a great forest of flats. If I close my eyes I can see all the way to the sea from here. I have come, after all, for a pedicure and she scrubs my feet.

We chat about Sisonke Sex Worker Movement and other sex workers we know. Sisonke is a sex worker organisation recently established at the Hillbrow Health Precinct. It is run by sex workers, and its business is sex work issues. I am assisting them to set up an office and to build an organisational structure to root themselves in Johannesburg. Pauline is a volunteer on the Sisonke committee and we meet at the Sisonke offices every two weeks. Here in the informal atmosphere of her beauty spa bedroom, Pauline expands on a thorny issue – tensions between foreign and South African sex workers. As in any other industry, politics is rife. South Africans are scared that foreigners will take away their work or “steal their men”. Zimbabwean sex workers think South African sex workers are too impatient and do not treat men “in the right way”. We talk about the campaign to decriminalise sex work that we are both involved in. Will it make any material change to the lives of foreign sex workers, we wonder?

Pauline covers my toe nails in Champagne Gold. She moves her chair forward to start work on my rough hands. She has switched on the TV and the white noise of a talk show on SABC1 fills the room. I glance at the talking heads, trying to make out what they are saying about the abolition of slavery in Africa. It seems to be an issue of major concern to the presenters and guests but I cannot hear what they are arguing about.
In the room, too, the irony of skewed power relations is heavy: a white Afrikaans researcher having her nails filed by a kneeling, Zimbabwean migrant.

I ask about Pauline’s family back in Zim and she tells me about her teenage daughter and son. Her mom is looking after them back in Bulawayo. She sends them money every month – South African rands are eagerly accepted in a country where the country’s currency has become an international joke. Pauline says she came to South Africa only last year. I express my surprise as she exudes confidence and know-how of someone who has lived here for years. She tells me with pride how she jumped the border. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was putting pressure on her sister and her to join their political meetings in the evenings. They refused and were targeted. They decided they needed to leave the country. From Bulawayo, she recounts she took a bus to Johannesburg. She had only R250 when she left Bulawayo and made it to Joburg With her she had a bag with clothes and a blanket – no passport or papers. The first night in Joburg she spent with a friend. The friend left in the morning without offering her breakfast, telling her to go and find work. Pauline located another friend living in a hotel in Hillbrow. This friend introduced her to the sex trade and helped set her up. Pauline has been able to make a living since and tells me that she now has a passport and visa.

We examine the Liquorice nail polish I have brought and try to find the purple glint that it projects in the right light. The room is too dark and my finger nails turn me into a goth. I tell her how I like the idea of looking like a fearless witch when I have black finger nails. She shrinks from the metaphor, but is happy that I am happy. I don’t want to ruin my shiny new nail polish and she helps me to fish R300 out of my jeans pocket, where I have hidden it safely against spying street eyes. She hides the money in the cupboard and takes out R20 for her security guard friend. “So that he lets through my other clients in future”. For a moment I am puzzled. Surely her folks don’t come here for business? I then realise she means the clients who require perfectly manicured nails – not the ones who need other, more private parts of their anatomy attended to. Either way, I am sure we all leave in shiny, new ship-shop shape.

We take the lift down to the foyer and I see my cockroach friend is still making the rounds. The security guard has his palm crossed and I wave him goodbye. Pauline walks me to the door and says she needs to clean up the room before her boyfriend comes or there will be trouble. I feel a faint tremble in my heart at the thought of having to walk back through Hillbrow unaccompanied, but then again I have my fearless black nail polish on.

I take the same route back and walk past the same enquiring eyes. I giggle quietly at the sight I must make. My feet are slimy (yet beautiful) from the cream Pauline rubbed into them with so much care, and my soles skid around in my plastic sandals. I pass school children scoring goals with a Coke can against a tree, miserable chickens awaiting a painful death, colourful West African skirts flapping in the wind, and the many hawkers waving their wares at me, legal or not. Although I work here too, I am but a tourist in Hillbrow, passing through. A curious white visitor who makes a living from gathering stories and information from people who have to survive in the harsh reality of Hillbrow every day: those whose living is fraught with dangerous clients, violent boyfriends, megalomaniac police men, corrupt hotel managers and life-threatening viruses. I am uncertain on my feet and it is only when I am back in my car where my trusty cellphone awaits that I feel that I am on safer ground.

