

Second African CSO Winter School on the ADP

Re-strategizing and Re-thinking African Climate Action

9/11/2015

Devonvale Golf and Wine Estate, Stellenbosch, South Africa



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ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AF	Adaptation Fund
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AU	African Union
AWG-KP	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, South Africa, India and China
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBDR(&RC)	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (and Respective Capabilities)
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CJA	Centre for Justice and Accountability
CMP	Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of Parties
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development
ERF	Equity Reference Framework
ESS	Environmental and Social Safeguards
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGCA	Global Gender and Climate Alliance
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
GNT	Geneva Negotiating Text
G77	Group of 77
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HBS	Heinrich Boell Foundation (Heinrich Böll Stiftung)
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPCC AR4	IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
IPCC AR5	IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
LCA	Long-Term Cooperative Action
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
LDC	Least Developed Country
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LTG	Long Term Goal
MOI	Memorandum of Intent

MRV	Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NAP	National Adaptation Programme
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributors
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIE	National Implementing Entity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PACJA	Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
PSF	Private Sector Facility
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANBI	South African National Biodiversity Institute
SIDS	Small Island Developing State
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-related
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA	United States of America
WEDO	Women's Environment and Development Organisation
WGC	Women and Gender Constituency
WMG	Women's Major Group
WS1/WS2	Workstreams 1 and 2 of the ADP
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

1. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND CONTEXT, AND OVERVIEW OF THE WINTER SCHOOL PROGRAMME AND OBJECTIVES

The Second African Civil Society Winter School on the 2015 Climate Agreement (ADP): *Re-strategizing and Re-thinking African Climate Action* was organised and presented jointly by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) and Pan African Climate and Environmental Justice Alliance (PACJA). The Winter School took place at the Devonvale Golf and Wine Estate, near Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 9 to 11 September 2015 as a follow up to the successful 2014 Winter School which was held in Muldersdrift, near Johannesburg. Fourteen African countries from sub-Saharan Africa were represented at the Second Winter School, namely Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. The Participants represented a range of key civil society organisations (CSO) operating in the climate change, gender, climate justice and environment space. In addition, the winter school benefitted from the attendance of government negotiators from Botswana and Kenya as well as representatives from several major international organisations such as the Climate Action Network (CAN), HBS, Oxfam, Women's Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO), and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The attendance register of the workshop is appended to this report in ANNEXURE 1.

Amanda Luxande, Programme Manager: Sustainable Development, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS), opened the winter school and welcomed all the participants on behalf of the HBS. *Tracey Sonny* gave the welcome address on behalf of *Mithika Mwenda, Secretary General, Pan African Climate and Environmental Justice Alliance (PACJA)*. The welcome message stressed the importance of the winter school as a platform to continue the convergences and conversations among African civil society about one of the biggest challenges of our time – climate change. Through this convergence and discourse, African civil society can develop a shared and common understanding of what the ADP means for Africa and what the Agreement needs to deliver in order to respond to the challenges and priorities that the continent and its people face around climate change. PACJA thanked HBS for partnering with it to host the Second Winter School as such partnerships allow CSOs to share experiences and information; and enhances African civil society capacity to participate in national and international climate change dialogue processes, and ensure that Paris delivers a climate change agreement that is responsive to African realities and aspirations, and is fair, equitable and ecologically just. The welcome address is appended in ANNEXURE 2.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) was set up as a key outcome of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban. The Parties agreed in Durban that the second commitment¹ period of the Kyoto Protocol alone will not reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions sufficiently to protect ecosystems and prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system. Accordingly, the ADP was mandated to “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, which is to be completed no later than 2015 in order for it to be adopted at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.”² Decision 1/CP.17 also provided the mandate for developing a work plan on enhancing mitigation ambition, to identify and explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties.

At its first session, in 2012, the ADP adopted an agenda³, to initiate work under two work streams: Workstream 1 – the 2015 Agreement (WS1)⁴, is focused on the vision shared among Parties for the new agreement to address climate change; whereas Workstream 2 – the pre-2020 ambition (WS2)⁵, focuses on enhancing the mitigation ambition to close the ambition gap pre 2020. The ADP has continued its work under both work streams throughout 2013, 2014 and 2015. This has been through a series of in-session round-table discussions and workshops, as well as technical expert meetings and briefings, taking

¹ The first and second commitment periods to the Kyoto Protocol are explained in paragraph 1.2 of this report which covers the history of the climate change negotiations and the status quo of the ADP.

² <http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php>.

³ Set out in document FCCC/ADP/2012/2, paragraph 13.

⁴ On matters related to paragraphs 2 to 6 of decision 1/CP.17 (agenda item 3(a)).

⁵ On matters related to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same decision (agenda item 3(b)).

into account submissions from Parties and observer organizations as invited by the ADP. Many developing countries, however, are of the view that a successful outcome of WS2 in addressing the implementation gaps and increasing the pre-2020 ambition, lays the basis for achieving future success under WS1, which determines the success of the new agreement. Additionally, failure to raise ambitions pre-2020 will raise the future cost of mitigation and adaptation.

The First and Second African CSO Winter Schools form an important component of the ADP process and are aimed at providing a platform for civil society from sub-Saharan Africa to participate effectively in this process through sharing information and significant learnings and developing common advocacy positions and strategies to ensure Africa's needs and priorities are included and mainstreamed in the 2015 Agreement. The main aim of the African CSO Winter School was threefold:

- Firstly, for sub-Saharan African civil societies to deliberate and develop a common understanding of what the ADP means for Africa and what it needs to deliver in order to respond to Africa's priorities and challenges in the context of climate change;
- Secondly, to assist CSOs in understanding the key influences shaping the COP negotiations, how to get the best possible arrangements for African civil society, and where pressure could be brought on national government to bring African issues to the fore; and
- Lastly, to allow civil society to reflect, rethink and if necessary, re-strategize their engagement in the governance of climate change both locally and at the international level so as to realize priority needs for the continent.

Specifically, the Second African CSO Winter School on the ADP set out to achieve the following:

1. African civil society deliberates on the main elements of the ADP and identify areas of priority for the continent that should be reflected in the 2015 agreement;
2. African CSOs explore a common understanding and a common agenda in order that the ADP delivers an outcome commensurate with science; and
3. African CSOs network and reflect on their individual and joint advocacy and lobbying efforts and identify areas of strength and improvement.

The expected key outcomes from the Second Winter School are to achieve:

- *Increased knowledge and awareness of the 2015 climate agreement (ADP) and a more confident and knowledgeable civil society group that effectively advances the interests of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, and in particular women's interest in climate change negotiations on the continent and internationally;*
- *A shared sense of "togetherness and common understanding of the opportunities for effective engagement in climate change negotiations; and*
- *African CSOs develop a common agenda for collective action and advocacy in preparation for COP 21 in Paris.*

With this objective in mind, and to optimise the sharing and exchange of insights, analysis and concrete ideas for action, the Second Winter School adopted an interactive and participatory adult learning approach. This meant that participants were not only provided with technical information and content on adaptation, intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), finance elements of the ADP as well as the technical components of a fair and equitable new agreement for COP 21 by experts, but were also encouraged to share their own experiences, ideas and learnings among each other. The Winter School provided ample opportunity for participants to engage in open dialogue on effective advocacy strategies for, and approaches to, voicing civil society positions based on the content knowledge shared at the Winter School to influence the global climate change debate effectively.

Day 1 of the Second Winter School focused on updating participants and information sharing around past developments and progress with the ADP. The day was structured around providing participants with factual and technical content on the ADP process, the current status quo and certain technical issues such as climate finance, climate justice and equity. It included presentations by various technical experts as well as a panel discussion on African negotiators', key African CSOs' and selected international CSOs' perspectives on certain technical aspects and the negotiations leading up to COP 21. Day 1 comprised

the following four thematic sessions: ADP overview and status quo; ADP – Perspectives on the Road to Paris; Finance and the Post 2015 Agreement; and Climate Justice and Equity in the post 2015 Agreement. Day 1 concluded with a cocktail launch of the HBS publication, *20 Years of African CSO involvement in Climate Change Negotiations: Priorities, Strategies and Actions*.

The approach to Days 2 and 3 differed as it tapped into the expertise among participants and focused on opening up the dialogue and discussion around key lessons from international and African CSOs, advocacy messages and strategy development to participants. The following thematic sessions were spread over the two days: Strategy Development – Lessons from international and African CSOs; COP expectations; a World Café session on Strengthening the African voice; and Re-thinking CSO approaches to climate negotiations.

The Winter School themes, presentations and interactive dialogue sessions are captured in the Programme which is appended in ANNEXURE 3.

Participants' expectations of the winter school

The participants shared their expectations of the winter school and what they hoped to achieve and learn from attending the winter school:

✓ Expand WEDO's networks and collaborate with African civil society
✓ Network and experience what happened at the winter school last year and move forward to Paris
✓ Network, share WWF's analysis of a fair and transformational outcome from Paris and get African civil society reaction on this analysis
✓ Network, listen and hear stories
✓ Hear and learn more about the African vision for the Paris negotiations and what African civil society is asking from Paris on adaptation and finance
✓ After spending 20 years attending climate negotiation meetings, have learnt not to expect much
✓ Not able to go Paris so need a clear strategy on how to influence African governments and institutions that do attend the negotiations
✓ Network and get a common understanding of African CSO vision for Paris
✓ Learn how the climate change discourse is brought to common people and the role CSOs can play
✓ Learn more about the ADP process, share experiences and broaden networks
✓ Explore CSO engagement beyond Paris and have a roadmap for what African civil society wants to see going beyond 2020
✓ Agree on a strategy that African civil society can employ in pushing the right agenda into the agreement at COP 21 to ensure that our inspirations are included; want to know what strategies to employ and what the different scenarios are
✓ Individual organisations to know how to engage with the negotiation process before Paris
✓ Clear understanding and strategy, between now and Paris, to build a collective African demand from CSOs to accompany negotiators
✓ Learn about different strategies, best practices and different tools and specifically to track progress nationally and internationally
✓ Reach agreement on how far – in the correct/wrong direction – CSOs have gone in realising climate change processes
✓ How to overcome the adaptation capacity of African countries to adverse effects of climate change, and especially what strategies have been put in place to put pressure on developed countries to commit to combatting climate change and reducing their emissions
✓ Share information on the challenges facing global climate change and how CSOs have a common goal regarding Paris. African voice is marginalised – so African CSOs have one goal for Paris, and they network to have a good roadmap for Paris

✓ Network and get to know how the African negotiators and CSOs will push to arrest climate change effects on the continent
✓ Hear what the African negotiators expectations of the COP and whether there is common ground for a stronger African position
✓ CSOs must devise a strategy to ensure clear gender equality and human rights are addressed in Paris, also want to know how CSOs track gender progress
✓ Leave with some sense of achievement this platform has been useful for networking among African CSOs
✓ Engage in the conversations on INDCs and learn more about the different countries reactions
✓ Develop a common approach from civil society to work with the African block of negotiators in supporting their agenda at Paris
✓ Listen to the views of African CSOs and in particular their expectations of COP; also encourage African CSOs not to lose focus but to network and share ideas

1.1 Recap of First ADP Winter School

Amanda Luxande, HBS

As not all participants had attended the First Winter School, the purpose of the first presentation was to summarise the key issues and learnings that came out of the First Winter School to ensure that all participants have the same level of knowledge and understanding of what the ADP means for Africa; what the ADP needs to deliver in order to respond to African challenges and priorities with regard to climate change; and the key influences shaping the COP negotiations. The key content issues, highlights and lessons of the First Winter School focussed on equity, mitigation, adaptation, finance, climate politics and CSO expectations:

- The **mitigation** discussion centered around addressing the causes of climate change through controlling, limiting and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and stressed the need for a deep cut in emissions, despite the upward trend, and for closing the emission gap and enhancing resilience include initiatives in energy, short lived climate pollutants, and cities. The key challenge identified at the First Winter School was that while mitigation is the priority pillar for the Parties while, adaption is the priority for Africa;
- Because of Africa's high vulnerability to climate change and the rate of warming on this continent will be roughly 1.5 times the global average, **adaptation** is seen as central to Africa's response to climate change. The 2014 Winter School highlighted the "**adaptation gap**" as developing countries are unable to meet adaptation needs at present carbon levels and implementation of adaptation to date has been limited;
- The First Winter School highlighted huge differences on the issue of finance between developing and developed countries. For developed countries key concerns relate to the prominent role of the private sector in mobilising climate finance and developing countries' ability to demonstrate effective management and utilise of resources. Whereas for developing countries key challenges include the notion that the bulk of climate finance should be publicly sourced and provided by developed countries and the failure or delay on the part of developed countries to fulfil previous financial obligations. An important aspect of climate finance is the roadmap to scale up climate finance to US\$100 billion per year by 2020. The roadmap has four dimensions: demand, support, delivery and transparency. The ADP proposals include finding pathways to scale up finance beyond the US\$100 billion target and to ensure that finance provided to developing countries is in line with the temperature goal. The allocation of climate finance should be balanced between mitigation and adaptation to ensure that adaptation initiatives and projects receive an equal level of resources and the share of funding allocated to each continent should match the challenges faced by the continent. Funding should be made as new and additional funds to current Official Development Assistance (ODA); and

- An important objective of the Winter School was to find ways of operationalising **CSO perspectives** and learnings, into advocacy and lobbying strategies towards COP 21 and beyond. The presentations scheduled for Day 1 of the Second Winter School would provide participants with important background information and context and reflect on what, if any, progress had been made since the First Winter School, whether the civil society concerns expressed in 2014 were still valid or had changed and what the latest developments in the negotiation process mean for African civil society and Africa's priorities and position with regards to the ADP. The 2014 Winter School helped African civil society understand there is a common African voice but that African CSOs need to be more proactive in developing common positions and advocating and lobbying for their positions publically and strengthen their understanding of which advocacy tools can most effectively serve their needs. The key issues that concern African CSOs include mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, transparency, implementation, compliance, capacity building and differentiation amongst Parties. African CSOs are pushing for the following to be addressed in the ADP process: immediate and deep emission cuts and changes to the current development pathway; climate finance and technology transfer commitments must be honoured; and long-term negotiations must set a global emission budget and share it fairly to ensure the needs of the most vulnerable communities are prioritised and addressed. The Second Winter School provides African CSOs with the opportunity of developing a strategy that will coordinate civil society to ensure a fair equitable and ecologically new climate change agreement and it should also include civil society initiatives towards achieving improved and positive media coverage of climate change issues and how these affect African societies.

1.2 The Status Quo of the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action on Climate Change

Webster Whande, Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN)

The presentation provided a brief overview of the history of climate change negotiations since the adaptation of the UNFCCC in 1992, the background to the establishment of the Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action on Climate Change (ADP) and an overview of the current status of the ADP negotiations leading up to COP 21 in Paris. For the first time in the history of the climate change negotiations there was a strong sense of urgency that the current trajectory is not sustainable and a realisation that the African continent is suffers most from the effects of climate change. The outcome of the ADP process is of particular importance to African countries as it will show what commitment the nations of this world are really prepared to make in dealing with effects of climate change.

The history of the climate change negotiations was traced back to the adoption in 1992 of the **UNFCCC**, one of three Conventions adopted at the "Rio Earth Summit". A major significance of this Convention was that it recognised that climate change is caused by human induced interference with the climate system and that this interference was responsible for accelerated climate change. The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced) interference with the climate system" and in the early stages of its history, the Convention's main focus was on dealing with dangerous emissions that were causing climate change.

The next major milestone was the adoption of the **Kyoto Protocol** in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. This Protocol serves to operationalise the UNFCCC by committing developed countries to stabilise their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and develop programmes for reducing these emissions by approximately 5% compared to 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008 to 2012. The Protocol set binding emission reduction targets for 37 developed countries and the European community in its first commitment period (2008 to 2012).⁶ The Kyoto Protocol introduced the principle of "common but

⁶ The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Doha, Qatar, on 8 December 2012, and launched a second commitment period, from 2013 until 2020.

differentiated responsibility” which recognises that current high levels of GHG emissions were largely as result of the industrial activity of these countries over the past 150 years. This meant that only developed countries are bound by the emission reduction targets but to date the Protocol has not yielded the results needed. The first COP Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) decided to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Annex I Parties’ Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). At COP13 (CMP3) held in Bali, Indonesia, delegates adopted the Bali Action Plan and established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). The AWG-LCA focused on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. 2009 was set as the deadline for concluding the two-track negotiations (under the UNFCCC COP and CMP); however, the process was marred by disputes over transparency and process which erupted in Copenhagen. This resulted in a political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord and the decision to extend the mandates of the AWGs to COP16 and CMP6 in 2010. At COP 16, 80 countries provided their mitigation targets (compared to the 56 countries that have submitted their INDCs so far). In Lima, Parties focused on outcomes under the ADP necessary to advance toward an agreement at COP21, including elaboration of the information and process of for submission of INDCs as early as possible in 2015, and on the progress on elements of a draft negotiating text. Another important aspect of the Lima decision is on enhancing the pre-2020 ambition. The Lima COP lay the groundwork for Paris by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft negotiating text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on INDCs, including their scope, upfront information, and steps to be taken by the Secretariat after their submission.

The **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)** was a key outcome of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP 17) in Durban. The ADP was established as a subsidiary body set up in terms of decision 1/CP.17 in December 2011.⁷ The Parties agreed to launch the ADP “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties under the Convention”. The ADP was also mandated to explore options to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the 2 degrees Celsius target.⁸ The timeframe to complete the negotiations on the ADP mandate is no later than COP 21 which is scheduled to take place in Paris in December 2015, and the new instrument will become applicable to all and enter into force in 2020. The ADP has two work streams⁹: Workstream I (WS1) comprises the legal component and deals with matters related to paragraphs 2 to 6 of decision 1/CP.17 (agenda item 3(a)). WS1 focuses on delivering the new 2015 Agreement. Workstream 2 (WS2) deals with matters related to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the same decision (agenda item 3(b)). It focuses on the technical and substantive aspects of enhancing the mitigation ambition to close the ambition gap pre-2020. WS2 is important for the African group but will only implemented in 2020 so requires building trust and confidence (between 2015 and 2020) before the new agreement comes into force.

The important milestones of the ADP negotiations are the Warsaw and Lima Conferences of the Parties (COP 19 and 20 respectively); ADP 2-8 which was held in Geneva in February 2015; and ADP 2-9 which was held in Bonn in June 2015. The significance of COP 19 is that the Parties called for accelerated action in declaring emission targets and measures for eliminating GHG. Furthermore, the scope of the ADP mandate widened to include all countries, not just developed but also developing countries. In Lima, COP 20, there was a re-emphasis of the Warsaw decision (COP 19) on INDCs and whether these contributions should focus on adaptation or just mitigation. The inclusion of adaptation has been largely due to lobbying and pressure from the African group and the language from Lima recognised that while INDCs are mitigation focussed, countries may also include adaptation.

ADP 2-8 held in Geneva resulted in a 90 page negotiating text. The objective of the Geneva session, as mandated by COP20, was to develop the negotiating text based on the elements for a draft negotiating text annexed to the Decision 1/CP.20 (the Lima Call for Climate Action). Although the Geneva Negotiating

⁷ Paragraph 5 of 1/CP17 looks at means of implementation for climate finance, capacity building and technology transfer INDCs.

⁸ The ADP’s mandate and two workstreams are described briefly in the introduction to this report.

⁹ Adopted at its first session in 2012.

Text (GNT) serves as the basis for negotiations on the 2015 agreement, this text is not refined enough to take the Parties to negotiation. ADP 2-9, which was held Bonn, undertook to streamline, consolidate, cluster and have conceptual discussions of the Geneva Negotiating Text. This has resulted in a streamlined version (83 pages), however, the Bonn session was also not able to produce a short enough text for negotiations.

Going forward from Bonn, the Co-chairs have been mandated to produce a document that Parties can start negotiation on, known as the Co-Chairs Tool. The Co-Chairs Tool is based on the GNT divided into 3 parts but simplifies the texts and includes Parties' perspective on the text. Part I of the Co-Chairs Tool forms the durable part of the agreement and reflects the co-chairs' views on what can go in the agreement. It contains provisions appropriate by their nature for inclusion in the Paris agreement, such as the broad principles that Parties agree on, overarching commitments, durable provisions and standard provisions for an agreement. Part II contains provisions appropriate by their nature for inclusion in a decision to operationalise the agreement. This Part includes details of implementation, provisions likely to change over time, provisions related to pre-2020 actions and interim arrangements pending entry into force of the agreement'. It is short term in nature and will be reported on in 2 years. Part III contains provisions whose placement needs further elaboration and clarity among Parties. It includes issues such as adaptation, climate finance, capacity building and technology transfer. The developing countries interpret Part III as the 'dustbin' and African Parties are concerned that Part III issues can 'quietly disappear' from the negotiations. The current status of ADP negotiations is as follows:

- On **mitigation** - spin offs group is in agreement that differentiation is at the core of the negotiations and will only be solved by a political decision;
- On **adaptation** - discussions converged on the need to enhance existing institutions, but lack clarity on how to do so. Points of convergence include national adaptation actions to be nationally-determined and country driven; flexibility in the vehicle of communications; harnessing co-benefits and mitigation/adaptation synergies; and country driven and flexible monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system;
- On **loss and damage** – there is still not much convergence and anchoring in existing institutions, but G77/China have made proposals for a loss and damage displacement mechanism;
- On **finance** – spin off discussions by Parties to continue under existing operating entities of the financial mechanism under the Convention;
- On **INDCs** - concern over imbalance between INDC actions and support for those actions
- On **technology** - Parties have started drafting text on the enhanced framework for action, cooperative action, and institutions but no agreement on the level of detail;
- On **capacity building** – Parties convergence on the need for enhanced capacity building and started engaging on how this should be done. The Co-Facilitators' text is enhancing and intensifying capacity building work under the Convention; and/or establishing an international capacity building mechanism.
- On **capacity in the pre-2020 period** – there are textual proposal for Parties to assess their capacity needs the implementation of the agreement.

The Bonn June negotiations have created a spirit of optimism despite some concerns about the process, mode of work and wanting clarity on the intended outcomes of the meeting. Parties have met in facilitated groups on the various sections of the GNT and have started developing putting forward some textual proposals with some areas of convergence emerging. The last negotiation session gave the Co-Chairs clear mandate on what should be produced in going forward – “create a negotiating text’ with language that reflects the true aspirations of the different regions and is in line with the principles of the provisions of the Convention so Parties can move to textual negotiations. The incoming COP Presidents are keen not to repeat the failures of Copenhagen and with this in mind the political negotiators will be brought in earlier so they are able to consider and take the technical aspects of the new Agreement into account. In contrast to past COPs, political representatives and negotiators have been brought on board from beginning of the COP 21 process, not at the end. For example, political representatives met in August and were invited to Paris towards the end of September 2015 to be brought up to speed with the negotiations and ensure they understand what is happening in the technical discussions. The purpose of

the parallel process of involving the political representatives is to ensure that Ministers and political heads talk from the same page as the technical negotiators and that political positions are aligned with technical aspects so that no new issues will be brought into COP 21 that have not been discussed and reflected upon in the technical discourse and negotiations process.