References:
A number of recent reports have drawn attention to the carbon footprint generated by the Fifa 2010 World Cup. The storyline involves the estimated 2.7 million additional tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂-e) greenhouse gases that will result from hosting the mega-event. 2.7 million is a big number. Comparing equivalent activities, the South African World Cup is forecast to be over eight times more carbon intensive than the preceding event in Germany. But 2.7 million tonnes of greenhouse gas is also less than 0.7% of the emissions that South Africa is responsible for every year. As with all climate change analysis, insight and perspective can be of great assistance particularly if, as appears to be the case in the reportage, this information is going to be used to formulate an opinion on the merits of hosting the World Cup in South Africa.

Calculations of carbon footprints, especially when conducted ex ante for complex and unprecedented events, are always assumption dependent. As a result, the numbers produced by such estimates are at best indicative; they serve as a reference point on the scale of the problem and a guide for remedial actions. Any carbon footprint can be contested: Would the lights in a hotel have been on anyway even if World Cup tourists had not been there? Should one include the affects of water vapour emitted by aeroplanes given that this vapour does trap heat in the atmosphere but does not hang around in the atmosphere very long? How many locals will not be commuting or holidaying as a result of the World Cup congestion? These are difficult questions to answer definitively, although accepted norms around these issues are becoming more common place. As calculations go, the forecast of 2.7 million CO₂-e produced by Randall Spalding-Fecher (an experienced and respected figure in South Africa’s climate change sector) and others from EconPöyry in February 2009 were about as comprehensive and balanced as anyone could have hoped for. The study disaggregated emissions for six different event-related activities, clearly stated its assumptions and applied internationally accepted conventions in arriving at its estimates. In many ways South Africa, and the Norwegian Government that sponsored the study, should be commended for conducting such a thorough first step. In particular they should be commended for being the first mega-event to include international travel to and from the event in their analysis. In the South African study international travel accounts for over 67% of all emissions, and including this source makes for a more comprehensive footprint calculation. It also raises important awareness around the climate change impact of economic and lifestyle

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decisions. The other reported contributors were inter-city transport (17.6%), intra-city transport (1.4%), stadia constructions and material (0.6%), stadia and precinct energy use (0.5%) and energy use in accommodation (12.4%).

Even if international travel is ignored, however, the South African World Cup appears set to emit significantly more greenhouse gas emissions than Germany did in 2006 or, on an intensity basis, any preceding Olympic Games or Football World Cup. Is this the fault of the World Cup? Is it another reason for Afro-sceptics to question the rationale of hosting such an event in South Africa? To answer these questions it is necessary to look beyond the World Cup to the way in which South Africa generates its electricity, moves its people and goods between and within cities and constructs its infrastructure. Indeed, it is necessary to delve into the entire macro-economic premise of South Africa’s efforts to address the social and material injustices of its past.

During apartheid South Africa relied heavily on a minerals and energy complex to sustain its economy in the face of growing isolation. As a part of this strategy the country exploited its abundant but dirty coal resources to provide cheap energy to its mines. It also developed industrial giants such as SASOL to synthesise oil from coal. SASOL ensured the apartheid government a measure of oil independence but simultaneously became responsible for the world’s biggest point-source of greenhouse gas pollution at Secunda, South Africa’s first democratic government set out to redress this situation with the intention of diversifying energy sources and managing environmental impacts (DME, 1998) but was soon won over by vested interests in the status quo. As a result the country continues to operate one of the most greenhouse gas intensive economies in the world (WRI, 2009).

To blame the World Cup for a large carbon footprint is to miss the point that it is the underlying nature of South Africa’s unreconstructed energy and transport sectors together with its remoteness from most internationally travelling football fans that generates this footprint. Frankly, relative to most other countries, hosting a flea market in South Africa would be bad for the environment. There could be no other way but for a World Cup in South Africa to have a massive footprint, and to blame the event for this is to confuse symptoms with causes. It is to the causes of this footprint that we should be casting our attention and focusing remedial actions.