Questions and comments from participants

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
<p>When it comes to INDC timeframe, can you confirm that some countries have already started submitting their INDCs and what does the assessment process of INDCs entail?</p> <p>INDCs submission deadline is October and countries have already started submitting their targets, but COP 21 is around the corner and the window to review all the INDCs is not sufficient window to interrogate emission targets and establish if the targets are ambitious enough or not. How can civil society ensure and push countries that don't have ambitious enough targets to improve their targets?</p>	<p><i>56 INDCs have been submitted by mid-September 2015 in time for the October deadline. The Secretariat will take all the submissions and do a thorough analysis and assessment to determine if the INDCs meet the 2 degrees Celsius target or go beyond this to achieve 1.5 degree Celsius target. For Africa, 2 degrees Celsius will not be enough so civil society should encourage Parties to go for a 1.5 degree Celsius target. Initial assessments of INDCs so far indicate that targets put forward to date are way off the mark to meet even the 2 degrees Celsius target and Parties are now looking to the BRIC countries to see what their emissions targets will be. It is not clear what will happen if the 2 degrees Celsius target is not met by all submissions. There is no guideline from Secretariat/ negotiators on what INDCs should look like. INDCs starting with a 2005 as baseline will have too high baseline. There is also no actual timeframe by when INDCs must be in – this can be done post Paris. INDCs are becoming NDCs – but it not clear what they will be called for the African group as NDCs are considered as undertakings and will need capacity building, technology and finance undertakings to be put in place for developing countries to be able implement NDCs. There is also a need to clarify how countries should account and what to do on actions that not being taken. Developed countries need to help provide the means of implementation for developing countries and recognition for those developing countries that are setting targets even though their emissions are very low.</i></p>
<p>How much convergence is there around the issues reflected in the 3 parts of the ADP texts, particularly in bringing up the 'dustbin issues' into Part 1 and 2? It is not clear from the preamble and there seems to be a lot of divergence still. The preamble should be a summary of the agreement but can't if there is lot of disagreement – how can this be done if there is still no real agreement?</p>	<p><i>The convergence around issues will continued to be discussed in the run up to Paris and there is a general sense this will only be resolved in political negotiation and continue until end. The differentiation is included in the preamble.</i></p>
<p>Considering the climate change challenges facing the African continent it is doubtful whether it will achieve mitigation if there is no adaptation, and with this situation in mind one cannot understand the mitigation statements.</p>	<p><i>From the Durban COP it became clear that nothing will ever the same again for developing countries and if there is to be an agreement parties must put down targets. Adaptation remains a key component, and there must be a balance between adaptation and mitigation, but one must recognise that adaptation need resources for capacity building and technology transfer.</i></p>

2. THE ADP – PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROAD TO PARIS

Webster Whande of CDKN moderated the panel discussion on different perspectives of the ADP process. The four panellists gave short presentations followed by a question and answer session.

2.1 African negotiators perspectives on the ADP

Edward Wabwoto, African Group Negotiator, Kenya

This presentation covered the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the key elements of the COP-18 and COP-19 decisions, the Lima Call for Action taken at COP 20, the elements of the new agreement, next steps in the negotiation process and challenges facing the African Group. Only the challenges and next steps are captured in this report as the other aspects have been covered in paragraph 1.2 under the previous presentation on the status quo of the ADP. Key challenges from the perspective of the African Group of negotiators include:

- Progress being undermined by procedural issues;
- Lack of clarity on the development of content/substance for several issues such as adaptation, finance, mitigation and technology transfer;
- Time constraints in light of the December 2015 deadline;
- Identification of issues that must be agreed to before Paris in order to reach a meaningful agreement;
- Issues related to the sequencing, structure and global picture
- Clarity on the treatment for INDCs toward their inscription in the agreement; and
- Clarity needed on the UNFCCC post 2015 agenda on both work streams.

2.2 The African Narrative - African CSO analysis and expectations: Update

Tracey Sonny on behalf of Mithika Mwenda, PACJA

This presentation provided an overview of the African CSO perspective of the ADP negotiations and highlighted their expectations of the actions required by developed countries, from Africa and other developing countries and what Paris should deliver to ensure meaningful action on climate change. African CSO analysis of the ADP negotiation process is that it has wiped away the people-centred gains made over years as mitigation is winning over adaptation which is what the African Group is advocating. The African CSO expectations of the actions required by developed and developing countries are summarized as follows:

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES	ACTIONS REQUIRED FROM AFRICA AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Developed countries should: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓ Drastically increase their emissions reductions targets and work towards a regime that ensures aggregate contributions are fair and sufficient to keep warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius;✓ Significantly increase technology, finance and capacity-building support to enable increased mitigation ambition by developing country Parties;✓ Collaborate and share best practices of policies, public investment measures, regulations and planning approaches that can have significant and transformational impact towards decarbonisation and emissions reductions; and✓ Abandon their focus on carbon trading, which has failed and does not lead to net emissions	African and developing countries should: <ul style="list-style-type: none">✓ Stop following the same path of profit-led, destructive high carbon growth that was pursued by rich countries and has brought the World to the current crisis;✓ Shift to equitable, just and sustainable development pathways, and start taking their fair share of the global effort; and✓ Be unrelenting in claiming climate finance and technology transfer.

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

ACTIONS REQUIRED FROM AFRICA AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

reductions, and revisit their stringent views on IPR in order to make climate friendly technologies available and accessible in both developing and developed countries.

African CSO expectations of the negotiation outcomes are that collectively Paris should:

- Catalyse immediate, urgent and drastic emission reductions in line with what science and equity require;
- Catalyse urgent short-term actions building towards an agreed long-term goal to shift away from dirty energy in order to keep the global temperature goal in reach and mark the beginning of the end of fossil fuels globally;
- Provide adequate support for transformation and ensure that the resources needed, such as public finance and technology transfer, are provided to support the transformation, especially in vulnerable and poor countries;
- Deliver justice for impacted people by enhancing the support to adaptation in a new climate regime, ensuring that there will be a separate mechanism to compensate for any loss and damage that goes beyond our ability to adapt and making a firm commitment to secure workers' livelihoods and jobs through a just transition; and
- Focus on transformational action which ensures that renewable and efficient solutions are emphasized rather than false solutions, such as carbon markets in land and soil, dangerous geoengineering interventions, and more that fail to produce the results and protection we need to deal with climate change.

The presentation ended with a 'call to action' to make the African civil society voice and demands heard by supporting the many civil society campaigns that are being undertaken by African CSOs and faith-based organisations. One such initiative is the faith cycling caravan that left Mozambique on 29 August and will pass through 10 countries before ending in Nairobi for a social pre-COP Summit where representatives will deliver the Africa Peoples' Petition. This initiative and petition is a partnering between PACJA, OXFAM and the faith-based organisation We Have Faith.



Figure 1 We Have Faith Cycling Caravan

2.3 Global CSO perspective- ADP analysis and expectations

Jaco du Toit, CAN International and WWF

The presentation highlighted the following priority outcomes that global CSOs are expecting to get out of the Paris process, namely:

- Clear targets and guidance on what INDCs should be;
- Uptake and elaboration of a credible and durable Ambition Acceleration Mechanism (i.e. ratchet up mechanism) that allows for the upscaling of all INDCs. This mechanism should include 5 year


commitment cycles, 5 year review cycles, targets on finance, adequate MOIs, and strong MRV provisions;

- Adequate climate finance / opportunities for climate finance for mitigation to work. Finance is part of solution for developing paths to pursue alternate development paths and adaptation should be part of actions that are financed;
- A deal that will protect the most vulnerable communities that sends out strong signals such as including a reference to 1.5 degree Celsius target in the Preamble;
- The appropriate placements of 'Section III' (unresolved) issues in the Geneva Negotiating Text into either Section 1 (the core Paris agreement) or Section 2 (COP decisions). Important issues in this regard include the operationalisation of the Long Term Goal (LTG) on mitigation; regular updates of support for adaptation; public finance of the Global Carbon Fund (Global Climate Fund); and the effective and verifiable use of carbon markets;
- Increasing the pre-2020 ambition to close the mitigation gap. Workstream II is about closing emissions gap but we cannot wait for targets that will only start to be implemented by 2020. We need a process and system in place now to see how and what more can be done to close this gap. WS2 needs to allow for good implementation in accordance with social and environmental safeguards. Adaptation needs to be promoted through a COP decision; the discussion on loss and damage must move forward and be a standalone part/anchor of the core agreement and not viewed as a trade-off; and there must be roadmap to achieve Finance targets (to meet the \$100bn target by 2020). The finance target was not enough to fund everything that needs to be done in addressing the impacts of climate change and it represented only the government contribution and the shortfall would have to be leveraged from the private sector; and
- A long term goal on the phase out of fossil fuels by 2050, and a just transition to 100% renewable energy.

2.4 EnGendering the ADP

Bridget Burns, Women Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO)

This presentation covered the importance of engendering the ADP negotiations and presented women's perspectives on the extent to which the gender issue has been addressed in climate policy and negotiations at the global scale. Climate change is a societal challenge that requires transformation in our energy systems, consumption and production patterns and overall way of life within a global community. Climate policies and solutions therefore must incorporate a human and social dimension, and crucially a gender dimension. Gender gaps around the world are exacerbated due to climate change impacts:



COPYRIGHT (2012) - WOMEN'S ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (WEDO)

Figure 2 Gender gaps and climate change impacts

The Women and Gender Consistency was officially recognised in 2010 and since then language on gender have been taken up in the UNFCCC and ADP. Whereas the UNFCCC had no language on gender in 2009, it now includes a large amount of foundation language on gender. The engendering of the Convention has moved from language on gender balance to an understanding of gender perspectives in climate impacts and actions, towards gender-responsive climate policy. For example, the decision on gender balance taken in 2012 at Doha, was enhanced through conclusions reached in Warsaw which looked at monitoring, reporting and accountability of gender considerations across agreements. The LIMA Work Programme on Gender helped Parties understand best practice with regards to gender, what it means for policy to be gender sensitive and gender responsive, and what the difference between these two are. The Lima Work Programme is pushing to see gender responsive and equality language maintained in the general agreement and operationalized to enhance the effective implementation of climate policy. Strong statements on gender equality and human rights first appeared in the ADP in 2014 and it includes references to gender under the general objective and in relation adaptation, capacity building, finance, technology and mitigation. Gender equality and human rights are included in the Geneva Negotiating Text. The GCF was the first fund to incorporate and gender-sensitive fund wide approach.

The presentation concluding by listing elements of what a 'gender just' 2105 agreement should look like:

- Gender equality and human rights in all climate actions;
- Sex and gender analysis and disaggregated data;
- Emissions reductions in line with science;
- Financial obligations to developing countries;
- Direct access to finance;
- People-powered energy solutions; and
- Use of traditional knowledge.

Questions and comments from participants

The participants first reflected on what had stood out and questions arose and why before bringing the questions/comments into the plenary group for the panellists and moderator to respond to:

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
It is not clear if the final agreement contains any non-compliance enforcement mechanism on INDCs.	<i>This issue has being raised again and again in negotiation forums. It is important to have non-compliance enforcement mechanism, but the bottom-line from the negotiation is that it is an issue for the Parties to decide. Hopeful there will be something positive coming from Paris.</i> <i>The Kyoto Protocol is considered legally binding and Canada and Japan walk away without complying. This raises the question whether compliance is so essential /central to agreement and whether it may not be better to have a good agreement and transparency.</i>
Are INDCs central to the agreement or the operationalisation of the agreement? If developing countries do not meet INDC targets then they will not be eligible / able to access climate finance. What about developed countries - does the same apply to them?	<i>With the Warsaw Decision, the key was to get an agreement applicable to all (Durban mandate) so the outcome of this led to adopting a bottom up approach. This explains why INDCs came about (come from the Parties) as it was meant to bring all Parties on board and be applicable to all. Going forward, INDCs are essential to this new agreement being adopted and implemented, and also to this particular process. Concerning non-compliance by developed countries, various options are currently being discussed on how to address this, for example linking compliance to finance support but also to</i>

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
	<p><i>meeting countries' own mitigation targets and proposing that countries which do not comply will not even qualify to participate in COP process and thus isolate them.</i></p> <p><i>The US has a strong argument against instituting a strong compliance regime as this means they will not get the green light from the Congress so they are calling for a more relaxed system of holding parties accountable. The US does not think the new agreement should be legally binding as it will have to be approved by their Congress. This position goes against what many Parties are arguing for and it is also critical for emissions ambitions, transparency around compliance and revision of emissions. Resolution on how to hold Parties accountable for what they have put on the table still requires lot of deliberation and negotiation before the Parties will reach consensus. Based on the Kyoto Protocol history, the European Union has always taken a very strong stand on compliance and the legal obligation to adhere to this protocol and they want the USA and China to commit to this protocol and adhere to the principle of 'applicable to all'. INDCs are seen as the second iteration of this battle which has more to do with developed countries than with developing countries. However, this is a very essential discourse to have and for civil society organisations to engage in and push governments to raise ambitions and adhere to the Durban mandates.</i></p>
<p>Want clarification on agreement and negotiations around the 'pledge and review approach' (INDCs) – if countries are not being pressurised into pledges CSOs fear they will not give enough as it is about what countries can afford instead of what they should be doing. What is point of this process and agreement and what will African and developing countries get out of this agreement?</p>	<p><i>Several issues-focussed CSOs have been involved in this process and have succeeded in influencing the language (eg inclusion of language on gender). However, CSOs need to address and discuss the larger geo-political issues (eg international trade agreements) in their constituencies and must shift their advocacy and lobbying efforts to a post Paris response to ensure there will be some legal outcome, such as the voluntary framework with a strong ratcheting up mechanism. That is how civil society can get the best outcome under the circumstances and how all of the discussions and negotiations will benefit the work CSOs are doing.</i></p>
<p>The issue of finance is very central to a climate change agreement yet pledges have not been substantial compared to targets that have been set. It is important to differentiate between pledges and the actual transfer of funding.</p> <p>Information gaps exist – how can CSOs leverage information from negotiators and share this with other CSOs so they can strategize and stay up to date with negotiations scheduled for October and later in Paris?</p> <p>Adaptation has been key in our discussions, but it is costly to do so how can CSOs access public/private</p>	<p><i>It is difficult to get inside negotiation rooms – one strategy that PACJA has employed is to get accredited by government and this enables them to get information first hand and means the CSO is able to feed back to civil society. It is also important to build trust and have good working relationships with government (as in Botswana) as this will ensure CSOs get accredited with the government team. CSOs can build this relationship but advising the government team on civil society concerns and providing input into the Minister's report at the end of negotiations. Civil society should try and work and collaborate as one voice during the negotiation process by for example sharing info with others on websites etc.</i></p>

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
funds?	
What is position that the African Group will follow – is it going with USA and China or not?	<i>The USA is the elephant in room, but remember what happened at Durban – the closing plenary wanted an agreement applicable to all, legally binding etc. yet when the Parties were in negotiations they entered with fixed positions and lost out to other parties positions. Keep in mind this is a global negotiation and one needs to find agreement among over 150 Parties. This is best solved by consensus, the Parties don't vote but negotiate to consensus.</i>
Concern about signing – is there any obligation on China and USA to sign the agreement?	<i>The USA approach on INDCs is that they are already implementing their INDCs and it is better for them than getting Congress to adopt a legally binding agreement.</i>
Should we go with the USA – if Obama cannot push Paris Agreement through Congress, then nothing will happen so why should we go with them? What the USA accepts is what the Parties will agree to.	

Summary by the moderator

- The nature of the discussion resembles what is happening in the negotiations and the questions raised indicates what negotiators are thinking of;
- Most questions and comments revolved around understanding and getting clarity on what issues and leveraging points the African Group can hold on to or give away to reach consensus;
- The Climate change negotiation process is a multilateral system that involves 196 countries. This makes it difficult for all to agree and reach an agreement that satisfies all Parties. The UNFCCC provides a framework within the agreement must be reached; and
- Paris is not the end – between 2015 and 2020 there will be further elaboration on what will be implemented in 2020. Parties have agreed to review INDCs and whether country submissions are adequate. These will be subject to further discussion and negotiations. Because this is a global and multilateral negotiation system we must find ways of ensuring that Parties comply with what they have undertaken/committed to do.

3. FINANCE AND THE POST 2015 AGREEMENT

3.1 Civil Society Perspectives on Climate Finance – a critical element in the Paris Agreement

Azeb Girmai Tesfai, LDC Watch, Ethiopia

Finances play a central role in the climate change negotiations and it is critical that the ADP contains clear decisions on sources and the scale of finance. Climate finance is not aid or charity but an obligation, as part of “climate debt”, under Article 4 of the UNFCCC, specifically sub-Articles 4.4, 4.5, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. It is important for two reasons: Firstly, sub-Articles 4.5 and 4.7 make it clear that due to developed countries’ historical overconsumption of the emissions budget, if we are to fit within the remaining budget, then developing countries must be enabled to do more than their fair share of effort - through the provision of finance, technology and capacity building by developed countries. Secondly, developed countries’ historical over-consumption has locked us in warming and associated impacts. Therefore, based on their historical responsibility and higher capacities, they are responsible for providing resources to developing countries to enable them to adapt to locked-in warming and to address loss and damage (sub-Articles 4.4, 4.8 and 4.9). Africa’s urgent need of finance is for adaptation and loss and damage and the 2014 Adaptation Report confirmed that that, if all cost-effective adaptation is realized, Africa will still suffer large “residual” damages, which are estimated to be double the adaptation costs in the period 2030-2050.

Finance delivery to date is characterised by fast start finance which consists of new and additional resources pledged by developed up to \$30bn by 2012; and long term finance of \$100bn, which is to be

jointly mobilised from a variety of public, private, bilateral, multilateral and alternative sources by 2020. According to the 2013 Oxfam Report of the total fast start finance delivered, only 33% was new finance; 24% was additional finance; 45% was from grants; 23% was multilateral finance; and around 21% went towards adaptation; and “The long-term commitment to mobilize \$100bn remains but with no agreed roadmap, trajectory, or milestones for getting there. Without any such commitments, international climate finance is at risk of declining.” When it comes to ‘who is footing the bill’, many African countries have had to divert large chunks of their budgets to adapt to climate change: “In the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, international support to assist countries adapt to climate change has averaged only \$130m annually, far less than the \$1.1bn that the UK alone spent on the floods three years ago, in what Archbishop Desmond Tutu calls ‘adaptation apartheid’”.¹⁰ According to an assessment of the total amount of climate finance available in 2009/2010, financing for mitigation outnumbered adaptation by a ratio of 20:1 with \$93B for mitigation and \$4.4B for adaptation.¹¹

Climate finance is a core element that can bring convergence in the new agreement. But this is not happening and finance is a major diverging point in negotiations. The Geneva Negotiation Text contains about 15 pages on finance which includes guiding principles; anchoring institutions under the legal agreement; addressing the scale of finance; contribution under the legal agreement; and the source of finance. The road map compiled by ADP Co-Chairs in 2014 includes commitment across the following four dimensions: Demand for new additional predictable support, yet there still is no clear strategy on how to monitor this or a common understanding of what ‘additional predictable support’ means; support – but questions remain around the commitment of developed countries and clarity on the source for adaptation; delivery; and transparency which presents a major challenge particularly regarding the way in which developed countries report on climate finance.

Two critical elements that fail to come clear in ADP discussions are the source and scale of funding. Concerning the source of funding, information is ambiguous and has been deliberately been obscured: It is unclear what the sources of the \$100bn are and what finances will be leveraged from the public and private sectors. The scale of finance is also uncertain as the basis for post 2020 climate finance is still undecided, as is the basis for scaling up climate finance and how to strengthen or replenish the GCF.

Most of the critical issues that Africa needs to advance in the GNT are in Part III: “Many issues such as principle of CBDR (common but differentiated responsibilities), linkage between action by developing country Parties and support by developed country Parties, institutions on adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, loss and damage, response measures and scope of contributions, which are important to the Group are now found in Part III, creating the impression that there is doubt about whether they need to be included in the agreement, or that they may be too controversial or difficult to be agreed on in Paris at all.”¹²

CSO demands from Paris include the upscaling of the \$100bn commensurate with the need based on science and the global temperature goal; a roadmap for climate finance from 2015-2020; an indication for the scale of climate finance beyond 2020; commitments on finance must be legally binding in the 2020 agreement; finance commitments do not include leveraged private investments; MRV of support should be provided by developed countries; clear rules to ensure climate finance is not used for dirty energy projects; climate finance must be committed to adaptation and additionally for loss and damage; projects receiving climate finance must be locally driven and gender responsive; and increased readiness in Africa to prepare for effective implementation of money coming from GCF.

¹⁰ Bird, 2014

¹¹ Buchner et al, 2011

¹² Reaction of the G77 representative, South Africa, TWN 2015

3.2 GCF status update, how it relates to a successful ADP and what operationalisation means for CSOs

Liane Schalatek, HBS (North America)

The presentation outlined the key climate finance obligations under the UNFCCC including article IV of the Convention and the finance criteria in the Bali Action Plan (2008); and the climate finance commitments under the UNFCCC in terms of the Copenhagen Accord (2009) and Cancun Agreement (2010). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a multilateral climate fund set up in 2010 under the UNFCCC to promote the shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways within the context of sustainable development and channel a significant share of funding for adaptation by supporting developing countries. It is guided by the principles and provisions of the Convention and its objectives and guiding principles include pursuing a country-driven approach; strengthening engagement at the country level through effective engagement of relevant institutions and stakeholders; promoting environmental, social, economic and decision co-benefits and taking a gender sensitive approach. The status of GCF resources is as follows: Initial Resource Mobilization (IRM) started in mid-2014, culminated in the Berlin pledge conference of November 2014 and has resulted \$9.6bn in pledges; pledges (mostly grants) accepted on a continuous basis from countries amount to \$10.2bn; at the point when the “effectiveness date”, which is the financial commitment authority for the GCF, was reached in May 2015, only 50% of Berlin pledges were committed in signed agreements; the biggest absolute pledge (\$3bn by the USA) has not yet been signed; and by 1 September 2015, \$5.8bn had been secured in signed contribution agreements. The Fund’s allocation framework is important for Africa as it reflects the commitment to balance spending on mitigation and adaptation, of the 50% allocated to adaptation at least half is allocated to Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Africa. The rest of the presentation described the GCF Access Modalities, Fit-for-Purpose accreditation approach, the fiduciary standards, environmental and social safeguards (ESS), readiness activities and readiness and preparatory support, the Fund’s six high level investment criteria, result areas in terms of programme/project impact, the Private Sector Facility (PSF) and outlined the GCF gender sensitive approach. In order for the GCF to be not only “open for business” in time for COP 21, but also ready to move beyond business as usual, several key operational mechanisms, policies and procedures are still missing or need improvement. This includes accountability mechanisms, information disclosure policy, a monitoring and accountability framework, stakeholder engagement and consultation processes and a communication strategy.

Questions and comments from participants

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
Please explain the gap between pledge and commitment.	<i>Pledges are what has been promised but the challenge lot of pledges take long time to materialise or not paid in entirety. For example, the GCF was pledged \$10.2bn but only \$5bn of the contributions have been signed and transferred, which has been faster than with other funds. Having a deadline and effectiveness date has been a good tool to ensure funds coming into the Fund.</i>
How will the 50% that is committed in the GCF Allocation Framework to adaptation, materialise for LDCs?	<i>This has to do with what will come under adaptation and will take more work and engagement as the Fund is pressed to show quick allocation. We suspect it will be for adaptation related infrastructure (eg ports and infrastructure to protect communities and settlements against raising sea levels) but there are challenges. If funds are going to be used for extractive industries, then this is not what you looking for. We will have to wait and see what proposals come in and if these rectify past imbalances.</i>