Did Fifa appreciate that awarding the 2010 World Cup to South Africa would result in such a large emissions footprint? Surely. And in that sense Fifa, which is set to generate over €3bn in profits from 2010, could take some responsibility for the carbon footprint of an event that it manages on a very short string. This is particularly true given Fifa’s insistence that South Africa build five new and large stadia and the emissions that arise from the cement, iron and steel used in the construction of these stadia (on this component I believe Econ Pöyrys estimate to be too conservative). From a climate change perspective, an ideal world would involve rhetoric on the problem being matched by decisions to award mega-events to those countries that have the lowest greenhouse gas intensity in their national energy grids and built environments.

But the Realpolitik of international football is far from ideal and not yet guided by climate change considerations. Competitive advantage in hosting mega-events is not, for the time being, determined by the relative carbon intensity of the aspirant hosts’ economies. Instead Fifa, in acknowledgement of climate change issues, encourages host countries to offset some of their carbon emissions in climate change mitigation projects. Significantly, Fifa does not enter into binding agreements with host countries on these offsets in the same way that it does on matters of security, stadia and hospitality, but Fifa did offset its internal carbon footprint arising from Germany 2006 through a carbon mitigation project in Letaba, South Africa.

Assuming that South Africa responds to Fifa’s encouragement and precedent on carbon footprints, the comprehensive estimation that has been completed represents a necessary and positive first step in a process that involves reducing this footprint via the carbon offset market. It is in taking this subsequent step of reducing its 2010 footprint that South Africa has fallen short, and more critically passed up a golden opportunity. Carbon offsets involve transactions in which polluters invest in projects that reduce or remove greenhouse gas emissions in exchange for the right to claim some credit against their own footprint. Collectively these transactions — which can be formal or informal — constitute the carbon market, a market that had a

total value of over €90bn in 2008 (Point Carbon, 2009). South Africa is not yet a significant player in this market, either as an investor or as a beneficiary of investment, but this is changing. The cost of a tonne of CO₂ credit in the offset market varies, but if it would cost roughly €20m to address the entire carbon footprint of the 2010 World Cup.

Whether spectators, Fifa, South Africa or commercial sponsors, should foot this bill might be contested, and there is a reasonable case for sharing the responsibility, but from a South African perspective not taking responsibility for this offset represents a lack of strategic foresight. €20m is a lot of money, but is a fraction of the cost of the cheapest new stadium in South Africa and manageable within the €3bn budget that has been allocated to the 2010 World Cup by South Africa. South Africa could purchase these credits and either retire them themselves or sell them to its 2010 partners including Fifa. Were South Africa to do this it would hold the legitimate claim of having hosted the first carbon neutral mega-event, a status that would automatically and instantaneously see it reposition itself from climate change laggard to climate change pioneer. It would also have set a watershed precedent for future events thereby ensuring a positive legacy for the 2010 World Cup even before it had started.

The money from this offset would be reinvested. As the purchaser, South Africa would be in a position to stipulate the location and the type of projects from which it would like to procure its carbon credits and in so doing could ensure that its investment remained domestic, or in keeping with the original intention to host an “African event”, on the continent. As the purchaser, South Africa could also ensure that the investment remained aligned to local needs. In so doing South Africa would kick-start a vibrant local carbon trading industry and support suppliers and adopters of exactly the type of renewable energy and energy efficient technologies that would allow the country to embark on a more sustainable industrial development pathway; one capable of serving the country’s economy and society well in a future in which climate change will become a growing concern.

Such an approach would accord with contemporary research findings on how hosts extract local development value from mega-events. The central strand of this research suggests that ensuring mega-events address local priorities while still meeting the demands of umbrella organisations, such as Fifa, is critical (Baade et al, 2002; Cartwright & Cristando, 2008; Kuper & Szymanski, 2009). Certainty this approach was central to Barcelona’s successful hosting of the 1992 Olympics and Germany’s hosting of the 2006 Football World Cup, and absent from the less economically successful Athens Olympics and Japanese and South Korean 2002 World Cup.

Importantly, projects do not have to exist or have been completed for an investor to purchase a credit. It is possible to purchase carbon credits “forward”, although obviously risk is reduced when credits have been completed or are near completion. It would be legitimate for South Africa to offset the 2010 World Cup in lieu of projects that are yet to be completed, or to initiate projects specially for the purpose of offsets.