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
<p>What lessons has the UNFCCC learnt from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to include into the GCF?</p>	<p><i>The GCF was specifically set up as anti-GEF facility in response to unhappiness by Parties around the GEF. The GEF does not allow direct access whereas the GCF does have this modality and it also does not restrict the number of national implementing entities (NIEs) that can be put forward for accreditation. The GCF started implementation of readiness and preparation support program early to help NIEs get strategies in place and think about funding priorities.</i></p>
<p>Is the potential of applying levies to transactions being considered from eg extractive (untapped) industries?</p>	<p><i>Other innovative financial instruments do come into play with how inputs into the Fund can be achieved and these can come from variety of sources including private sector and exploring ways of utilising finance from innovation funding sources. But this is not the focus at present as the Fund is focussing on setting up and becoming operational. The first regular replenishment cycle which will start in mid-2017, will be key to see how this works and if the generosity of developed countries continues and builds up or if it was once off intervention linked to the Paris agreement.</i></p>
<p>What form should CSO participation on projects take? Many governments are not keen to have CSO involvement and prefer secretiveness. How will evaluation and final reporting be done to ensure transparency and non-partisanism?</p>	<p><i>This is a real challenge and a current weakness in the GCF. In the interests of encouraging country ownership, the Secretariat is giving only guidance not stating what countries must do. It can't compel governments to allow stake participation. However, it different when looking at project proposals as these are put forward by accredited entities and these must fulfil environment and social safeguarding which are drafted according to international performance standards in the finance sector, one of which is explicit about stakeholder involvement in project development and implementation, as well as who should benefit. The problem is ensuring that accredited entities are capable of fulfilling these standards. Concerning the monitoring and accountability framework, CSOs have important role to play in doing spot checks and serving as third party independent verification agents that can bring issues to the Fund's attention.</i></p>
<p>What steps are being taken to address the lack of monitoring and accountability mechanism?</p>	<p><i>This is a challenge for all multilateral climate funds and funding is not easily accessible to vulnerable communities because of the requirements and overall approaches in climate finance when it comes to mitigation and adaptation. The Fund is trying to shift away from big projects towards smaller better projects. The key is enhanced direct access, support for SMMEs and access modality to allow for the transfer of funds to smaller projects. The Fund works with accredited organisations to make this happen – eg small transfer facilities with participatory governance structure (such as the small grants facility that SANBI is setting up in South Africa); and also provides small-scale commercial grants at low interest and repayment schedules. There needs to be 'passing-on' structures through accredited entities to</i></p>
<p>The GCF is supposed to fund climate actions especially for vulnerable communities but for them to benefit they have to go through the Fund's loan system. It is very difficult for poor and marginalised communities to put together proposals as these have technical requirements and are complex processes and the fear is that they will not be able to meet the requirements.</p>	<p><i>This is a challenge for all multilateral climate funds and funding is not easily accessible to vulnerable communities because of the requirements and overall approaches in climate finance when it comes to mitigation and adaptation. The Fund is trying to shift away from big projects towards smaller better projects. The key is enhanced direct access, support for SMMEs and access modality to allow for the transfer of funds to smaller projects. The Fund works with accredited organisations to make this happen – eg small transfer facilities with participatory governance structure (such as the small grants facility that SANBI is setting up in South Africa); and also provides small-scale commercial grants at low interest and repayment schedules. There needs to be 'passing-on' structures through accredited entities to</i></p>

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
	<i>smaller entities and building community capacity to become executing entities (eg local cooperatives). Interventions like this are needed to make funding accessibility to vulnerable communities possible and the Fund should provide guidelines.</i>

4. CLIMATE JUSTICE AND EQUITY IN THE POST 2015 AGREEMENT

4.1 Equity Reference framework

Balisi Gopolang, African Group Negotiator, Botswana

There is urgent need to close the emission gap but the UNFCCC cannot raise the ambition without tackling the issue of equity. The rationale for the Equity reference Framework (ERF) is that it reconciles science imperatives with national circumstances, in light of the inadequacy of a purely science or national circumstances driven approach for a global agreement. It further operationalises equity by recognising the importance of a perception of fairness for cooperative action, flexibility in legal, architectural, technical application. The ERF brings adaptation to the center of the global climate policy dialogue by recognising that inadequate global mitigation efforts increase adaptation costs and needs; and develops envelopes of fair effort, based on indicators, in order to inform commitments.

Finally, it focusses the differentiation discourse on ambition rather than structure. The ERF comprises three elements: Definition of the required global effort as informed by a temperature goal (how much needs to be done in aggregate terms); definition of a fair effort by Parties (who does what); and an assessment process for adequacy of commitments by Parties relative to their fair effort as well as in aggregate compared to their required aggregate efforts. The architectural options for the ERF are as integral element of the Agreement; an integral optional of the Agreement; a technical process informing the Agreement; or as an external process. There are also equity proposals on the table from the Climate Action Network (CAN) and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN):

CAN PROPOSAL	AGN PROPOSAL
Climate change can only be efficiently tackled if party duties have been decided based on equity	Identified indicators reflective of:
Suggest holding to 2 degrees Celsius through a global emission budget while also supporting a common right to adaptation and sustainable development	✓ Historical responsibility (eg: cumulative for any year or multiple)
They looked at carbon budget, relate to temperature, then temperature concentrations and tonnes	✓ Development needs (human development index, poverty burden and unemployment rate)
Then they looked at allowable tonnes to reach temperature	✓ Current capability (GDP and per capita)
They also looked at basket of indicators	

The INDC process has been a placeholder process to provide assurances amongst Parties to reflect the current political realities. However, in the Agreement, Parties must communicate their post-2020 undertakings in line with their obligations under the Convention. The assessment process agreed to in Lima further presents the current political realities. In building an effective and durable agreement there is space for the integration of an assessment for adequacy and fairness framework in the 2015 Agreement, building on decisions 1/CP.19 and 1/CP.20. The Equity Reference Framework is highly adaptable - on substantive assessment inputs, legal form, and architectural options - and it may thus prove to be an invaluable framework in a highly contested environment with divergent views. There are however open questions such as what would constitute an optimal and minimum contribution per contribution type by Parties in line with their treaty obligations that have a likely chance of approximating the required global effort; how the ERF can interface with the existing institutional architecture of the

Convention without duplication, whilst at the same time bringing coherence to the regime; and whether the application of the ERF could progress from an aggregate assessment (Annex I, Non-Annex I) for 2020-2030 with an option for self-assessment of an agreed framework, and to individual Parties beyond 2030.

4.2 Fair Shares Approach and the Equity Reference Framework

Jaco du Toit, CAN International and WWF

Equity matters because it is a common problem, Parties have different responsibilities and capabilities for responding, it is important for building trust among Parties, and for changing realities – such as developing countries moving up in economic status. Equity should be based on the precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibility and respective capability (CBDR&RC) and the right to sustainable development. Indicators are needed to measure adequacy of effort; responsibility (start date and development threshold); capability relative to development need or poverty gap; development need; and adaptation (and loss and damage) need. In Paris the Parties must agree to a basket of equity indicators, a regular equity and ambition review, global adaptation goal and loss and damage. Once a standardized set of equity indicators is agreed, an Equity Reference Framework is reached. The ERF is designed to form part of a multilateral process that would consider Parties' INDCs with a view to determining the extent to which it conforms to ambition (science) and equity (fairness) benchmarks. The African Group and the Alliance of Small Island States favour more rigorous options. Originally the Africa Group's proposal for an ERF was discussed in broad conceptual terms at Warsaw, albeit within a political frame. The ERF was welcomed by the LDCs, but the Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) resisted the ERF, seeing it as eroding the division of responsibilities laid out in the division of Parties into Annexes.

4.3 INDCs and implications for Africa

Webster Whande, CDKN

It is important to locate the INDCs in the historical context of the Convention (specifically Article 2) and the Kyoto Protocol. The INDCs fall under the 2015 legal agreement which is applicable to all and is legally binding. Developing countries are expected to provide their INDCs as much as developed countries are. Under the ADP, the INDC decision made in Warsaw encouraged Parties to accelerate the preparation of their INDCs. In Lima, Parties decided on INDCs that do not just address mitigation, but can also include adaptation. A number of countries are also including finance, capacity and technology needs in their INDCs. By September 2015, 29 INDCs had been submitted (reflecting 56 countries including a block submission from EU countries). The contributions submitted so far constitute 65% of global emissions and an assessment done by the Climate Action Tracker indicate that the ambition of INDCs vary, with most not in line with a fair contribution to hold warming below the 2 Degrees Celsius, let alone aspire for a 1.5degree target. So far, only Ethiopia and Morocco's INDCs are in line with the 2 degree target.

The outlook is not very positive for the African continent as the reality is higher for Africa. Emissions targets are directly related to the temperature that we will experience and it is important to have higher ambition for reducing emissions in order to meet temperature target. The baseline year used also seems to be arbitrary – it should be 1990 but INDCs are using 2005 as the baseline. There is also a gap between the pledges countries are making and the policies that they are implementing, as this trend is likely to increase over time it is of concern. Another concern is whether it is possible for African countries to develop without polluting technologies and to set low emissions targets taking oil and gas discoveries into account. African countries need support in the form of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building to help them use new clean technologies for development. A possible positive implication is using INDCs as a planning and development tool as many countries are basing their INDCs on their national development plans.

Questions and comments from participants

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
<p>No mention has been made of the Adaptation Fund (AF) – concerned that it is an indication this Fund is dying a natural death. How is it going to be revived, and can it be considered as another channel for climate finance and scaling up climate finance. If this mechanism is going to disappear it reduces access to funding.</p> <p>Scattered nature of funds – different funds – weakens the process as they are all dependent on the same sources of funding and all have problems with economy and world recession. How will the Funds meet commitments they are signing up to now?</p>	<p><i>Adaptation fund funding comes from CDM and cost p/tonne has gone below the Euro so this is problem but is being supplemented by pledges. The Adaption Fund is still there and can be contacted through the relevant National Implementing Entity.</i></p> <p><i>The AF and GCF are creating funding hierarchies which is unfortunate, but where a fund is viable it should be supported.</i></p>
<p>Ethiopia submitted very ambitious INDC (65% reduction target). What are the merits of this submission and risks to Ethiopia. What message does it send to rest of the world</p>	<p><i>Trust building is very important – name and shame big countries to reduce emissions so baseline is shifting. It is important that there is discussion on ERF to ensure countries set targets that are fair and equitable for post 2015. So far INDCs have not shown this so further discussion is needed on the ERF in preparing these INDCs. This will probably be discussed in Paris and form a strong basis for informing the 2015 legal agreement.</i></p>
<p>Because there is no legal framework for INDCs most countries (eg Kenya) are very cautious – emissions reductions advantageous or otherwise based on legality and availability of resources.</p>	<p><i>The benefit to Ethiopia is great - it is not about trying to please the global community but about meeting their own needs and growth and development targets and plans and achieving what is best for the country. Developing countries can draw lessons from this – base INDCs on your own development targets and domestic circumstances. Ethiopia should still be able to access international financial support by taking this approach.</i></p>
<p>Zambia submitted by 31 Aug – also very cautious. Countries below target are developed – only developing countries Ethiopia and Morocco but stricter targets. Has this been conscious ploy of developed countries to set less ambitious targets?</p>	<p><i>Developing countries are understandably concerned that voluntary contributions may be dropped from INDCs in Paris and become mandatory. You need to be able to reduce emissions on your own resources but have a fall-back position to say you have own resources for 40% reduction but need assistance with remaining 20%.</i></p>

5. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT – LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL CSOS

The purpose of this Session was to give an international perspective of what strategies are being used by civil society organisations operating overseas and to facilitate the furthering strengthening of relationships and enhancing understanding of strategic issues within the group.

5.1 CAN International

Emily Hickson

The four main benefits to civil society of engaging at the UNNFMCC are the ability to shape and influence political will; opportunity to gather new intel which can be used to hold Parties accountable and allow civil society to strategize solutions for influencing the proceedings; media attention can be used to place Parties that are not doing what they promised or committed under the spotlight and to highlight related

issues and events (eg natural disasters to make effective climate change point); and it is a beneficial space to network and strategize on issues outside COP. CAN uses several strategies influence the negotiations at the COP, these include:

- Good coordination within the network, willingness by groups to compromise to find a common position and communicate that position;
- Strategy sessions before sessions to find civil society 'red lines' (what not acceptable) which helps form common positions and reactions to the outcome of the negotiation;
- Daily sharing sessions (CAN Daily) to share intel, briefings, plan the strategy for the day and decide on key advocacy tools (Fossil of the Day);
- Fossil awards – identify one country which is blocker = public shaming. Done right at middle of concourse at COP and governments hate it);
- ECO newsletter is produced every day of COP – articles on various work streams and gives intel and arguments that negotiators read every day and is an important advocacy tool;
- Side events;
- Press conferences; and
- Joint interventions with other constituencies.

CAN faces the following challenges at COP negotiations: the lack of accreditation; the expense of geographically and thematically diverse membership; the clamp down on the civil society space and transparency; demonstrations are being held in tight remit; and the fossil industry is invited to attend sessions.

5.2 WEDO

Bridget Burns

WEDO applies similar strategies to CAN but it has a very specific approach, based on the theory of change, which it uses in building women's power and influencing other policy spaces around gender issues. WEDO focuses on finding the global policy spaces in which women's voices and issues need to be addressed or strengthened and then facilitating that space through participation or external pressure depending on which approach will best achieve the objectives. WEDO uses the theory of change in building a comprehensive political narrative to challenge the status quo; understanding what the systems are which hold up an unjust, unequal, and unsafe world for women; listening to the needs, concerns and perspectives of women around the world; collaborating to define women's key challenges; creating spaces for women to speak directly to and influence power; and mobilizing to demand change in policy and practice.

*The **theory of change** methodology is concerned with the "how and why" a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It illustrates the series of assumptions and relationships between inputs, activities and their immediate outputs, intermediate outcomes and intended impacts.*

Movement building is another strategy that WEDO uses. This involves bridging local experience and the political voice on the one hand, and building women's political capacity in technical language movement to directly influence policy on the other hand. Movement building examples include the Women's Major Group (WMG) and the Women and Gender Constituency (WGC).

Other useful strategies include understanding and using the global policy framework, making linkages, developing position papers, introducing champion awards to highlight countries that were championing women, reviewing negotiation texts and drafting alternate texts that reflect gender positions, and building high level support from politicians to give gender mandates to their negotiators. Developing a successful advocacy strategy requires definition of a clear goal, creating clear message, knowing the audience, assigning tasks, creating allies with other CSOs, governments and the staff of organisations you

wish to influence, being in the right place at the right time, using the media to get the message out, a social media strategy, organising events – and not giving up but knowing when to ‘take a break’.

The main challenges that WEDO faces are rhetoric, which represents women as victims and/or agents of change as opposed to upholding language on women’s human rights; and the climate agreement is not ambitious enough to tackle the challenges of today.

Questions and comments from participants

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
Which strategies were more and less effective? OXFAM also use the strategy of letting communities use the negotiation space but it is a very foreign space for them. However, taking community representatives to the negotiations is quite effective @ side events and allows them to interact in that space.	<p>CAN RESPONSE – CAN is a network and has many different members doing different things and building on their different strengths. CAN does not have huge financial resources but it does have regional networks that also apply for funding and capacity building grants to participate. CAN has a leadership fellowship development programme. With regard to incorporating the African perspective CAN accepts that it will have to compromise positions to ensure the network can accommodate all regions. This involves a huge amount of coordination, consensus building and strategizing to ensure there is balance in positions. CAN has clear rules about getting regional perspectives captured. The CAN regions are not ‘one-man-shows’. CAN recognises that PACJA is very important successful in the region and has many overlapping members with them. CAN have tried to cooperate with PACJA on INDCs but agrees there is more that can be done. Inviting the fossil fuel industry to COPs is unjustified because this industry still gets huge subsidies that are not being made availability to renewables and it is not appropriate to invite them when negotiation around climate change. What has really worked has been strong coordination within and between different constituencies such as women and gender, business, farmers; building policy positions eg on long term goal to phase out fossil fuels; lots of consultation within the network and making this available to negotiators; strong campaign on renewables and its co-benefits; having a three-pronged approach – coordination, development of positions and campaigns.</p> <p>WEDO RESPONSE – WEDO is set up a very differently CAN as it not a network but an organisation in own right, so it uses the space that is available to civil society. WEDO focuses on the major spaces and facilitates global positions being made there. The WMG includes 8 organising partners from different regions. The WGC works differently and has focal points in the regions so they are able to mobilise resources for women to attend negotiation sessions and do advocacy work. Their positions have always been led by developing countries positions and issues. WEDO decentralises actions and is working on ensuring there are inputs from the regions to showcase issues and case studies. WEDO us consistently trying to ensure there is a strong balance and strong voice for African women. WEDO applies multiple strategies in getting support from high level decision makers, such as meeting with ministers, using the Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA) partnerships, the Women Delegates Fund (a WEDO programme) and working with national delegations to ensure</p>
CAN uses a wide range of strategies but this may be difficult for African CSOs: what are the enabling factors / mechanism that enables CAN to do what it does – does it have a good and steady source of finance, what is mechanism that allows you to; and how does WEDO manage to get high level support and endorsement from ministers –do you have champions within WEDO that bride this gap?	
Both organisations have African members –to what extent is African interest being highlighted in your groups and do you provide a space for continental voices with different demands/issues to be raised?	
How is the African voice being included at the international level? CAN Ghana is a ‘one-man-show’ with no representatives or networks. In Africa there is PACJA – is CAN working with PACJA to ensure there is one voice coming from Africa? Why is PACJA not your network and link in Africa instead of your regional offices which have become individualised and are not networking in Africa. The PACJA network is strengthening and it has strong links with government which can influence the negotiations. Has this been assessed and considered by CAN and WEDO?	
Why is the invitation of the fossil fuel industry to the negotiations a problem for CSOs?	
Communication strategy: How are you maintaining communication and information dissemination to communities and enabling them to communicate their experiences?	
Given the challenges that CSOs face in reaching out to negotiation they should consider using the trade structures such as	

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
COMESA as this will allow them to reach high level people and also get information from official structures on what positions are being taken	<i>the key messages come through from the high level to mandate the technical negotiators mandated. WEDO focuses on finding the right global policy spaces in which women's voices and issues need to be addressed or strengthened and then facilitating that space. Information dissemination is important and one needs to be strategic about who you disseminate information to and what network is being built in doing so. It is often an issue of capacity and availability of resources. What has really helped is having sustained funds and WEDO has benefitted from this. It is trying to develop tools that connect local level with international level policy making and to support and pool resources. WGC have become strong partners in pooling resources, developing proposal and ensuring information is translated to higher and community levels. What really worked was having a multi-tiered strategy; raising the gender profile by developing strong positions; having people at different platforms (GGCA) and more access to government forums; building strong relationship with the Secretariat Co-chairs and Co-facilitators at UNFCCC. One must to be very strategic when engaging in the international space – doing all together to get some key messages across.</i>
Explain what has really worked in getting an audience to speak at COPs so that we can compare with what African civil society is doing.	

6. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT –AFRICAN CSO EXPERIENCES

Participants were asked to share experiences in respect of the following three questions in small groups:

- *What is the prevailing context within which your organisation is operating?*
- *What advocacy strategies are working - what are the enabling factors that enable success in relation to you organisation's work and what it is trying to achieve?*
- *What are the challenges that your organisation faces?*

Prevailing context

CSO activities related to climate change are quite wide and varied and each organisation approaches the challenge from its own angle and context. The prevailing context within which African CSO's operate includes:

- women and climate justice for all, including the promotion of women-in governance and policy;
- capacity building, gender development, livelihoods, advocacy research;
- research advocacy linked to policy, awareness raising and gender;
- energy;
- agriculture; and
- development communication (taking development concepts and communicating these to communities so that they will understand the concepts and implications of development for them– eg taking complex concept such as ambition gap & explaining this in simple terms).

Strategies that work well on the ground level

Participants acknowledged that there are a wide range of strategies that they use in advocacy. They agreed that there is no panacea approach to climate change advocacy and that organisations should use what offers them the greatest benefit in the most cost effective way. Multiple strategies can also be used simultaneously where possible. The participants identified the following approaches as yielding positive results for them so far in their advocacy efforts on climate change:

- capacity building on policy advocacy at grassroots level, including training communities and stakeholders;
- input into national policy documents such as climate change bills;

- information dissemination - this includes working closely with the media and the use of different technical media such as blogs and packaging messages in user friendly ways;
- building trust, credibility and relationships with government thereby earning their respect, eg some CSOs have got invitations by members of parliament to speak at parliament events and various other forums. Some CSOs also work with local negotiators to influence country positions;
- partnerships in the Africa regions and within the international space;
- clear organisation structure and representation in the decision-making process;
- working with local negotiators to influence country positions (negotiation) and building relationships;
- researching scientific evidence to support messages, eg research on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and impact of coal mining on communities (eg making brickettes for efficient wood stoves); and
- working in a network as a member of an international organisation.

Enabling factors

Participants identified the following as being enabling factors for successful strategies and ensuring an organisations work and objectives are achieved:

- having a clear organisational structure and representation in the decision-making process;
- representation in national legislatures/assembly/senate;
- sufficient support from partners;
- good coordination and enhanced collaboration;
- exploring new mechanisms for working together; and
- better pooling of resources.

Challenges facing CSOs

Participants shared similar experiences concerning the challenges that their organisations face and these mostly revolved around resources, information, capacity and political power. Specific challenges that were identified included:

- Mobilising adequate resources, data, human resources and especially finance, to participate in the negotiation process, and at national level, to cover advocacy work and mobilise messages;
- Knowledge and information gaps and knowledge transfer (information flow between CSO's is a challenge in some cases);
- Messaging and conveying science into simple basic language that can be used at community level;
- Political interference and political power change (when new ministers take office which means civil society have to rebuild relationships);
- High expectations from government, the public and communities;
- Institutional knowledge and retaining institutional knowledge;
- Competition among CSOs to be 'seen';
- Capacity building and project sustainability; and
- Ensuring that women, farmers and youth represented in all meeting and are able to influence policy.

6.1 COP expectations - An ideal COP scenario for Africa

This group exercise focused on the future and participants responded to the following two questions:

- *What does Africa want to see in the ADP (bringing in lessons taken from Day 1 presentations)?*
- *In an ideal scenario, where Africa was to be happy and satisfied about COP negotiations, what would this situation look like?*

What Africa wants to see in the ADP

Building on the lessons taken from the presentations made on Day 1, participants identified the following expectations regarding what Africa wants to see in the ADP:

- separate goals for adaptation, loss and damage and adaptation finance – loss and damage as a standalone chapter;

- a final legally binding agreement which is binding on all Parties;
- keep emissions to 1.5 degree Celsius – on the basis of the common but differentiated responsibility principal emissions should be cut below this target;
- INDCs should be reviewed every 5 years to ensure no backsliding; reflect finance related contributions to adaptation, technology and capacity building; and consider adaptation and not only mitigation;
- transparency and accountability in the process;
- space for CSOs to actively track contributions in and out of the UNFCCC process;
- finance and capacity building support for preparing INDCs;
- finance – clear pathway for the 2020 agreement for public finance, must be new, additional and predictable to implement adaptation and loss and damage;
- differentiation – there should be strong alignment with CBDR;
- support to developing countries for clean development pathway (no carbon markets);
- technology transfer should be affordable and based on the needs of local realities and gender equality;
- one umbrella body should operate all climate change funds;
- 2020 is too far for achieving targets because pollution and emissions will go too high;
- estimate of \$100bn must be up-scaled;
- capacity building as per CBDR;
- all principles in UNFCCC should be considered senior;
- to meet the emissions gap the polluter pays principle should be included in ADP; and
- gender responsiveness should be integrated in all agreements.

Ideal COP scenario

Participants' expectations of the ideal COP scenario which would satisfy African CSOs were:

- CSOs are capable and able to lobby parliaments and major countries that pull back on positions;
- negotiations based on trust among Parties and compliance, and Parties working together;
- accountability mechanism that is operational and works smoothly;
- Clarity on how COP decisions are implemented;
- gender is mainstreamed - Parties will be gender responsive in all texts and not have to be prompted to be gender responsive;
- fairness in terms of the different party/country representatives - equal representation in decision-making between CSOs and country parties - civil society representatives have equal decision making voice and do not just participate as observers;
- increased number of participants in UNFCCC processes (if the UN recognises the important role that civil society plays then the space needs to be opened up) and representation of CSOs in the decision-making of the UNFCCC; and
- flexible and alternative platforms for African CSOs to participate in.