There has, unfortunately, been inadequate public appreciation in South Africa of quite what an international marketing opportunity the tackling the 2010 carbon footprint presents. In the light of the guaranteed benefits, €20m (and it could be less) would represent money extremely well invested, but indications are that this transaction will not take place prior to the event. It is possible to offset the World Cup after the event, but doing this foregoes the obvious marketing platform that the run-up and actual event presents.

Late in 2009 the then Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism issued a tender for an organisation and projects that could offset the air-travel component of the World Cup and subsequent events, but then failed to award a contract. Instead host cities appear to have been left with the responsibility of scoring “Green Goals” and with a few exceptions have been as successful as the national soccer team has been in scoring actual goals with the responsibility of scoring “Green Goals” and do offer other potential benefits – shade, food and fodder, building material, fuel, better water infiltration and the type of habitat diversity that can support biodiversity. As a means of

off-setting the greenhouse gases arising from a Football World Cup they are quite limited, however. Not only is an extraordinary number of trees required to offset 2.7 million tonnes of CO2, but establishing exactly how many are needed can be very difficult. Moreover, trees eventually die, releasing most of their CO2 back into the air as they decay, and there is concern that trees may prove a highly labile lock-up for atmospheric greenhouse gases as temperatures increase. Simply put, while planting some trees in the wake of the 2010 World Cup is a good idea, trying to mop up all emissions derived from coal and oil combustion in forests not only represents a very expensive idea, but is also highly risky and probably ill-founded. It makes more sense to use offset investments in a range of projects involving solar water heaters, solar panels, wind turbines and energy efficient buildings and public transport, all of which offer social benefits of their own.

How did South Africa come to miss the offset opportunity created by the hosting of the 2010 World Cup? On the surface the answer relates to a lack of public awareness and institutional capacity to identify and seize a climate change opportunity, but this situation has its origins in a mindset that relies on heavy industrial sectors for economic development in spite of the clear limitations of these sectors in creating employment or redistributing wealth. The same mindset does not consider environmental costs to be real costs, in spite of the fact that they are borne disproportionately by the poor, and fails to connect environmental degradation (including climate change) with the continuing poverty of South Africa’s most marginalised people.

This mindset is pervasive within government, but also exists in many sectors of South African society. It relies on a notion of the environment as a luxury good, a white man’s construct, a place that rich people visit in 4x4 vehicles, a place that should be conserved once, and only once, we have taken care of human needs. In contrast the reality is that it is the environment that provides the water, air, fuel, food and even stability that sustains us, it is the environment that houses much of our culture, heritage and spirituality and it is the environment that when compromised produces outbreaks of the diseases that afflict us. Perhaps most crucially it is the environment that provides both the foundation as well as the means and inspiration with which people can escape deprivation. How we choose to manage and interact with this environment constitutes the foundation of our macroeconomic strategy.

All may not yet be lost. Although the opportunity has been missed to stand in front of a global audience at the 2010 kickoff as the hosts of the first carbon neutral mega-event, it is possible to offset an event ex-post. Climate change is not going away and scrutiny will be cast on South Africa before, during and after the 2010 Fifa World Cup. The country could yet, in its own way and own time, offset all or a portion of the carbon footprint generated by the event. In so doing it would reap the economic and developmental rewards associated with the nascent global renewable energy sector. It would also make a small but significant contribution towards curbing climate change and ensure a famous, if slightly delayed, legacy for the 2010 World Cup.

In the mean time observers need to appreciate that the large footprint that results from the 2010 World Cup, is not so much the event’s fault as a symptom of the way in which South Africa provides electricity and transport, and the distance between the country and most travelling football fans not to mention the distance between stadia. Criticism of the footprint should look to Fifa’s decision to award the event to a greenhouse gas intensive host, and encourage Fifa to consider emissions more seriously in future decisions as a means of incentivising the uptake of renewable energy among aspirant hosts. With regards to South Africa, the focus should be on what, at this late stage, can be done to offset the massive footprint through projects and technologies that will reduce the country’s emissions and tackle poverty. That, surely, is the way to secure a legacy for 2010 that will be celebrated for generations to come.