Questions and comments from participants

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
<p>The ADP process is big machine that CSOs need to get their heads around and understand that negotiators have to take into very complex and interrelated issues consideration. Similar themes and key issues keep coming up –common but differentiated responsibility, finance, support and capacity building - and while the approach to pursuing/addressing them may differ there are strong commonalities.</p> <p>African civil society already has a voice as they are participating but it is not being heard, so what can we do to advance these common themes and push more</p>	<p>RESPONSE FROM AFRICAN NEGOTIATOR For the African Group, the basis for all negotiation stems from Article 2 of Convention. CSOs must familiarise themselves with the IPCC reports to inform their thinking, positions and demands on costs and funding that you want. We can't talk of adapting and not develop our continent, and we need energy for development. With the increase of hazards, the cost of mitigation and adaptation has gone up. The African vision for ADP and agreement is to push for:</p> <p>✓ Under UNFCCC – the principles should apply</p>

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS	RESPONSES
to get the outcomes that we as African civil society want to achieve? We have already identified four areas – government collaboration, South-South-North collaboration, gender and capacity and resource availability but need to discuss how we can really push these and unpack how we will do this.	<p>(especially CBDR and ERF) that do not marginalise the African community;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Outcome that provides for parity between mitigation and adaptation; ✓ Operationalise global responsibility for adaptation and surety that funds will flow; ✓ Work stream 2 - raised ambition to push developed countries to do more to close gap before 2020 especially on adaptation and to include this in their INDCs; and ✓ Technology transfer should be included in INDCs.
How realistic is it to ask for legally binding agreement, transparency and accountability mechanism and climate finance for adaptation, increased ambition to close gap etc – is there sense that we may realise these things	Feasible of legally binding agreement –review the process of the adequacy of long term global goals and attainment of those goals (Article2 of UNFCCC).
Geo-politics makes African nations helpless because we depend on Europe and the US for econ support so African negotiators have to align their points and language – water down- so not to displease Europe and USA. Not a free discussion – lot of internal dynamics and trading and politics that influence negotiations.	CSOs must be clear on what they ask for –eg technology transfer/ capacity building – are you sure this is what will improve things and what is it going to cost? Have you thought through all the implications? Reporting and verification – need to take stock of funding that has been provided for adaptation projects. Make sure you can do this and justify need and actual implementation and that you have capacity for implementation
What is the AGN putting on table - are there concrete requirements and will Africa be on the table?	Yes, the AGN group has a strong position and case around capacity building technology and finance and pushing very hard for this but still needs to unlock more support.

6.2 Strengthening the African voice

World Cafe (involving Government representatives, domestic and international CSOs) facilitated by Rubert Van Blerk

The World Café exercise focussed on what needs to be done to strengthen and increase the African voice in the negotiation processes and covered four broad themes: CSO capacity building needs; enhancing government collaboration with CSOs; enhancing South-South-North cooperation; and enhancing gender responsiveness in COP outcomes. The outcome from the group discussions were as follows:

6.2.1 CSO capacity building needs

- **Capacity building for who:** Boards, members, staff, public, champions (in the public, grassroots) CSO networks, and the media;
- **How to build capacity:** Adapt climate change messages to the audience eg. put in own language for communities, use their issues, illustrate how their lives as fisherman, farmers etc. are being affected by climate change;
- **What types of capacity building are required?:** Fundraising mobilisation, by communicating CSO work to donors, partners, to provide opportunity to attend meetings; human resource mobilisation – meaning you train new staff, not get consultants; skills development in campaigning, advocacy, lobbying, media, communication; technical training on policy/policy analysis/research; science understanding; networking (with government); public speaking for local champions and staff; movement building and coordination; and on organising events, marches, protests;

- **Who should provide the capacity building?** In house and external organisations, CSO's provide to supporters and partners, partnering/mentoring, co-funding with another CSO. Get seed funding in grants so you can do your own fundraising. Government is a provider –partner with government on common goals and build a good relationship with government. Government should have policies to allow partnership with CSOs and to allow them to advise government without being threatened with losing funding on losing neutrality or doing the work of state agencies. The policy needs to clarify roles and responsibilities;
- **How to protect capacity building:** Give to organisations rather than to individuals, CSO's lose capacity and those that receive capacity building have a duty to share with organisations, partner, networks. Gain experience from participation, getting advice, replicating meetings at national level rather than always having to go to COP/ UNFCCC. How you communicate your position effectively, takes practice and knowledge of the system; and
- **Capacity building for organisational development:** Procedures, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, accounting and identifying new opportunities.

6.2.2 Enhancing Government collaboration with CSOs

Participants identified the challenges that CSOs face in collaborating with government as follows:

- CSO are not in a position to compete with the government which means they have to tread a fine line when it comes to influencing negotiations;
- CSOs lack adequate capacity in climate change (includes technical capacity and resources to mobilise advocacy initiatives);
- having an enabling environment that is conducive to CSO participation and collaboration with government;
- compliance obligations that governments must uphold which may be at odds with CSO positions and objectives; and
- stakeholders are sometimes wary of collaboration with government (trust issue).

Participants recognised that collaboration with government held certain opportunities for CSOs, such as:

- helping to bridge and augment the capacity gaps/weaknesses in CSOs (as collaboration means CSOs have access to capacity within government);
- being part of the development of government positions which in turn is a way of supporting negotiators in pushing for issues and commitments that are important to African CSOs;
- legitimising the work of the CSO (collaboration with government means the CSO is able to operate in a legal framework that is supported by government);
- raising the profile and competency of CSOs in advocacy and negotiations; and
- providing a channel through which to pass on experience and case studies that support CSO advocacy messages to government.

6.2.3 Enhancing South – South and North – South Cooperation

Participants agreed that a lot must be done to build effective South/South cooperation. A key challenge to enhancing cooperation is that the South is very diverse, characterised by a uniqueness of issues, some of which are particular to Africa. There seemed to be a limited understanding among participants of the value of strengthening South – South cooperation ('don't know; don't care what's happening in other countries') but everyone had experienced the value of 'strength in numbers'. Participants recognised that PAJCA served as an example of South - South cooperation. Other examples included The Group of 77 (G77), Third World Network and CJA. The following issues that could be addressed to enhance South – South cooperation were identified:

- setting up a more formal cooperation on targeted aspects, which could address issues that are of common / shared concern in context of climate change;
- cooperation around resources and technology;
- cooperation around addressing information and research gaps to facilitate knowledge and capacity transfer – examples given included the INDC hand book energy projects (bioenergy); and

- utilising the platforms provided by regional trading blocks such as SADAC , ECOWAS, G77 and SADC to facilitate South – South cooperation.

Participants felt there were many challenges with regard to North - South collaboration, as the North is at a more advanced stage than the South and a lot needs to be done first to transfer knowledge, resources, capacity to developing nations to bring the South to the same level. North – South cooperation could be enhanced though bilateral cooperation and development support (eg GTZ, DFID) and capacity building.




Figure 3 World Cafe discussion groups

6.2.4 Enhancing gender responsive COP outcomes

Participants identified the key challenges to enhancing gender responsive COP outcomes as being:

- the limited representation of women in UNFCCC decision making structures;
- inadequate capacity (particularly with regard to knowledge and technology) among women, men, the youth, children and marginalised groups; and
- no strength in the COPS towards enhancing gender responsiveness.

Opportunities that the participants identified for enhancing gender responsive COP outcomes included:

- operationalising the Lima work program by setting up a framework to enable Parties and partners to carry out regular reporting on gender issues and concerns ;
- the language on gender that has been taken up in the UNFCCC and ADP agreement could be made more responsive to gender concerns; and
- packaging gender issues in simplified language.

6.3 Re-thinking CSO approaches to climate negotiations – formulating strategies

The session started with input from the facilitator on the basic elements of good strategy and planning for change. It is important to frame the right set of questions that can assist in planning strategies within the organisations and in relation to broader climate change debate and process the organisation wants to impact on. Organisations need to clarify their core purpose; define target groups (this is an essential aspect of developing good strategy); set **SMART** goals and objectives; identify other stakeholders, opportunities and threats in the outside world (SWOT); develop a lobbying and advocacy plan; ensure monitoring and evaluation and follow up of actions; and ‘hold the bigger picture’.

Participants met in three groups to formulate strategies and initiatives for managing identified priority issues for the way forward to ensure the outcome CSO’s want to see from ADP and COP 21 and were reminded to refer to the HBS’ findings on African CSO strategies and advocacy approaches and activities at UNFCCC COPs.




Figure 4 African CSO activities at UNFCCC COPs (HBS 2014)

6.3.1 Strategies for enhancing CSO advocacy work

The participants identified several opportunities and strengths which they could leverage to make their advocacy work more effective and strengthen their influence on climate negotiations and decided on the following strategies:

- African civil society must come together with a common agenda and develop a clear set of demands captured in a one page document which should be taken to African negotiators and civil society;
- National CSOs need to engage domestic (national) government as collective unit rather than as individual (better to come together to understand each other issues and interests) and engage on attainable issues (not unrealistic demands);
- National CSO need to enhance their networks and engagement process to avoid duplication and mobilise African civil society to join some of the big marches planned at beginning of COP to show that African cares about climate change and push the message that Paris will deliver something but it is not the end and post Paris action is vital; and
- African civil society demands and the message that post Paris action is vital should be passed on to champions outside the UNFCCC process such as faith leaders, celebrities so they too can drum up support from the grass roots.

6.3.2 Strategies for enhancing CSO influence on COP outcomes

The participants identified three levels of influence, namely the domestic, regional and continental levels and agreed to the following:

- At the domestic level, CSO’s should try and influence their own government and negotiators. Strategies for exerting influence at the domestic level will depend on the relationship that each CSO

- At the regional level a good strategy is to use regional structures such as SADC to influence regional positions on climate change and to ensure there is common position; and
- At the continental level PACJA was identified as one of the effective platforms to put forward the African voice at the international forum.

The participants agreed on a broad strategy for African CSOs to address the coming COP in Paris which covered the following priorities and areas of action between 1 October and 30 November 2015:

- The strategies for immediate action are summarised in the table below and includes timeframes and the lead role player for each of the strategies:

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TIMEFRAME	STRATEGIES	LEAD ROLEPLAYER
	negotiations ✓ Civil society to engage home governments and put across their ideas ✓ Establish contacts and relationships with negotiators	
	✓ Messaging – should be targeted clear and relevant	All African CSOs
	✓ Join targeted initiatives on African voice /push for Negotiations e.g 2015 Africa climate talks. West Africa committee on COP21 “joint French and West Africa CSOS	All African CSOs

7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WINTER SCHOOL CONTENT

Participants identified specific content areas which they would like to explore further. They felt that these areas are important for re-shaping African civil society advocacy strategies at the national level towards achieving enhanced outcomes for Africa at the COPs. The discussion areas included:

- **climate finance** – finance is seen as a major diverging point, the definition of climate finance, the scale and source of finance, limits of financing and shortfall in pledges so far, the lack of clarity with regard to funds flow, the future of the Adaptation Fund, transparency in the Green Climate Fund process, and the uncertainty around the replenishment of Funds in the context of the current economic crisis. Participants identified the need for further discussion around pledges versus actual transfer of money and the gap between these two, and civil society’s role in advocating for adaptation finance;
- **ADP process** – specifically around whose interests are driving the ADP and being represented, the involvement of CSOs in the process, information gaps, the mitigation versus adaptation balance, the debates around whether the new agreement should be legally binding or voluntary, the need to address loss and damage separately, and the influence of geo-politics in shaping negotiations. There too many things in brackets that are not yet resolved and the negotiation are not progressing because there are too many sticking points. Participants felt that there was space to engage as civil society in African – there is something we can do which has been enabled by the information sharing through the presentations and interactions with negotiators.; and
- **INDCs** – in particular what constitutes a fair contribution, shifting the baseline to 1990, the responsibility start date, the risks and opportunities that INDCs present, compliance, the lack of accountability and monitoring mechanisms, and temperature and emission targets that have been set. Participants would like to hear more about the relationship between NAMAs and INDCs.

8. CLOSING REMARKS

Ruth Mitei spoke on behalf of PACJA and expressed appreciation for everyone who had contributed to making the Winter School a success. There had good interactions between participants and shared experiences in group work which allowed everyone to discover how far CSOs have come and what must still be done. CSOs have capacity and space to do this – our grandchildren need healthy environment to grow in and it is up to us to do this. Africa has a very good chair at the negotiations and hope to have another audience with chair before COP. She encouraged all participants to do something to keep the network and discussion going and take action in pushing forward on what had been agreed today. Communicate our message with boldness and stand strong as African civil society. Ruth thanked HBS for partnering with PACJA in presenting the Winter School and wished everyone safe travels home.

Farayi Madziwa thanked all the participants on behalf of the HBS Regional Director for attending and appreciated that it is not always easy to leave work behind. He expressed the hope that information

shared at the Winter School would help drive the African agenda and voice forward and encouraged CSOs and negotiators not give up and get tired, but to persevere and remember there is strength in numbers. He ended by saying that HBS would definitely contact PACJA and continue working with them in taking the immediate strategies forward.



Figure 5 Winter School Participants Group Photo

ANNEXURE 1 ATTENDANCE REGISTER



HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG
SOUTHERN AFRICA

SECOND AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY WINTER SCHOOL ON THE ADP AND WORKSHOP
"RE-STRATEGIZING AND RE-THINKING AFRICAN CLIMATE ACTION"

DEVONVALE GOLF & WINE ESTATE, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
9 - 11 SEPTEMBER 2015

ATTENDANCE REGISTER DAY 1

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	COUNTRY	CONTACT NO.	EMAIL	SIGNATURE
Abebe	Selam Kidane	Ministry of Environment & Forest	Ethiopia	+251 92 174 9314	Selam.k.abebe@gmail.com	
Ajuvakpe	Queensley	Women Environmental Programme (WEP)	Nigeria		ajuvakpe@yahoo.com	
Akambi	Is Deen	ECO BENIN	BENIN	(229) 96 12 66 67	isdeen55@yahoo.fr	
Al-zubaidi	Layla	HBS	South Africa	+27 21 461 6266	Layla.Al-Zubaidi@za.boell.org	
Arega	Yoseph	Ethiopian Network on Climate Change	Ethiopia	(251) 911 303 940	yoseph_arega@yahoo.com	
Awotar	Rajen	Council for Development, Environmental Studies and Conservation (MAUDESCO)	Mauritius	230 73610	maudescosco@intnet.mu	
Bonzi	Jean	Women Environmental Programme (WEP)	Burkina Faso	+226 70 23 49 30	segdaorama@gmail.com	
Burns	Bridget	Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)	USA	+1 212-973-0325	bridget@wedo.org	
Chileshe	Musonda	Zambia Climate Change Network	Zambia	+260 977 226 227	zccn.info@gmail.com	
Coetzee	Ingrid	Rapporteur	South Africa	+27 (0)21 673 3890	ingrid@greencounsel.co.za	
Dakalira	Yamikani	CISONECC	Malawi	+265 881 038 910	yamikani@cepa.org.mw yammie4@gmail.com	

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	COUNTRY	CONTACT NO.	EMAIL	SIGNATURE
Dossou	Krystel	Reseau Climat Developpement (JVE)	Togo		krystod7@yahoo.fr	
Du Toit	Jaco	WWF Africa Programme	SA/CPT	(27) 21 657 6600	jdutoit@wwf.org.za	
Dwumfour	Kwasi Ohene	Network for Promotion of Agriculture and Environmental Studies	Ghana	+233-263 623159	netproaes@hotmail.com	
Gopolang	Balisi	Government	Botswana	267 361 2200/ 364 7909	bgopolang@gmail.com	
Hebel	Hauke	HBS Intern	South Africa	+27 21 461 6266	Hauku.Hebel@za.boell.org	
Henderson	Owen	Facilitator	South Africa	+27 21 701 1336	owen.henderson@bpg.co.za	
Hickson	Emily	Climate Action Network (CAN)	USA	+49 157 3173 5568	rvoorhaar@climatenetwork.org	
Wahande	Webster	CDKN	South Africa	(27) 21 447 0211	webster.wahande@cdkn.org	
Khambule	Happy	Project 90 by 2030	South Africa		happy@90by2030.org.za	
Kibe	Cecilia	Kenya Climate Justice Women Champions	Kenya	(254) 721 814 137	ceciliakibe8@gmail.com	
Kittivo	Michael	Climate Change Network Kenya	Kenya	(254) 720881222	mike.kittivo@catholicchurch.or.ke	
Kunihira	Edith	SWAGEN (Women in Agriculture & Environment)	Uganda	(256) 711 685 332	edithkunihira@yahoo.co.uk	
Luxande	Amanda	HBS	South Africa	+27 21 461 6266	amanda.luxande@za.boell.org	
Madziwa	Farayi	HBS	South Africa	+27 21 461 6266	farayi.madziwa@za.boell.org	
Maguire	Gray	Project 90 by 2030	South Africa	(27) 21 674 5095 or (27) 21 674 5094	gray@90by2030.org.za	

SURNAME	NAME	ORGANISATION	COUNTRY	CONTACT NO.	EMAIL	SIGNATURE
Makombe	Kudzai	IPS Africa	South Africa	+27 11 047 6366	klmakombe@gmail.com	
Maregele	Lerato	Earthlife Africa	South Africa	+27 11 339 3662	makoma@earthlife.org.za	
Mhene	Noktula	Oxfam GB	South Africa	+27 11 2232440	nmhene@oxfam.org.uk	
Mitei	Ruth	Care - Adaptation Learning Centre	Kenya	(254) 722 443 739	rmitel@careclimatechange.org	
Mpalanyi	Julius	ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT FOR LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENT (EMLI)	Uganda	(256) 779487700	mpajulius@gmail.com	
Mwangala	George	African Youth Initiative on Climate Change	Kenya	(254) 726646371	mugageo@gmail.com	
Mwenda	Mithika	PACJA Secretariat	Kenya	+254-20-8075808	mithika@pacja.org	
Seburikoko	Liberal	GCF			lseburikoko@gcfcfund.org	
Senato	Asrat Yirgu	WWF Africa Programme	Kenya	(254) 20 2124744	asratyirgu@gmail.com	
Sonny	Tracy	Botswana Climate Change Network	Botswana	(267) 7213 0141	tsonny25@gmail.com	
Taal	Amadou	Worldview	Gambia	(220) 992 1441	taalaso46@yahoo.com	
Tesfai	Azeb Girmai	LDC Watch	Ethiopia	(251) 911 228 506	azebgnat@gmail.com	
Wabwoto	Edward	Government	Kenya	(254) 724 403 514	ekaroph@gmail.com	
Yussif	Nafisatu	GACCESS/Abantu for Development	Ghana	(233) 243 603 640	yussifn@yahoo.com	

ANNEXURE 2 **WELCOME ADDRESS, MITHIKA MWENDA (PACJA)**

OPENING REMARKS BY MITHIKA MWENDA, SECRETARY GENERAL, PAN AFRICAN CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE DURING THE AFRICAN CSO WINTER SCHOOL ON THE ADP, 9 - 11 SEPTEMBER 2015, DEVONVALE GOLF & WINE ESTATE, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA - "RE-STRATEGIZING AND RE-THINKING AFRICAN CLIMATE ACTION"

Ms Layla Al-Zubaidi, Regional Director, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southern Africa, facilitators and resource persons, participants, Ladies and Gentlemen;

May I start first by apologizing to you all most profusely for missing this very important session of the second Winter School, which, once again, we are hosting with the Heinrich Böll Foundation – Southern Africa. I had till Monday planned to be present but due to circumstances beyond my control, I will miss an opportunity to physically interact with colleagues and allies in antiquity. But in spirit we are together, and will be following development keenly from Nairobi – and of course, the new technology will help to register my virtual presence throughout the workshop.

This Winter School is part of the convergences to continue conversation about one of the biggest challenges of our time – climate change. Though we come from different countries and cultures, we share a common history and a common destiny as Africans. To paraphrase John F. Kennedy, one of the most cherished sons of America and the world, *"Our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air...We all cherish our children's future....And we are all mortal."*... Today, we are confronted with a common challenge – one that calls for great humility, courage and leadership. Climate change threatens the well-being of all people and the Earth. Across the continent, millions suffer in silence as crops fail, wells dry up and the deserts advance relentlessly on our villages and towns.

The world's leading scientists tell us that by 2020, the year the UNFCCC Parties will start implementing the Paris Agreement, up to 250 million Africans could be exposed to increased water stress, and yields from rain-fed agriculture could drop by up to 50%. Climate change undermines our farms, threatens our water supplies, and risks unprecedented human conflict. Just as we seek to break the chains of poverty, we are shackled with new burdens.

The burdens of climate change are not of our making. With little more than 15% of the world's population, the 54 countries of Africa together contribute less than 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. The countries, communities and people of Africa have done least to cause climate change, yet are among its worst victims.

May I take this opportunity to thank the HBS for partnering with us to host this remarkable workshop. It is our desire as a coalition that such partnerships continue to build into existing processes that seek to enhance the capacity of African civil society to participate in climate change dialogue processes both at national and international levels.

In the next three days we will learn, share experiences on what each of us is doing to ramp up ambition for Paris, and more importantly update ourselves on the progress we are making in consolidating our efforts with a view of ensuring Paris delivers a climate change agreement that is responsive to African realities and aspirations, and that is fair, equitable and ecologically just.

Obviously we are sceptical, and remain disillusioned by inaction of industrialized countries to curb the growing emissions at domestic level and delivering adequate finance to poor countries to build resilience, and we are upbeat that the momentum building towards Paris will translate into tangible outcome capable of returning trust on the UNFCCC process.

May I end by you wishing best of successes in your deliberations... Thank you

ANNEXURE 3 WINTER SCHOOL PROGRAMME

Wednesday 9 September 2015	
Session	Presenter
Recap of first ADP Winter School	Amanda Luxande, HBS
Objectives and Expectations	Facilitator
ADP Status Quo	Webster Whande, CDKN
The ADP – Perspectives on the road to Paris	
Panel discussion (10 minute presentations): 1. African negotiators perspectives on the ADP (Edward Wabwoto, African Group Negotiator, Kenya) 2. The African Narrative - African CSO analysis and expectations: Update (Mithika Mwenda, PACJA) 3. Global CSO perspective- ADP analysis and expectations (Jaco du Doit, CAN International) 4. Engendering the ADP (Bridget Burns, WEDO)	Moderated by: Webster Whande
Q & A- Plenary Discussion	ALL
Finance and the post 2015 Agreement	
Civil Society Perspectives - Finance: Update	Azeb Girmai Tesfai, LDC Watch
GCF status update, how it relates to a successful ADP and what operationalisation means for CSOs	Liane Schalatek, HBS (North America)
Q & A – Plenary Session	ALL
Climate Justice and Equity in the post 2015 Agreement	
Fair Shares Approach and the Equity Reference Framework	Balisi Gopolang, African Group Negotiator, Botswana Jaco du Doit, CAN International
INDCs and implications for Africa	Webster Whande
Q & A – Plenary Discussion	
HBS Publication Cocktail Launch: <i>20 years of African CSO involvement in Climate Change Negotiations: Priorities, Strategies and Actions</i> , Farai Madziwa, Climate Governance in Africa Programme Manager, HBS	
Thursday 10 September 2015	
Session	Presenter
Day 1 recap and outlook for Day 2	Rubert von Blerk, Facilitator
Strategy Development Lessons for International and African CSO's	
CAN International	Emily Hickson
WEDO	Bridget Burns
CSO experiences - Plenary presentation and discussion	ALL
Basic Elements of an Effective Strategy	Rubert von Blerk, Facilitator
COP expectations	
An ideal COP scenario for Africa Group discussion (3 groups) Group feedback and plenary	ALL
Strengthening the African voice	
World Café (Government representatives, domestic and international CSO's) 1. CSO capacity building needs 2. Enhancing Government collaboration with CSO's 3. Enhancing South- South and North- South Cooperation 4. Enhancing gender sensitive COP outcomes	Rubert von Blerk, Facilitator

Friday 11 September 2015	
Session	Presenter
Day 2 recap and outlook for Day 3	Rubert von Blerk, Facilitator
Re-thinking CSO approaches to climate negotiations	
Formulating strategies and initiatives to manage identified strategic issues (Group Activity)	ALL
Plenary Feedback and Discussion	
Conclusion	Rubert von Blerk, Facilitator
Closing remarks	Farayi Madziwa, HBS